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Congress and American normal-bilateral foreign policy: The making of U.S. China policy during the 1980s

Zhu, Hongqian, Ph.D.

The University of Michigan, 1991

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**CONGRESS AND AMERICAN NORMAL-BILATERAL FOREIGN POLICY:
THE MAKING OF U.S. CHINA POLICY DURING THE 1980S**

by

Hongqian Zhu

**A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Political Science)
in The University of Michigan
1991**

Doctoral Committee:

**Professor John W. Kingdon, Co-Chair
Professor Michel Oksenberg, Co-Chair
Assistant Professor Richard Hall
Professor Bradford Perkins**

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**To My Wife
Xian Gei Jihong**

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H.Z.

September 1991

PREFACE

How and why will congressional opposition arise in a normal period of a bilateral relationship between the United States and another country? How will such an opposition influence the making of U.S. normal-bilateral foreign policy? These are the questions this dissertation sets out to answer.

Existing theories on the United States Congress's role in foreign policy focus on the power-sharing and multilateral policy-making dimensions. They are inadequate to explain legislative behavior in the making of U.S. bilateral foreign policy.

Applying concepts in the area of legislative decision-making, this study offers a theoretical interpretation of the following phenomenon in the making of U.S. bilateral policy: As the relationship between the United States and another country develops into a normal period, Congress tends to become increasingly critical of the foreign country's domestic and foreign policies and restrictive on U.S. policies toward that country. The study explores how and why coalitions of such congressional opposition are formed and how they influence U.S. bilateral foreign policy.

The study focuses on the making of U.S. China policy during the normal period (1982-1988) of the American relations with China. Employing both quantitative methods (content analysis of the *Congressional Record* and analysis of roll-call votes) and case studies (U.S.-China nuclear agreement, Chinese textiles exports to the United States and Chinese family planning policy) with extensive interviews and documentation, this study argues that in a normal-bilateral relationship between the United States and another country, congressional opposition will arise as lawmakers' attitudes toward that particular country become diversified,

which is caused by changes in both the external and internal environments to which the lawmakers are exposed. This diversification of attitudes leads to the emergence of various issue-focused coalitions of congressional opposition to U.S. policies toward that country. Such coalitions are formed around three types of issues--external/strategic, electoral/economic and emotive/moral--each meeting a particular type of lawmakers' personal goals and inducing an inward, outward or mixed orientation of congressional interest. These different types of issues produce different intensities, functional roles, policy effects and levels of influence of those coalitions.

This study supports a pluralistic perspective on the legislative decision-making process and advances a theory that can be used to explain Congress's role in the making of U.S. normal-bilateral policies toward other countries.

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...there is always an element of uncertainty in dealing with the US administration in the field of foreign policy. One is never absolutely sure what Congress might or might not choose to do, and perhaps more important, one is never absolutely sure of the extent to which Administration policy is geared to warding off possible congressional trouble.

--A foreign ambassador to the United States

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The ambassador's words keenly reflect the frustration as well as the puzzlement of many foreign governments over the role of the U.S. Congress in foreign affairs. Therefore, they are quoted here as the starting point for my research on the congressional behavior in the making of U.S. China policy during the 1980s.

After more than two decades of hostility, the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) finally restored their diplomatic relations on 1 January 1979. From then to 4 June 1989, the bilateral relationship developed rather rapidly, especially after 1982 when the political and economic ties were fully established and both sides reached a further understanding on the Taiwan issue through a joint communique limiting U.S. arms sales to the island. During most of the 1980s, the two countries enjoyed a basically normal, friendly, and expanding bilateral relationship. In the same period, however, the U.S. Congress became increasingly active and restrictive on American China policy. With the lingering concern over the future of Taiwan, many members of Congress also became more and more involved in other controversial issues that had occurred in the development of the bilateral relationship. Many urged the U.S. government to impose increasingly restrictive quotas on Chinese textile imports; and their efforts culminated in the textile bill of 1985 to limit Chinese and other foreign textiles through legislation. In the same year, Congress passed the Kemp Amendment prohibiting the United States government from providing aid to the United Nations Fund for

Population Activities (UNFPA) because of its reported involvement in China's family planning programs which the sponsors of the amendment had found coercive. Later that year, Congress nearly put in jeopardy the U.S.-China nuclear cooperation agreement that had taken four years to negotiate, when the opponents attempted to place on it strict conditions unacceptable to the Chinese government. The year of 1987 saw a substantial surge of congressional interest in the Tibet issue, passing resolutions condemning the Chinese government's human rights violations in that region. In the meantime, many lawmakers frequently criticized the Chinese government on other human rights issues.

How can we look at this congressional behavior that seemed to run counter to the growing relations between the two countries? What was the nature of this congressional opposition? Did there exist a single, commonly-called "anti-Chinese" coalition in the U.S. Congress during this period of the U.S.-Chinese relationship? Or were there various kinds of coalitions advocating different, other than anti-Chinese, objectives? Why did the congressional opposition arise during a normal and generally friendly period of the bilateral relationship? And what were the consequences of this congressional opposition for U.S. China policy and Sino-American relations? This phenomenon also leads us to more general and theoretical inquiries: Why does congressional opposition arise in the normal period of a bilateral relationship? What is the nature and influence of this congressional opposition in the formulation of *U.S. normal-bilateral foreign policies*? This dissertation sets out to answer these questions, with a focus on the behavior of the congressional opposition in the making of U.S. China policy during the normal period of the Sino-U.S. relationship.

In the pages that follow, I will argue that congressional opposition to China policy was bound to arise during the normal period of the bilateral relationship. While the opposition might sound anti-Chinese in its rhetoric, this was not its cause. Instead, this opposition was issue-oriented, being determined by the types of issues that arose from the normalized bilateral relationship. Different issues tended to produce different coalitions of congressional

opposition; and the policy influences of these coalitions tended to vary significantly. Congressional opposition increased as bilateral issues became more and more mingled with American domestic politics and related to issue areas that would induce strong congressional interests. The negative impact on the bilateral relationship caused by the opposition was therefore not the result of anti-Chinese sentiment, but actually the byproduct of the political battles being fought for quite different causes. I conclude that the occurrence and variance of congressional opposition are typical in a normal period of a bilateral relationship, due to the lack of a predominant congressional attitude toward the particular country during a period of normal relations. This study of the congressional opposition in the making of U.S. policy toward China during such a normal period will also cast light on the kind of congressional opposition that occurred during the "nonnormal" period that followed the June-4 event in which the Chinese government ordered its army to crack down on the student-led demonstrations in Tiananmen Square.

The Theoretical Gap in the Existing Studies

In the general literature, Congress's role in foreign policy has always been linked to the old issue of legislative powers vis-a-vis the executive's in the conduct of American foreign relations. Over the years, three major theories have emerged to explain the different roles of the president and Congress. Each of them offers a very limited theoretical guidance on the role of congressional opposition in normal-bilateral foreign policies.

The two-presidencies thesis, a model of presidential dominance in foreign policy, argues that although the president is much constrained in his domestic policies because of strong political opposition, he has virtually a free hand in conducting foreign relations (Wildavsky 1966; Graebner 1983). In the latter area the president is vastly more "presidential" (Cronin 1980, 147). He prevails because he has superior resources (e.g., information, expertise, hierarchical organization) and his potential opponents are weak, divided, or believe that they

should not control foreign policy (Wildavsky 1966). On the other hand, Congress plays a secondary role in the *initiator-respondent* pattern of executive-congressional interactions (Kegley and Wittkopf 1982). This reactive role results from its inferior information structure, which is incompatible with modern foreign policy making (Robinson 1967, 14-15, 213). However, a major problem with the two-presidencies theory is that it tends to exaggerate the differences between foreign and domestic policies by overestimating the presidential power vis-a-vis the congressional role in foreign policy (LeLoup and Shull 1979; Sigelman 1979; Edwards 1986). To its credit, the theory does inform us of some general advantages the president enjoys in the conduct of U.S. foreign relations, but this is not enough to explain why Congress behaved the way it did on China policy during the 1980s.

While the two-presidencies model emphasizes the president's advantages in a distinctive institutional approach, the so-called "intermestic" perspective looks into the president's difficulty in controlling foreign policy making by emphasizing the salience of issues. The term refers to a mixture of inter(national) and (do)mestic issues, suggested first by Bayless Manning (1977). It points to the linkage between foreign policy and domestic politics. Issues like foreign economic and trade policies, ethnic concerns related to foreign countries, environment, ecology and transportation have both foreign and domestic implications. The more a foreign policy issue is related to domestic concerns, the more difficult it will be for the president to make decisions (Peppers 1975; Spanier and Noguee 1981; Terchek 1983). Some students even claim that foreign and domestic policies have become thoroughly intertwined in the American setting. Not only does foreign and defense policy have abundant domestic sources, but in many ways the nature of foreign and defense issues is not fundamentally different from that of domestic policies (Rosenau 1967; Hughes 1978; Ripley 1985).¹ Thus,

¹This perspective has also attracted some "converts" from the two-presidencies school. For example, Aaron Wildavsky, the pioneer of the two-presidencies theory reassessed his previous claim in a co-authored article, suggesting that the two presidencies "exaggerated the degree of presidential control over American foreign policy" and that "foreign policy has become more like domestic policy" (Oldfield and Wildavsky 1989, 59).

congressional influence increases when a foreign policy issue involves domestic consideration. According to Ripley and others, the only area in which the president clearly dominates is crisis policy. But on other issues there usually exists a "sustained institutional tension" between the president and Congress (Ripley and Franklin 1984, 203-236; Ripley 1985, 63-84).

The intermestic perspective offers us some important insights into the congressional role in foreign policy. It gives us a strong notion of complexity in foreign policy making. In particular, it reminds us that issues can make a difference in terms of congressional influence. According to the thesis, then, the increase of congressional influence on U.S. China policy during the 1980s was the result of the rise of those bilateral issues that had close ties with domestic politics. It thus makes us consider the types of issues in which the congressional opposition was involved. But one of the problems with the intermestic perspective is that it has not become a well-integrated model. There exists some confusion over what types of issues should be considered intermestic. Some believe that strategic and security issues, unlike economic and other issues, are still under the president's control (Peppers 1975; Spanier and Uslaner 1978; Terchek 1983), while others do not see much difference between the two sets of issues (Berkowitz, Bock and Fuccillo 1977; Ripley and Franklin 1984). Moreover, it is entirely possible that congressional influence on a particular intermestic issue may change over time. But the theory does not provide an answer to the question of under what circumstances congressional influence on the issue may change.

At the end of the 1970s, there emerged a different theory with a distinct historical perspective. Stressing the dynamic roles of the president and Congress in foreign policy, the pendulum theory argues that there are cycles of presidential and congressional predominance in foreign policy; an epic event and individual personalities are among the determining forces of the power swinging between the two branches (Wilcox 1971; Lehman 1974; Frank and Weisband 1979; Abshire 1981). This theory has been frequently applied to the interpretation of the congressional assertiveness in foreign affairs during the 1970s. Such assertiveness has

been described as "congressional revolution" (Frank and Weisband 1979), "congressional codetermination" (Crabb and Holt 1980; Nathan and Oliver 1983), and "neocongressional government" (Abshire 1981). These terms imply that Congress had entered a period of predominance in American foreign policy making.² The pendulum in the foreign policy arena has also paralleled the rise and fall of congressional power in domestic policies (Sundquist 1981). When one branch's appropriation of power at the expense of the other reaches an excessive point, the other branch will take action and reassert itself. The cycles are seen as continuous and endless.

The major advantage of the pendulum over other theories is the notion that congressional influence in foreign policy can change over time, sometimes being weak, and sometimes strong or even predominant. It also helps us look into the competitive and conflicting nature of interbranch relations--the constitutional base characterized by separate institutions sharing powers (Neustadt 1960). But the theory has a strong element of simplicity. It seems to be too mechanical, overlooking countervailing movement within each tendency. In addition, it may lead to an overestimation of congressional influence or an underestimation of presidential power in foreign policy during a particular period (Rourke 1983). Moreover, it tends to portray the making of foreign policy as a zero-sum game between the executive and legislative branches--a more active Congress must operate at the expense of the presidential power. However, it is possible that as foreign policy involves more and more complex issues Congress may regain some of its lost power without actually weakening the presidency (Baker 1984).

In sum, these three theories contain both positive and negative aspects. But none of them can be considered adequate to explain the role of congressional opposition in U.S. normal-bilateral policy. One major flaw in the current studies of congressional influence in

²It has also been argued that the pendulum is swinging back again to the presidential power during the 1980s in view of the Reagan administration's Central America policy (see, for example, Rubner 1985-86; Sharpe 1987).

foreign policy is the failure to acknowledge that there are a number of different foreign policy making dimensions. A large volume of the literature that has generated the two-presidencies and pendulum theories has actually focused on the balance (and imbalance) of the presidential and congressional powers in the general conduct of American foreign policy (e.g., war and treaty-making powers, executive agreements, intelligence operations, information sharing, international crisis), which has often become a major source of interbranch rivalries since the Vietnam War (Henkin, 1978). Therefore, such foreign policy making, being related to the distribution of authority between the two branches, frequently falls into the *power-sharing* dimension. At the same time, studies with the intermestic perspective have tended to be concerned with the *multilateral* dimension of foreign policy making--policies related to global or regional political, economic, trade, financial, and security issues that deal with a group of foreign countries rather than a specific country (such as negotiations on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, nuclear nonproliferation, human rights, population control). These issues, which are closely linked to various domestic groups, do not necessarily produce the kind of interbranch conflicts as the issues in the power-sharing dimension would. By contrast, these theories have generated few systematic studies on the congressional role in the *bilateral* dimension of foreign policy making--policies related to individual countries.

The result of the failure to distinguish these three different dimensions of foreign policy making is that generalizations from studies in one dimension are not necessarily applicable to cases in the others. The president and members of Congress can behave very differently in each of the three dimensions. Theories developed from foreign policy studies in the power-sharing dimension are very inadequate for or even irrelevant to the exploration of the congressional role in the making of multilateral or bilateral policies. The two-presidencies theory, for example, is insufficient to explain the making of U.S. China policy: On several important occasions, the president was anything but predominant and members of Congress forcefully exerted their influence (Oksenberg 1986). U.S. lawmakers also have played a strong

role in such policy areas as Soviet-American trade (Stern 1979; Bertsch 1985) and the Middle East policy (Saunders 1986). According to the pendulum theory, congressional acquiescence in foreign policy in the 1950s and 60s was replaced by the congressional assertiveness in the 1970s. Such a theory can not satisfactorily explain the reactive congressional behavior on U.S. policy toward China (or many other individual countries) in the 1970s. It certainly could not explain why members of Congress became more active and assertive on China policy in much of the 1980s. Conclusions drawn from the studies in the multilateral dimension of foreign policy making are similarly inadequate to explain the making of bilateral foreign policies.

Another flaw in the existing studies, which is also related to the failure to differentiate the three dimensions of foreign policy making, is the tendency to treat Congress as a single institutional entity vis-a-vis the presidency. Most of them do not show the kind of sophistication that has often characterized the studies of Congress in the area of domestic policies. After all, the Congress is made up of 535 individual political power centers. While institutional politics (the President vs. Congress) may occur in the power-sharing dimension, dynamic coalitional politics is frequently the case in the multilateral and bilateral dimensions in which various alliances of opponents and supporters can be formed across both institutional and partisan boundaries.

Thus, despite an impressive literature that has produced three basic theories, we actually know very little about the congressional influence on bilateral foreign policies. While the general literature has largely neglected this dimension of foreign policy making, what have we learned from the research on the formulation of America's China policy?

Over the years, a number of scholars have created a small, scattered but growing volume of literature on American China policy. Most of them have emphasized the important role Congress and other domestic elements have played in the China policy making process. Koen, for example, began his book with the claim that "United States policy toward China is more deeply involved in domestic politics than any other aspect of American foreign affairs"

(1960, vii). Koen pioneered the study of the "China Lobby," being followed by Bachrack's intensive research on the "Committee of One Million" (1976). These studies showed that the China Lobby, through its influence in Congress, had a profound impact on the making of the post-war American China policy. More recent works have also drawn lessons from the congressional role in the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) in 1979. To Crabb, the TRA has provided "convincing evidence of Congress's determination to exert its prerogatives and exert a forceful influence in foreign affairs," and served as "a model of what Congress sought generally in the formulation and administration of American foreign affairs" (1985, 96-97). Meanwhile, Pious contends that the TRA is a case in which the United States government actually makes two different foreign commitments: One is made by the president, the other by the Congress (1985, 155-161). But both failed to note that in the TRA case the Congress played a mainly reactive role in response to a presidential initiative. In a historical perspective, Oksenberg argues that in several other instances as well as in the TRA, Congress played the pivotal role: the exclusion of Chinese immigrants in the 1880s, the Silver Purchase Act of 1934, and Senator Joseph McCarthy's attack on many American China specialists (1986, 209-219). Meanwhile, Sutter shows that divisions of opinion among policy making elites over Taiwan policy, U.S.-Soviet-PRC relations, U.S.-PRC economic relations, and the management of American China policy have enhanced the congressional influence upon the policy making process on these issues (Sutter, 1983).

While most studies tend to emphasize the congressional influence on China policy, Tucker's research (1983) suggests an element of caution: Congress's role may be selective and limited. Her inquiry into the Truman administration's China policy during the crucial period of January 1949 to June 1950 found that widespread lack of interest in China and the confusion of continual civil war in China had minimized congressional influence and left the White House and State Department in almost complete control of Chinese affairs.

Clearly, these studies have considerably enhanced our knowledge of the congressional

role in the making of U.S. China policy during the *nonnormal* period of Sino-U.S. relations. However, they were not systematic studies and offered few theoretical generalizations for the making of U.S. bilateral foreign policies. Most of them also treated Congress as a single, policy-making institution. There has been little discussion on the congressional attitudes toward China, how changes in the attitudes would affect congressmen's behavior on China policy, and the relationship between the nature of Sino-American relations and the role of congressional opposition. What is also missing in this literature is the Chinese government's influence on members of Congress during the decision-making process. Finally, with the exceptions of the TRA (Koenig, Hsiung, and Chang 1985; Junn 1985) and Sutter's study in the early 1980s, all these studies have focused on the years before the normalization of relations between the two countries. The absence of studies on the 1980s--a period of normal relations between the United States and China--explains the lack of theoretical implications from the work on U.S. China policy to the congressional role in normal-bilateral foreign policies in general.

By focusing on the behavior of the congressional opposition in the making of U.S. China policy during the normal period of the bilateral relationship, this dissertation is part of the effort to shorten the theoretical gap in the studies of congressional role in foreign policy. It also seeks to contribute to the literature on Sino-U.S. relations in general, and Congress's influence on China policy in particular.

The Approach of the Study

Before presenting my theoretical arguments, I will first define the terms that will be used in the dissertation. These terms indicate the quite different approach of my thesis from the existing studies on the congressional role in foreign policy.

Unit of Analysis: Congressional Opposition As noted earlier, this dissertation concentrates on the role of congressional opposition in the making of U.S. China policy. The

term "congressional opposition" here is not the one that has been frequently used in the study of the presidential-congressional relations, where the president faces an opposition in Congress in the making of U.S. foreign policy. Instead, it is defined as *a coalition formed by members of Congress, who either oppose a particular policy explicitly favoring a foreign state and/or the development of United States relations with that state, or initiate a particular policy not favoring a foreign state and/or the development of U.S. relations with that state.* According to this definition, the congressional opposition can be in conflict with the president on some policy issues, particularly in the first instance in which it tends to respond to a presidential initiative, but it may also find itself in a coalitional relationship with the president on some other issues due to a congruence of views between the two.

This definition has three major implications. (1) It stresses the main theme of the dissertation: Why does the congressional opposition arise in the normal period of a bilateral relationship? What is the nature of this congressional opposition in the making of U.S. normal-bilateral policies? And how does it exert its influence on a policy issue? (2) It treats presidential-congressional relations not as the focus of the study, but rather as just one important element that influences the behavior of the congressional opposition in the making of normal-bilateral policies. (3) The use of the term "congressional opposition" avoids the tendency, common in the existing studies, to treat Congress as a single entity. Instead, it recognizes that Congress is made up of coalitions and that members of Congress may form coalitions either along or across partisan, ideological and/or regional lines on a given foreign policy issue. Thus, congressional opposition also implies the existence of a "counter-opposition" that supports or advocates a policy favoring a foreign state (e.g., China) and/or the development of U.S. bilateral relations with that state (e.g., Sino-U.S. relations). Since my focus is on the congressional opposition, I will also treat the counter-opposition as one of the forces that try to limit the influence of the congressional opposition in the policy process.

Congress-Centered Policy Process The congressional opposition exists and operates

in a policy process in which it can exert its influence on a policy issue. The term *foreign policy process*, as defined by Crabb and Holt, denotes

a complex and often time-consuming series of steps by which officials in the executive and legislative branches formulate external goals or objectives and decide upon the most appropriate means for reaching them (1989, 6).

This definition, however, does not address the question of where the center of the foreign policy process is located, an issue which the existing studies leave unsettled. There has been enough evidence for some observers to conclude that "scholars are often partisans of the institutions they study" (Rockman 1984, 388). Many students of American foreign policy have frequently regarded the policy process as *presidency-centered*, to use the term suggested by Mark Peterson (1985, 1). The president is the chief foreign policymaker and Congress is only one of the forces that influence presidential policy making. Such an orientation often reflects the analyst's normative bias: The presidency, not Congress, should predominate in the making of the nation's foreign policies.

This bias is likely to influence both the research and conclusions in a study of the congressional role in foreign policy. Therefore, the term "policy center" needs to be defined in a more impartial way. Simply put, *a policy center is the focus of attention and activities in a policy-making process involving a particular policy issue*. Some policy processes are clearly presidency-centered, while others require an orderly combination of the president and Congress.³ As Koenig suggested, American foreign policy making is operated on a "two-track system" (1985, 5-12). The first track consists of a set of powers and practices in whose use

³This is somewhat similar to the point raised by Peterson in his dissertation, which views "the presidency and the Congress as *tandem institutions* constituting the major components of the American national legislative *decision-making system*." (1985, 4) But as will be noted later, I differ with Peterson on two major points. First, while Peterson eliminates the term "center" entirely in his notion of the legislative process in which both the president and Congress must act as a partnership in a strict legal sense, I suggest that there are two centers in a policy-making process that involves both the president and the Congress. Second, by adopting the term "tandem" Peterson in fact raises the familiar president-initiating/Congress-responding pattern (Ibid., 5). Instead I suggest that sometimes the Congress may sit at the "front" of the process when it initiates policy proposals and forces the president to respond.

the president enjoys almost full autonomy. They include secret negotiations with foreign nations, diplomatic recognitions, and dispatches of armed forces in crisis situations as defined by the president. Here the policy center is clearly located in the presidency and foreign policy establishment of the executive branch. By definition, Congress remains one of the forces outside the center that try to influence the presidential policy making.

The second track, again in Koenig's terms, is characterized by substantially different and formal interactions between the executive and legislative branches. These interactions include such executive-initiated issues as treaties, presidential appointments to principal administrative and diplomatic posts, and foreign policy actions that *must* require appropriations or other congressional authorizations. On these issues, the policy center is first located in the executive branch, then moves to the legislative arena as the president submits his policy proposals to the Congress, and finally comes back to the executive arena as he decides whether to sign what the Congress has acted upon. For those interactions that involve *congressionally-initiated* policy proposals, the policy center is clearly first located in the legislative arena, and then moves to the executive branch as the president takes action on the congressional initiatives. When the Congress functions as the policy center, the executive branch becomes one of the forces outside the center that try to influence the legislative process. My study of congressional opposition in the making of U.S. China policy thus focuses on this Congress-centered policy process in which a coalition of congressional opposition takes legislative actions in either responding to the presidential initiatives or initiating foreign policy proposals itself.

Major Forces in the Congress-Centered Process As the three theories discussed earlier in this chapter imply, there are differences and similarities between foreign and domestic policies in terms of policy-making process. Foreign policies are different from domestic ones because they are part of international politics and concerned with the United States' relations with foreign nations and international organizations. They are similar to domestic policies when

they involve certain domestic interests (Terchek 1983). In the case of bilateral foreign policies, each particular foreign government will likely be involved in the American policy-making process when it directly affects their interests. In the meantime, certain U.S. domestic groups will also try to influence the policy process if their interests are affected. However, students of American foreign policy tend to focus on either presidential-congressional relations or the influence of domestic interest groups in foreign policy while largely neglecting the issue of how the behavior of a foreign government would actually affect the making of U.S. policy toward that particular country. Yet this is one important element that helps distinguish the bilateral dimension of foreign policy making from the multilateral and power-sharing ones. As a result, while we know that a foreign government can exercise its influence through its strong ethnic or ideological groups in the United States (e.g., Israel and its pro-Israel lobby, the Nationalist government in Taiwan and China Lobby)⁴, we still have very little knowledge of how a foreign government can exert its impact on the policy process without such strong ethnic or ideological groups.

This dissertation will consider four important forces that interact with the congressional opposition in this Congress-centered policy process. One of these forces consists of those members inside Congress who would support a particular policy favoring China and/or the development of Sino-U.S. relations and thus form a counter-coalition against the congressional opposition. The other three forces consist of the president and his administration, the foreign government concerned (China), and domestic interest groups. These will be considered the outside forces that try to influence the Congress-centered policy process; and the actions taken by each of these forces would affect the behavior and influence of the congressional opposition. In other words, the influence of the congressional opposition on a bilateral foreign

⁴For very good discussions on the influence of the ethnic groups on U.S. foreign policy, see Paula Stern, *Water's Edge: Domestic Politics and the Making of American Foreign Policy* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979) and Abdul Aziz Said, ed., *Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy* (N.Y.: Praeger, 1981).

policy cannot be understood properly without looking at the behavior of these outside forces. While the foreign government will be treated here as a simplified "unitary" actor capable of making coherent foreign policy responses, each of the other three groups is characterized as consisting of different "cross-cutting" coalitional forces pulling policies toward different directions (Furlong and Scranton 1984). It is just these divisive elements within and among these groups that can enable a foreign government to exert its influence on the Congress-centered process.

Normal-Bilateral Foreign Policy As noted earlier, the major theme of the study concerns the congressional opposition in the making of U.S. normal-bilateral policies during the normal period of U.S. relations with individual foreign states. Hence we also need to define the term "normal-bilateral foreign policy".

*By definition, a normal-bilateral foreign policy is designed to deal with issues that accrue from a normal-bilateral relationship between the United States and another country. The existence of a normal-bilateral relationship depends on three conditions: (1) the two countries must have diplomatic relations with each other; (2) the bilateral relationship must not be merely limited to diplomatic ties but expanded to other political, economic, cultural, and/or military areas; and (3) the two countries must interact with each other on a genuinely friendly, stable, and regular basis, while the existence of differences over certain issues do not interrupt the positive interactions between the two countries in other areas of common interest.*⁵

Accordingly, the U.S.-China bilateral relationship between 1982 and June 4 of 1989 can be characterized as a normal one. This normal relationship poses a sharp contrast with the nonnormal ones in different periods in the history of PRC-U.S. relations. For example, during the 1950s and 60s, a hostile-bilateral relationship existed between the two countries. With President Nixon's historic trip to China in early 1972, the bilateral relationship apparently

⁵Based on this definition, the majority of the bilateral relationships with the United States today can be considered normal.

entered a "special" period in which positive interactions increased *without* the restoration of diplomatic relations. Following the formal establishment of diplomatic ties at the beginning of 1979, the bilateral relationship gradually became normal as it expanded from political to economic, cultural, and military areas. The Sino-U.S. communique on the issue of U.S. arms sale to Taiwan, reached on 17 August 1982, appeared to symbolize the ending of the normalizing process and the beginning of a normal relationship, which lasted until June 4 of 1989 when the Chinese government ordered its army to crack down on the student movement. Following that event, Sino-American relations apparently deteriorated from normal to uncertain.

The above discussion indicates that there can be different types of bilateral policies dealing with different types of bilateral relationships (e.g., "hostile," "special," "normal," and "uncertain"--in the case of U.S.-Chinese relations since 1949). Therefore, the behavior and influence of congressional opposition in the making of U.S. policy toward a particular country is likely to differ in different types of bilateral relationships. This dissertation will focus on the normal period of a bilateral relationship, this being the condition that characterizes most U.S. bilateral relationships at present.

The Arrangement of the Dissertation

In this introductory chapter, I have discussed the theoretical gaps in the existing scholarship on the making of U.S. foreign policy and laid out the purpose and approach of the study. In the next chapter, I will present the theoretical arguments and propositions on the behavior and policy influence of the congressional opposition in U.S. normal-bilateral policy. The purpose is to search for an explanation for the rise of the congressional opposition in a normal period of a bilateral relationship and its consequent impact on American normal-bilateral policy. It will be argued that the appearance of an issue-oriented congressional opposition is the result of increasingly diversified congressional attitudes toward a particular foreign country. Such a diversity of congressional attitudes is related not merely to the development of the

bilateral relationship itself, but to the changes in both the internal and external environment to which members of Congress are exposed. As lawmakers become more and more interested in the salience of specific issues than in the bilateral relationship, different coalitions of congressional opposition will be formed around the issues that have accrued from the development of the bilateral relationship. A coalition's intensity, roles, and patterns of interactions with the four other forces will depend on the dimensional linkages of the bilateral issue in question and the type of issues to which it belongs. The interplay of these variables will finally determine the coalition's policy influence.

Before presenting the empirical tests to the theoretical arguments and propositions made in Chapter II, I will first discuss my research strategy, which will be dealt with in Chapter III. It will be noted that both quantitative analysis and the case study are important research methods. Each has strengths and weaknesses. The quantitative approach is very useful for us to understand many aspects of the legislative behavior, but the frequent lack of numerical data in foreign policy making tends to limit its applicability in this area. Quite often, the case study is the only alternative. Sometimes, as will be used in this research, a combination of the two methods can be another alternative and may produce a better result than if only one is used. However, I will not give an equal weight to each of the methods. Due to the numerical data restrictions, the case study will be emphasized, being supported by the quantitative techniques whenever possible.

Indeed, one of the quantitative techniques--the content analysis, which can "take a verbal, nonquantitative document and transform it into quantitative data" (Bailey 1982, 312)--will be used in Chapter IV to determine the trends of the congressional attitudes toward China during the normal period of the bilateral relationship. Evidence that congressional attitudes were quite diversified would satisfy a necessary condition for the emergence of an issue-oriented congressional opposition. I will also look for explanations of why congressional attitudes were distributed in the way the content analysis indicates.

The three chapters that follow Chapter IV will present three case studies conducted to determine the relationships between the types of issues, dimensional linkages, patterns of interactions between the congressional opposition and the four other forces, and the intensities, roles, policy effects and influences of the congressional opposition in U.S. policy toward China during the normal period of the bilateral relationship. The behaviors of three coalitions of congressional opposition in three cases representing three different types of issues will be analyzed in length. If these are not found to be issue-oriented coalitions or if they were all "anti-Chinese" in nature, then the results would not support the propositions made in Chapter II.

Chapter VIII will make comparisons of these three case studies, analyzing the similarities and differences between them. It will reach conclusions on whether the empirical evidence provided in the preceding chapters has supported the thesis articulated in Chapter II. It will also discuss how we can assess the policy influence of the congressional opposition.

Finally, Chapter IX will discuss the implications of this study's findings for the development of Sino-U.S. relations, presidential-congressional relations in U.S. normal-bilateral foreign policy, and its applicability to the making of U.S. policies toward other countries that have normal relationships with the United States.

CHAPTER II

CONGRESSIONAL OPPOSITION AND THE MAKING OF U.S. NORMAL-BILATERAL FOREIGN POLICY: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

In the preceding chapter, I argued that there is a strong need for the study of congressional opposition in the making of normal-bilateral foreign policies. It is important not only because it would improve our understanding of American foreign policy making, but because the behavior of congressional opposition would affect the United States' policy toward a foreign country and hence the course of the bilateral relationship. Before considering the policy influence of the congressional opposition, we need to ask the essential question: Why and how will such an opposition arise in the normal period of a bilateral relationship in the first place? The basic argument I will advance here is a fairly simple one: During a particular period of a U.S. bilateral relationship with a foreign country, there exists a particular set of congressional attitudes toward that country; and this set of attitudes, which is subject to changes in both the internal and external environments to which members of Congress are exposed, will determine the congressional behavior in considering various policy issues toward that country in the period.

Congressional Attitudes and Behavior in a Normal Period

The point behind the above argument is that congressional attitudes toward a foreign state are crucial for the emergence and influence of the congressional opposition in formulating U.S. policy toward that particular state. Here "congressional attitudes" is a general plural term that includes various views, opinions, prepossessions, perspectives, and feelings held by members of Congress toward a foreign country. These attitudes can be dominated by one or

two (e.g., ideological, strategic) perspectives in one period of a bilateral relationship, or become quite diversified with several different perspectives in another.

Congressional Attitudes

The relationship between congressional attitudes and behavior in U.S. foreign policy has been much documented by studies of presidential-congressional relations in foreign affairs since the 1970s. Changes in the congressional attitudes toward the Vietnam War led to Congress's assertiveness most visibly in the power-sharing dimension of foreign policy making (see, for example, Wilcox, 1985). The most symbolic result of this assertiveness was the passage of the War Powers Resolution over President Nixon's veto, which "symbolized legislative disenchantment with the 'imperial presidency' and a determination to become an equal partner with the executive in the foreign policy process" (Crabb and Holt 1980, 46). The studies of this congressional assertiveness in the power-sharing dimension leads me to the following proposition:

Congressional attitudes toward a foreign country are a crucial determinant of congressional behavior in the making of U.S. bilateral policy toward that country; therefore, congressional attitudes toward a foreign country during the *normal* period of the bilateral relationship will affect the congressional behavior in the making of U.S. *normal-bilateral* policy toward that particular country.

The question is what the congressional attitudes in the normal period of the bilateral relationship would look like. Before the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1979, Sino-American relations were in a nonnormal state of affairs. During most of the thirty years of that relationship, the congressional attitudes toward China were clearly dominated by the anti-Communist perspective. This perspective contributed enormously to the hostility between the two countries. On the other hand, during most of the post-World War II years U.S.-Israel relations have been widely considered special--a unique relationship beyond normal friendliness. This relationship has been closely related to the fact that the Congress has been "a bastion of pro-Israeli sentiment in the United States government" throughout the period (Ibid., 109-110).

Nonnormal-bilateral relationships tend to be associated with single-perspective-dominated congressional attitudes toward a particular foreign country. Thus, congressional consideration of any important bilateral issue is likely to be primarily influenced by such a perspective. Likewise, we can argue that congressional attitudes toward that particular foreign country will no longer be dominated by a single perspective during the normal period of the bilateral relationship, which is characterized as neither hostile nor exceptionally friendly. Instead, several or many perspectives will coexist and exert diversified influences on the lawmakers.


Sources of Attitudinal Change

Before going further, we need to consider under what conditions congressional attitudes would change, for example, from one single perspective to another, or to a greater diversity. It is generally recognized that an individual's behavior is in large part shaped by the manner in which he perceives, diagnoses, and evaluates his physical and social environment (Holsti 1976). Inevitably, changes in the environment will affect the individual's "cognitive maps" (e.g., beliefs and attitudes). Students of congressional voting behavior also suggest that although legislators' views are relatively stable over time, they can be affected by changes in both the internal (e.g., membership replacement) and external environments (a cause of "member conversion") to which members of Congress are exposed (Asher and Weisberg 1985). With regard to change in congressional attitudes toward China, we may expect to find three sets of variables--external, domestic and institutional--influencing both congressional attitudes and behavior (Figure 2.1). Here congressional attitudes is an intervening variable between the sources of attitudinal changes and changes in congressional behavior.

Since foreign policy making is part of international politics, the international environment becomes one of the most important sources of foreign policy behavior (see Jensen 1982). At a minimum, the external environment "operates as a set of often slowly changing conditions which continuously assert themselves, producing incentives for any nation to adjust

FIGURE 2.1

Sources of Change in Congressional Attitudes and Behavior Toward China



to changing requirements" (Kegley and Wittkopf 1982, 538). Rosenau and Holsti (1983), for example, found that the relative decline of the United States' status as the world's preeminent superpower in the 1960s and 70s led to the breakdown of the American leadership attitudinal consensus into several, largely mutually exclusive and internally consistent belief systems. In our analytical context, congressional attitudes toward a foreign nation will be affected by the *external* variables that are associated with the bilateral relationship.

Clearly, the development of the bilateral relationship itself can influence the change of congressional attitudes toward the foreign country. A harmonious relationship is more likely to relax the attitudinal constraints on the policymakers than a nonnormal one. But the bilateral relationship alone will not necessarily change the nature of congressional attitudes. It must be

put in a larger external context. If the situation in the Middle East changes to such an extent that the strategic importance of Israel is significantly reduced, we would expect to see some change in the congressional attitudes toward Israel--at least among those who are not politically vulnerable to the influence of the American Jewish community. During the 1970s, especially immediately before and following President Nixon's historic trip to China in early 1972, there was an increased realization of China's strategic importance to the United States (see, for example, Kissinger 1979, Chapter VI; Garthoff 1985, Chapters 6 and 20). The need to contain a perceived Soviet threat gradually weakened the ideological perspective that had dominated the congressional attitude toward China since 1949. "For the first time in over two decades, a consensus among U.S. leaders supporting improved relations with the PRC emerged" (Sutter 1983, 2). Since Sino-U.S. relations were in a large part linked to U.S.-Soviet relations in a triangular relationship (Dittmer 1981; Segal 1982; Zhu 1989), an improvement in the U.S. relations with the Soviet Union would reduce the strategic significance of its relations with China.

At the same time, congressional attitudes will also be subject to changes in the internal environment in which members of Congress perform their legislative duties. The *domestic* variables include those which members of Congress frequently encounter in the policy making process, such as the prevailing views in the executive branch, particularly the president's, public opinion, and the availability of influential ideological pressure groups. For example, the strategic perspective held by the Nixon administration apparently had an important impact on the congressional attitudes toward China, which was also colored by a clear shift in the public opinion on China following the administration's action (Cohen 1978; Kusnitz 1984). In the meantime, the decreasing influence of the Committee of One Million also contributed to the change in congressional thinking. But the influence of these domestic variables will not be as strong as the external ones since they themselves are affected by changes in the external environment at about the same time as the congressional attitudes. Rather, they are more

likely to precipitate the change in congressional attitudes.

The *institutional* variables, on the other hand, are related to changes in the legislature itself and hence are much less affected by change in the external environment. Therefore, they have a more direct impact on congressional attitudes than the domestic variables. We can expect that one direct institutional effect on congressional attitudes will come from membership turnover (Brady and Lynn 1973; Hurley 1984; Brady and Sinclair 1984). The replacement of lawmakers holding a predominant perspective with freshmen who do not have such a perspective could increase the diversity of congressional attitudes. In the case of congressional attitudes toward China, it can be assumed that the disappearance from the legislative scene of the anti-PRC lawmakers who were once active in the 1950s and 60s would reduce the anti-Communist element in congressional attitudes toward China, since they tended to be the most ideological on China policy. Likewise, the disappearance of the pro-PRC lawmakers, who were active in the 1970s, a period of enhanced strategic cooperation between the United States and China, would also reduce the strategic element in congressional attitudes toward China. On the other hand, newly-elected congressmen during the period of the normal relationship of the 1980s would be less ideologically-structured in their perceptions on China and thus strengthen the issue orientation of the congressional attitudes toward that country.

**Congressional Behavior:
The Rise of the Issue-Oriented
Congressional Opposition**

The nature of congressional attitudes toward a particular foreign country is thus subject to the changes in both external and internal environments. In turn, changes in congressional attitudes will affect congressional behavior in the making of U.S. policy toward that country.

With no single perspective dominating congressional attitudes in the normal period of a bilateral relationship, members of Congress will find themselves less constrained by their concern over the development of the United States' relations with a particular foreign country

when they consider individual issues that arise from the bilateral relationship. Lawmakers will feel freer to consider each policy issue according to their personal goals and interests and be less worried about its impact on the bilateral relationship. This means that lawmakers are likely to separate individual issues from the overall consideration of the importance of the bilateral relationship--how an issue is dealt with in Congress will become less and less tied to the bilateral relationship itself. Consequently, members of Congress will become increasingly *issue-oriented* in making their decisions.

Under these circumstances, we can expect the rise of congressional opposition in the making of normal-bilateral foreign policies. Each occurrence will be dictated by the nature of the issue involved in the policy process. In a nonnormal (e.g., hostile) period of a bilateral relationship, the congressional opposition would be a relatively stable coalition against the policies favoring the foreign country or the development of the bilateral relationship, with this opposition being dominated by a single perspective. During the 1950s and 60s, as noted earlier, there existed a predominant coalition of congressional opposition against any U.S. policy favoring the improvement of Sino-U.S. relations. For more than two decades, this anti-Communist/anti-PRC coalition was strong, fairly stable and single-minded.

But in a normal period of the bilateral relationship, such a dominant coalition will no longer exist. Instead, there will be an increase of various coalitions of congressional opposition formed around particular issues. The rise of the *issue-oriented congressional opposition* in the normal period of the bilateral relationship will be closely associated with a substantial increase in issues arising from the development of the bilateral relationship. The further the relationship expands into political, economic, cultural and other fields, the more likely new bilateral issues will occur, thus giving rise to a greater variety of coalitions of congressional opposition.

The issue-focused congressional opposition will be strengthened by the increased influence of *issue leaders* in the policy process. Issue leaders are essentially the same as Arnold's "coalition leaders" (1979, 40-42), who tend to know a particular policy issue better

and have significantly more intense preferences than most of their colleagues. They are major sources of information or suppliers of "cues" (Matthews and Stimson 1975, 45) for their congressional colleagues when making their voting decisions. They are essentially what Walker called "legislative activists," who "supply the crucial source of enterprise needed to expand the discretionary portion" of the congressional agenda and "to overcome the natural tendency of legislatures to become mainly deliberative, passive bodies" (1977, 426). They are also more likely to come from "informal legislative groups" (Davidson and Oleszek 1981, 352)--ad hoc congressional caucuses formed around specific issues--than from the congressional leadership. Consequently, they will play the major role in forming *issue coalitions* in opposition to certain bilateral policies. Based on the activist nature of the issue leaders, we can predict that they are likely to fight persistently over a policy issue, even if they do so at the risk of jeopardizing the United States' bilateral relations with the foreign country. As politicians, meanwhile, they would not be so rigid in their strategies as to rule out any compromise if they are faced with a strong counter-opposition. Therefore, persistency in goal and flexibility in strategy would tend to characterize the legislative styles of issue leaders. It can thus be argued that understanding the behavior of the issue leaders is essential to understanding the behavior of the issue coalitions they lead.

Congressional Opposition and The Differentiation of Issues

It is clear that the rise of the issue-oriented congressional opposition leans heavily to the notion that policy issues determine politics (Lowi 1964, 1972). Issues will determine the behavior and influence of the congressional opposition in the making of U.S. normal- bilateral policy toward a foreign country. The question is on what issues a coalition of congressional opposition is likely to emerge. To be sure, congressional opposition will *not* occur automatically on every issue that accrues from the bilateral relationship. On many issues, little opposition can be expected from within Congress if they have caused few conflicts between

national, local and lawmakers' personal interests while benefiting the two countries. On other issues, coalitions of congressional opposition will emerge when they strongly affect these interests--whether or not these policy issues would benefit the particular foreign state and/or the bilateral relationship. Thus, the formation of a coalition of congressional opposition will depend on the kind of issue that confronts the lawmakers.

The application of issue typology to the study of foreign and domestic policy making is not new. One of the most well-known scholars on this is Theodore Lowi, whose pioneering work on the relationship between different categories of domestic issues and politics (1964) has attracted major attention in the field. In the late 1960s, Lowi began to apply a similar typology to foreign policy issues by dividing them into the same three different types he used on domestic issues--distributive, regulative, and redistributive--and attempted to correlate them with different modes of decision making that would affect U.S. foreign policy (1967). This approach was later expanded by others to the area of comparative foreign policy (see, for example, Zimmerman 1973) and U.S. foreign economic policy (see, for example, McGowan and Walker 1981).¹ In a similar fashion, Aage R. Clausen argues that congressmen make their decisions by using "a limited set of policy content categories to which legislative proposals are assigned" (1973, 8). Accordingly, Clausen incorporated *both* domestic and foreign policy issues into five major policy dimensions--civil liberties, international involvement, agricultural assistance, social welfare, and government management--and then attempted to find different patterns of influence on congressmen across these dimensions.

While basically adopting the approach used by Lowi and Clausen, I depart from them

¹William Zimmerman, for example, argued that "differences in policy process across issue areas within a given state, the United States or the Soviet Union as cases in point, may be as great as differences in foreign-policy process within a particular arena of power for each" (1973, 1212). This led him to suggest an "issue-based foreign policy paradigm" of distributive, regulatory, redistributive, and power politics. He speculated that similar issues would involve similar policy processes in different countries. Accordingly, the Soviet weapons-procurement process in its domestic aspect might (like the American one) fall into one of the categories ("distribution") that he adapted from Lowi's formula.

on two major accounts. First, Lowi attempted to categorize *all* foreign policy issues into his three types and then to look for the prevailing structures and patterns of power in foreign policy making. However, in the field of foreign policy, it is often difficult to differentiate distributive policies from regulatory ones (Berkowitz, Bock, and Fuccillo 1977, 275; Kudrle and Bobrow 1982, 358-59). On the other hand, Clausen's classification of foreign policy issues into a single dimension is too broad an approach to identify the differences between various foreign policy issues. Moreover, both types of classification failed to take into consideration the three different dimensions of foreign policy making--bilateral, multilateral, and power-sharing, as noted in the previous chapter.

Second, my thesis is different in both scope and focus. I am interested in *those types of issues that lead to the emergence of congressional opposition in the formation of U.S. normal-bilateral foreign policies*. I believe that the nature of an issue is essentially linked to the differentiation of lawmakers' personal goals and interests in foreign policy. Different types of issues may meet different types of lawmakers' goals and induce an *inward-* or *outward-* looking or a *mixed* orientation of congressional interest. This then leads to different coalitions of congressional opposition and their roles in normal-bilateral policies. Accordingly, I put those issues on which congressional opposition is likely to occur into three categories.

Electoral/Economic Issues When the congressional attitudes toward a foreign country become diversified and issue-oriented, members of Congress will become increasingly inward-looking, with the tendency to relate bilateral issues to their individual goals. It is generally believed that getting reelected is a primary goal for elected officials (Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974; Fiorina 1974; Fenno 1978) since it is a prerequisite for the advance of other goals. Accordingly, lawmakers will be most interested in those bilateral issues that can increase their chance of reelection. Trade issues like foreign import restrictions tend to increase benefits for a foreign country or a domestic economic group at the expense of another domestic group or vice versa. They often result in high-salience conflicts between two domestic interest groups

(e.g., domestic producers vs. importers) or between domestic interest groups and foreign exporters. These conflicts can be best described as economic in nature. They do not necessarily lead to ideological conflicts, as Lowi's thesis would suggest (1964). The issues attract lawmakers' attention when they directly affect the well-being of their constituents and are therefore likely to become electoral issues in those districts to which such issues are salient (Kingdon 1981). The constituents' influence would be particularly strong if they are part of the lawmaker's "reelection constituency" in the district who he thinks vote for him (Fenno 1978; Fleisher 1985).

External/Strategic Issues If a bilateral issue is not electoral/economic in nature, it may belong to the external/strategic type of issues, which do not have a reelection linkage but instead prompt strong outward-looking interest among members of Congress because of the issues' potentially vital impact on the United States' strategic and foreign policy interests in the world. It is linked to another goal of lawmakers, that is, "good public policy" (Fenno 1973). One such issue area is nuclear nonproliferation. For many years, it has induced a strong congressional interest because of its potential impact on U.S. security interests and international stability. Many lawmakers will raise the nonproliferation issue when a normal-bilateral relationship expands to the area of U.S. nuclear exports to the foreign country, as demonstrated by the strong congressional response to the Carter administration's decision to ship nuclear materials to India in 1980 (Markey 1983). But because of their complex and "remote" nature, these issues tend to have "weak constituency intensity" (Kingdon 1981, 40). Their attractiveness depends more on the personal interest of individual lawmakers than on the influence of their constituencies which, to use Denny's words, "are hard to identify" (1985, 174) on this type of issue.

Emotive/Moral Issues Between these two types of issues there exist certain value-oriented issues (e.g., human rights) that entail some of the characteristics of the former two. They will likely meet the following two purposes that lawmakers have: the pursuit of political

self-interests at home, and moral idealism in their foreign policy orientation. Unlike the electoral/economic issues, the emotive/moral issues do not directly affect the well-being of the constituents. Nevertheless, they have a *potential* reelection linkage, since they are "emotive" in nature and likely to touch the hearts of their constituents. The legislator knows "how to reflect in the most exquisite way the tempers and moods of their constituents" (Bergner 1987, 292). He can exploit these issues for political purposes. On the other hand, he could put his political future at risk if he appears inattentive to the presence of these issues. Kingdon notes,

If nobody in the district notices a vote at the time it occurs, an opponent in the next election still might pick up an unpopular vote and use it against the congressman. Even though it doesn't affect the election outcome, legislators often simply try to avoid such an embarrassing situation if they can (1981, 60).

Apart from the "rule of anticipated reactions" (Freidrich 1963, 199-215), congressmen are likely to act on such issues because there is a strong congruence between their personal beliefs and those of the voters. Like the electoral/economic issues, the emotive/moral ones can be closely involved in American domestic politics if linked to controversial domestic issues.²

Meanwhile, this type of issue can have strong foreign policy implications. Members of Congress are strongly concerned with human rights conditions in other countries. This is in part because many of them or their ancestors came from countries where either authoritarian or totalitarian rules prevailed, and in part because they represent constituencies substantially composed of immigrants from such countries. Besides, there have been strong "messianic

²It is generally believed in the scholarship of U.S. foreign policy and international politics that there exist two trends in the American conduct of foreign relations: realism and idealism. The former refers to a pragmatic, "power politics", approach in dealing with relations with other countries while the latter means a foreign policy based on strongly moral grounds. Human rights policy and advocating democracy abroad are frequently cited as examples of the idealistic trend. However, these two terms can not be used to explain the foreign policy behavior of U.S. lawmakers. It would be misleading to simply term as "idealists" those members of Congress who advocate human rights and democracy abroad, because they can also be called "realists" in terms of their domestic political interests. Likewise, many congressmen's strong interest in restricting foreign imports actually reflect their down-to-earth "realism," although such practice may jeopardize U.S. relations with certain foreign countries and hence be criticized as such by "power-politics" realists. Thus, the differentiation of these issues here should help avoid the misuse of the two terms for congressional behavior in foreign policy.

assumptions" historically held by American leaders about America's uniqueness, destiny and mission abroad (Kegley and Wittkopf 1982). Thus there is a natural tendency for lawmakers to try to change human rights conditions and repressive regimes in foreign countries. The congressional outward-looking interest in this type of issue is an essential part of what Crabb calls "liberal interventionism," which has formed the U.S. diplomatic behavior patterns in U.S. foreign relations that have been designed "to safeguard or promote the goals and values integral to the U.S. way of life, as embraced specifically by the mission of projecting democracy abroad and uplifting the condition of the human race" (Crabb 1986, 191).

By differentiating the issues according to the different goals and interests lawmakers have, it becomes clear that the more congressmen focus on these three types of issues, the less attention they will pay to the impact of their actions on the bilateral relationship. This argument does not contradict the actions of those lawmakers whose districts and states have close economic and trade ties with the foreign country. Naturally, these lawmakers would like to see a healthy development of the bilateral relationship. Their interest in the relationship will be primarily based on the economic benefits they wish to obtain from such a relationship. But the economic consideration will not be strong enough for them to support every policy issue that benefits the bilateral relationship. During the normal period, this relationship has not developed to such an extent that its importance induces the support of these lawmakers in every issue area. Consequently, when value-oriented or national security policy issues come up, they will judge these issues according to their political instincts and the salience of the issues, rather than the importance of the bilateral relationship. With a diversification of attitudes toward the foreign country, a member of Congress can act differently on different issues. To put it in another way, in considering normal-bilateral foreign policies, any member could potentially belong to a coalition of congressional opposition.

This is compatible with the general observation that "congressional politics is coalitional rather than partisan in nature" (Collie 1988, 322). But it does not mean that partisanship will

not have an impact on the formation of coalitions (Clausen 1973). Coalitions of congressional opposition will shift with issues, sometimes along party lines, sometimes not. Issue coalitions will differ from one another in size and goal. A lawmaker from a coalition of opposition at one point in time could become a member of a coalition of counter-opposition at another, and vice versa. In the China case, then, there should be a number of issue coalitions expressing congressional opposition on China policy in the normal period of the bilateral relationship, each led by a different group of issue leaders rather than by the persistent anti-Chinese legislators who would make only a fraction of the coalition. It is unlikely that any one of the coalitions would become dominant in the congressional consideration of other China-related issues during the period.

Building Coalitions of Congressional Opposition

The argument that coalitions of congressional opposition shift with issues leads to the larger question of the "pluralist vs. ideologist position" in considering congressional voting alignments. The pluralist view is most strongly supported by the works of Clausen and his colleagues (1970, 1973, 1977). In his five policy dimensions, Clausen found that the structure of voting alignments tended to shift from one policy area to another as a result of different patterns of influence on legislators' voting decisions in each area. This conclusion, however, was challenged by studies conducted by others (Schneider 1979; Smith 1981; Shelley 1983), which argued that a single left-right ideological dimension tended to structure congressional voting.

While my own argument on the issue-oriented congressional opposition in the 1980s falls readily into the pluralist camp, it is important to note that the period (1953-64) from which Clausen drew his conclusion happened to be the one in which the ideological perspective dominated congressional consideration of U.S. policy toward China, thus supporting the single ideological position. But the period (1971-76) from which Schneider drew his single-ideology

conclusion happened to be the one in which the single ideological perspective became less dominant in the congressional consideration of U.S. China policy following Nixon's trip to China in 1972.³ Such inconsistencies appear to suggest the gap between the theories drawn from systematic studies (not to mention the disparities between the theories themselves) and their application to a more particular policy area. Clearly, when we look at the nature of the coalition-building within the congressional opposition in the normal period of the bilateral relationship, the existing theories may offer very inadequate guidance. We must take the nature of the subject and the time (in this case, the normal period of a bilateral relationship) into consideration.

Types of Issues, Dimensional Linkages and The Intensity of Congressional Opposition

In the Congress-centered policy process, the ultimate goal of the congressional opposition is to achieve a winning voting coalition. Such a coalition will depend much on the *intensity* of congressional opposition on a particular issue. Apparently, the degree of intensity is closely related to the attractiveness of an issue to legislators. The more attractive the issue is, the more intensely the congressional opposition will act, and consequently, a coalition will be more easily built. It is also clear that the intensity of congressional opposition can not be isolated from the correlation between the types of issues and the degree of linkage among the dimensions of foreign policy making. In terms of issues, the intensity of the opposition is likely to be stronger on the electoral/economic issues and weaker on the external/strategic ones, since the former tend to be considerably more attractive to lawmakers with their reelection linkage than the latter. In the meantime, the intensity of the opposition will also differ among

³Steven S. Smith (1981) tried to fill in the gap between Clausen and Schneider by focusing on the period of 1957-1976 and concluded that Senate voting patterns exhibited a trend toward greater alignment consistency which was associated with a trend toward greater left-right ideological structure. Later, Mack C. Shelley II (1983) covered an even longer, 48-year time span of 1933-80 and concluded that a long-time southern Democrat-Republican alliance has evolved into a permanent conservative majority coalition in Congress over the years.

the three different dimensions of foreign policy making. Each dimension is different in terms of policy and political impact, from lower-salience bilateral policies to higher-salience constitutional, power-related issues.

Thus, the intensity of congressional opposition will rise as a bilateral issue is increasingly linked to the multilateral and/or to the power-sharing dimension of foreign policy making. An example of such dimensional linkage was the strong reaction from members of Congress to the Carter administration's normalization of relations with the PRC in early 1979, as reflected in the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act. It was not only related to some lawmakers' concern over U.S. relations with Taiwan, but also to the administration's haste and secrecy (and lack of consultation with Congress) in coming to an agreement with the PRC, thus expanding the controversy to include the institutional rivalry (e.g., Congress's right to be consulted) in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy (Sutter 1983; Pious 1985; Oksenberg 1986). The same was true for the debate over Carter's "unilateral" termination of the U.S. defense treaty with Taiwan, which raised the constitutional issue of the president's treaty power (Wachman 1984).

We can expect that similar dimensional linkages will also occur during a normal period. The intensity of congressional opposition on a particular bilateral issue will depend on what type of issue it is and whether it obtains an *expansive* nature, that is, whether it is linked to either or both of the other two dimensions of foreign policy making. To summarize the points discussed above, we can make the following propositions:

- (1) whatever type of issue to which a bilateral issue belongs, the intensity of congressional opposition will increase as the issue is being expanded to the multilateral and/or to the power-sharing dimension; and
- (2) in whatever policy-making dimension a bilateral issue is considered, the intensity of congressional opposition will increase as the type of issue moves from external/strategic, to electoral/economic, and to emotive/moral ones.⁴

⁴That emotive/moral issues tend to have the strongest intensity is based on two considerations: (1) such issues tend to make lawmakers more emotional and passionate than the other types of issues; and (2) they combine the outward and inward orientations of

Accordingly, we can further expect that

- (3) the intensity of congressional opposition will be lowest if an external/strategic issue is considered *just* within the bilateral policy-making dimension; and that
- (4) the intensity of congressional opposition will be greatest if the consideration of an emotive/moral issue has been expanded from the bilateral, to multilateral, and to power-sharing dimensions.

It is not difficult to notice that the three issue areas mentioned earlier--foreign import restrictions, human rights, and nuclear nonproliferation--are not bilateral in nature (they are not aimed at any particular country). They have explicit and strong multilateral and world-wide implications. Thus, we may expect an increase in the intensity of congressional opposition on a bilateral issue if such an issue becomes seen as part of a larger, multilateral, or even power-sharing dimension.

Coalition-Building Strategies

Then how is the intensity of congressional opposition related to issue leaders' coalition-building strategies? How large a coalition is desirable? According to Riker's size principle of political coalitions, the game players would make strenuous efforts to reduce their oversized coalition in the direction of a minimum winning one because the fewer the winners the larger the share of benefits (1962, 54). This theory may be applied to electoral/economic issues such as those in the area of foreign import restrictions. A minimized winning coalition could bring maximized benefits to the coalition members. But even here the issue leaders may still want to form and maintain a larger coalition in order to affect the winning of subsequent games (Hinckley 1972).⁵ On the external/strategic and emotive/moral issues, there is no reason why

congressional interest.

⁵According to Clausen and others (see, for example, Clausen and Van Horn, 1977; Asher and Weisberg, 1985), once a coalition is formed in a policy dimension it tends to remain relative stable over time because of the stability of the legislator's policy positions or his voting history. Changes in policy positions are likely when members of Congress respond to major events such as Great Depression and Vietnam War (Sinclair 1977, 1982). In our context, coalitions of congressional opposition may be expected to be stable during the normal period

issue leaders would want to control the coalition size since any eventual benefits are not necessarily divided among the coalition members (Arnold 1979, 43-44). Indeed, if the issue involves the opposition's strong desire to influence a foreign government's policy (e.g., human rights), it would be highly desirable for the issue leaders to build a coalition of the largest possible size (e.g., total membership of the House or the Senate or both)--or a "universalistic coalition" (Collie 1988)--so as to maximize congressional influence on the foreign government.⁶

Undoubtedly, building a winning coalition is not an easy task. The issue leaders have to make a greater effort if they want to achieve a two-thirds majority to counter a potential presidential veto than they would if they just need a simple majority, or if their aim is merely to express their opinion. As will be discussed later, they have to face possibly strong resistance from the counter-opposition in Congress, the president, the foreign government concerned, and domestic interest groups. Given the issues and the relationships between the intensity of congressional opposition and the dimensional linkage discussed earlier, we can expect two strategies to be used by issue leaders. The first is related to Axelrod's prediction based on his "minimally-connected winning" model (1970) that coalitions will consist of parties that are connected--adjacent to one another on some policy dimension.⁷ In our context, this means that issue leaders will try to build a winning coalition by allying themselves with those actors that are adjacent to the relevant issue area. For example, domestic textile producers

of the bilateral relationship unless some major events severely affect the bilateral relationship and hence change the nature of the relationship. But this is a bit outside of my thesis. I am interested mainly in the formation of different coalitions on different types of issues.

⁶This is also true for coalition-building in the making of nonnormal bilateral policies. Throughout the 1950s and 60s, for example, the anti-Chinese leaders appeared to have adopted "maximum size strategies" (Hinckley 1972, 201) to achieve and maintain a dominant ideological coalition in Congress on U.S China policy.

⁷Axelrod constructed his model with the emphasis on the ideological positions of parties, as represented by their locations on some policy dimension. His model may not be applied to all the issue areas in our context for the reasons given in the previous pages, but the idea behind it is relevant here.

and shoe makers may share a similar interest in restricting foreign imports of their respective products. Thus, there is a strong incentive for one to seek a coalition with the other in order to achieve a winning (voting) coalition on import-restriction legislation.

The second strategy the issue leaders could use is to exploit the expansive nature of a bilateral issue and link it to the other dimensions of foreign policy making as much as possible. It can be expected that the more a bilateral issue is linked to the other dimensions of foreign policy making, the larger a coalition of congressional opposition will become.

Roles and Influences of The Congressional Opposition

Having discussed the formation of issue-oriented coalitions of congressional opposition on different types of issues, we now turn to the roles and influence of the congressional opposition in the making of U.S. normal-bilateral policy. Here role and influence are two different concepts. The former is more related to the policymakers' function and behavior, while the latter is more associated with the actual policy impact. In our analytical context, the policy role of the congressional opposition refers to its legislative function and behavior. But the congressional opposition can exercise its policy influence only if it produces an explicit impact on U.S. policies toward a particular foreign country. More specifically, the influence of the congressional opposition is felt if it forces the president to make, change or modify his policy in the direction it desires. At the same time, role and influence are also related to each other. The type of role played by the congressional opposition may directly affect its policy influence. The relationship between the types of issues, the congressional opposition's roles, its effect and policy influence is presented in Table 2.1.

The Policy Roles of the Opposition

To answer the question of what roles the congressional opposition is likely to play in the Congress-centered policy process, we need to look at the three general *functions* the

opposition can take (see Table 2.1). The opposition takes the *revising* function when it reacts to a presidential proposal by pushing the Congress to impose certain conditions on it. It takes the *initiating* function when it pushes the Congress (both houses) to pass a binding or

TABLE 2.1
Types of Issues, Roles and Influences of the
Congressional Opposition

Type of Issue	External/Strategic	Electoral/Economic	Emotive/Moral
Functional Role	Revising	Initiating	Supplementing
Functional Effect	Constraining	Generating	Amplifying
Behavioral Role	Reactive	Assertive	React/Assertive
Policy Influence	Moderate	Strong	Strongest

nonbinding resolution (expressing congressional opinion) initiated by its issue leaders. It takes the *supplementing* function when it pushes the Congress to pass a binding or nonbinding resolution that not only reaffirms the president's policy but goes further than that.⁸ These different functional roles can be seen more clearly by considering their different *functional* effects. The effect of the revising function is to *constrain* the president in his carrying out a

⁸Remember that the congressional opposition refers to the congressional coalition or coalitions opposing policies favoring a particular foreign state and/or the bilateral relationship. Therefore, when the congressional opposition plays the initiating role it means that it acts in opposition to the administration's policies that it considers are in favor of the foreign state. When the opposition plays the expanding role, it means that there is some congruence of views between the congressional opposition and the administration on a specific policy, but the former wants to go beyond the actions favored by the administration. Apparently, in addition to the three roles, the congressional opposition can also take an *acquiescing* function when it reacts to the presidential proposal without trying to revise it, indicating its agreement with the president's policy. However, such a role is insignificant since it minimizes the policy influence of the opposition and indicates presidential dominance of the process. Therefore, it is not considered here.

policy while that of the initiating function is to *generate* policy changes from the president.⁹ On the other hand, the supplementing function is to *amplify* the president's policy. The different functional roles of the congressional opposition would then be associated with its different types of *behavioral* roles. From existing studies on the interbranch relations in foreign policy discussed in the previous chapter, we know that the congressional opposition could have two major types of behavioral roles. It plays the *reactive* role, as best suggested by the two-presidencies model, when it responds to presidential initiatives. This behavior is closely related to the opposition's revising function. It plays the *assertive* role, entailed in the intermestic model, when it takes the policy initiative and forces the president to respond. The opposition's initiating function is most likely to induce this type of behavior. But the problem with these two models, as discussed earlier, is that each tends to overemphasize one type of role and overlook the other. In addition, the existing studies have failed to suggest that it is possible for the congressional opposition to exhibit a third, different type of behavior: a *react/assertive* role. Such a behavioral role is likely to be linked with the opposition's supplementing function as it first reacts and agrees to a presidential initiative and then asserts itself by amplifying the presidential policy through legislation.

Relationship between Roles and the Issues

How are these roles related to the three types of issues? We can expect that an issue-oriented congressional opposition is likely to play different types of policy roles on different types of issues. This is similar to the notion that Congress may choose different responses to different policy initiatives from the president (see, for example, Peterson 1985). The difference here is that the congressional opposition may not only react to presidential initiatives but also respond directly to issues that arise from, say, a bilateral relationship--without a forthcoming

⁹There can be some difference between binding and nonbinding resolutions passed by Congress in terms of policy effect. Presumably, the former is more likely to generate policy changes from the president than the latter, which the president may not take seriously.

presidential initiative. As argued earlier, congressional opposition is likely to arise in the three issue areas that tend to meet different types of lawmakers' personal goals and induce a strong inward, outward, or mixed orientation of congressional interest. For instance, foreign import restrictions are electoral/economic issues. Political necessity and constituents' pressure would push the legislators to play the assertive role on these issues by initiating policy proposals themselves.

On the other hand, nuclear nonproliferation issues induce an outward orientation of congressional interest. Since ordinary constituents are not particularly interested in this type of issues, it is unlikely to become a campaign issue. Therefore, the congressional opposition would have less incentive to take assertive actions. It would be more likely to play the reactive role by attempting to revise a presidential policy proposal.

Finally, value-oriented issues, because of their emotive nature, are more likely than the other issue areas to induce a react/assertive behavior from the congressional opposition, since there tends to be a strong congruence of views (e.g., shared concern over human rights violations in a foreign country) between the administration and the congressional opposition in this area.

Interactions with the Other Forces

In the meantime, we can also expect both the roles and issues to be related to the policy influences of the opposition. For example, the opposition is more likely to have its influence felt when it plays the assertive role with its initiating function on the electoral/economic issues than it is on the external/strategic issues where the opposition tends to play the reactive role with its revising function. It is also likely to exert considerable influence on the emotive/moral issues when it plays the react/assertive role with its supplementing function. To consider whether and how the policy influence of the congressional opposition tends to vary with different roles and types of issues, we need to look

at some intervening variables between the types of issues and policy influence. These variables are composed of the congressional opposition's interactions with the four major forces that are likely to be involved in the Congress-centered process: the administration, the foreign government concerned, the interest groups, and the counter-opposition in Congress.

Congressional Opposition and the Administration We can expect that the issue-focused congressional opposition tends to have frequent conflicts with the administration on policies toward the foreign country in issue areas like nuclear nonproliferation, foreign imports restrictions, and human rights. Conflicts are likely because of the different "political cultures" that surround the administration and the congressional opposition, which lead to different "rules of the games" adopted by the participants on each side (Heginbotham 1983/84) in the making of these policies. Heginbotham notes that for the administration stable and friendly relations with foreign governments are goals worth pursuing for their own sake. This was true even for President Reagan, whose well-known anti-Communist position did not prevent him from developing a closer relationship with the PRC (Downen 1982; Hirschfield 1985). For congressional opponents, however, relations with foreign governments will be dealt with according to their own interests and the salience of the bilateral issue. In the making of normal-bilateral policies, as noted earlier, congressional opposition could impose a tough scrutiny on the executive policy proposal; they could also take the initiative if the opportunity arises.

How would the president act in the face of the issue-focused congressional opposition playing its roles in normal-bilateral foreign policies? In a system of "separated institutions sharing powers", there are powerful limits to what a president can do to exercise his powers (Neustadt 1960; Hargrove and Nelson 1984). The president can not rely solely on his informal (lobbying) and formal (veto) powers to prevail without making concessions to the congressional opposition. Nor can he expect strong partisan support when he is faced with an issue-oriented

congressional opposition.¹⁰ Furthermore, the congressional opponents will exploit any sign of policy differences within the administration to support their positions. Given the roles the congressional opposition is likely to play, we can make the following propositions concerning executive behavior:

- (1) The president is less likely to make concessions to a coalition of congressional opposition playing the reactive role than he is to the one playing the assertive role; and
- (2) the president is more likely to acquiesce to the coalition playing the react/assertive role with its supplementing function than he is to the one playing either of the other roles.

The expectation that the president is less likely to make concessions to the opposition playing the reactive role is based on two considerations. The first has to do with the president's advantage in initiating policy proposals. By the time the administration submits a proposal to the Congress, it can be expected that the policy has achieved a general consensus within the administration, having gone through the process of bureaucratic pulling and hauling. In the meantime, during the period up to the submission, the president has already gotten a touch of the congressional pulse on the proposal through various formal and informal contacts with the people on the Hill. Finally, the president can decide whether and when to submit his proposal to the Congress, choosing not to do so until the congressional atmosphere appears to be favorable to him.

The second consideration is related to the constraints imposed on the administration by its obligations to the foreign government. If its policy proposal happens to be an agreement or treaty with that government, the president's foreign policy prestige will be affected if his proposal is significantly compromised on the Hill. The administration will be especially sensitive to the opposition of the foreign government to any unilateral changes in the accord. Thus, the

¹⁰Indeed, the president can expect considerable support from the opposite party. A recent study of conflictual roll-call votes in the House and Senate from 1953 through 1984 (Fleisher and Bond 1988) suggests that Republican presidents tend to receive greater support on foreign policy issues from liberal Democrats and from Democratic party and committee leaders.

foreign government's reaction can practically set a limit on the concessions the administration can make to the congressional opposition.

On the other hand, the president is more likely to make concessions if the congressional opposition is playing the assertive role. Clearly, the opposition becomes assertive when congressional sentiment is running high on a particular issue. Such a sentiment would be associated with time and events. A surge of important events, as reported by the media, could make legislators highly emotional and mobilized. It may approach the point of the "coupling" of agenda and policy change (Kingdon 1984, Chapter 8). The policy window opens suddenly for issue leaders to provide legislative alternatives to the president's policies. As a mobilized Congress threatens to pass mandatory legislation restricting presidential authority and flexibility in conducting bilateral relations, the president is likely to make substantial concessions to the lawmakers in order to prevent this from happening.

The concessions could be made easier by the fact that the administration could take advantage of congressional sentiment to press the foreign government for policy concessions (Cohen 1981, 93). This is most likely to happen when the two governments are negotiating a difficult agreement. If the issue leaders are attentive to such negotiations, they could try to direct the congressional sentiment to put significant pressure on the administration to gain concessions from the foreign government. If they are successful, the administration would then have something at stake: if it cannot satisfy the congressional demand, it may face an unwanted congressional restriction on its conduct of foreign policy.

Conceivably, executive concessions would vary when the congressional opposition plays the assertive role. The administration is likely to both lobby hard and make considerable policy concessions if the opposition is initiating binding legislation. On the other hand, it would have less need to lobby intensively and make concessions if the opposition is initiating a nonbinding resolution.

In the meantime, the pressure on the president to make concessions would be even

greater on electoral/economic issues than on external/strategic ones, since the intensity of domestic politics (e.g., the intensity of congressional constituents' interest) is considerably greater on the former than on the latter issues.

Finally, the administration is more likely to go along with the congressional opposition if the latter is playing the react/assertive role with its supplementing function. This acquiescing behavior on the part of the executive would occur when there is a strong congruence of views between the administration and the congressional opposition commanding a congressional majority on a value-oriented issue (the emotive/moral type). Indeed, the opposition would find it easier to exert its influence through its expansion of a presidential policy.

To be sure, whatever concessions the president would like to make, there is always a limit. Apart from the familiar argument that the president would never like to see his foreign policies dictated by Congress, his responsibility for managing a healthy bilateral relationship will always press him to limit the damage to the bilateral relationship. Given the analysis on the relationship between the expansive nature of a bilateral issue and the intensity of congressional opposition, we can expect that the president and his administration will try to reduce the linkage between the bilateral issue to the other dimensions of foreign policy making as much as possible--for example, by stressing the importance of the bilateral relationship--so as to weaken the intensity of the congressional interest in the issue. Assuming that the foreign government will react more strongly if the congressional action is specifically directed against it, the administration would press Congress for legislation with some ambiguity, such as not mentioning the name of the particular country.

Congressional Opposition and the Foreign Government An issue-focused congressional opposition will have two important implications for the foreign government concerned. First, as noted earlier, it tends to separate individual issues from the overall consideration of the bilateral relationship. The congressional treatment of an issue will be less relevant to the bilateral relationship than to the salience of the issue itself. As a result, the foreign

government's stress of the importance of the bilateral relationship will not have a direct impact on the congressional behavior.

Second, an issue-focused congressional opposition will increase the influence of the issue leaders (or issue specialists) who care deeply about the details of a policy issue, while reducing the influence of the "generalists" who would favor the bilateral relationship with a predominant perspective. In the case of Sino-U.S. relations, this means that the influence of issue leaders on the bilateral relationship would increase, with a relative decline of influence of both the traditional anti-PRC and pro-PRC leaders based on either ideological or strategic considerations. Furthermore, issue leaders tend to be quite popular since they are likely to focus on those issues that attract the interest of their colleagues. While the generalists want either to prevent the United States from developing the bilateral relationship or urge it to do so, issue leaders would not oppose the development of the bilateral relationship per se but demand some policy changes on a particular issue from the foreign country as well as the U.S. government.

With those two tendencies, an issue-focused congressional opposition is likely to exacerbate the conflicting side of congressional relations with the foreign government. Under these circumstances, how would the foreign government react? Clearly, the foreign government will treat the executive and legislative branches differently because of the different ways the two branches deal with it. The administration would prefer to handle disagreements with the foreign government in a quiet and diplomatic manner, keeping the difference over an issue at a minimal level. On the other hand, free from foreign policy responsibilities, congressional opponents can criticize the foreign government's policy openly and loudly. Such behavior will tend to be interpreted by the foreign government as an act of interfering in its domestic affairs. Indeed, there is nothing more sensitive and annoying to a foreign government than foreign interference. In addition, the issue leaders are much less inclined than the administration to compromise with the foreign government, and they would continue their

opposition until the foreign government changes its policies or the president accepts their suggestions. Furthermore, even if the executive branch adopts a policy unfavorable to the foreign government, there is still a chance that such a policy could later be altered by the administration. But if the policy is made through a legislative action and becomes law, it will be difficult to change. The foreign government would certainly agree with former U.S. senator John G. Tower's assertion that "the great danger of Congressional intervention in foreign affairs is that enacted legislation becomes an institutional rigid 'solution' to a temporary problem" (1981/82, 232).

Accordingly, the foreign government would consider it much easier to influence and find a common ground with the administration than with members of Congress. Most foreign governments, however, simply lack the financial and political resources that are necessary for the conduct of lobbying campaigns in Congress, apart from their very limited knowledge of its very complex legislative process.¹¹

It can be expected that clashes between a foreign government and its congressional opposition are likely to occur in the three issue areas mentioned earlier. If the foreign government has serious disagreements with the congressional opposition in each of the three issue areas, the bilateral relationship is likely to experience considerable fluctuations.

It can be further expected that the influence of the foreign government on the Congress-centered policy process will vary with the issues. Given the three different types of issues, we can make the following proposition:

The foreign government is more likely to successfully exert its influence on the Congress-centered policy process and hence increase the constraints on the congressional opposition, on the external/strategic and electoral/economic issues than on the emotive/moral issues.

¹¹It is not ruled out that a foreign government can occasionally exert considerable influence on the U.S. Congress. For example, it is generally recognized that Madame Chiang Kai-shek, the wife of the first leader of the Nationalist Chinese government on Taiwan, was a very effective lobbyist for the Chinese nationalist government's interests in the United States. But such cases have been rare and tended to occur under special circumstances.

This proposition is based on the assumption that when the congressional opposition acts on either the external/strategic or electoral/economic issues, there will be a diversity of views on the policy issue in question. In addition to the differences that may arise between the congressional opposition and the administration, there will be a counter-opposition in Congress as well as pressure groups outside the Congress. This will give the foreign government an opportunity to influence the legislative process. The intervention of the foreign government is thus likely to strengthen the positions taken by the administration and the congressional counter-opposition.

On the other hand, when the congressional opposition acts on an emotive/moral issue, there will be much less diversity of views among members of Congress and between the congressional opposition and the administration. As noted earlier, human rights belongs to this type of issue. The counter-opposition will be minimal on such issues. Therefore, the foreign government is much less able to influence the process and can impose fewer constraints on the congressional opposition.

Congressional Opposition and Interest Groups When congressional attitudes toward a foreign country are dominated by a single perspective, the number of interest groups that can influence the process will be very limited. As the previous studies on the making of U.S. China policy told us, during the long hostile period of Sino-U.S. relations in the 1950s and 60s, the China Lobby was a predominant ideological pressure group that exerted influence on every major U.S. China policy (Koen 1960; Steele 1966; Bachrack 1976). There were virtually no groups that could counter it during the period.

In the normal period of a bilateral relationship, however, such a group can no longer have a predominant influence. Instead, members of Congress, with their diversified attitudes, will be relatively open to the influence of a number of issue-oriented interest groups. Like the issue-oriented congressional opposition, those interest groups that oppose a specific policy favoring a foreign country will be mainly concerned with the salience of the policy issue and

how to realize their own policy goals. They may not oppose the development of the bilateral relationship *per se* but care little about how the policy outcome will affect the bilateral relationship. The penetration of interest groups into the policy process would be accelerated by their increasing numbers, as has been observed during the past two decades (Walker 1983; Ornstein 1984). Many of these groups are highly committed to single issues and are most likely to draw bilateral issues into domestic politics in order to achieve their policy objectives with a minimal consideration of what consequences it may bring to U.S. foreign relations.

How will the availability of interest groups affect the congressional opposition? Kingdon (1981) notes that interest groups tend to have slight influence on congressional voting unless they have some constituency connection. If so, we can expect that the influence of interest groups is likely to vary on different types of issues. We can further expect that interest groups advocating a particular type of issue will promote or strengthen a particular type of role the congressional opposition plays and hence the opposition's influence on a particular policy. Therefore, considering the different constituency connections, we can argue that

- (1) the groups advocating electoral/economic issues (e.g., foreign import restrictions) are more likely to be influential than those advocating external/strategic ones (e.g., nuclear nonproliferation); and
- (2) the former groups are more likely to push the congressional opposition to assume the assertive role (and the generating effect) in the policy process than the latter, who tend to strengthen the reactive role (and the constraining effect of the congressional opposition in the policy process).

It nearly goes without saying that not all the interest groups involved in the policy process support the congressional opposition. Because of the countervailing phenomenon on many issues (Wilson 1980, Chapter 10; Kegley and Wittkopf 1982, 266-7), some interest groups can form a *de facto* coalition with the foreign government if their own interests are somewhat coincident with those of the latter. Various economic interest groups, for example, would tend to have very different views on foreign trade issues (e.g., freer trade vs. protectionism) depending on their products and markets. Indeed, as noted earlier, the

availability of such groups could contribute to the influence of the foreign government in the policy process.

It can also be expected that on emotive/moral issues such as human rights, interest groups are likely to be quite influential in the policy process and push the congressional opposition to assume the assertive role. This would constitute additional difficulty for the foreign government attempting to influence Congress on human rights policies, since there will be few countervailing interest groups available here. Culhane and Hacker (1988), for example, found that Amnesty International's grassroots lobbying had a significant influence on human rights legislative activities in the U.S. Congress in the absence of countervailing groups.

Congressional Opposition and Counter-Opposition Clearly, the congressional opposition's interactions with the administration, the foreign government concerned, and interest groups will ultimately affect its balance with the counter-opposition in Congress. In the meantime, the nature of this counter-opposition will also affect policy influences of the congressional opposition. As noted earlier, the counter-opposition, like the opposition itself, is issue-oriented in the making of normal-bilateral foreign policies. A small number of legislators may still consider policies in terms of a single perspective, such as the strategic importance of the bilateral relationship. But many will support a policy favoring a foreign country and/or the bilateral relationship because their interests happen to be coincide with those of the foreign government on that particular issue. Thus, much as with the congressional opposition, the salience of an issue will determine the formation of the counter-opposition in the policy process; and its coalitions will also tend to vary with issues.

In the Congress-centered policy process, the counter-opposition is the only direct force that can potentially limit or even deny the legislative success of the congressional opposition, depending on the size of its coalition. Since the congressional opposition is likely to arise in relatively popular issue areas and therefore have an issue advantage, the strength of the counter-opposition on these issues will be limited. It will frequently find itself in a minority.

As a result, its leaders will try to avoid an all-or-nothing outcome by seeking a compromise that could minimize the coalition's expected loss (Enelow 1984). They may also function as "blocking coalitions" (Herzberg 1986) by resorting to procedural strategies (e.g., threat of filibuster) to block or delay the actions of the opposition. But the success of such strategies may not be clear, especially in view of the parliamentary skills possessed by the issue leaders of the opposition. Based on the analysis so far, we can then make the following propositions:

- (1) The counter-opposition is likely to anticipate and rely on outside forces, particularly the president, to contain the legislative drive of the opposition on all the three types of issues;
- (2) such a reliance will tend to be greatest when the opposition, in a majority status, is playing the assertive role; and
- (3) the level of the counter-opposition will be much lower on emotive/moral issues where the congressional opposition is more likely to build an oversized or even universalistic coalition than on the other types of issues.

Policy Influences of the Congressional Opposition

Now let us summarize the points so far on the policy influences of the congressional opposition as a function of the issues, the opposition's roles, and its interactions with the four other major forces in the policy process:

- The influence of the congressional opposition is likely to be relatively moderate on the external/strategic issues such as nuclear nonproliferation, because of the executive's very limited concessions, the pressure from the foreign government concerned, and the lack of strong domestic-oriented interest groups linking the issues closely with constituents' interests.
- The congressional opposition is likely to exert a substantial influence on electoral/economic issues such as foreign import restrictions, because of the executive's likelihood to make significant concessions and the strong influence of domestic interest groups on these issues; but at the same time, such an influence will be limited by an opposing coalition of the administration, the foreign government concerned, the countervailing interest groups, and the counter-opposition in Congress.
- The congressional opposition will have the greatest impact on emotive/moral issues such as human rights because, in addition to the executive's likely acquiescence and lack of countervailing pressure groups, the foreign government can exert only minimal influence on the legislative process in this issue area.

-The policy influence of the congressional opposition on each type of issue will be marginally strengthened if it plays the assertive role with its initiating function.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that in the absence of single-perspective-dominated congressional attitudes during the normal period of a bilateral relationship, there will arise a variety of issue-oriented coalitions of congressional opposition in the making of the normal-bilateral policy. These coalitions will tend to emerge in issue areas like foreign import restrictions, nuclear nonproliferation, and human rights. I differentiated these issues into electoral/economic, external/strategic, and emotive/moral categories in accordance with lawmakers' personal goals and the orientations of congressional interest these issues can induce. I then discussed the intensity of congressional opposition in terms of these different types of issues and their linkage with the three different dimensions of foreign policy making. I contended that the policy influence of a coalition of congressional opposition would vary with the types of issues, the roles it plays, and the constraints exerted by each of the other four major forces in the Congress-centered policy process.

The rest of this dissertation will test the theoretical arguments outlined in this chapter by examining the behavior of congressional opposition in the formulation of U.S. China policy from 1982 through 1988--a normal period of the bilateral relationship between the two countries. I will look into the congressional attitudes toward China during the period and then conduct three case studies selected from each of the three issue areas noted in this chapter. But before that, I will first discuss the methodology used in the research.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY: A RECONCILIATION OF TWO APPROACHES

For a long time, the case study was a leading research strategy in the discipline of political science. The last few decades, however, have seen this traditional method being significantly challenged by the quantitative approach, a product of the sweeping behavioral revolution that began in the 1950s. Quantitative analysis has become a major research tool in the field of American politics, especially in the areas of electoral and legislative behavior, as demonstrated by various issues of the prestigious *American Political Science Review*. But it has also permeated the domain of international relations and the area of U.S. foreign policy--strongholds of the case study and other traditional methods--particularly since the mid-1960s.¹ In this chapter, I will first take a look at these two major methodological approaches and then discuss my research strategy in the light of the content of my study and the strengths and limitations of both the case study and quantitative analysis in the study of foreign policy making.

A Comparison of the Two Approaches

The quantitative study became attractive because of its scientific value and precision. Research relying on hard, statistical data is more likely to identify the relationship between variables. Explanations can be formulated so that they can be tested and researched

¹One of the most significant works was the Correlates of War project initiated by J. David Singer and his associates in the mid-60s. It has been the main source of scientific data on the frequency, magnitude, and severity of war, including civil war, since 1815. It has also provided reliable data on alliances, arms races, national capability, and serious disputes (see, for example, Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972).

systematically. Consequently, "one of the major contributions of quantitative analysis has been to show that many of the things we thought were true are wrong" (Vasquez 1986, 206).

Singer noted that the critical difference between the two methods is the "N/V ratio":

the traditional researcher tends to look at a very few cases (and often only one) at a time, producing a very small N (number of cases) while trying to cope with and analyze a fairly large V (number of Variables). This may make for interesting narrative but not for compelling theory. The modern social scientist, on the other hand, tries to limit himself to a few variables (V) at a time, but seeks to measure their role in the largest feasible number of cases (N), seeking an N/V ratio with maximum organizing efficiency (1969, 66).

According to Singer and other behaviorists, the scientific method will eventually produce the kind of systematic body of knowledge that exists in the physical sciences. However, there remains considerable doubt that such a scientific progress can be truly made, since problem definition in political science cannot secure autonomy from external social forces as that in the natural sciences (Dryzek 1986).

Despite the increasing popularity of the quantitative approach, the case study nevertheless remains as important a method as ever in the study of American foreign policy and policy-making process. From Allison's study of the Cuban Missile Crisis (1969) to Alexander George's work on the presidential policy making (1980), case studies have virtually dominated the research on presidential foreign policy making. It is also a common approach to the study of presidential-congressional relations in foreign policy, as reflected in most of the works reviewed in Chapter I.

This seems to indicate that a particular research method can be applied only to certain areas of study. Take the studies of the presidency and Congress for example. Students of Congress tend to rely more on quantifiable data, while presidential scholars have long focused on case studies and other qualitative approaches (Mezey 1985, 520). The quantitative analysis of legislative behavior is particularly effective and cumulative in result (see Rieselbach for a summary of the research, 1983) because of the availability of large amounts of quantifiable data (e.g., roll-call votes) and the relative openness of data sources (such as easy access to

congressmen and their staff members) to systematic surveys and interviews. But it is apparently much less useful in the study of the presidency and executive branch which, with hierarchy, secrecy and few numerical indicators, make it very difficult for scholars to conduct quantitative research (Spitzer 1983, 2-3). Some data does exist in the area of presidential-congressional relations, such as the Presidential Support Scores and the Presidential Boxscores provided by the *Congressional Quarterly*. These data, though very valuable and indicative, are nevertheless inadequate (Wayne 1978, 168-172; Bond and Fleisher 1980, 293-296; Peterson 1985, 40-43). Some researchers have made strenuous efforts to revise them in order to measure the presidential influence in Congress more successfully (see, for example, Edwards 1985), but the application of such methods remains quite limited. Thus, with the difficulty of generating quantitative data regarding the presidency, the case study often becomes the only available choice (Edwards 1984a).

The difference between foreign and domestic policies further complicates the use of the quantitative method. While scholars have found that foreign policy is becoming increasingly mingled with domestic politics, the fact remains that statistical data related to foreign policy making is much harder to obtain than that related to domestic policy making. This is not merely because of the secret nature of foreign policy making, but because of the difficulty in quantifying some of the variables and the relatively small number of cases available in the area (Jacobson and Zimmerman 1969, 5). Besides, the quantitative approach has some problems of its own. For example, it may miss some of the subtlety, some of the nuance, and some of the flavor of real politics (Goldsmith and Boo 1989).

On the other hand, case studies can illuminate abstract theories through concrete, colorful examples and they are concisely focused in time and range of observation (Graber 1968). They are "valuable at all stages of the theory-building process," particularly "the stage at which candidate theories are 'tested'" (Eckstein 1975, 80). Some influential case studies have shown that the use of this research method can produce highly-valued theoretical models.

Richard Neustadt's *Presidential Power* (1960) has considerably enhanced the understanding of the nature and limitations of presidential power and significantly stimulated future studies in this area. Allison's study of the Cuban Missile Crisis resulted in three influential decision-making models, which have dominated much of the research on the foreign policy making process within the executive branch. The case study strategy adopted by George and Smoke (1974) has also become a well-recognized model in the study of American foreign policy. These studies, along with many others that have followed them, indicate that the case study continues to be a very useful research tool in political science.

As an alternative to the quantitative approach, the case study has certain limitations which the other may not. For example, there is the danger that case studies concern unique events and fail to provide a basis for generalization--one of the primary goals of systematic research. In reviewing recent works on Congress and foreign policy, Deering noted that too often "the cases are chosen because they are unusual, which underrepresents 'normal' decision making. This, in turn, limits the extent to which generalizable statements can be drawn from the studies" (1983, 246). Deering echoed Lowi's warning made many years ago (1964) that the failure to examine decisions within categories seriously limits the utility of case studies and prevents that analysis from becoming cumulative. Without such categories, it becomes impossible to pick even a purposive sample of decisions (Deering 1983, 245-46). As will be discussed shortly, the approach I take in this research reflects my strong consideration of these limitations as well as my efforts to reduce them.

The Approach of the Study

A lengthy discussion of the different research methods and their respective merits and limitations is unnecessary here. The point I want to make is that which research strategy one should adopt depends on what one studies. In some areas where statistical data are difficult to gather, it is particularly inappropriate to rely on the quantitative method. In others, one may

achieve better results by combining the two major research methods than by using only one. Based on that premise, my dissertation will rely on a certain combination of the two methods. The case study will be employed as the major strategy for the study of the issue coalitions of congressional opposition in the making of U.S. China policy during the normal period of the bilateral relationship. At the same time, quantitative analysis will be used whenever possible to supplement the case studies.

My use of the case study approach is related to the purpose of this research. As discussed in the previous chapter, the major objective of this dissertation is to demonstrate the nature of the congressional opposition and its roles and influences in the making of normal-bilateral foreign policy. I have argued that congressional opposition is likely to be active in those issue areas that can induce a strong inward, outward, or mixed orientation of congressional interest and that its influence is likely to vary on different types of issues. Because the normal period of Sino-American relations was relatively short, however, the number of cases in which Congress had been involved was not sufficient to warrant a random selection for a quantitative analysis.

The case study approach is also able to reflect another purpose of the study, which is to examine the interactions between the congressional opposition and the forces of the congressional counter-opposition, the administration, the foreign government concerned, and domestic interest groups taking part in the Congress-centered policy process, and the constraints of these forces on the policy influence of the congressional opposition. Unlike quantitative analysis, the case study can vividly depict the policy-making *process*. It is especially good for demonstrating the *dynamic* interactions among the participants, between and within each of the two branches, and between the executive, members of Congress, domestic interest groups and the foreign government.

The case study method is also suitable for the study of the *issue-oriented* legislative policy process since it can deepen our understanding of the issues under study. By comparing

the results of several case studies (a multi-case approach), we are able to identify the similarities, and especially the differences, of the policy-making processes involving different issues, and determine how issues and politics are related to each other. Based on this comparison, some generalizations may be reached with regard to the relationship between types of issues and types of policy role and influence of the congressional opposition. This approach also allows us to identify the different kinds of behavior that may be exhibited by the executive, the foreign government, and domestic interest groups in the making of different normal-bilateral foreign policies.

The major limitation of the case study method for this research is its inability to provide precise measures of the variables we use to assess the policy impact of the congressional opposition. This is especially so with respect to measures of influence. Since it is impossible to apply quantitative techniques to the basically qualitative attributes in each single case, the best outcome of the case studies may only demonstrate the relative differences or degrees of the same variable (e.g., influence) among the cases under study.²

Selection of Cases

Three cases will be selected for the study of the congressional opposition in the making of U.S. China policy during the normal period of the 1980s. They are the U.S.-China nuclear cooperation agreement, Chinese textile imports and the textile bill of 1985, and Chinese family planning policy and the cutoff of U.S. aid to UNFPA. These cases are intended to reflect the following three purposes.

Different Issues Each case is from a different one of the three issue areas in which congressional opposition is likely to occur: nuclear nonproliferation (the nuclear agreement), foreign import restrictions (the textile case), and human rights (the UNFPA case). They are also

²In Chapter VIII, I will deal with in length the question of how to assess the influence of the congressional opposition.

intended to reflect the three different types of issues: external/strategic (nuclear nonproliferation), electoral/economic (foreign import restrictions) and emotive/moral (human rights). We want to see how the congressional opposition behaved on those issues represented by the three cases. We also want to see the interactions of the congressional opposition with the congressional counter-opposition, the administration, the Chinese government, and domestic interest groups.

Different Roles According to the arguments I made in Chapter II, different types of issues should demonstrate the congressional opposition's different roles and influences. These three cases are therefore chosen to reflect three different behavioral roles as well as the different functional roles and effects of the congressional opposition: the nuclear case (revising, constraining, and reactive); the textile case (initiating, generating, and assertive); and the UNFPA case (supplementing, amplifying, and react/assertive). We want to see whether these specific roles and effects in each of the three cases would lead to different behaviors among the major participants and different levels of policy influence of the congressional opposition in the Congress-centered processes.

Different Cases in the Same Year All of the three cases took place in the year 1985, during the Second Session of the 99th Congress. The major reason for selecting cases within the same year is the ability to control for certain significant variables. This approach allows us to see how the congressional opposition would behave in the making of different normal-bilateral foreign policies when congressional membership, lawmakers' partisan and ideological orientations, and the administration are all subject to minimal change. If the congressional opposition behaves differently from one case to another with few changes in those variables, then we can conclude more confidently that the behavior of the congressional opposition is likely to be more influenced by something other than the variables under control. In addition, the year of 1985 was about the middle of the normal period of the bilateral relationship between the United States and China. It was a typical normal year of the relationship in which

while disagreements clearly existed, there were frequent, positive interactions between the two countries.

It could be argued that the behavior of congressional opposition may change from one year to another, especially since the variables mentioned above do change over time. However, such changes should be both gradual and generally minor so long as they take place during a normal period of the bilateral relationship. We can therefore assume that the general condition during the normal period would not vary much from one year to another barring the inauguration of a new administration. The selection of a "middle" year is thus part of the effort to eliminate these types of variances. It was argued in Chapter II that congressional attitudes toward China, rather than some other variables, would be the major factor influencing congressional behavior in the making of U.S. China policy. If congressional attitudes remained quite diversified during the normal period, a question that will be the focus of the chapter that follows, then an issue-oriented congressional opposition should occur. By focusing on the cases of one year while controlling for the other variables, we will see more clearly the variance of the behavior of the congressional opposition across different issues.

Sources of Data

One of the advantages of the case study is that it allows the researcher to collect data through a variety of sources (Yin 1984, 20). Various types of sources and evidence, with careful documentation, can help eliminate the risk of bias (Johnson and Joslyn 1986, 113). Therefore, I will rely on four major sources of data in conducting this research: official documents, personal and private papers, interviews, and major independent newspapers and journals.

Official Documents Congressional documents are essential for research on legislative behavior. The *Congressional Record* contains the floor speeches and remarks made by members of Congress, particularly the issue leaders of the congressional opposition and its

counter-opposition, who are active on a policy issue. These statements usually express the rationale for supporting or opposing a specific policy toward China. Thus, different congressional views can be identified through examining these congressional statements. Congressional hearings and markups, on the other hand, offer detailed information on the nature of a particular issue, usually provided by administration officials, congressional issue leaders, outside experts, and representatives of various interest groups. Committee hearings and markups can help the researcher identify different coalitions formed by members of Congress, executive officials or agencies in the executive branch, and domestic interest groups around specific policy issues. They are particularly useful in detecting the major policy differences between the two branches. Congressional roll-call votes do not clearly express the views of a lawmaker, as the other documents would do, since they essentially offer him/her only two choices. But they are highly valuable for analyzing a congressman's voting behavior, testing the influence of partisanship, ideology, presidential leadership, regionalism and other variables on the legislator. Apart from congressional documents, public statements from the administration are also important since they reflect the official views of the U.S. government. The chief sources for these views are the *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* and the *Department of State Bulletin*.

As for the Chinese government's response to the congressional opposition in the making of U.S. China policy, I rely on two major sources: the *People's Daily* and the *Beijing Review*. The former is the official Chinese newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), reflecting the policies of the Chinese government. The latter is an official English-language weekly, a major source of information for foreigners on the official line of the Chinese government.

Personal Files and Private Papers While official documents reveal the different views and opinions of lawmakers and governmental officials, they do not clearly reflect the motives behind the actions taken by policymakers or the strategies they used in forming coalitions. For

these, I turn to the personal files and private papers that can be obtained from some congressional staff members and lobbyists. These sources enable me to gain important and a considerable amount of knowledge of the activities of different coalitions behind the scene.

Interviews An integral part of the research was the 126 interviews I conducted in Washington in three separate years: fifteen in the summer of 1985, ninety-five between November of 1987 and October of 1988, and sixteen in the spring of 1989. This number does not include repeated interviews with the same respondent. Of 126, there were six members of Congress; fifty-one committee and personal staffers; thirty-four executive officials in the Departments of State, Commerce, and Energy, including four from the office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and the White House staff; seven specialists at the Congressional Research Service (CRS); ten lobbyists; six journalists; and twelve Chinese officials from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Economic and Trade Affairs, and the State Science and Technology Commission.

I identified potential interviewees using the "grapevine" (or snowball) strategy, asking one respondent to introduce another one or more for further interviews. Despite the problems normally associated with this sort of "chain referral sampling," it is particularly applicable when the focus of study is on sensitive subjects such as foreign policy issues, which require the knowledge of insiders to locate people for study (Biernacki and Waldorf 1981). All the interviews were generally conducted in an open-ended fashion, allowing free discussions of the cases and other broader issues regarding the making of China policy. Such an approach was preferred for my three case studies, since it substantially helped me comprehend the nature of the issues in question and politics involved. Apart from asking questions that sought a better understanding and detailed knowledge of the cases, I also asked congressional respondents questions such as: "What factors do you think influence you most when you consider a policy issue related to China?" "What do you think of China's importance to the United States?" "Why was the senator (congressman) so interested in the issue?" "What

factors can you identify to explain the congressman's opposition to the policy?" And so on. The purpose of raising these questions was to gain a general sense of congressional attitudes toward China and how that was related to congressional behavior on a particular issue. The duration of the interviews ranged widely, from twenty minutes to more than four hours, with the majority between sixty to ninety minutes.

It should be noted that while the snowball strategy and open-ended interview technique tend to maximize the researcher's chance to clarify, illuminate, and probe more deeply into the subject matter, they seem to preclude the use of statistically powerful analytic techniques on the resulting data (Aberbach, Chesney and Rockman 1975). However, this did not present me with a particular problem since my major objective was to explore the cases.

Obviously, foreign policy issues are much more sensitive than domestic ones because they may involve national security. They are even more so if the researcher has a foreign background. Therefore, a tape recorder was not used during the interviews so that the interviewees would feel more candid in discussing the cases. For the same reason, they were not attributed for any citations or information. In most cases, I took only brief notes during the interview, and then reorganized them through recollection immediately after the interview. This technique helped me recapture nearly all the information I had received from the interview. Even though, I still feel extremely reluctant to directly quote what the interviewee said--even without attribution--in case I did not catch the exact words.

Major Newspapers and Journals Some major American independent newspapers and journals can also be important sources of information. The *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Wall Street Journal* are highly respectable newspapers in the United States, and their news reports are relatively more reliable than many other papers. Their editorials are regularly read and well regarded by policymakers in both the executive and legislative branches. The *Far East Economic Review*, *U.S. Export Weekly*, and *Textile World* are among the journals that often carry quite detailed stories on certain subjects and interviews with U.S. governmental officials

and lawmakers. For example, the *Textile World*, an organ of the U.S. textile industry, is informative on the relationship between the industry and both branches of the U.S. government. There are some other good newspapers and journals that have assisted my research.

I used the newspapers and journals mainly for two purposes. First, they helped me with the chronology of each case, facilitating my collection of facts and the assembly of the pieces of a case. Second, they helped me identify the major players in each case, enabling me to contact them for interviews. They also provided some valuable information on the conflicts and contradictions within the administration and among lawmakers and interest groups, which often became one focus of my interviews with the people involved.

Quantitative Research

As discussed earlier, the kind of research strategies employed depends on the subject. The case study is especially useful for the examination of the dynamic roles of the major players in a policy-making process concerning a particular issue. However, it is too inadequate a tool to serve one of the purposes of my research, which is to trace congressional attitudes toward China during the normal period of the bilateral relationship between the two countries. As noted in Chapter II, if we want to know how members of Congress behave in the making of the normal-bilateral policy, we must first get to know the attitudes the legislators hold toward the particular foreign country. In this respect, the quantitative approach can accomplish what the case study fails to do. But one prerequisite of this approach is the availability of quantifiable data. How can we get this data on the congressional attitudes toward China in the 1980s? Indeed, no one has ever conducted a systematic congressional survey on it. It is certainly possible to do so if we want to know the current status of the congressional attitudes toward China. Yet it would not tell us how different these attitudes are from those several years ago. To keep track of congressional attitudes over the years, one

good method would be the panel study that permits the researcher to use a standard questionnaire to interview the same group of randomly selected members of Congress over time. But this was practically impossible because the group that was randomly selected for interviews in the early 1980s might not have existed at the end of the decade, due to a possible membership turnover. For a similar reason, the use of the "recall" method would not yield a good result either, considering the fact that some people may not clearly remember what his attitudes were several years ago.

One alternative is to look at the congressional roll-call votes over the years to detect the congressional attitudes. That is, let the congressman's behavior explain his attitudes. The most obvious defect of this resort is the very small number of votes available. These limited votes do not tell us how congressional attitudes were distributed among members of Congress and how diversified they were. Although we may get some idea from the roll-call votes of how the congressional opposition increased during the period, we could not know how it was related to congressional attitudes during the same period.

A better alternative, which is utilized in this study, is the content analysis technique. This method is particularly appropriate for studying beliefs, attitudes and human relations (Holsti 1969; Woodrum 1984). It "essentially provides methods for measuring the characteristics of communications, both manifest (e.g., word frequencies, symbol coincidences) and latent (e.g., theme presence, thematic interrelations)" and facilitates the use of quantitative techniques for theoretical inference from symbolic information (Woodrum 1984, 2-3). This method, therefore, is employed here to examine the statements and remarks made by members of Congress on issues related to China. These statements and remarks are most likely to reveal not only the lawmaker's position on a specific policy issue, but his/her general attitudes toward China. The only source that regularly records congressional remarks is the *Congressional Record*. Every year, a number of lawmakers make floor speeches and debate on China-related issues. Content analysis of these speeches helps us identify the trends in

congressional attitudes toward China, and find how diversified the attitudes were in each year. Then, we may detect the changes, if any, of these attitudes over the years.

Relying on the *Congressional Record* has several problems, though. First, those who expressed their opinions on the floor were voluntary speakers. They were not randomly selected. Second, these speakers tended to be more active on China policy than other members of Congress. Finally, since lawmakers tended to react to outside events, the number of statements and remarks varied each year, depending on the events that occurred in a given year. Because of these problems, it should be noted that the result of the content analysis is unlikely to reflect the *exact* or *absolute* congressional attitudes toward China. Rather, it is better used on a relative basis and for comparative purpose.

To achieve a better result, I divided the congressional attitudes into two major categories: unfavorable and favorable. The unfavorable attitudes are affected by four perspectives (or subattitudes): ideological, value-oriented, trade-related, and pro-Taiwan. The favorable attitudes are affected by three other perspectives (or subattitudes): strategic, economic, and other importance of China (e.g., emphasis on China's population, call for better relations with China). The coding strongly reflects the consideration of combining word and thematic indicators so as to achieve a greater degree of reliability and validity.³ In addition, the indicators are all familiar terms and they can be easily used and tested by other researchers on the same subject. Thus, a lawmaker's floor remarks are analyzed according to the coding of these seven perspectives (see details in the appendix). After calculating the total number in each perspective category into percentages, a proportional distribution of the congressional subattitudes in a given year is discovered. When this is done for each year, we can detect the

³For example, a speaker may express his opinion of China's strategic importance by using the word "strategic" which describes what s/he means most explicitly (word coding). On the other hand, the "economic" category (latent coding) can include several different expressions or words used by the speakers to express his/her theme favoring U.S.-Chinese relations for economic reasons (e.g., increasing trade or economic consultation with the Chinese, expanding U.S. foreign market or benefiting U.S. economy, etc.).

trends of the congressional attitudes during the normal period of the 1980s.

The content analysis of the *Congressional Record* is supplemented by the interviews with fifty-seven people on the Hill, as mentioned earlier. These interviews help answer why the congressional attitudes toward China had existed the way they did in the normal period of the bilateral relationship. It should be noted that all of these respondents were active on one issue or another related to China and therefore were not randomly selected from all legislators and staff members. Nevertheless, by combining these interviews with the content analysis, we can obtain a stronger sense of the congressional mood in the making of normal U.S. China policies.

While the quantitative approach is suitable for the study of the congressional attitudes toward China, it can also serve as an important component of the three case studies. As mentioned earlier, the congressional roll-call votes are most useful for analyzing congressmen's voting behavior, in this case testing the influence of partisanship, ideology, regionalism, presidential leadership and other variables on the lawmakers. In terms of ideology, I use the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) ratings to get a measurement of the ideological voting trend of the members of Congress on the three issues.⁴ In terms of presidential leadership, I use the *Congressional Quarterly's* presidential support scores to obtain a degree of presidential influence on each of the issues in question. The analysis of the roll-call votes will tell us much about whether and how members of Congress behaved on different issues, and therefore whether there were in fact diversified congressional attitudes toward China as we expect. If there existed an issue-oriented congressional opposition, we expect that the influence of these variables on the congressmen's voting behavior will tend to vary from one case to another, depending on each of the issues involved.

⁴The ADA scores are widely used by scholars and considered more accurate than other measurements (see, for example, Shaffer, 1982). The indexes have a relatively high degree of reliability and validity (Smith, Herrera and Herrera 1988).

Conclusion

Both the case study and quantitative analysis continue to be very important research methods in the discipline of political science. Each has its own unique advantages in some areas and limitations in others. What type of strategy should be taken depends much upon the content of the research. The congressional opposition in the making of U.S. normal-bilateral foreign policy is an area in which the combination of these two research methods should achieve a better result than the use of a single approach.

The case study seems to be the better choice for the study of the dynamic Congress-centered policy process in which members of Congress, the administration, the foreign government concerned, and domestic interest groups interact in the making of U.S. policies toward a foreign country. This approach is supported by the use of a variety of sources of data including official documents, interviews, personal files, and journalistic materials. But the case study is much less useful for the study of congressional attitudes and voting behavior. This deficiency can be best complemented by the use of quantitative techniques. In light of the lack of any survey data, the content analysis of the *Congressional Record*, along with supplementary information from interview data, can serve as valuable substitutes. In the meantime, differences and similarities in congressional voting behavior on different issues can be gauged by a careful analysis of the congressional roll-call votes in each of the cases under study. In the next chapter, I will first use content analysis to examine and analyze the congressional attitudes toward China during the normal period of the 1980s, and I will then discuss why the congressional attitudes changed the way it did in these years.

CHAPTER IV

CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD CHINA: TRENDS, DIVERSITIES, AND SOURCES OF CHANGE

In Chapter II, I argued that congressional attitudes are a central element in the study of the congressional behavior in the making of U.S. normal-bilateral policy. To understand the behavior of the congressional opposition in the making of U.S. China policy during the normal period of the bilateral relationship, we need to first examine to what extent lawmakers shared their attitudes toward the PRC. We want to see whether the congressional attitudes were dominated by one or two perspectives or were more diversified. In the end, we also want to know why the congressional attitudes were distributed the way they were, thus paving the way for the three case studies in the chapters that follow.

Diversity of Congressional Attitudes: Seven Perspectives

The content analysis of the floor statements and remarks made by members of Congress during 1981 to 1988, as contained in the *Congressional Record*, suggests that the congressional attitudes toward China during the period were made up of seven major perspectives or subattitudes that lawmakers tended to hold on that country. I classified these perspectives into two categories: "unfavorable" and "favorable." The unfavorable category includes four major perspectives: ideological, value-oriented, trade-related, and pro-Taiwan; the favorable one includes three: strategic, economic, and other importance of China. It is necessary to clarify the scope and meaning of each of the seven perspectives before we turn to the data itself.

A member of Congress was coded as holding an *ideological* perspective on China when

he/she expressed views on a China-related issue in explicit ideological terms. Such terms included "Red China" and "Communist China." Those who used the former expression in their remarks would be considered more ideological than those who only used the latter. Thus, the intensity of the ideological perspective can be seen by comparing the total numbers of the two terms used by the lawmakers in a given year. The *value-oriented* perspective is different from the ideological one in that a lawmaker expressed his or her unfavorable views toward China in terms of human rights and related expressions. Thus, the term "human rights" would be used as a major indicator of the value-oriented perspective members of Congress expressed in their floor speeches. In cases where this term of human rights was not explicitly used, the lawmaker's value-oriented perspective was judged on his other expressions such as complaints and criticisms of China's lack of religious freedom, forced abortion and so on. The unfavorable *trade-related* perspective was used when members of Congress expressed their complaints about trade (e.g., deficits, increase of Chinese cheap imports) and trade-related (e.g., the Chinese economic system) problems with that country. The *pro-Taiwan* perspective is a cluster of opinions expressed by members of Congress in favor of the government in Taiwan, including calls for maintaining close ties with Taiwan or descriptions of the government there as American "friends" or "allies."

In the favorable category, members of Congress were coded as having a *strategic* perspective when they expressed the geopolitical importance of China and Sino-U.S. relations to the United States, such as containing the Soviet Union or maintaining stability in Asia and in the world. The *economic* perspective, on the other hand, was applied to those who emphasized the importance of China and its bilateral relationship with the United States for the American economy, trade, and market abroad. Finally, the "*other importance of China*" is a general term for members' opinions that were not expressed in either strategic or economic terms. These opinions include such statements as that China was important because of its large population, as well as calls for closer ties with the PRC, or favorable comments on

cultural and scientific exchanges with China.

According to the arguments raised in Chapter II, if any one of the seven perspectives became predominant in the congressional attitudes, the congressional behavior in the making of U.S. normal-bilateral policy toward China would experience a substantial change. At the same time, however, these seven perspectives were apparently not equal in impact. For example, a predominant ideological perspective would have much greater effect on the congressional behavior than each of the other three unfavorable perspectives, as it did during the period of the 1950s and 60s. On the other hand, if the congressional attitudes were overwhelmed with the strategic importance of China to the United States, congressional behavior should be exceptionally warm and friendly toward China, since the concern of American national security naturally would dominate other interests. The degree of warmth and friendliness would be somewhat lower with the dominance of any other favorable perspectives. Therefore, when examining congressional attitudes during the normal period, we are particularly interested in the status of the ideological and strategic perspectives vis-a-vis the others.

Trends and Diversities

Having discussed the definitions of the seven perspectives and their comparative influence on congressional behavior, we now proceed to look at the findings of the content analysis of statements and remarks made by members of Congress as carried in the *Congressional Record* from 1981 to 1988. Figure 4.1 displays the relative changes of the seven perspectives during the period on a yearly basis, based on the percentage of each perspective calculated from the total entries in each year (for details, see the appendix). It shows several aspects of the congressional attitudes toward China during the period.

First, the most important thing the figure indicates is that from 1981 through 1988 both the ideological and strategic perspectives declined quite noticeably while the value-

FIGURE 4.1

Proportional Distributions of Seven
Congressional Perspectives on China, 1981-1988
(On a Yearly Basis)





FIGURE 4.2

Proportional Distributions of Seven
Congressional Perspectives on China, 1981-1988
(On a Two-Year Basis)



oriented perspective ascended, especially during 1986 and 1987. The other four perspectives experienced some ups and downs in the eight-year period. However, the changes of all seven perspectives are much clearer if they are observed on a two-year basis. As Figure 4.2 indicates, apart from the steady declines of the ideological and strategic perspectives, the favorable "other importance of China" and unfavorable pro-Taiwan perspectives were also weakened between 1981-82 and 1987-88. At the same time, the value-oriented perspective rose steadily from 5% in 1981-82 to 16% in 1985-86, and then increased sharply to 47% in 1987-88. The unfavorable trade-related perspective was strengthened between 1981-82 to 1983-84, and declined somewhat afterwards.

Second, no single perspective actually assumed a dominant position during the whole period under study, although occasionally the ideological, pro-Taiwan, and value-oriented perspectives were somewhat above the others. But Figure 4.2 does indicate that the value-oriented perspective had the tendency to rise to a predominant status at the expense of the others.

Third, after some fluctuations during 1981 and 1982, the seven perspectives became relatively stabilized and quite balanced during 1983 through 1985. Beginning in 1986, the congressional attitudes became somewhat volatile, mainly among the unfavorable perspectives. A significant result of the changes was that for three years (1986-88) in a row, each of the four unfavorable perspectives was either substantially above or at the same level with each of the three favorable ones (Figure 4.1). This showed that the unfavorable aspect of the congressional attitudes toward China increased in the later period of the normal-bilateral relationship between the two countries.

Fourth, during the entire eight year period, the level of the ideological perspective was considerably higher than that of the strategic one, although both had generally declined. This seemed to imply that in spite of the fact that ideology was no longer predominant, it tended to have a much stronger influence on congressmen's thinking than the strategic imperative


during the normal period of the bilateral relationship. It appeared that members of Congress were more likely to oppose China policies on ideological grounds than to defend them on strategic grounds. Indeed, since 1982 the strategic perspective, as reflected in the lawmakers' floor remarks, was rather insignificant compared with the others and eventually disappeared during 1988. During the same period, the favorable congressional attitude was somewhat sustained by the economic perspective and consideration of the other importance of China, even these two declined after 1985.

In addition to these aspects of the findings, there were other changes in the congressional attitudes toward China that could not be revealed by the two figures. Figure 4.3 shows that the frequency of the term "Red China" used in the congressional remarks entailing the ideological perspective dropped significantly after 1983 and reached zero during 1987 and 1988, thus indicating a noticeable decrease of the ideological intensity in congressional attitudes toward China. It also demonstrates the decline of the influence of the traditional anti-PRC forces that prevailed during the 1950s and 60s, since these lawmakers tended to oppose China by using the strongest ideological terms.

Another implication from Figures 4.1 and 4.2 is that members of Congress appeared to separate their value-oriented perspectives from the ideological ones. If we believe that those criticizing the Chinese government for its human rights record would also have a similar ideological intensity, then the trends of the value-oriented and ideological perspectives should parallel each other or at a similar level. But the result of the content analysis does not show that. Instead, it indicates that the value-oriented congressional attitude had increased steadily throughout the period while the ideological one had actually declined. It therefore suggests that in terms of the congressional attitudes toward China during the normal period of the bilateral relationship, members of Congress did not necessarily link the value-oriented issues closely with ideology. A closer look at the lawmakers' statements also reveals that conservative lawmakers were more likely to make the connection between the value-oriented

FIGURE 4.3

Distribution of Ideological Expressions, 1981-1988



and ideological perspectives than the moderates and liberals. During the first half of the 1980s, it was the conservatives who usually condemned the Chinese government of its human rights violations while the liberals remained largely silent. But after 1986, the liberals became increasingly outspoken on human rights issues and matched the conservative voice by the end of the normal period.

Three Attitudinal Tendencies

While Figures 4.1 and 4.2 have illustrated the changes in both the favorable and unfavorable attitudes by showing the trend of each of the seven perspectives during the period, they do not indicate whether and how a lawmaker could at the same time exhibit both types of attitudes toward China. Table 4.1 shows three groups of lawmakers who made at least three or more floor statements and remarks on China during 1981 to 1988 and revealed a favorable, unfavorable, or a mixed attitude. It indicates some patterns on the congressional attitudes in terms of party and ideology. Apparently, Republicans and conservatives were more likely to hold an unfavorable attitude toward China than Democrats and liberals. On the other hand, the favorable and mixed attitudes tended to be held by members of Congress across the partisan and ideological lines. Liberal Democrats, in particular, tended to hold either a favorable or a mixed attitude. Finally, the table shows that at least in terms of floor debates and remarks, the number of the lawmakers holding an unfavorable attitude was considerably larger than that of those with a favorable attitude. This, in part, explains why the unfavorable attitude tended to be stronger than the favorable one during the period, as both Figures 4.1 and 4.2 have indicated.

More importantly, however, Table 4.1 demonstrates the existence of a mixed attitude held by many members. It explains, in part, why an unfavorable attitude was unlikely to become dominant in Congress. This mixed attitude, accepted by liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans alike, appeared to serve as a buffer between the two more extreme

TABLE 4.1

**Lawmakers and the Three
Types of Attitudes Toward China***

Favorable	Unfavorable	Mixed
Senate	Senate	Senate
Howard H. Baker (R-C) Joseph R. Biden (D-L) Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (R-M) Robert Byrd (D-L)	Jeremiah Denton (R-C) John P. East (R-C) Barry Goldwater (R-C) Phil Gramm (R-C) Paula Hawkins (R-C) Jesse Helms (R-C) Gorton J. Humphrey (R-C) Malcolm Wallop (R-C)	Robert Dole (R-C) Mack Hatfield (R-M) John Heinz (R-C) Robert W. Kasten (R-C) James A. McClure (R-C) Frank Murkowski (R-C) Larry Pressler (R-M) Rrlen Specter (R-M) Steven D. Symms (R-C) Alan Cranston (D-L) Christopher Dod (D-L) John Glenn (D-L) Edward Kennedy(D-L) William Proxmire (D-L)
H.R.	H.R.	H.R.
David O'B Martin (R-C) Stephen J. Solarz (D-L) William F. Clinger (R-C) Don Bonker (D-L) Al Swift (D-L) Douglas K. Bereuter (R-C)	Dan Burton (R-C) Tom Corcoran (R-C) William E. Dannemeyer (R-C) Edward J. Dewinski (R-C) Robert K. Dornan (R-C) Jack Fields (R-C) Benjamin A. Gilman (R-C) Newt Gingrich (R-C) Thomas N. Kindness (R-C)	George W. Gekas (R-C) Robert H. Michel (R-C) John E. Porter (R-C) Richard Schulze (R-C) Tom Lantos (D-L) Edward Markey (D-L) James Scheuer (D-L) Gus Yatron (D-M) Christopher Smith (R-M)

(TABLE 4.1--Cont'd)

Favorable	Unfavorable	Mixed
H.R.	H.R.	H.R.
	Robert J. Lagomarsino (R-C) Ron Paul (R-C) Mark Siljander (R-C) Gerald B.H. Solomon (R-C) Don Sundquist (R-C) Philip M. Crane (R-C) Roy Dyson (D-C) Francis X. McCloskey (D-M) Larry McDonald (D-C) Stephen L. Neal (D-M) Charles Rose (D-M)	

- * The lawmakers listed here were those who made three or more statements on China during the period of 1981-88. Their ideological orientations were based on ADA's 1984 and 1985 ratings.

Sources: Various issues of the *Congressional Record*.

attitudes, preventing either one from assuming dominance. Since a lawmaker with a favorable or unfavorable attitude would be more susceptible to the influence of a single perspective, he would be much less likely to be so if he held a mixed attitude. Instead, the lawmaker's thinking would tend to be guided by different perspectives on different issues. Clearly, his position of support or opposition on particular issues would at one time contribute to the strength of those with a favorable attitude and at another time enhance the strength of those with an unfavorable one.

A closer look at the remarks made by each of the three groups of lawmakers would further reveal how diversified the congressional attitudes toward China were during the period. Those holding a unfavorable attitude tended to be strongly ideologically-oriented. All of those listed in Table 4.1 under the unfavorable category used either "Red China" or "Communist

China" in their speeches. They also consistently held the other three unfavorable perspectives: They generally wanted the United States to maintain its close ties with Taiwan for both strategic and economic reasons and advocated U.S. supply of military equipment to the Nationalist government there; they routinely condemned the Chinese government for its human rights violations; and they were also highly suspicious of American economic benefits from Sino-American relations. But there were some differences among these lawmakers in terms of their unfavorable feelings toward China. Some showed more ideological intensity than the others.

Table 4.2 lists the lawmakers who used the term "Red China" in their speeches. These eleven senators and representatives played the most important role in shaping the unfavorable

TABLE 4.2

**Lawmakers with Most Intensive
Ideological Orientation, 1981-88**

Lawmakers	Number of Remarks Using "Red China"
Barry Goldwater	34
Jesse Helms	5
Dan Burton	3
John P. East	2
Larry McDonald	2
Malcolm Wallop	2
Tom Corcoran	1
Philip M. Crane	1
Thomas N. Kindness	1
Ron Paul	1
Gerald B.H. Solomon	1

congressional attitude toward China during the period. They were the core of the anti-PRC forces in Congress.

By contrast, those lawmakers with a favorable attitude stressed the strategic, political

or economic importance of American relations with China. Some particularly emphasized the geopolitical significance of such a bilateral relationship. The Soviet Union, argued Rep. Stephen J. Solarz (D-N.Y.),

continues to pose a threat not only to us but to China. There may be situations in which we would deem it mutually advantageous to work together in an effort to contain the Soviet threat.¹

Others were more oriented toward the economic aspect of the relationship. On this point, the Democrats appeared to be much more enthusiastic than the Republicans. There was the expectation of a successful Chinese economic reform that would eventually benefit the United States:

The People's Republic of China is engaged in a broad-ranging reform of the entire Chinese economy. As a recent report in the New York Times indicates, these reforms have "set off an economic chain reaction that will inevitably alter the international balance of power." The report continues that "the ongoing conversion of China to a more prowestern and procapitalist orientation represents a peacetime victory for our political and economic system."... What is needed is a commitment by American industry and by our Government to assure a continued and growing U.S. presence in the expanding Chinese market.²

The People's Republic of China is in the middle of a dramatic economic and social transformation, which is opening this enormous market to American traders for the first time since World War II.... Today she is an important friend and an increasingly important trading partner.³

Lawmakers from the west-coast states that had a close trade relationship with the Pacific-rim countries especially emphasized the importance of U.S.-China relations in economic and trade terms. The State of Washington benefitted most from its trade with China and hence its lawmakers's economic perspective was naturally the strongest. As shown in Table 4.1, both Don Bonker and Al Swift were from Washington; both chaired important subcommittees with high interest in the China trade (Bonker on the House Foreign Affairs

¹*Congressional Record*, daily edition (hereinafter *Con. Rec.*), 10 December 1987, H11161.

²Robert C. Byrd (D-W.V.), *Con. Rec.*, 10 June 1985, S7852.

³Don Bonker (D-Wa.), *Con. Rec.*, 10 October 1985, H8648.

Committee's Subcommittee on International Trade and Economic Policy, and Swift on the House Commerce Committee's Special Subcommittee on the U.S.-China Trade).

TABLE 4.3

Lawmakers with the Mixed Subattitudes

	Ideological		Value-Oriented	Pro-Taiwan	Trade-Related
	R.C.*	C.C.**			
Cranston		+		+	
Dodd			+		
Gekas				+	
Glenn		+		+	
Hatfield		+			+
Heinz			+		+
Kasten				+	
Kennedy				+	
Lantos			+	+	
Markey		+	+	+	
McClure	+				
Michel	+		+	+	
Murkowski				+	+
Porter	+	+	+		+
Pressler	+			+	
Proxmire	+	+	+	+	
Scheuer		+	+		
Schulze					+
C. Smith		+	+		
Specter			+	+	
Symms	+	+	+	+	
Yatron			+		

* R.C. = "Red China"

** C.C. = "Communist China"

The group of lawmakers with a mixed attitude had the most diversified views on China and its relationship with the United States. These views varied between a strong ideological orientation to a clear recognition of the importance of China and Sino-American relations. Table 4.3 shows how the unfavorable perspectives varied among these lawmakers, who, in

various degrees, also displayed a favorable perspective through recognizing the importance of China and urging the United States to develop its relationship with that country.

It is clear that this group of lawmakers shared quite diversified attitudes among themselves. With the common interest in preserving and developing U.S.-China relations, many of them still viewed China from one or a combination of two or three unfavorable perspectives. With such a mixed attitude, it would be not surprising that their remarks often sounded "contradictory": criticizing or even condemning the Chinese government for many of its policies while expressing the importance of China and support of Sino-U.S. relations. For example, conservative Republican Sen. James McClure of Idaho was staunchly anti-Communist and still called the PRC "Red China," but he was one of the strongest supporters of U.S.-China nuclear cooperation with China, arguing that the congressional failure to approve the U.S.-China nuclear agreement could jeopardize the relationship between the two countries. By contrast, Sen. John Glenn of Ohio, a liberal Democrat, frequently pointed out the political and strategic values of developing close relationship with China, while attempting to impose strict restrictions on the nuclear agreement that could have prevented it from going into effect. Another liberal Democrat, Sen. Christopher Dodd of Connecticut, argued when he proposed a concurrent resolution criticizing the Chinese religious policy in 1984:

we must not seek a relationship with China at the expense of our values. That would not be in our interest, and ultimately, it would not further our bipartisan goal of a sound, healthy relationship with China, based upon a mutual understanding and respect that was so lacking for a large part of the modern era.⁴

The recurring rationale, as further put forward by Democratic Rep. Tom Lantos of California, was that raising problematic issues could influence the Chinese government and push it to change certain undesirable policies and hence improve the bilateral relationship:

It is the view of the congressional human rights caucus that strategic or other considerations must not be an excuse for sweeping human rights violations under the rug. As a matter of fact, it has been the consistent activity of the congressional human rights caucus and many other human rights organizations to expose Soviet

⁴Ibid., 17 May 1984, S12734.

human rights violations which led simultaneously to the improvement of human rights conditions in the Soviet Union and to the improvement in United States-Soviet relations. We expect and hope for a parallel pattern and outcome with respect to China.⁵

While there was an increasing feeling that the development of the bilateral relationship should not neglect the problems that existed between the two countries, my interviews with the people on the Hill suggested an additional aspect of the mixed attitude.⁶ More than half, or thirty-three of the respondents (most of them worked for liberal and moderate lawmakers) revealed the expectation that the economic reforms and open-door policy initiated by the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping at the beginning of the 1980s would gradually lead to a liberalized Chinese leadership, a more open, democratic Chinese political system and a market-oriented economy. Increasing interactions in the areas of economy, trade, culture, science and technology would help China move in that direction, as most strongly desired by those with a favorable attitude. For those with the mixed attitudinal tendency, raising the value-oriented and other problematic issues that occurred in the expanding relationship could also induce positive changes in the Chinese policies.

In the meantime, those working for conservative congressmen tended to have a suspicious view of the ongoing Chinese economic reforms. Although they acknowledged that there had been quite positive economic developments in China, they could not see how the economy would prosper with the Communist Party in control. They shared with their more liberal-oriented counterparts the view that it was necessary for the United States to press the Chinese government to change its domestic policies. But they put a much stronger emphasis on pressure than on positive inducement in making the Chinese government change its policies. They seemed to care less about whether pressure would have a negative effect on the bilateral

⁵Ibid., 3 June 1988, E1837.

⁶Most of the interviewees were either committee or personal staff members and they might not have reflected *exactly* the thinking of the lawmakers they served. But they apparently shared these views with the lawmakers and could have, in many ways, influenced the latter.

relationship than about the effectiveness of the pressure itself.

It has thus been demonstrated that during the normal period of the bilateral relationship between the United States and China, no single perspective dominated the congressional attitudes toward China. Instead, there was a variety of opinions coexisting among members of Congress. We have seen that a mixed attitude was clearly a major trend during the period and that it was held by members of Congress across the party and ideological lines.

Such a mixed congressional attitude affected the behavior of the lawmakers. It tended to make them consider the development of U.S.-Chinese relationship much less of a priority than before and pay more attention to the salience of individual issues that were emerging from the bilateral relationship--issues in which they were interested or specialized. As will be discussed in the three case studies, those lawmakers holding a mixed attitude were most likely to be issue leaders of the congressional opposition on a particular issue (e.g., Sens. J. Glenn, A. Cranston, W. Proxmire; Reps. C. Smith, E. Markey, J. Porter). Their positions (pro or con) would change from one policy to another, depending on the issues they were dealing with.

The strength of the lawmakers with a mixed attitude was apparently related to the weakness of those holding either a favorable or unfavorable attitude. With the diversity of congressional attitudes, it would be extremely difficult for the lawmakers with extreme attitudes to generate either an overwhelmingly friendly (e.g., based on the strategic perspective) or a hostile (e.g., based on the ideological perspective) congressional behavior on China. In order to exert their influences, advocates of either "pure" perspective must themselves become issue-oriented and seek issue coalitions. They had to either be allied with the issue leaders holding the mixed attitude or become issue leaders themselves, thus contributing more to an issue-oriented congressional behavior in making U.S. China policy.

Sources of Diversity and Change

Why did congressional attitudes toward China exist as they did during the normal

period of the bilateral relationship? How can we explain the decline of both the ideological and strategic perspectives and the noticeable rise of the value-oriented perspective among members of Congress? In Chapter II, I suggested that changes in congressional attitudes would tend to be affected by changes in both the external and internal environments to which members of Congress are exposed. In this section, let us look at the changes in these areas during the period under study.

The External Environment

The Soviet Factor In the international arena, the Soviet Union was always an important factor that had influenced congressional thinking on China. During the 1950s and 60s, congressional hostility toward China was not only related to the anti-Communist ideology but also to China's alliance with America's number-one adversary, the Soviet Union. During the 1970s, however, congressional attitudes changed significantly as many members of Congress recognized the rift between the two Communist giants and China's strategic value in containing the Soviet Union. As a result, they generally supported Nixon's historic trip to China in early 1972 and later the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries. At the beginning of the 1980s, the perceived Soviet threat, which had influenced Sino-American relations during the 1970s, continued to strengthen the strategic cooperation between the United States and China, particularly in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December of 1979. Consequently, the debate on the trade agreement between the United States and China in January of 1980 was tinged with anti-Soviet rhetoric and criticism of the Soviet invasion (for more detailed accounts of the impact of U.S.-Soviet relations on U.S. China policy and congressional views on China, see, for example, Stevenson 1985; Dulles 1972; Segal 1982; Levine 1978; Dittmer 1981; Garthoff 1985; Oksenberg 1982; Zhu 1989; Sutter 1983).

But the strategic significance of the relationship was somewhat reduced as China

began in 1982 to adopt a more independent policy position between the United States and the Soviet Union, and at the same time sought to expand its relations with the United States beyond the strategic dimension to economic, trade, science and technology areas, which were essential for the country's economic modernization program.⁷ Meanwhile, signs of positive changes in both Sino-Soviet and U.S.-Soviet relations were also emerging as the Soviets attempted to find solutions to its increasing economic problems at home and to the foreign policy dilemma created by its military involvement in Afghanistan. The pace of improving relations with both the United States and China appeared to quicken in 1985 when a new Soviet leadership headed by Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power. For the balance of the period under study, U.S. congressional attention was captured by Gorbachev's charismatic leadership and the dramatic changes in both Soviet foreign and domestic policies generated by his reform programs. China, once the focus of attention, subsequently fell into the background. As a result, the strategic value of Sino-American relations was reduced considerably in the eyes of many lawmakers.

Bilateral Arena Benefiting from the strategic relationship between the two countries in the late 1970s and early 80s, Sino-American relations developed remarkably well following normalization of the relationship in early 1979. The two countries also restored their economic and trade relations in 1980 when Congress overwhelmingly passed the trade accord granting the PRC the most-favored-nation (MFN) status. In 1982, the two governments reached a third joint communique on the Taiwan issue by agreeing on the restrictions of U.S. arms sales to the island, and thus managed to control the "Taiwan time bomb" (Solomon 1981, 33)--the most-threatening obstacle to the development of the bilateral relationship.

Since then, Sino-American relations had developed quite stably. The volume of two-

⁷On the subtle change in the Chinese policy toward both the United States and the Soviet Union, see, for example, Hu Yaobang, "Create a New Situation in All Fields of Socialist Modernization--Report to the 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of China," *Beijing Review*, 13 September 1982, pp. 29-33.

way trade reached \$7.8 billion in 1987. By the same year, United States private investment in China had totaled more than \$3 billion. In 1979, only a small number of Americans visited China; in the second part of the 1980s hundreds of thousands of them toured the ancient country every year. In 1978, there were virtually no government-sponsored Chinese students and scholars studying in the United States; in 1988 the number reached nearly 30,000. These are only some of the indicators for the depth of the development of U.S.-China relations.

While the old issue of Taiwan still persisted, new issues emerged from the increasing interactions. The rising trade volumes led to problems of deficits and protection, particularly in textile products. The expansion of scientific and technological exchanges touched upon the sensitive issue of U.S. high-tech transfer to China. The expansion of bilateral cooperation into the peaceful use of nuclear technology led to the question of the Chinese nonproliferation policy and practice. Among other things, the surge of American tourists and a growing number of American press corps in China made that country more and more exposed, in both positive and negative terms, to the outside, especially to the American public and members of Congress. Even the increase of Chinese students in the United States created some frictions between the two countries. Table 4.4 lists the major issues that surfaced from the development of bilateral relations, which attracted some attention from lawmakers.

Thus, the rapidly expanded relationship in the 1980s brought enormous benefits to both countries. At the same time they also caused concerns and grievances on each side. Apparently, if American policymakers continued to treat China in a special way dominated by the strategic perspective, statements of these concerns and grievances would be somewhat subdued in order not to jeopardize a strategic relationship with China.

But as noted earlier, the changes in the international arena, especially within the triangular relationship, had weakened the strategic perspective that prevailed in much of the 1970s. To an increasing number of U.S. lawmakers, the importance of U.S.-China relations had declined because of the reduced weight of China in the American strategic

TABLE 4.4

**Controversial Issues in Sino-American Relations, 1981-1988
(By Category)**

Trade

China's unfair trade practice
 China's failure to carry out grain agreements
 Restrictions on Chinese imports (mushrooms, Steel, textiles)
 Restrictions on China's launches of U.S.-made satellites

Value-Oriented

Hu Na Affair (In 1983, Chinese tennis star Hu Na sought political asylum in the United States and was subsequently granted.)
 Yang Wei Affair (In 1987, Yang Wei, a Chinese student studying in the United States, was arrested in China for conducting "counter-revolutionary activities.")
 Coercive Chinese family planning program (forced abortions, forced sterilization, and infanticide)
 Human rights in Tibet (independent movement in Tibet; Dalai Lama's visit to the United States in 1987)
 Religious Freedom in China
 Purges of Chinese intellectuals during the anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign in 1987
 Protection of Chinese students studying in the United States from possible persecution for participating democracy movement

Security and Foreign Policy

China's nuclear nonproliferation policy and nuclear export practice
 Restrictions on U.S. high-tech transfer to China and nuclear technology transfer
 Restrictions on arms sales to China
 China's sales of missiles to the Middle East (e.g., shipments of silkworm missiles to Iran)
 China's voting behavior in the United Nations

Taiwan

Continuing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan
 Call for the PRC's peaceful reunification with Taiwan

consideration. One senior congressional watcher in my interviews described the congressional sentiment this way:

This is not because Congress does not like China. What explains it then? My view is the strategic imperative. In late 1970s, the United States' position was quite vulnerable, it needed allies. China could help us. Now China has adopted an independent policy. The Soviets are preoccupied with domestic problems. Why should you give special treatment to China? China is asking too much, and there is no way to satisfy China. So we pull back.

This view reflected the thinking of the congressional interviewees. A staff member for the House Foreign Affairs Committee, who had been deeply involved in China-related issues, expressed this common view more bluntly:

People think that there is not much of U.S. benefit from U.S.-China relations. The geopolitical position is not stated in the way it was done before 1981. People do not worry about the consequences because we do not have much to lose.

For an increasing number of lawmakers, now that Sino-American relations had become normal, China should be treated in a normal way as many other nations were. Rep. Lantos, a well-known issue leader on the Tibetan issue, declared:

Our relations with China must be put on an adult basis. The honeymoon is over. It is an index of our respect for the American relationship with China that we are prepared to deal with problems in our relations with China.⁸

There was also a strong feeling among my respondents that the depth of U.S.-China relations was such that it could absorb any differences that arose in the bilateral relationship. These differences, in the words of a staff member for the Senate Appropriations Committee, could "be dealt with on an issue-by-issue basis and need not be related to other aspects of the relationship."

The Domestic Environment

The domestic environment, in the meantime, had also experienced changes that were compatible with the changes previously documented in congressional attitudes. This includes

⁸*Con. Rec.*, 3 June 1988, E1837.

changes in the positions of the administration, in public opinion, and in interest group pressure.

Changes in the Reagan Administration's Views Since the executive branch has the major responsibility for carrying out United States policy toward China, any significant changes in the views of the administration would have some impact on congressional thinking. Studies of the Reagan administration's China policy have strongly indicated that there was a noticeable change in the Reagan administration's view of China's role in American strategy toward the Soviet Union during Reagan's first term in office (see, for example, Garrett and Glaser 1987). At the beginning, Reagan's first Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, tried to continue the Carter administration's triangular policy of developing an overt strategic partnership with the PRC as part of a global coalition against Soviet expansion. But after George Shultz succeeded Haig in mid-1982, the administration tended to play down China's global strategic importance in the American strategy. Garrett and Glaser noted:

American officials scaled down their expectations of the role that China could play--and would be willing to play--as an active strategic partner in a global coalition. Rather, the administration viewed China's importance to the United States as stemming primarily from its passive role as a strategic counter-weight to Soviet power (1987, 270).

Instead, the administration considered Japan strategically and economically more important than China in East Asia and the Pacific region. The change in the administration's strategic consideration of China had coincided with the subtle change of Chinese foreign policy toward a more independent posture at the time, as noted earlier. It was no accident that during most of the 1980s, the Reagan administration treated the Sino-American relationship as that between friendly, non-allied states, apparently in recognition of China's independent foreign policy that avoided alignment with either superpower.

With the strategic significance of Sino-U.S. relations reduced, the administration displayed an increasing interest in the economic reform programs initiated by the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping. As President Reagan told his Chinese audience during his 1984 trip to Beijing:

Unlike some governments which fear change and fear the future, China is beginning

to reach out toward new horizons, and we salute your courage....Well, today in China, the reality of more small enterprises doing a thriving business, more families profiting from their own hard work and the bigger harvests they produce, and more investment in science and technology points to more opportunity for all.⁹

Within the administration, there were high expectations of a fundamental change in the Chinese economic system. Consider what a second high-ranking official in the State Department said during my interview conducted in March of 1988:

This administration wants to be favorable toward China on trade issues. Economic development in China is very valuable to the United States. Japan, for example, has an enormous value to the U.S. because we helped its economic development. We also have political interest in China. It seems to me that we have a bigger market in China than we originally expected.... China is more sophisticated in economic reforms than the Soviet Union. I'm optimistic about China's reforms.

One former administration official wrote in his book manifestly titled *Revolution*:

Since the early 1980s the Chinese people have tested a few of the fruits of capitalism, and their appetite seems barely whetted. They have embarked on a course from which there is no easy turning back, and if their success continues, they will never turn back. China will not become another United States, but we may see the day when Chinese capitalism emerges as one of the three or four major powers in the world (Anderson 1988, 16).

A review of the administration's public statements, as carried in the *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* and the *Department of State Bulletin*, detects not only the strong official enthusiasm with the Chinese reforms and hopes for their success but an increasing emphasis on economic cooperation, rather than the strategic imperative, between the two countries. These statements indicate the administration's new thinking about China as the bilateral relationship entered a normal period.

My interviews with thirty-four mid- and high-ranking officials in the Reagan administration also showed that as the bilateral relationship expanded to political, economic, cultural, and military areas, the decision-making process was increasingly extended from the National Security Council (NSC) and the State Department, to other more specialized departments and agencies and consequently became more issue-oriented and bureaucratically-

⁹"Address Before Community Leaders, Great Hall of the People, April 27, 1984," *Department of State Bulletin*, June 1984, p. 3.

contested. While my respondents in NSC and State still tended to emphasize the importance of Sino-U.S. relations (the higher an official's rank, the stronger his emphasis) in considering individual issues, the people from the Departments of Energy, Commerce, Defense, USTR, and the United States Agency for International Development (AID) tended to stress the importance of the individual issues they were dealing with.

One common view among the governmental respondents was that the Sino-U.S. relationship had developed to such an extent that it could absorb any problems that occurred between the two countries. They believed that both sides could now deal with these issues frankly without worrying much about their negative impact on the overall relationship.

The trends within the executive branch identified above broadly corresponded to many of those identified in the legislative branch. Clearly such executive views were likely to influence congressional opinions in the frequent interactions between the two branches and hence contribute to the diversity of congressional attitudes.

Changes in Public Opinion Since the late 1960s the American public opinion toward China had changed noticeably, with a substantial rise of "favorability," particularly during Nixon's historic trip to China in 1972 and Carter's normalization of relations with the PRC at the end of the decade (Russett and Deluca 1981, 391). According to the Gallup Polls, while only 20% of the general public rated China favorable in 1976, this rose to 42% in 1980. By the spring of 1989 (before the turmoil in Beijing started) it had reached 72%.¹⁰ Unlike the previous decades, the 1980s saw a majority of Americans holding a favorable attitude toward China. But such an opinion survey, which asked the respondent only one general question about his overall opinion of a country, can not be used to compare the congressional attitudes being considered here, since the measures employed in the two cases are very different. Meanwhile, the public opinion survey did not often encompass the more meaningful aspects of the public's attitudes, so we do not know for sure whether and how these attitudes were

¹⁰*Gallup Report*, No. 284 (May, 1989), p. 6.

diversified or how well they tracked with the seven subattitudes noted earlier.¹¹ However, it might be reasonable to suggest that if public opinion tended to be constrained by a predominant anti-Communist ideology during the hostile period of the bilateral relationship, this should have eased considerably as the relationship improved and became normal. Likewise, if the substantial gap between the general public's favorable attitude toward China and the Soviet Union in the late 1970s (42% vs. 13%) was due much to China's strategic counterweight against the Soviet Union (Russett and Deluca 1981, 389-91), then the much reduced difference in the two percentages of favorability in the spring of 1989 (72% for China vs. 62% for the Soviet Union) would indicate the decline of China's strategic importance to the United States in the eyes of the general public during the 1980s.¹² Consequently, the attitudes of the American public toward China during the normal period were likely to be more diversified than in a nonnormal period.

However the general public's attitudes were distributed, its influence on the congressional attitudes toward China should not be overestimated. This is in part because of the nature of an "uninformed, uninterested, unstable, acquiescent, and manipulable 'public voice'" on foreign affairs (Kegley and Wittkopf 1982, 287). Except for dramatic and overtly threatening events, the public is susceptible to the "extraordinary pull of domestic and private affairs even in periods of international crisis" (Almond 1960, 54). The general public may even care less about individual foreign countries and the United States' relations with them. Past polls indicated a significant lack of knowledge among the general public on even the most elementary facts of the China situation (Steele 1966, 95). Structurally speaking, it is apparently easier for the administration than the Congress to move considerably ahead of public opinion in attitude and policy change. This may suggest that congressional sentiment

¹¹Occasionally the survey does ask for opinions on certain specific but very salient policy issues, such as the admission of China to the United Nations or the recognition of the PRC.

¹²Ibid.

can reflect public opinion more accurately than the administration's positions. As the polls conducted in early 1979 (Boer 1980) showed, the congressional sentiment over U.S. relations with Taiwan following the normalization of ties with the PRC was largely consistent with the general public opinion at the time, which did not appear to be ready to accept the actions taken by the Carter administration. Nevertheless, any shift in the American public's attitudes toward a foreign country is likely to take place more slowly than with that of congressional attitudes, if we consider that policy makers tend to be better informed and hence more attentive than ordinary citizens.¹³

The Change in Interest Group Pressure Another change in the domestic environment that also contributed to the diversity of congressional attitudes was the replacement of the traditionally strong anti-PRC ideological groups with issue-oriented domestic interest groups. The one-time influential China Lobby (the Committee of One Million) vanished from the political scene during the 1970s as it failed both to prevent the PRC from entering the United Nations and to continue U.S. recognition of the Nationalist government in Taiwan--the two major goals for which it existed. As Sino-U.S. relations developed into a normal period, there emerged a different type of pressure group whose objectives were entirely separate from those that were active in the hostile period of the bilateral relationship. Table 4.5 lists some of the major groups that actively participated in the politics of making China policy at one point or another during the 1980s.

The table tells us four things. (1) It shows the considerable number of domestic interest groups involved in the politics of U.S. China policy making during the normal period of the bilateral relationship; (2) it shows the diversity of these groups, ranging across

¹³Some studies have demonstrated the disparities between elite (including members of Congress) and mass foreign policy opinions. Converse's study (1964) showed virtually no constraint within the general public's foreign policy attitudes as compared to the elites. Oldendick and Bardes (1982) also concluded that there were definite distinctions between the mass and the elites on foreign policy questions. Their data, for example, showed that in 1978 the elites (97.4%) favored "expanding trade with Communist China" more strongly than the mass (75.2%).

TABLE 4.5

**Domestic Interest Groups Active on China Policy Issues During the 1980s
(By Category)**

Groups Supporting Policies Favoring China and/or The Bilateral Relationship	Groups Opposing Policies Favoring China and/or The Bilateral Relationship
Economic Interests	
National Council for United States-China Trade American Nuclear Industry (The Industrial Forum) American Soybean Association American Farm Bureau National Association of Wheat Growers American Free Trade Association American Association of Exporters & Importers National Retail Industry Trade Action	American Textile Manufacturers' Institute American Apparel Association Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union Fiber, Fabric, and Apparel Coalition for Trade
Foreign (or Public) Policy Interests	
Population Crisis Committee Population Institute Alan Guttmacher Institute Audubon Society American Academy of Pediatrics	Nuclear nonproliferation groups: Nuclear Control Institute Union of Concerned Scientists Sierra Club National Resources Defence Council Public Citizen
Value-Oriented Interests	
	National Right to Life Committee, Inc. Roman Catholic Church American Life Lobby Amnesty International Office of the Tibetan Representative
Ideological Groups	
	Conservative Caucus Inc.

economic, foreign (or public) policy, value-oriented, and ideological interests; (3) many of them were single-issue groups, such as the anti-abortion National Right to Life, the Nuclear Control Institute, and the population-control advocate Population Crisis Committee; and (4) most of these groups were not set up for a specific anti- or pro-Chinese cause, and none of them--probably with the exception of the Conservative Caucus Inc.--resembled the kind of anti-Communist ideological intensity as was evident in the traditional China Lobby.¹⁴ These four features made it practically impossible for these groups to be turned into a single pro- or anti-Chinese grand coalition. Clearly, the involvement of these domestic groups in the policy making process was a result of the expansion of the U.S.-China bilateral relationship during the normal period. Their existence also contributed to the diversification of congressional attitudes toward China.

In sum, the changes in the domestic environment apparently had some impact on congressional attitudes. But their influence may be quite limited. The administration tends to experience attitudinal changes more easily, especially when a new president from a different party takes office, than members of Congress, who, because of their number, diversity, and voting history, tend to change in a more evolutionary manner (Asher and Weisberg 1985). Interest groups are more likely to contribute to than to cause the change in congressional attitudes. The impact of the general public is even less clear. In the meantime, the changes in the domestic environment were themselves influenced by the changes in the external environment, particularly by the development of the Sino-U.S. bilateral relationship--at about the same time as the changes in the congressional attitudes. Therefore, they would not have had as direct an impact on congressional thinking as the changes in the external sources would. In the final analysis, the domestic environment tended to reinforce, and to some extent be influenced by, the diversification of congressional attitudes.

¹⁴It should be noted that the Conservative Caucus Inc. was also different from the China Lobby. Its anti-PRC position merely accrued from its broad anti-Communist, conservative course it was pursuing.

The Institutional Environment

A more direct and important source of influence on congressional attitudes, one which was more independent of the impact of the external environment than the domestic variables, came from the changes in the institutional environment in which lawmakers conduct their legislative duties. The most important and visible of these changes was membership turnover.

In the 1980s, the change of membership in Congress was substantial (see Table 4.6). During the entire decade, 272 (or 62.5% of the total) members of the House elected in the 1978 election or earlier were replaced by new members. The biggest turnover occurred in the 1980 and 1982 elections. The shift in the Senate was less dramatic but also significant: 53 (or 53% of the total) were new arrivals. In 1980 alone, there were 18. In all, 325 (or 60.7% of the total membership) congressional replacements were made during the period. On average, the combination of retirements, running for other offices and deaths

TABLE 4.6
Congressional Membership Turnover, 1980-88

	1980	1982	1984	1986	1988	Total
Senate	18	5	7	13	10	53
% of Sen.	8	4	7	13	10	53
House	73	79	40	47	33	272
% of Reps.	16.8	18.2	9.2	10.8	7.6	62.5
Total	91	84	47	60	43	325
% of Total	17	15.7	8.8	11.2	8	60.7

Source: *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* 1988, p. 56.

was more responsible for the change of the House membership than electoral defeats. This was similar to the situation in earlier years documented by other studies (Cooper and West 1981; Hibbing 1982). While from 1982 to 1988 an average of about nine senators were replaced, the average of the senators who actually lost reelection bids was only four in each election during the same period. The gap for the representatives was even larger. The average number of defeated House members was eighteen, compared with an average of fifty replacements.¹⁵

The importance of membership turnover lies in its impact on policy. Some studies have indicated that membership replacement is a major source of domestic policy change in the Congress (Brady and Lynn 1973; Clausen 1973; Brady and Sinclair 1984). Each election could result in the disappearance of some old advocates, bringing in new members with some fresh ideas. The 1980 election, for example, brought new and overwhelmingly conservative members to the Congress, and as a result, public policy moved in a conservative direction (Hurley 1984).

Just as it would on domestic policies, the large membership turnover would also have an impact on the making of U.S. China policy. For example, Congress lost several effective spokesmen on U.S.-China relations. Gone were people like former Senators Henry Jackson and Jacob Javits, who tended to see the strong political and strategic value of China for the United States and advocated close ties with that country. They played a very important role in influencing congressional attitudes toward China in the normalizing process during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In much of the 1980s, except for the small number of lawmakers still holding a favorable attitude as indicated by Table 4.1, the Chinese could find relatively few friends in the legislative branch who would be devoted to the cause of U.S.-China relationship. The Chinese were much less familiar with the new people than with their seniors who, in the

¹⁵*National Journal*, 17 March 1990, p. 634. For more details on this, see *Vital Statistics on Congress, 1989-90* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1990).

old days, debated intensively on whether the United States should abandon Taiwan and forge a new tie with the PRC. In one interview, a staff member for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee pointedly described the nature of the Congress in the making of China policy:

Taken as a whole, unlike the executive branch, the Congress is an institution with little institutional memory and wisdom in international affairs. People come and go with different interests and issues in mind. Unless there exists a leadership that advocates a strong U.S.- China relationship, no one will care much about it.

In the meantime, membership turnover also affected the traditional anti-PRC forces in Congress by shrinking their size over the years. Of the eleven lawmakers who were most ideological on China policy during the period (see Table 4.2), four left the legislative scene because of death (Rep. Larry McDonald, 1983), retirement (Sen. Barry Goldwater, 1986) or failure to run for the Senate successfully (Reps. Tom Corcoran and Ron Paul, 1984; and Rep. Thomas Kindness, 1986). The disappearance of these people helped to explain why the ideological intensity of the congressional attitudes toward China declined noticeably after 1983 (see Figure 4.3). Clearly, as time passed, those lawmakers like Barry Goldwater, who ardently opposed any contacts with the PRC during the 1950s and 60s,¹⁶ had been gradually replaced by a new breed of conservatives (e.g., Reps. Gerald Solomon and Dan Burton, elected in 1978 and 1982 respectively), who, accepting the reality of having diplomatic relations with the PRC, now instead focused on how to slow down the seemingly rapid development of U.S.-PRC relations and prevent a further decline of the pro-Taiwan forces in the U.S. policy circle.

Another effect of membership turnover on congressional attitudes toward China was the increase of young, energetic, and aggressive issue leaders in the "juniorization" of the Capitol" (Ornstein 1986, 60) in the 1970s, who would like to challenge the established policies

¹⁶Of the seventy-seven U.S. lawmakers who identified themselves as members of the Committee of One Million in April of 1955 (Bachrack 1976, 115-116), Goldwater was one of the five U.S. lawmakers and the only Republican who still served in Congress in 1980. While the four Democrats (Dante B. Fascell of Florida, John D. Dingell of Michigan, Robert C. Byrd and Robert H. Mollahan of West Virginia) had changed their previous positions and instead become defenders of U.S. relations with the PRC, Goldwater continued to uphold his anti-PRC position.

and practices. The rising influence of the junior lawmakers was much related to the congressional reforms during the decade and the relative decline of congressional leadership (Waldman 1980; Whalen 1982; Loomis 1984). But on China-related issues, their positions were apparently also colored by the general atmosphere surrounding the Congress. They tended to hold a mixed attitude toward China. They generally supported the further development of Sino-American relations. But at the same time, the relaxation of tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States and the relatively rapid development of Sino-American relations provided increased opportunities for these junior members to focus on those specific issues they were most interested in, with little fear of the negative consequences for the bilateral relationship. The best examples of these junior issue leaders were Reps. Christopher Smith (R-N.J.), elected in 1980, an anti-abortion activist and a major critic of China's family planning policy, and Tom Lantos, elected in 1980, a human rights advocate and major critic of China's Tibetan policy.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the congressional attitudes toward China during 1981 to 1988. The available data has demonstrated that during the normal period of the bilateral relationship between the United States and China congressional attitudes were not dominated by any particular perspective. Rather, they were quite diversified. While a number of lawmakers were still holding either a favorable or unfavorable attitude, the main trend of the congressional attitudes was clearly mixed and ranged across the partisan and ideological lines.

The sources of the diversified congressional attitudes came from the changes in the external, domestic, and legislative environments to which the lawmakers were exposed. The reduced Soviet threat and the changes in both the Chinese foreign policy and U.S.-Soviet relations significantly weakened the strategic imperative in Sino-American relations and the value of China for the United States in the eyes of many lawmakers.

In the meantime, by the early 1980s both countries had apparently reached the end of the normalizing process and entered a normal period of the bilateral relationship. The national debate that once divided the Congress along pro-PRC and pro-Taiwan lines had been largely concluded. People now tended to take U.S.-China relations for granted. As senior pro-PRC spokesmen left the scene and new members came in, many in Congress did not feel the need to speak for China. Instead they felt freer to criticize the Chinese government and its policies. To some lawmakers differences over one single issue would not affect the whole relationship. On the contrary, they thought that it was a measure of firmness and stableness in U.S.-China relations. These changes in congressional thinking were reinforced by changes in the Reagan administration's views of China and public opinion, as well as by the involvement of new types of domestic interest groups in the politics of making U.S. China policy.

Furthermore, under the impact of the external and domestic changes and membership turnover in particular, the traditional anti-PRC forces had been gradually replaced by a new kind of opposition to the development of United States-China relations. This new group of lawmakers would no longer rely on ideology to form anti-PRC coalitions. They instead would have to become issue leaders and seek issue coalitions by allying themselves with those who were not in the same ideological line but held similar views on a particular issue.

Thus, the diversified congressional attitudes with their several coexisting perspectives would affect the behavior of members of Congress in the making of U.S. China policy, providing the necessary conditions for the formation of issue-focused coalitions of congressional opposition. In the following three chapters, I will present three case studies chosen to illustrate the involvement of some of these coalitions in the policy process. We will see how each of them played its roles and influenced the making of China policy in its interactions with the counter-opposition in Congress, the administration, the Chinese government, and domestic interest groups on different types of issues.

CHAPTER V
THE EXTERNAL/STRATEGIC ISSUE COALITION AND
THE U.S.-CHINA NUCLEAR AGREEMENT

The preceding chapter demonstrated that the congressional attitudes toward China in the normal period of the bilateral relationship were quite diversified. Consequently, following the arguments outlined in Chapter II, it would lead to the emergence of issue-oriented coalitions of congressional opposition in the making of U.S. normal-bilateral policy toward China. There would be no single, predominant anti-PRC coalition existing in the Congress. The formation of a coalition of congressional opposition would be determined by the salience of the issue. Different types of issues would induce different orientations of congressional interest, and hence different intensities of congressional opposition, different functional and behavioral roles of the congressional opposition, different patterns of its interactions with the four other major forces in the Congress-centered policy process, and ultimately different levels of policy influence of the congressional opposition.

Accordingly, external/strategic issues like nuclear nonproliferation will lead to a different intensity of congressional opposition than the other two types of issues such as foreign import restrictions and human rights. The policy influence of the external/strategic issue coalition of congressional opposition will be moderate due to its tendency to play the reactive role with its revising function, the likelihood of very limited executive concessions, the pressure from the foreign government concerned, and the absence of strong domestic-oriented interest groups connecting the issues to constituent interests.

This chapter will make an empirical test of these propositions on the nature, behavior and influence of the external/strategic issue coalition of congressional opposition by examining

a case in the issue area of nuclear nonproliferation--the U.S.-China nuclear cooperation agreement of 1985.

The Nuclear Agreement As a Fruit of The Expanded Bilateral Relationship

The U.S.-China nuclear cooperation agreement is an example of how an expanding bilateral relationship could engender both benefits and problems for the two countries. The United States and China began to consider the accord in the fall of 1981, at a time when their relationship was entering a normal period, following the restoration of their political, diplomatic and economic relations in the previous two years. It was the result of a strong convergence of interests as perceived by both the Chinese government and the Reagan administration.

The Chinese government's major interest in nuclear cooperation with the United States lay in its desire to develop its nuclear energy program. China began its research on nuclear energy in the late 1950s. But it was not until the late 1970s did it seriously consider the development of nuclear energy in order to cope with a severe energy shortage associated with a rapidly growing economy.¹ While China's main principle in developing its nuclear energy was self-reliance, its lack of some advanced technology also required it to emphasize international cooperation. As the *People's Daily* declared, "China needs to draw on other countries' experience in developing nuclear power and introduce certain technology and equipment so as to speed up its own development."² China negotiated with a number of countries for assistance with its nuclear energy program; at the same time it also had a high regard for U.S. nuclear equipment and technology and was willing to deal with American companies, for example, inviting them to participate in the bidding for the supply of nuclear reactors.

¹See *People's Daily*, 5 November 1980, p. 1.

²*Ibid.*, 25 September 1984, p. 1.

The Reagan administration was also very interested in the emerging Chinese nuclear program. Indeed, according to the interviews with both American and Chinese officials involved in the case, it was the Reagan administration that initiated the idea of a nuclear cooperation agreement between the two countries. It approached the issue with three major motives. First, it believed, as declared by President Reagan, that U.S. nuclear export policy "should support a secure, friendly and modernizing China."³ It hoped that nuclear cooperation would have "a significant, positive impact on overall U.S.-China relations."⁴ Second, the administration hoped that it would provide "substantial economic benefit" to the ailing U.S. nuclear power industry.⁵ For example, Secretary of Energy John Herrington expressed the administration's desire that a nuclear agreement with China "will go a long way toward opening foreign markets, specifically China, to the American nuclear power industry" and that "it could help to revitalize the nuclear industry in this country."⁶

And finally, the administration also sought to keep nuclear cooperation with China "consistent with our nonproliferation interests."⁷ It believed that nuclear cooperation could help move China closer into the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. The administration concluded that

Based on our talks with the Chinese, we can expect that China's policy of not assisting a non-nuclear weapon state to acquire nuclear explosives will be implemented in a manner consistent with the basic non-proliferation practices common to the United

³*New York Times*, 2 June 1982, p. A1.

⁴President Reagan's message to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, "On the Agreement between the United States and the People's Republic of China Concerning Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy," 24 July 1985 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), p. v.

⁵*Ibid.*

⁶Remarks made at the signing ceremony for the U.S.-China nuclear cooperation agreement on July 23, 1985, *International Trade Reporter*, 24 July 1985, p. 949.

⁷State Department statements on the nuclear cooperation agreement with China, quoted in *U.S. Export Weekly*, 6 August 1982, p. 362.

States and other suppliers.⁸

Thus, the perceived prospect for significant political and diplomatic dividends and substantial economic benefits for both sides helped sustain the difficult and time-consuming negotiations on the questions of China's nuclear nonproliferation policy, safeguards, and consent rights, as the Reagan administration tried to keep the agreement within the framework of American nuclear nonproliferation laws. After nearly four years and six rounds of talks, the two governments finally signed the agreement on 23 July 1985. The following day, President Reagan submitted the accord to Congress for approval, along with his confirmation that "this agreement meets all requirements" of U.S. laws "for agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation."⁹

The Major Content of the Agreement

The Sino-U.S. agreement for cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy established the legal framework for future deals between the two countries, specifying the guarantees and controls for the sale of U.S. reactors, components, nuclear materials, and technology in various aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, including cooperation in studying the health, safety, and environmental implications of the peaceful use of nuclear power. The accord did not call for the transfer of any *sensitive* nuclear technology or facilities. But it did contain the following provisions related to the transfer of nuclear materials, which would later become the points of contention between the supporters and opponents of the accord:

Retransferring "Material, facilities, components or special nuclear material transferred pursuant to this agreement and any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or facilities may be retransferred by the recipient party ... unless the parties agree, beyond its territory." (Article 5[1])

Enrichment, Reprocessing, and Storage "In the event that a party would like at some future time" to enrich to twenty percent or greater, reprocess, alter, or change

⁸Reagan's message to the Foreign Affairs Committee, p. v.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. vi.

locations for storage of the material subject to the agreement, "the parties will promptly hold consultations to agree on a mutually acceptable arrangement. The parties undertake the obligation to consider such activities favorably, and agree to provide pertinent information on the plans during the consultation." (Article 5[2])

Diversion "Material, facilities or components transferred pursuant to this agreement and material used in or produced through the use of any material, facility or components so transferred shall not be used for any nuclear explosive device, for research specifically on or development of any nuclear explosive device, or for any military purpose." (Article 5[3])

Safeguards "The parties recognize that this cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is between two nuclear-weapon states and that bilateral safeguards are not required....the parties will use diplomatic channels to establish mutually acceptable arrangements for exchanges of information and visits to material, facilities and components subject to this agreement." (Article 8[2])

If the agreement took effect following the congressional consideration, American companies could pursue sales of reactors, components, and technology with the PRC. But under U.S. law, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA), individual nuclear exports would have to be licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which is an independent regulatory agency.

Support In Congress

The administration's three major positions noted earlier also reflected the diversity of views held by the congressional supporters of the nuclear cooperation agreement with China. There was a clear realization on the Hill that such an accord would be significant for the development of the bilateral relationship. But a careful reading of congressional remarks suggests that for the congressional supporters, the most promising aspect of cooperation with the Chinese in nuclear energy was the prospect of enormous economic benefits it could bring to the American economy, the nuclear industry in particular. In 1983, for example, following their trip to China and extensive discussions with the Chinese on the sale of U.S. nuclear equipment, thirteen members of the congressional delegation led by House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill wrote to Secretary of State Shultz, urging a quick conclusion of the agreement so that the American nuclear industry could compete with other foreign companies in the Chinese

nuclear energy market. Noting China's goal of building 10,000 megawatts of nuclear capacity, they argued:

Time is rapidly closing in on this opportunity.... Should the U.S. be able to obtain a preferred position in developing this business, it could mean as many as 40,000 man-years of U.S. employment over the next twenty years not to mention the \$20 billion in sales. The long-term economic growth of the energy industry as well as that of the entire nation will be greatly enhanced by U.S. participation in these Chinese projects.¹⁰

Less than three weeks after the agreement was initialled on 27 April 1984, the Special Subcommittee on U.S. Trade with China of the House Energy and Commerce Committee held the first public hearing on the agreement.¹¹ The hearing subsequently became a public forum for both the nuclear industry and its supporters in Congress to repudiate potential congressional opposition and urge the Congress to approve the agreement quickly.¹² Economic benefit was the most important consideration for enthusiastic supporters like Reps. Richard C. Shelby (D-Ala.) and Al Swift (D-Wash.). To Shelby, a nuclear cooperation agreement with China was closely related to jobs and the establishment of a U.S. nuclear market in China. The

¹⁰Letter from O'Neill et al. to George Shultz, 26 April 1983. In addition to O'Neill, the other members were Dan Rostenkowski (D), Chairman, House Ways and Means Committee; Melvin Price (D), Chairman, House Armed Services Committee; Clement J. Zablocki (D), Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee; Edward P. Boland (D), Chairman, House Intelligence Committee; Joseph G. Minish (D), Chairman, Oversight Subcommittee, House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee; Joe Moakley (D), Chairman, Subcommittee on Rules, House Rules Committee; John P. Murtha (D), Subcommittee on Defense, House Appropriations Committee; Tony Coelho (D), Subcommittee on Oversight, House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee; Silvio O. Conte (R), Ranking Member, House Appropriations Committee; Delbert L. Latta (R), Ranking Member, House Budget Committee; Ralph Regula (R), Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Milcon, House Appropriations Committee; and Harold Rogers (R), Agriculture Subcommittee, House appropriations Committee.

¹¹The hearing held by the Special Subcommittee, which did not have the power to initiate bills, caused some uneasiness among the members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on International Trade and Economic Policy, which was supposed to have the major jurisdiction on the agreement. Interview with a senior staff member for the subcommittee.

¹²See hearings before the Special Subcommittee on U.S. Trade with China of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House, *The Nuclear Energy Cooperation with China*, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 16 May 1984 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984).

agreement, said Shelby,

will be a shot in the arm, not only for jobs in this country, wherever they are, whether in Washington State or Alabama or New Jersey, you name it.... I never had a real problem with the Chinese exporting weapons-grade material based on U.S. energy techniques. As you well know, they have had nuclear weapons for 20 years. I thought the argument was fallacious in that regard. I would be interested in knowing about the real competition. I know there is competition between the United States and France in the world market, and particularly China.¹³

A short dialogue between Swift and Roger H. Williams, chairman emeritus of the Ebasco Services, Inc., revealed the Washington congressman's special interest in the nuclear trade between his State and China:

Mr. Swift: A provincial interest. Mr. Sherman, coming from the Northwest as I do, I note with considerable fascination the efforts of TVA (the Tennessee Valley Authority) to sell its Yellow Creek plant to the Chinese. We have a couple of nuclear plants hanging around out there in my State. Seriously, what do you think are the opportunities to also talk with the Chinese about those plants, or other plants besides the TVA plants?

Mr. Sherman: I am unfortunately well aware of the fact that you have some excess plants kicking around.

Mr. Swift: Got some stock, do you?

Mr. Sherman: And we were working on units three and five.

Mr. Swift: Yes.

Mr. Sherman: Actually some steps have been taken in that direction. And some preliminary activity is currently underway. A group of people from the WPPSS (Washington Public Power Supply System) organization is going to go and will be accompanied by somebody from our organization familiar with the WPPSS job, are going to go to China and have talks with the Ministry of Water and Electric Power--Water Resources and Electric Power, to see what kind of interest they can generate in the sale of some of the WPPSS units.¹⁴

According to interviews with staff members for the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Rep. Bonker (D-Wash.), Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, enthusiastically supported nuclear exports to China, even though he was a strong environmentalist. "To Bonker's district, trade is very important, the trade with China in particular," said a close aide to the congressman. "This is a driving force behind him." Economic benefit aside, many lawmakers believed that the nuclear agreement would influence

¹³Ibid., pp. 95-96.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 103.

China's nuclear policy in a positive way. Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, argued that the negotiations on the accord had contributed to the changes in the Chinese nonproliferation policies:

The record shows that the Chinese have proceeded to take a number of responsible actions in cooperation with others who believe in nonproliferation and inspection (of nuclear facilities) since we became actively engaged with them in these talks.¹⁵

Rep. Solarz, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, also believed that the nuclear agreement would "create additional incentives for China to refrain from helping other countries acquire nuclear weapons," and as a result, at least on nuclear nonproliferation the United States would "have a much better chance of getting China's cooperation with this agreement than without it."¹⁶ O'Neill, in particular, believed that a nuclear cooperation agreement with China could serve both economic and nonproliferation interests:

U.S. concerns and objectives in the area of nuclear non-proliferation would be better served by negotiating certain terms bilaterally with the P.R.C., and by dealing with them on a continuing basis rather than abandoning their trade and their partnership to other countries.¹⁷

Sen. James A. McClure, a conservative Republican from Idaho and strong advocate of nuclear energy, told the Foreign Relations Committee that besides the enormous economic benefit,

the significant political and security gains the United States will achieve by endorsing this historic agreement far outweigh any of the publicized potential risks....China's energy demands give us an opportunity to enhance the world's overall security. Our participation in China's energy development will be pivotal in insuring world peace.¹⁸

¹⁵*Associated Press*, 29 October 1985.

¹⁶Hearing and Markup before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *The Proposed Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with the People's Republic of China*, 13 November 1985 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), pp. 116-117.

¹⁷Letter from O'Neill to Secretary of State Shultz, 4 May 1983.

¹⁸Testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, *United States-People's Republic of China Nuclear Agreement*, 9 October 1985 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 112.

The Congressional Opposition to the Agreement

Despite the attractiveness of the agreement and support from the crucial congressional, committee, and subcommittee leaders such as O'Neill, Lugar, Solarz, and Bonker, the administration faced strong opposition within both parties and houses. An official from the State Department told me,

Of course, there are always supporters for every proposal we send to the Congress. What gets us nervous is that someone there raises a question. When that occurs, we know we have a problem.

The problem on the nuclear agreement was substantial. The attacks on the accord came from two different groups of lawmakers who emerged to form an anti-agreement coalition. One group, headed by Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), mainly made the ideological charge. As a senior member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Helms was in a position to coordinate the anti-PRC conservatives in opposition to the agreement. These conservative critics were not particularly concerned with the details of the agreement but with the perceived strategic folly of lending aid to a Communist power. They believed that providing nuclear technology to China would, in the long term, pose a threat to the national interests of the United States and to the security of Taiwan. To Helms, "the question arises as to whether we can trust Red China to keep any agreement--no matter how it is drafted."¹⁹ His House counterpart, Rep. Dan Burton (R-Ind.), argued that the nuclear cooperation agreement with China could lead to a lessened U.S. support for anti-communist Taiwan:

This is, obviously, in the long run going to help their industrial complex in China....once their industrial complex is built up, then the military complex of course will follow, and they will have the ability to reconcile the Taiwan island with the mainland.²⁰

This group of conservative opponents was relatively small, though vocal in the chorus against the agreement. As discussed in Chapter IV, their behavior was quite predictable, since

¹⁹*Con. Rec.*, 28 October 1985, S14233-S14243.

²⁰Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Proposed Nuclear Agreement*, 31 July 1985, pp. 103-104.

they held a generally fixed unfavorable attitude dominated by the ideological perspective on China. What is more important here is the other, larger group of lawmakers, basically led by liberal Democrats, whose behavior was not particularly influenced by ideology but by the salience of the issue. They were called the "legalistic" group, because they were particularly concerned with the specific legal and policy implications of the accord. Their opposition posed a real challenge to the passage of the accord as they attracted much more support from members of Congress than the ideological group. In the Senate, this group was led by Sens. John Glenn (D-Ohio), William Proxmire (D-Wis.), Alan Cranston (D-Calif.), and William Cohen (R-Maine). In the House, it was headed by Reps. Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), Howard Wolpe (D-Mich.), and Edward F. Feighan (D-Ohio).

The Legalistic Opposition

Before the agreement was submitted to Congress, the legalistic group in the anti-agreement coalition had already shown their remarkable consistency in their concern over nuclear cooperation with China, as seen during the long negotiating process leading up to the agreement. Their key demands were raised in a letter to Secretary of State Shultz in December 1983 from Sens. Proxmire, Gordon Humphrey (R-N.H.) and William Roth (R-Del.). In the letter, they suggested three conditions for a nuclear agreement with China: (1) An explicit pledge by China "not to transfer any nuclear weapons hardware or information to any nation;" (2) an explicit pledge by China to ensure that "countries which receive any new significant nuclear exports cooperation with China place all of their peaceful nuclear activities under the IAEA (the International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards;" and (3) a pledge by China "to enter into a voluntary agreement with IAEA (the International Atomic Energy Agency) along lines identical to those of the United States-IAEA safeguards agreement."²¹

But the Reagan administration failed to attach these conditions to the agreement with

²¹*Con. Rec.*, February 1984, S1930.

the Chinese. Instead, it secured only an oral statement from the Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang in his toast to President and Mrs. Reagan at a White-House state dinner on 10 January 1984 during his visit to the United States.²² Therefore, when the nuclear agreement was initialled on April 27 that year, it immediately drew heavy attacks from these congressional opponents, who cited Zhao's toast as a flimsy basis for a nuclear agreement.²³ Faced with this congressional opposition, the administration delayed the submission of the agreement to the Congress for fifteen months, during which it sought "further assurances" from the Chinese government on its nonproliferation policy. Again, the American negotiators failed to obtain a formal, written statement from the Chinese. They eventually brought back from Beijing a "summary of discussions" with then Vice Premier Li Peng and other top Chinese officials, which was written by the American negotiator Richard Kennedy but not signed by the Chinese. The original version of the accord remained unchanged.

Thus, when the agreement was finally submitted to Congress on 24 July 1985, the legalistic opposition was as strong as ever. It focused on the following three major aspects of the agreement: Chinese nonproliferation policy, safeguards and consent rights.

Chinese Nonproliferation Policy The opponents expressed doubts about China's commitment to nonproliferation, pointing to China's criticism of and unwillingness to sign the Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that contained an obligation not to assist other countries obtain nuclear explosives; its refusal to give formal nonproliferation assurances to the United States; and its alleged nuclear assistance to Pakistan. Cranston insisted that

China has, in the recent past, engaged in the most egregious effort in history to export

²²Mr. Zhao made the following statement concerning China's nonproliferation policy: "We are critical of the discriminatory Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, but we do not advocate or encourage nuclear proliferation. We do not engage in nuclear proliferation ourselves, nor do we help other countries develop nuclear weapons. (*People's Daily*, 12 January 1984, p. 1.)

²³See, for example, William Proxmire, "The Risks in Selling China a Stronger Nuclear Genie," *Wall Street Journal*, 24 May 1984, p. 32; Letter from Markey et al. to President Reagan, 15 May 1984; and speech by Sen. Cranston, *Con. Rec.*, 21 June 1984, S7903-S7904.

nuclear bombmaking know-how. To our knowledge, no other nation has ever undertaken systematically to aid the nuclear bomb development and construction efforts of another nation secretly trying to attain the capability, as China has done with Pakistan.²⁴

Citing news reports, Sen. Cohen argued that the Chinese assistance to Pakistan "continued even after the United States-People's Republic of China nuclear cooperation agreement was initialled" in April of 1984.²⁵ The opponents claimed that China's commitment to nonproliferation was purely verbal and believed that the agreement would set a precedent for more hand-shake deals on nuclear matters. They called the "summary of discussions" with the Chinese leaders nonreassuring. According to Cranston, these were "assurances the State Department is going to provide Congress about what they hope the Chinese understand. In other words, it's American bureaucrats reassuring each other, rather than a clear, written pledge from the Chinese."²⁶ The opponents again demanded a "clear, written commitment" from the Chinese. Glenn argued:

We need a comprehensive description prepared by the Chinese themselves so we see whether what they say is consistent with what the State Department believes, and also we have a formal basis for comparing future Chinese actions to Chinese words in the area of nuclear nonproliferation.²⁷

Safeguards The legalistic group noted that the agreement contained no specific verification of peaceful uses of U.S. nuclear exports to China. Instead there would be merely diplomatic discussions for the purpose of agreeing on visits to the exported facilities and for exchanges of information. There were no goals or standards regarding what would constitute an acceptable arrangement to the United States.²⁸ By failing to include international or

²⁴*Con. Rec.*, 21 October 1985, S13624.

²⁵Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *U.S.-PRC Nuclear Agreement*, p. 85.

²⁶Remarks by Cranston, quoted in *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 27 July 1985, p. 1479.

²⁷*Con. Rec.*, 9 October 1985, S13011.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 9 October, S13010.

bilateral safeguards, the agreement surrendered the most reliable method of verifying Chinese compliance with pledges made in the agreement. To strengthen their case, the opponents cited the NRC's concern over "the absence of any provision for the application of international or bilateral safeguards on U.S. exports to the PRC" in the agreement.²⁹

Consent Rights The critics contended that the agreement failed to spell out clearly and unambiguously U.S. prior consent rights to the reprocessing of weapons-usable plutonium from spent fuel. They argued that the "consider favorably" clause contained in Article 5[2] meant in fact that the United States had the obligation to go to very considerable lengths to give an approval if China made such a request for reprocessing. "A promise to talk in diplomatic channels is not a guarantee of anything," said Markey. "The language...is an embarrassment."³⁰ On this issue, the congressional opponents again cited the NRC's concern over:

the potential decrease in U.S. flexibility which this creates in the decision process and the possible precedent it sets for future agreements where strict consent rights prior to reprocessing and enrichment could be critical to achievement of U.S. nonproliferation goals.³¹

They warned that the provisions could lead to future misunderstanding and trouble between the United States and the PRC:

We are not playing with fire, but something much more deadly than fire. When it comes to nuclear trade, the U.S. cannot follow a policy of sell now--negotiate later. If we are to have a constructive nuclear relationship with the P.R.C., we must lay out

²⁹"Prepared Statement of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives", 3 October 1985, p. 4. The NRC is a regulatory commission, independent of direct presidential control and acting in a quasi-judicial manner. Because of this status and its specialty, the NRC was most outspoken and critical of the China agreement in the executive branch and therefore its opinions were frequently cited by the anti-agreement lawmakers as authoritative critiques of the accord. The NRC thus became a good ally of the congressional opposition.

³⁰Markey's testimony before Foreign Affairs, *Proposed Nuclear Agreement*, 31 July 1985, p. 3.

³¹NRC, "Prepared Statement," p. 3.

the ground rules of that relationship.³²

Dimensional Linkages and the Intensity of the Anti-Agreement Opposition

We have seen that to the Reagan administration and many members of Congress the nuclear agreement was very important, because it would not only improve relations with China but also advance nuclear nonproliferation policy and bring potentially great economic benefits to the United States. The question is why it still drew such a strong and intensive opposition in Congress. As mentioned earlier, it is easy to explain the ideological group's opposition, since with their fixed unfavorable attitude toward China they would be opposed to anything that would either benefit China and/or contribute to the development of Sino-American relations. By comparison, the legalistic group's opposition was clearly not generated by ideology but by the very content of the agreement. Then why did they want to focus so much of their attention on the legal details of a *bilateral* agreement that could potentially benefit both countries, as the administration and its supporters in Congress claimed? Why did it push China so hard on the issue? Did it just want to avoid future misunderstandings between the two countries on nuclear cooperation?

The Expansive Nature of the Issue

The explanation lies in the expansive nature of the issue. The rise of the congressional opposition to the China agreement had much less to do with the bilateral relationship itself than with the accord's broader implications for the other dimensions of foreign policy making. First of all, it was directly linked to the traditionally strong outward-looking orientation of congressional interest in the area of nuclear nonproliferation and U.S. nuclear export policy--a U.S. *multilateral* policy toward other countries. This interest can be traced back to the early

³²Sen. William V. Roth, Jr., "News Release: Roth, Glenn Criticize Terms of U.S.-China Nuclear Agreement," 9 October 1985, p. 1.

postwar years when Congress passed the 1946 and 1954 Atomic Energy Acts (AEA). But it was the 1970s that saw the "reassertion of congressional foreign policy prerogatives" in this policy area.³³ A series of House and Senate hearings during 1974 put considerable constraints on the Nixon administration's intention to enter into agreements for nuclear cooperation with Egypt and Israel, and at the same time greatly promoted the notion that nuclear proliferation was one of the greatest threats to world peace and security. What followed were a number of bills and further hearings that sustained the high congressional interest in the issue.³⁴ In 1978, Congress passed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, which represented "the apogee of congressional activism, with its penchant for detailing the 'dos' and 'don'ts' of executive implementation."³⁵ Not long after that, the Carter administration narrowly defeated the attempt of nonproliferation activists in Congress to block the shipment of U.S. nuclear fuel to India in 1980.³⁶

But it was the change in U.S. nuclear export policy at the beginning of the Reagan administration that linked the congressional interest in nuclear nonproliferation most closely to the issue of nuclear cooperation with China. Despite its differences with the congressional nonproliferation activists, the Carter administration had nevertheless carried out a relatively restrictive nuclear export policy, emphasizing U.S. restrictions on exports of nuclear material and equipment that could be used to build weapons. In 1977, President Carter declared that

³³Steven J. Baker, "Nuclear Nonproliferation," in Purvis and Baker, eds., *Legislating Foreign Policy*, 1984, p. 138.

³⁴See Warren H. Donnelly, "Congressional Interest and Input," Joseph F. Pilat, ed., *The Nonproliferation Predicament* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1985), pp. 47-56.

³⁵Michael J. Brenner, *Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation: The Remaking of U.S. Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 190.

³⁶For a detailed account of the Indian nuclear case, see Brian L. Schorr, "Testing Statutory Criteria for Foreign Policy: The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 and the Export of Nuclear Fuel to India," *International Law and Politics* 14 (Winter 1982), pp. 419-466; and also Edward J. Markey, *Nuclear Peril: The Politics of Proliferation* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1983).

in asking other countries to restrict nuclear exports, the United States should set an example by restricting its own exports.³⁷ The new Reagan administration, however, adopted a different policy from its predecessor's. On 16 July 1981, President Reagan announced that by improving its reputation as a reliable supplier of nuclear technology to other countries, the United States could win back some of the nuclear business it lost under Carter and would be in a better position to enforce non-proliferation standards.³⁸ While Carter viewed nuclear power as an energy source of last resort, Reagan saw nuclear power as "one of the best potential sources of new electrical energy supplies in the coming decades."³⁹ It was under this policy, in accordance with the other considerations mentioned earlier, that the Reagan administration had enthusiastically encouraged U.S. nuclear industries to participate in China's emerging nuclear program.

Congressional nonproliferation activists were therefore particularly concerned with the relaxation of nuclear export standards under the Reagan administration. They became activated on nonproliferation issues during the first term of the administration, while the China agreement was being negotiated. Congress passed several public laws at that time as well as advisory resolutions designed to strengthen the American nonproliferation policy.⁴⁰ What the nonproliferation activists were worried about was that the China agreement might set up a bad example for future U.S. policies. Glenn repeatedly emphasized that if the "flaws (in the China agreement) are not corrected, I believe they would set an unfortunate precedent for future U.S.

³⁷*Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, 1977, p. 27-E.

³⁸*Ibid.*, 1981, p. 146.

³⁹Quoted in *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 17 October 1981, p. 2033.

⁴⁰For the legislative activities on nonproliferation during the first term of the Reagan administration, see Warren H. Donnelly, "Nonproliferation laws: A Checklist," updated 07/24/87, *Issue Brief* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service). For an account of the conflict between the administration and congressional nonproliferation activists in these years, see John Maxwell Hamilton and Leonard S. Spector, "Congressional Counterattack: Reagan and the Congress," in Joseph F. Pilat, ed., *The Nonproliferation Predicament* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1985), pp. 57-69.

nuclear nonproliferation policy."⁴¹ Thus, the China agreement inevitably became a target of the congressional effort in tightening U.S. nuclear export policy toward other countries. As a senior nonproliferation analyst in the Congressional Research Service (CRS) said during an interview, "the agreement provided an opportunity, a convenient battlefield, for the opponents."

The Power-Sharing Linkage: The Proxmire Amendment In addition to its multilateral implications for nuclear nonproliferation and U.S. nuclear export policy, the China agreement was also drawn into the power-sharing dimension of foreign policy making. According to U.S. law prior to 1983, a nuclear agreement with a foreign country could take effect only if it had gone through two procedural steps. First, the president must sign the agreement after he received recommendations from the secretary of state, the secretary of energy, NRC, and ACDA. Second, the president must submit it to Congress; and within sixty days of "continuous session," Congress could reject the nuclear agreement with a concurrent resolution passed by House and Senate. Such legislative vetoes, however, were nullified by the 1983 Supreme Court decision in the Chadha case, which ruled the legislative veto (e.g., concurrent resolution) unconstitutional.⁴² The only way Congress could squelch the agreement was to pass a joint resolution or a bill, either of which would require the president's signature or the two-thirds vote needed for a veto override. Thus, the Court ruling made it very difficult for Congress to disapprove the nuclear accord.

Nonproliferation activists in Congress therefore believed that legislative control over the nonproliferation issue was weakened as a result of the Court decision. "The pendulum has swung to the executive branch," said Proxmire. It was time for Congress "to insist that its

⁴¹Sen. John Glenn, "News Release: Opening Statement of Senator John Glenn: U.S.-China Nuclear Agreement," 6 October 1985, p. 1.

⁴²For a discussion of the overall impact of the Court ruling, see, for example, I.M. Destler, "Dateline Washington: Life After the Veto," *Foreign Policy*, 52 (Fall 1983), 181-186; and Joseph Cooper, "The Legislative Veto in the 1980s," in Dodd and Oppenheimer, eds. 3d ed., *Congress Reconsidered* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1985), 364-389.

proper role and authority be restored."⁴³ A senior aide to Proxmire recalled in an interview:

So he tried to do something about it. The senator was then the ranking minority member in the Banking Committee. In February 1984, we were reviewing an export control bill on the floor. He saw the opportunity on the floor, since at the time the U.S.-China nuclear agreement was being negotiated. He offered an amendment, an addition to the Nonproliferation Act of 1978.... This was an issue between Congress and the administration, not between Republicans and Democrats.

The Sino-U.S. nuclear agreement thus became the first test for the nonproliferation activists to maintain congressional authority on the nonproliferation issue since the 1983 Court ruling.

The Proxmire Amendment aimed to strengthen the legislative procedure of considering a nuclear agreement with not only China but any other country as well (again a multilateral purpose). In the senator's words, it was to restore "the right of the Congress to participate, as partners, in the approving of nuclear agreements of cooperation."⁴⁴ The amendment required that when the president sent a nuclear cooperation agreement to Congress, the agreement must obtain an approval from both Houses of Congress, in the form of either a joint resolution of approval or a bill, before it went into effect. Unlike the existing law, the amendment would make the president unable to use his veto power if Congress failed to pass a joint resolution approving the agreement.

The amendment passed in the Senate by 76 to 16, but it became bogged down in a House-Senate conference. The administration opposed it, arguing that it would "make it far too difficult to undertake nuclear cooperation with any country."⁴⁵ It threatened to veto the Export Administration Act to which the Proxmire Amendment was attached. In March 1985, after an intense negotiation with State Department officials, and House and Senate staff members, Proxmire agreed to settle for less than he wanted. The new version, passed by Congress in late June, required the executive branch to report in detail to Congress as to

⁴³*Con. Rec.*, 29 February 1984, S1929.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 29 February 1984, S1929.

⁴⁵*U.S. Export Weekly*, 1 May 1984, p. 898.

whether a proposed nuclear pact would meet all criteria of the NNPA of 1978. The new law then gave the authorizing committees, the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee, thirty working days to review the pact informally and gave Congress another sixty working days to formally consider the pact. If either of the committees believed that the pact was not consistent with any of those criteria, the president might choose to submit an exemption, and in that case Congress must pass a joint resolution of approval of the agreement. Otherwise the agreement took effect unless the Congress disapproved by a joint resolution (and, presumably, overrode an expected presidential veto).

The new procedure helped Congress partially regain the power of reviewing nuclear agreements that was lost as a result of the 1983 Supreme Court ruling, and it provided the lawmakers a legislative forum to scrutinize any agreements of cooperation reached by the executive branch with other countries. Furthermore, it gave the authorizing power to the two foreign affairs committees whose decisions could affect the way Congress was to treat the nuclear agreements. Finally, it demonstrated the China agreement as an integrated part of the power-sharing dimension of foreign policy making involving a broader executive-legislative struggle over the control of making U.S. nonproliferation and nuclear export policies.

The Question of International Law vs. Domestic Legislation Another indication of the expansive nature of the issue was related to a provision of the China agreement concerning superiority of international law over domestic legislation. It had not merely an important meaning for bilateral nuclear cooperation but explicit multilateral, power-sharing and legal implications. Section 2 [1] stated:

The parties recognize, with respect to the observance of this agreement, the principle of international law that provides that a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.

The opponents were concerned that this provision could be interpreted to reduce the flexibility of the U.S., in particular that of Congress, to enact and implement future legislation affecting not only U.S.-China nuclear relations but the United States' current and future nuclear dealings

with other countries as well. Raising the question of "executive agreements," Glenn argued that the United States had never treated agreements for cooperation as treaties. "The Senate does not ratify them," stated the senator. "And they generally do not put the U.S. under obligation to actually engage in any nuclear trade."⁴⁶ Other critics warned that "such restrictions on domestic law threaten to tie the U.S.'s hands to respond to future needs or changes in circumstances vis-a-vis nuclear export policies."⁴⁷

Characteristics of the Anti-Agreement Coalition

The above discussion has shown that while the intensity of the congressional opposition to the China agreement was related to the linkage of the external/strategic issue with the multilateral and even power-sharing dimension of foreign policy making, it was also due to the fact that it was an *issue-oriented* opposition being overwhelmingly concerned with nuclear nonproliferation. Here let us look further at the nature of this issue coalition.

The Nonproliferation Issue Leaders

As discussed earlier, the anti-agreement coalition was generally led by the nonproliferation issue leaders, rather than the traditional anti-PRC lawmakers. The power and influence of these issue leaders lay in the fact they were much more knowledgeable on a particular issue than other members of Congress. As an expert on U.S. nonproliferation policy puts it,

Members of Congress normally shy away from technically daunting subjects--especially those that do not directly affect their constituents' interests. It is in the nature of congressional life to defer on these recondite matters to colleagues who have chosen to make a specialty of them and who burrow into the committees with jurisdiction over

⁴⁶Testimonies by Proxmire and Glenn before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *US-PRC Nuclear Agreement*, pp. 22-23, 53.

⁴⁷"Fact Sheet: Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation with the People's Republic of China," prepared by the Public Citizen, 3 October 1985, p. 6.

them.⁴⁸

In addition to knowledge, my interviews with the issue leaders' aides strongly suggest that they were also very conscious of maintaining principle and credibility as the necessary quality for the issue leadership. As a chief aide to Sen. Glenn said: "To Senator Glenn, principle is the key to influence. If we'd retreated from the issue (the China agreement), we'd have lost our credibility next time a similar issue came up."

There is also no indication that the issue leaders linked their strong interest in nonproliferation to their electoral goal. A personal aide to Markey said: "The (nonproliferation) issue has little or no importance to his overall reelection prospects. It is not an issue for his constituents. He has a safe district."

In the 1985 legislative battle over the China agreement, Sens. Glenn and Cranston and Rep. Markey were the most active of those leading the opposition coalition. In the Senate, Glenn, then ranking Democrat of the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Government Processes of the Government Affairs Committee, was one of the few acknowledged experts in Congress on nonproliferation and the author of key laws designed to prevent the United States from helping other countries' nuclear weapons capabilities. In 1980, he was the key Senate spokesman against President Carter's executive order to ship U.S. uranium to India. His membership on the Foreign Relations Committee and his chairmanship of the subcommittee of the Government Operations Committee that handled nonproliferation questions put him in an influential position and provided him with an able and experienced staff to help deal with the issue.⁴⁹ In 1985, he was no longer a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. Yet his influence was apparently not reduced as a result. My interviews with Senate staff members and government officials strongly indicated that as a well-recognized expert on nonproliferation issues, Glenn was both respected and feared by his colleagues in

⁴⁸Brenner, *Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation*, p. 89.

⁴⁹Baker, "Nuclear Nonproliferation," p. 150.

Congress as well as people in the executive branch.

Cranston was also a well-known nonproliferation activist. He was then a ranking Democrat on Foreign Relations's Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs. He had been interested in strengthening American policies designed to prevent other countries from newly acquiring nuclear weapons. In 1980 Cranston supported Glenn in opposition to U.S. shipment of uranium to India. In 1984 he also collaborated with Glenn in trying to get Foreign Relations to adopt an amendment suspending military and economic assistance to Pakistan unless the president certified that the country was not developing nuclear weapons. The measure, however, was substantially weakened by the Committee.

In the House, Edward Markey, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Conservation and Power of the Energy and Commerce Committee, was one of the most outspoken and passionate members on nonproliferation. A strong foe of the nuclear power industry, he profoundly believed that "nuclear power is neither inexpensive nor necessary, and it is inherently unsafe," and that peaceful, electricity-generating nuclear reactors "create, extend, and ensure the realistic potential for the production of nuclear bombs."⁶⁰ In 1980 Markey spoke out vehemently against the Carter administration's decision on the U.S. shipment of uranium to India, "a nation that in the past had used such fuel to fabricate a bomb."⁶¹

Other anti-agreement coalition leaders, though not as specialized in nonproliferation as Glenn and Markey, were also highly interested in the issue. Sen. Proxmire established himself as a spearhead in the debate on the China agreement by sponsoring the Proxmire Amendment designed to increase Congress's review power on U.S. nuclear export policy. Sen. Cohen was one of the leading Senate spokesmen on military and defense policy. He had cooperated closely with Glenn on nonproliferation issues for a number of years. On the House side, Rep. Wolpe had used his memberships on the Foreign Affairs and Science and Technology

⁶⁰Edward J. Markey, *Nuclear Peril*, p. xv.

⁶¹*Ibid.*, p. xiv.

Committees to oppose the nuclear power industry and U.S. sales of nuclear technology to other nations. In 1984, he collaborated with Sen. Cranston and others in a lawsuit against the Reagan administration, alleging that a nuclear sales agreement with Norway and Sweden violated U.S. nonproliferation law.

Nonproliferation vs. Sino-American Relations

One important element that distinguished the legalistic group from the ideological opponents on the China agreement is that the former usually did not oppose the development of Sino-American relations per se. They would like to see stronger political and economic ties between the two countries and acknowledged that nuclear cooperation was a right step in that direction. My interviews with their aides strongly indicated that they genuinely wished to see further development of U.S.-China relations. For example, one of Markey's aides described the congressman's views toward China this way:

He is in favor of warm relations with (the) PRC because it is an important country in world politics. China has the potential to become an economic power....He publicly supported what Carter did on China. He is not pro-Taiwan and anti-PRC. The issue concerning the China agreement was not U.S.-China relations. We criticized it not because we disliked China. We were disturbed by the Chinese activities. China was irresponsible for nonproliferation. That set the stage for confrontation.

Cranston believed that through nuclear cooperation both the United States and China could improve mutual understanding on nonproliferation issues:

I also have not wanted to foreclose a possible opportunity to gain sorely needed United States export earnings, especially in Asia where we are suffering such a horrid trade imbalance....I have wanted, too, to advance the opportunity for mutually beneficial United States-People's Republic of China technological and commercial cooperation--in this respect, I have been suspicious of the motives of those radical right-wingers who, under the guise of nonproliferation concerns, would do most anything to sour our relations with Beijing.⁵²

Like Cranston, Glenn drew a clear line between himself and the ideological opponents of the agreement:

⁵²*Con. Rec.*, 21 October 1985, S13624.

I am not about to argue that there should be no United States nuclear agreement with China. There are, however, those who believe that even though China is a nuclear weapon state, the transfer of United States nuclear technology for power generation will make a contribution to China's military capability; and that a country that has experienced such severe internal political instability may move in the future in unpredictable ways, including ways that could threaten United States national security. But I am not one of those who believe that trade agreements with potential adversaries ought to be avoided in every case. There are benefits to be obtained, both economic and political.⁵³

However, what these issue leaders did not want to see was to have the relationship overshadow their issue concern, that is, the priority of nonproliferation, which, in the words of John Glenn, was "the single most important factor we face in the world today."⁵⁴ It was the dominant theme held by nonproliferation advocates that decisions as critical as the transfer of nuclear technology and material should not be subject to the exigencies of short-term foreign policy and economic interests. Sen. Proxmire argued:

Improving relations with the People's Republic of China should be a foreign-policy priority for the U.S. It's clearly in our economic interest to have the world's most populous nation as a trading partner and in our national-security interest to have close ties with a nation that keeps 52 Soviet divisions occupied along its border. But there's another foreign-policy priority--preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Too often, however, the goal of nonproliferation becomes subordinated to short-term U.S. interests overseas.⁵⁵

To them, the China agreement was certainly good for the bilateral relationship. But it must, first of all, promote U.S. nonproliferation interests. "I want to see it go through," said Glenn, "*on a basis* (italics mine) that protects our leadership position in the world in trying to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons."⁵⁶ Markey declared that "we have an obligation to the American people and future generations not to sacrifice long-term guarantees against the

⁵³Ibid., 9 October 1985, S13010.

⁵⁴*Proceedings of the 76th Annual Meeting* (Washington, D.C.: American Society of International Law, April 22-24, 1982), p. 78.

⁵⁵William Proxmire, "The Risks in Selling China a Stronger Nuclear Genie," *Wall Street Journal*, 24 May 1984, p. 32.

⁵⁶Testimony before Foreign Relations, *US-PRC Nuclear Agreement*, p. 46.

spread of nuclear weapons to short-term profit."⁵⁷

Their position was reinforced by the common notion held among the members of the legalistic group, as strongly revealed in the course of my interviews, that the bilateral relationship between the two countries was so good that it would not be necessarily jeopardized by their opposition to the agreement. Indeed, what many of them were concerned with was that the Reagan administration had been too friendly to the Chinese to pay sufficient attention to U.S. nonproliferation interests. It was not surprising that Glenn and others, in arguing against the provisions of the China agreement, frequently cited a commentary by the *New Republic* titled "Carrying Friendship Too Far." "In the name of Sino-American rapprochement," it said, "we are about to embark on a 30-year Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation with the most egregious proliferator in the history of the atomic age."⁵⁸ It charged that the Reagan administration "transcended our outspoken verbal commitment to nonproliferation for financial and geopolitical gains."⁵⁹

The legalistic group's position was thus based on the premise that the issue they had been advocating for a long time was more important than the bilateral relationship itself. It was one of the bases on which both liberals and conservatives, Democrats as well as Republicans, could form a coalition opposing the agreement. The coalition was also strengthened by a common ground shared by both legalistic and ideological groups--the distrust of the Chinese government in carrying out international agreements. While Helms accused China of its "unreliability" in the bilateral grain and textile accords with the United States,⁶⁰ Glenn charged that the signing of the non-nuclear high technology export agreement with China in January 1984 "did not provide a sufficient incentive for good behavior by the People's

⁵⁷Markey, "Dear Colleague" letter, 29 July 1985, p. 1.

⁵⁸"Carrying Friendship Too Far," *The New Republic*, 25 November 1985, p. 7.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰*Con. Rec.*, 28 October 1985, S14234.

Republic of China in high technology trade."⁶¹ Proxmire also questioned how responsible a trading partner China was, citing its political history and change in leadership.⁶² In the House, liberal Democrat Markey found praise from his conservative allies who were otherwise unlikely to be on his side on other issues when he testified before the Foreign Affairs Committee. Conservative Republican Burton, who was staunchly pro-Taiwan, told Markey that "we agree wholeheartedly on this issue" while Solomon, another anti-PRC conservative, was glad to see "Ed Markey coming to many conclusions" that he was coming to and commended the liberal for his testimony.⁶³

Therefore, it was no wonder that the issue leaders of the legalistic group played the leading role in the anti-agreement coalition. They attracted both liberals and moderates in both parties by expressing their favorable attitude toward China and Sino-American relations (thus distinguishing themselves from the ideological group) on the one hand, and by advocating a traditionally popular issue in Congress on the other. Glenn and others argued that what they were trying to do was to eliminate the potential misunderstandings that could become "an ongoing irritant in United States-China relations."⁶⁴ At the same time, their emphasis on the issue and distrust of the Chinese government on its nonproliferation policy made it possible for them to form, however uneasy it might be, an issue coalition with the ideological group which, with its extreme position, was apparently unable to lead the anti-agreement opposition.

The Voting Patterns

Then how was this issue coalition reflected in the voting patterns on the China

⁶¹Ibid., 6 November 1985, S14877.

⁶²Ibid., 10 October 1985, S13039.

⁶³House Foreign Affairs Committee, *Proposed Nuclear Agreement*, 31 July 1985, pp. 33,45.

⁶⁴John Glenn, testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, *US-PRC Nuclear Agreement*, 9 October 1985, p. 2.

agreement? Tables 5.1-5.3 present two roll-call votes: One was the House vote on the passage of the compromise resolution reached between congressional opponents and supporters on the China agreement; the other Republican Sen. Evans' motion to table the Glenn amendment prohibiting the implementation of the China agreement unless it met certain strict conditions, which was the only recorded Senate vote related to the China agreement. Vote for the motion indicates support for the China agreement. The tables show how the votes were affected by the partisan, ideological, presidential leadership, and regional variables.

It is apparent that the voting did not strictly follow partisan lines (Table 5.1). In the House, a majority of each party voted for the compromise resolution. That a much higher percentage of Democrats voted for the resolution than that of Republicans could be attributed in part to the fact that Democrats in general tend to be more enthusiastic about developing

TABLE 5.1
Party and the Voting on the China Nuclear Agreement

	House		Senate	
	Passage of The Resolution		Evans Motion	
	Yea	Nay	Yea	Nay
Total	307	112	28	59
Democrats	208	39	5	35
% of all Dem. votes	84	16	13	87
Republicans	99	73	23	24
% of all Rep. votes	58	42	49	51

relations with the PRC. But it is difficult to know whether the Democrats were also more economic-oriented than the Republicans in this particular case. In the Senate, however, the majorities of both parties supported the Glenn amendment putting stiff conditions on the China agreement. Again, it is hard to determine whether the high percentage of Democrats opposing

TABLE 5.2

Ideology and the Voting on the China Nuclear Agreement

	House		Senate	
	Passage of The Resolution		Evans Motion	
	Yea	Nay	Yea	Nay
Total	307	112	28	59
Mean	52.5	26.1	28.6	45.5
Correlation Coefficient	r = .35		r = .23	
% of Most Conservative Votes*	49.7	50.3	39.0	61.0
% of More Moderate Votes#	86.7	13.3	33.3	66.7
% of Most Liberal Votes@	87.9	12.0	16.7	83.3

* Those members had the ADA scores at 20% or below.

Those members had the ADA scores between 21 and 79%.

@ Those members had the ADA scores at 80% or above.

Note: Some percentages may not add up to 100 due to the rounding errors.

the Evans motion was related to the partisan factor or to the appeal of the amendment itself. But the Republican vote clearly indicated that party had very limited influence at most, despite the fact the amendment was made by a Democrat attempting, in effect, to block the China agreement negotiated by a Republican administration.

The voting also indicated no clear ideological cleavage over the China agreement (see Table 5.2). Using ADA's congressional voting scores in 1985, we obtain a measurement of the ideological voting trend of the members of Congress on the compromise agreement. As Table 5.1 shows, on the House side the mean ADA score among those voting for the resolution was 52.5, while the mean ADA score for the opponents was 26.1. (The range of ADA scores used here was 0-100.) In addition, the Pearson product moment correlation between ADA score and voting on the agreement was .35. This suggested that there was a positive relationship between the liberal trend and voting for the resolution. But the relationship was not strong enough for us to confidently conclude that the higher the ADA score, the more likely a member was to support the resolution, or the opposite. Indeed, when we compared the voting patterns of the most liberal and conservative congressmen (those scored at 20% or lower and those at 80% or higher), we would find that the number of the most-conservative members who voted for the resolution was about equal to that of those opposing it (77 to 78), with 87.9% of the most-liberal members casting the vote supported the measure. Apparently, the most-liberal members supporting the resolution were more responsible for the trend of the ideological voting than the most-conservative ones. One explanation for this could be that the liberals tended to be more supportive of developing Sino-U.S. relations than the conservatives.

On the Senate side, the mean ADA score among those voting against the Evans motion (or the proposed China agreement) was 45.5, while the mean ADA score for those supporting the motion was 28.6. The Pearson product moment correlation between ADA score and voting on the motion was .23. (The range of the ADA score was 0-100.) Thus, there was a positive

relationship between the liberal trend and opposition to the agreement: The higher the ADA score, the more likely a senator was to oppose the agreement. This was somewhat contradictory to the voting pattern in the House. But again, the relationship was not a strong one. For example, while 83% of those most-liberal senators casting the vote opposed the motion, a high percentage (61%) of those most-conservative senators casting the vote did so. Overall, then, ideology was not a significant determinant for the congressmen's voting decisions on the China agreement.

While ideology had a positive but not a strong relationship with the voting, there was actually an inverse relationship between the presidential leadership and each of the two votes (Table 5.3). The mean CQ presidential support score among those House members voting for the resolution was 40.3, while the mean for those House members voting against it was 59.8. (The range of the scores was 11-94.) Furthermore, the Pearson product moment correlation was $-.38$. In the Senate, the mean for those supporting the Evans motion was 66.5, compared with 55.1 among those opposing the measure. (The range of the scores was 20-92.) In addition, the Pearson product moment correlation was $-.30$. Thus, both the House and Senate votes suggested that the higher the presidential support score in 1985, the less likely a member was to vote for the China agreement. But the inverse relationship was once again not particularly strong. Moreover, it appeared to have resulted substantially from the large variances of those members with the smallest presidential support scores away from the mean. However, it did indicate strongly that presidential leadership offered little explanation for the voting. It instead raised the question of why members of the anti-agreement coalition opposed the China nuclear accord, even though many of them had a considerably high presidential support score. Since ideology and partisanship were not strong explanations for the voting, we may well suggest that the salience of the issue could have a substantial influence.

Meantime, Table 5.4 also shows no clear regional impact on the congressional voting

coalitions. A few Western states, noticeably Washington, did have a strong interest in selling nuclear power equipments to China. But this did not draw them into a conflict with the other regions. The nuclear industry was relatively small and scattered in some

TABLE 5.3

Presidential Leadership and the Voting on the China Nuclear Agreement

	House		Senate	
	Passage of The Resolution		Evans Motion	
	Yea	Nay	Yea	Nay
Total	307	112	28	59
Mean	40.3	59.8	66.5	51.1
Correlation Coefficient	$r = -.38$		$r = -.30$	
% of Most Supportive Votes*	44.8	55.2	43.2	56.8
% of Less Supportive Votes#	72.2	27.8	26.5	73.5
% of Least Supportive Votes@	92.1	7.9	18.8	81.3

* Those House members had the CQ presidential support scores at 80% or above. For senators, the scores were at 70% or above.

Those House members had the CQ presidential support scores between 21 to 79%. For senators, the scores were between 31 to 69%.

@ Those House members had the CQ presidential support scores at 20% or below. For senators, the scores were at 30% or below.

Note: Some percentages may not add up to 100 due to the rounding errors.

TABLE 5.4

**Region and the Voting on the China Nuclear Agreement
(Vote by State Delegation)**

	House		Senate	
	Passage of The Resolution		Evans Motion	
	Yea	Nay	Yea	Nay
Total	307	112	28	59
Single Vote	12	3	6	19
South*	0	0	0	7
East	4	1	0	7
West	5	1	4	2
Midwest	3	1	2	3
Majority Vote#	24	4	3	8
South	10	1	1	1
East	4	0	2	0
West	2	3	0	3
Midwest	8	0	0	4
Split Vote	6		13	
South	2		3	
East	2		2	
West	2		4	
Midwest	0		4	

* Regions are classified according to the *Congressional Quarterly*:
 South: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana,
 Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee,
 Texas, Virginia.

(Cont'd on the next page)

(TABLE 5.4--Continued)

East: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia.

West: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wyoming.

Midwest: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Wisconsin.

A majority state vote in the Senate means that one senator voted, the other did not.

congressional districts around the country. Presumably, those lawmakers whose districts or states could not benefit from the nuclear trade with China were more likely to be influenced by the nonproliferation issue leaders than those whose constituencies were closely related to the nuclear trade.

In sum, the votes on the China agreement were across the partisan, ideological, and regional lines. They appeared to have little to do with the presidential leadership. It thus further indicated that the lawmakers tended to be influenced more by the salience of the issue in making their voting decisions. The examination of the roll-call votes gives additional confirmation of the position of the legalistic group and their issue leaders as the leading players in the legislative battle on the China agreement, who used their unique policy positions to form an anti-agreement issue coalition. Indeed, as will be discussed later in the chapter, the weak partisan and ideological differences between the supporters and opponents of the China agreement in the House, as well as the inverse relationship between presidential leadership and the voting, were even weaker than what the analysis of the roll-call votes could reveal. We will see that a number of anti-agreement liberals voted for the resolution not only because it was a *compromise* measure but also because it was procedurally necessary for them to do so. The House and Senate votes actually reflected both flexibility and persistency of the legislative styles of the anti-agreement issue coalition. This will be examined later, following our

discussion of the roles of the anti-agreement coalition in the next section.

Roles and Effect of The Anti-Agreement Coalition: Reacting, Revising and Constraining

In considering the nuclear agreement with China, the anti-agreement coalition was clearly not in a position to take any initiative. It was the Reagan administration that had set the U.S. nuclear export policy toward China and had been negotiating the agreement with the Chinese government since the fall of 1981. As the congressional opponents waited anxiously for the opportunity to examine the accord after it was initialled in April 1984, the administration delayed the submission for fifteen months until it appeared that it could get the agreement through the congressional scrutiny. Although congressional opposition to the accord had already arisen during the negotiations, it was only when the official text of the agreement was formally submitted to the Congress and formal committee hearings were conducted that the anti-agreement coalition clearly emerged. Thus, the coalition played the reactive role as it responded to the initiative from the administration.

This reactive role then motivated the anti-agreement coalition to take its functional role, that is, to revise the policy proposal (the China agreement) proposed by the administration. In so doing, the coalition apparently attempted to exert a policy-constraining effect on the administration's nuclear export policy toward China. This role can be illustrated by the strategies made by the issue leaders and the legislative battle that followed.

The Anti-Agreement Strategies

After the agreement was submitted to Congress, the question facing the opponents was what kind of legislative strategies should be used to change the provisions of the agreement that they did not like. And there was no consensus on it. Rep. Markey, for example, believed that Congress could do so through the existing legal requirements for the consideration of U.S. nuclear cooperation with other countries. Accordingly, on September 30

he and thirty-three other cosponsors in the House introduced a resolution asking President Reagan to withdraw the agreement and to resubmit it to Congress along with an acknowledgement that it fell short of legal standards designed to guard against the diversions of civilian nuclear supplies to military purposes. If Reagan were to comply with that request, the agreement would go into effect only if Congress approved it by passing a joint resolution.⁶⁵ This resubmitting approach was also recommended by Proxmire in the Senate.

Senator Glenn would use a different strategy. According to the interview with one of his aides, the senator believed that the administration would definitely refuse the request for resubmission with a waiver since it had already stated that the agreement met all the legal requirements. Any acceptance of such a request from Congress could only mean a political embarrassment to the administration. Besides, the two foreign affairs committees would be unlikely to adopt and recommend such a resolution (indeed, the resolution died in Foreign Affairs without a hearing). Reopening negotiations with the Chinese was an even more remote possibility since China would not be willing to do so. To Glenn, then, a better way for Congress to influence the agreement was to pass a "Sino-American Nuclear Verification Act" (SANVA), which

will not prevent the agreement from formally going into effect but the bill, if enacted, postpones any nuclear transfers or retransfers to the PRC until the President has certified that the identified deficiencies have been rectified.⁶⁶

The SANVA, introduced by Glenn on October 9, specified that there should be no U.S. nuclear exports to China unless the president certified that the Chinese had provided a detailed, written exposition of their non-proliferation policies; that the Chinese accepted verification in the form of IAEA safeguards; that the Chinese recognized that consent rights were not biased by the language of the agreement; and that China recognized that U.S. domestic law was

⁶⁵*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 28 September 1985, p. 1943. Also see letter from Markey and forty-five other congressmen of both parties to President Reagan, 4 November 1985.

⁶⁶William V. Roth, Jr. and John Glenn, "Dear Colleague" letter, 8 October 1985.

paramount when it came to determining which transfers would be made and which would not. A companion bill was introduced in the House by Rep. Feighan.

The sponsors of the SANVA did not totally repudiate the idea of resubmission, except that they thought that to put forward such a resolution abruptly could only lead to a quick refusal from the administration and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Instead they believed that a milder resolution might be more attractive to the moderates in Congress. Sen. Cohen, a strong supporter of the SANVA, speculated that if Congress failed to accept the bill, then it might adopt a resolution of disapproval of the agreement that could very well send to the president a strong message explaining congressional consensus. In so doing "we could invite the president to resubmit the agreement with the necessary qualification and clarification."⁶⁷ In essence, the SANVA was designed to present a legislative alternative for the very purpose of revising the provisions of the China agreement.

The Compromise Resolution The SANVA was strongly opposed by the Reagan administration. It argued that if enacted the SANVA would require renegotiation of the agreement and thus "undermine the carefully negotiated agreement and destroy any prospect for U.S.-China peaceful nuclear cooperation, without serving any non-proliferation purpose."⁶⁸ However, this anti-agreement strategy was reenergized when suddenly there occurred a wave of condemnation of China for its nuclear links with Pakistan and Iran in late October, triggered by a news report that China had indicated that it might provide Iran with sensitive nuclear technology after Beijing signed the U.S.-China nuclear agreement.⁶⁹ It subsequently put pressure on the pro-agreement members of the two authorizing foreign affairs committees.

⁶⁷Testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, *US-PRC Nuclear Agreement*, 9 October 1985, pp. 87-88.

⁶⁸Letter from William L. Ball, III, Assistant Secretary for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, to Dante B. Fascell, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 5 November 1985.

⁶⁹*Washington Post*, 23 October 1985, p. A1.

According to the personal files of several staff members involved in the legislative process, the question facing the agreement supporters now was not whether the authorizing committees should simply report a resolution of approval but what kind of conditions should be put on the agreement so as to silence the opposition, especially those swing voters who became concerned with the agreement, and at the same time, not doing anything that would require the administration to go back to the Chinese for renegotiation.

The leading pro-agreement members on the two committees (Sen. Lugar, Reps. Bonker and Solarz) and the administration struck a compromise with Sen. Cranston, one of the leading opponents on Foreign Relations after intensive negotiation. According to interviews with staff members for both committees, Cranston became the ideal man for making a compromise because he appeared not as strongly concerned with the legal aspects of the agreement as Glenn and some others were. The senator was also said to have personally considered the SANVA too restrictive. He wanted to avoid what he called an "unwise confrontation" with China and the administration on the nuclear agreement.⁷⁰ A careful reading of Cranston's statements reveals that his major concern was China's linkage with countries on the verge of developing nuclear weapons. The compromise became possible after the allegations about China's nuclear linkage with Iran were substantially repudiated by a closed briefing from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Cranston himself wrote the compromise resolution that deviated considerably from the SANVA.

The Foreign Relations Committee later passed the resolution by a vote of 12-3. The three dissenting votes were cast by conservative Republicans Helms and Larry Pressler (S.D.) and moderate Republican Nancy Landon Kassebaum (Kan.). Kassebaum explained that she voted against the compromise resolution:

because it did not adequately address my concerns about safeguards. Nor did it adequately address my concerns about China's nuclear nonproliferation policy. I welcome our growing trade relationship with the People's Republic of China....But even

⁷⁰*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 16 November 1985, p. 2387.

when we are dealing with friendly governments, I think it is critical that we apply objective and strict standards to cooperation agreements in this very important area to ensure that any nuclear material, facilities or components provided by the United States be used solely for peaceful purposes.⁷¹

Kassebaum's vote apparently reflected the "hard-liners" within the legalistic group, who firmly upheld the principle of nonproliferation against the political and economical attractiveness of the agreement.

The compromise resolution would require a 30-day waiting period for issuing export licenses for U.S. nuclear technology after a corporation had won a contract from the Chinese. During that time, the president must certify to Congress that there were satisfactory arrangements to verify the peaceful use of U.S. technology, equipment, and materials supply to China; that the Chinese government had provided "additional information" concerning its nuclear nonproliferation policies; and that the obligation in the agreement to consider favorably a Chinese request to enrich or reprocess did not prejudice the U.S. decision to approve or disapprove such a request. At the same time the resolution also required the president to report to the Congress detailing the history and current developments in Chinese nonproliferation policies and practices. It further stated that each proposed export pursuant to the agreement should be subject to U.S. laws and regulations in effect at the time of each such export.⁷²

Although the resolution was much less restrictive than the SANVA, it nevertheless reflected the constraining effect that the anti-agreement lawmakers exerted on the administration's nuclear export policy toward China. It was an implicit congressional rebuke to the Reagan administration on nuclear nonproliferation. While endorsing the agreement, the resolution demanded more information about China's nonproliferation policy and practice than either Beijing or the administration had so far been willing to provide. The administration

⁷¹*Con. Rec.*, 9 December 1985, S17156-S17157.

⁷²House Foreign Affairs Committee, *Proposed Nuclear Agreement*, 13 November 1985, p. 110.

appeared unhappy with the restrictions that set up a series of hurdles to make it more difficult for U.S. firms to compete for China's nuclear business. The resolution, however, did not give Congress veto power over nuclear exports to China. Nor was it compatible with what Glenn and Markey had intended, such as specific IAEA inspections or adherence to other IAEA arrangements, a clear, written commitment from China, a presidential resubmission with a waiver, or a renegotiation with the Chinese--any of which would have made the agreement impossible to go into effect. Because of this, the administration was willing to settle for less than what it wanted and concluded that "this resolution in no way undercuts the implementation of our agreement with China."⁷³

Flexibility and Persistency

For an issue coalition playing the reactive role, its logical aim is to maximize its influence on the policy issue by exerting its constraining effect as fully as possible. But how to achieve that objective is a subjective question as well. In the case of the anti-agreement coalition, the issue leaders perceived it very differently. While Cranston apparently considered the compromise resolution the best result the coalition could achieve, Glenn and Markey believed otherwise and continued their opposition. This reflected the two legislative styles of the anti-agreement coalition: flexibility in strategy and persistency in goal. But even for Glenn and Markey, the two styles were interwoven in their efforts to maximize the constraining effect on the American nuclear export policy toward China. This is illustrated by their legalistic group's reaction to the compromise resolution in contrast to the action of their ally--the ideological group.

The Procedure and the Vote on the Compromise Resolution The compromise resolution, passed in the two foreign affairs committees, weakened the anti-agreement coalition with the "defections" of Sen. Cranston along with Reps. Wolpe and Feighan, who had

⁷³*Washington Post*, 22 November 1985, p. A3.

also participated in the negotiation. But the legalistic group, as well as the ideological one, continued their efforts to block the accord, each using their different tactics. On November 20, less than three weeks before the China nuclear agreement would take effect automatically,⁷⁴ Reps. Markey and Matthew F. (Matt) McHugh (D-N.Y.), Chairman of the House Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus, demanded that the agreement be "thoroughly debated" in the House.⁷⁵ Given that both houses leaned heavily toward approval of the compromise resolution (the Senate passed the resolution on November 21 by a voice vote), such an open debate would not turn the tide. Markey and his supporters apparently realized that when the Senate had approved the resolution it would be harmful to their cause if they tried to push the House to disapprove it (and then let the original agreement go into effect automatically). After all, a compromise was better than nothing. Therefore, they decided to use the issue to publicize what they perceived as deficiencies of the agreement and the inadequacy of Reagan's nonproliferation policy. As a result, when the time came for the House to vote on the resolution, Markey and many of his supporters eventually voted along with the pro-agreement members.

By contrast, the ideological group apparently wanted to fight the agreement to the end. On December 5, House leaders attempted to bring the measure up for a vote but were foiled when conservative Republican Dan Burton objected to a motion allowing action by unanimous consent. Rep. Gerald Solomon (R-N.Y.), another conservative, argued that the resolution "improved the agreement," but "doesn't make the agreement any more acceptable."⁷⁶ He blamed his fellow Republicans for letting the resolution be "snuck through the Senate without

⁷⁴Remember that according to the law, the agreement would take effect automatically unless the Congress disapproved it by a joint resolution (and, presumably, overrode a presidential veto) within 60 working days.

⁷⁵*Con. Rec.*, 20 November 1985, H10325.

⁷⁶Quoted in *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 14 December 1985, p. 2654.

anyone hardly knowing anything about it."⁷⁷ The conservatives wanted an open rule so that they could amend the resolution. In this way, they were actually helping the original agreement go into effect, regardless of their own intention. Markey, Wolpe and some others in the legalistic group, on the other hand, supported a closed rule barring any amendments to the compromise resolution after they secured a floor debate from the agreement supporters. The closed rule was then upheld by a vote of 252 to 158. Following a heated two-hour debate on the agreement, the House passed the compromise resolution by 307-112 (see Tables 5.1-5.3). The difference between the votes against the closed rule and the votes against the resolution suggested that some anti-agreement members, mainly Republicans, who voted against the closed rule, had apparently recognized the procedural dilemma of the anti-agreement coalition and subsequently shifted their position and voted for the resolution.⁷⁸

The Glenn Amendment While Markey and his supporters showed a sense of flexibility in face of a procedural dilemma, the action taken by Glenn in the Senate reflected the persistent side of the issue coalition in pursuing its objective. Dissatisfied with the compromise resolution passed by the Senate, Glenn on December 9 submitted an amendment to the fiscal 1986 continuing appropriations resolution that was under debate. The amendment required that Congress would withhold any funds for the implementation of the China agreement until the president certified that the discussions on verifications that were provided in the agreement had in fact resulted in Chinese acceptance of IAEA safeguards, or their equivalent, on any U.S. exported materials or equipment.⁷⁹ Glenn's coalition succeeded in having the Senate pass

⁷⁷*Con. Rec.*, 11 December 1985, H11759.

⁷⁸Of 68 who voted nay on the closed rule and yea on the compromise resolution, 58 were Republicans, 10 Democrats. There were also 24 others (6 Republicans and 18 Democrats) who voted yea on the closed rule and nay on the compromise resolution. The motivation for the latter's switch was not clear. It may mean that the votes on the closed rule did not indicate clearly the lawmakers' positions on the China agreement. In any case, the large difference between the two groups suggested at least some influence of the procedural dilemma.

⁷⁹*Con. Rec.*, 9 December 1985, S17143.

the Glenn amendment on a voice vote after it defeated Sen. Daniel Evans (R-Wash.)'s motion to kill the amendment by 59 to 28 (see tables 5.1-5.3) and another attempt by Sens. Robert Dole (R-Kan.) and Charles McC. Mathias (R-Md.) to put aside the consideration of the amendment.

The passage of the amendment might be related to the parliamentary opportunity seized by Glenn, Cohen and their supporters. For example, they took advantage of the absence of Lugar from the four-hour debate--who, as the Chairman of Foreign Relations, would have played an important role in the attempt to preventing the passage of the amendment. They also seemed to have captured the distrust of China among both liberals and conservative senators. The amendment clearly showed that there was a strong opposition to the China agreement in the Senate, led by the issue leaders with strong conviction on nonproliferation.

Nevertheless, the anti-agreement coalition was met by a staunch counter-coalition of the Reagan administration, the pro-agreement members in Congress, the Chinese government, and the nuclear industry during the House-Senate conference on the continuing resolution. The pro-agreement coalition, in particular, stressed the consequences the Glenn amendment would bring to Sino-U.S. relations. The administration, for example, warned that

this amendment would undermine the agreement, would do serious damage to US-China relations, and would severely set back all the progress we have made with the Chinese in the nonproliferation area.⁸⁰

The administration argued that it would accept the compromise resolution, which served "the same purpose as the Glenn Amendment *without* killing the agreement."⁸¹ Winston Lord, U.S. Ambassador to China, telephoned several members of Congress from Beijing to reinforce the importance of the agreement for Sino-U.S. relations. Ambassador Kennedy, who negotiated the agreement, also called from Brazil. Then Vice President George Bush personally reminded

⁸⁰Letter from John C. Whitehead, Deputy Secretary of State, to Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole, 7 December 1985.

⁸¹Letter from Michael H. Armocost, Acting Secretary of State, to House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., 10 December 1985.

both Glenn and Cohen that the administration did not want to see this forced into renegotiation and that it just felt the Chinese would dump the whole thing.⁸² The White House threatened to veto the continuing resolution if it included the amendment. The administration's efforts made Glenn complain bitterly: "I have been here 11 years and only rarely in those 11 years have I seen what I term a real full court press on lobbying from the administration."⁸³

The administration's argument was reinforced by congressional supporters of the agreement. In his letter to the conferees urging them to delete the Glenn amendment from the bill, Rep. Dante Fascell, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, wrote,

Besides the fact that this provision is clearly not germane to an appropriations bill, we believe this provision would be harmful to U.S.-Chinese relations generally, and would undercut a delicate agreement reached by both critics and supporters of the recently-concluded nuclear cooperation agreement between the U.S. and the PRC.⁸⁴

At the same time, the lobbying network of Westinghouse, a major nuclear industrial company, was working to the full capacity. The lobbyists were busy with identifying the leading opponents and supporters in the conference. "We have the lobbyists out all over Capital Hill tonight for the nuclear industry," Glenn told the Senate. "I can guarantee you that. They have been ringing my phone off the hook and the phones of dozens of other Senators."⁸⁵

Across the Pacific Ocean also came the protest of the Chinese government. In a statement released on December 11, the Chinese Foreign Ministry criticized the Glenn amendment for having "raised unreasonable demands for the U.S. side to unilaterally change some substantive provisions" of the agreement. It warned that "any unilaterally imposed additional provisions beyond the agreement are completely unacceptable."⁸⁶ The Chinese

⁸²*Washington Post*, 16 December 1985, p. A23.

⁸³*Con. Rec.*, 12 December 1985, S17511.

⁸⁴Letter from Dante Fascell to Jamie L. Whitten, Chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations, 11 December 1985.

⁸⁵*Con. Rec.*, 12 December 1985, S17513.

⁸⁶*Washington Post*, 12 December 1985, p. A35.

statement apparently helped reinforce the argument made by the administration and the congressional supporters that the Glenn amendment would damage the U.S.-China relations.

By mid-December, Glenn and Cohen had seen their hope vanish despite their counter-lobbying efforts. The Republican conferees who had supported the amendment on the Senate floor switched votes one after another in face of intense pressure from the White House and State. The most effective weapon used by the administration appeared to be the specific threat that President Reagan would veto the continuing resolution with the Glenn amendment. Confronted with that possibility, the conference committee voted 15 to 7 not to accept the amendment, and on the same day Reagan signed into law the resolution that had been on his desk but had been held up pending action on the Glenn amendment.

The battle was over. But it did not weaken the determination of the issue leaders. Glenn and Cohen warned that they would come back again to attach greater restrictions on nuclear exports to China if an opportunity came in the future. "This is not the end of the matter," said Cohen. "It will be back in January, February, March, and April, and on into next year and the year thereafter."⁸⁷ The remarkable persistency of the issue leaders, together with their sense of flexibility, again reflected the nature of an issue-oriented congressional opposition, different from the ideology-oriented opposition. But the fate of the Glenn amendment suggested that persistency does not necessarily yield an immediate policy-constraining effect in face of a determined counter-coalition.

Policy Influence of The Anti-Agreement Coalition

Having examined the policy roles of the anti-agreement coalition in the Congress-centered policy process, let us now turn to the assessment of the coalition's influence on the China agreement. By playing its functional role of revising the China agreement submitted by

⁸⁷*Con. Rec.*, 12 December 1985, S17513.

the administration, the coalition clearly exerted a constraining effect on the U.S. nuclear export policy toward China. It pressed the reluctant administration and the congressional supporters of the agreement to make a compromise by imposing some mild conditions on the agreement. These conditions subsequently forced the administration to pay more attention to the Chinese nuclear policy and practice, and complicated its negotiations with the Chinese on the details of the implementation of the agreement, which dragged on until 1988 (interviews with Energy Department officials).

On the whole, however, the anti-agreement coalition failed to achieve their original goals. The compromise resolution was far from what Glenn and other determined opponents had wanted. The resolution failed to include most of the conditions raised by the opponents, of which the most important one was a clear, written pledge from the Chinese government on nonproliferation. The limited influence of the anti-agreement coalition will be seen more clearly in the context of its interactions with the counter-opposition in Congress, the administration, the Chinese government, and the domestic interest groups.

The Anti-Agreement Coalition and Counter-Opposition in Congress It was clear from the beginning of the Congress-centered process on the China agreement that the anti-agreement coalition enjoyed the issue advantage over their counter-opponents. This issue advantage resulted from the expansive nature of the issue--its linkages to the broader, more salient, multilateral-related nonproliferation issue and Congress's power in making and its subsequent oversight of laws governing U.S. nuclear export policies. Confronting the increased intensity of the congressional opposition, many supporters of the agreement found themselves caught between the popularity of the nonproliferation issue and the political and economic importance of the agreement. According to interviews with the staff members for the House Foreign Affairs Committee, both Solarz and Bonker, who each chaired an important subcommittee having jurisdiction over the agreement, consumed an unusually large number of hours (compared with the time they usually spent on other issues) searching for a position that

could reconcile the two seemingly conflicting compulsions, despite their own predispositions toward U.S.-China relations (Solarz) and liberalization of technology transfer (Bonker).⁸⁸ The compromise resolution was the last of several concessionary steps taken by the supporters of the agreement. The passage of the Glenn amendment in the Senate further reflected the attractiveness of the nonproliferation issue.

On the other hand, the success of the anti-agreement coalition was limited by the fact that the Congress was in a generally reactive mood when it received the policy initiative from the administration. It thus made it difficult for the issue leaders to mobilize their colleagues to form a potential winning coalition from the beginning, even though they had the issue advantage. For many lawmakers, moreover, the attraction of a big Chinese nuclear energy market, particularly at a time when the American nuclear industry was in a deep recession,⁸⁹ overshadowed their concern of the spread of nuclear weapons in an uncertain world; and this was reinforced by the belief that China was already a nuclear-weapons state.⁹⁰ All this enabled the leaders of the counter-opposition to employ compromise as a strategy to form a winning coalition, coupled with the procedural advantage they enjoyed when the resolution

⁸⁸A senior aide to Bonker told me in the interview that the congressman saw the China agreement as a "hot potato", and tried hard to avoid his involvement in the issue and debate whenever possible.

⁸⁹Since 1975 the U.S. market share declined from a high of 85% of all nuclear powerplant exports in the period 1955-74, to only 39% in the period 1975-83. Between 1972 and 1983 the U.S. nuclear industry saw over 90 nuclear powerplants or plant orders canceled and received its last domestic order in 1978. Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on U.S. Trade with China, *Nuclear Cooperation with China*, pp. 3, 41.

⁹⁰The defenders of the agreement argued that this was the first time that the United States had had a bilateral agreement with a nuclear-weapons-producing state which made it unique and that U.S. nonproliferation laws implied that weapons-producing states were not necessarily subject to safeguards as a non-weapons-producing state would be. Solarz's statement reflected this opinion: "Given the fact that China is already a nuclear weapons state; given the fact that China has a capacity to transfer nuclear technology even without this agreement if it choose to do so; given the fact that China would even transfer nuclear weapons themselves to other countries if they should decide to make that decision, it is not clear to me in what way the approval of this agreement and transfer of our nuclear technology to China could potentially jeopardize our efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation." (Hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, *Proposed Nuclear Agreement*, 31 July 1985, p. 31.).

came to a vote.

The Administration's Limitation in Making Concessions We have seen that the Reagan administration had to make concessions, under pressure from the anti-agreement coalition. Its acceptance of the compromise resolution was a strong indicator of such executive concessions. But no matter how willing the administration was to make concessions, its bottom line was clear: It would neither withdraw and hence resubmit nor renegotiate the agreement with the Chinese. The administration held the line firmly. During the delay of the submission of the agreement, the administration did not renegotiate the pact with China--the version of the agreement was virtually unchanged when it was sent to Congress. Instead, the administration only tried to get further clearances from the Chinese and obtained the summary of discussions prepared by its own negotiators. When the summary apparently failed to satisfy opponents during the congressional deliberation of the accord, the administration made its further concessions only to the extent that certain conditions were put on the American side of the agreement, for example, on the process of licencing U.S. nuclear materials to China. The administration was clearly pushed into the corner by the passage of the Glenn amendment in the Senate, which went beyond the limit the administration was willing to accept. Thus, it waged an all-out, no-concession, lobbying campaign against the amendment.

It might be argued that the executive was unwilling to accept the demands made by the congressional opponents because of his institutional ego. But in this case, a more direct constraint on the administration's concessions appeared to be its concern over the fate of the China agreement and its consequences for U.S.-Chinese relations. There was a general feeling in the executive branch, as reflected in my interviews with twenty-one officials who were involved in the case in one way or another, that while the administration could bargain hard with the Chinese during the negotiating period it was practically restrained by its strong sense of its foreign obligations and diplomatic credibility from making any unilateral changes after the agreement was completed and signed by both sides. Obviously, the bottom line would have

been crossed if the administration had demanded China for a clear, written statement on its nonproliferation policy, as requested most explicitly by the congressional opponents. The administration warned that the agreement would be aborted if it tried to meet the opponents' demands. The Chinese government had repeatedly stated that it would not do so in any case. It thus helped explain why the administration was only willing to let the conditions be imposed mainly upon the American side of the accord, rather than on the Chinese, as the opponents wanted.

The Constraints of the Chinese Government This then leads to the question of the influence of the Chinese government on the congressional policy process. In this case, the Chinese government and the Reagan administration appeared to act as "natural allies" against the anti-agreement coalition in Congress, particularly over the Glenn amendment. The Chinese had the same bottom line--no renegotiation should be conducted on the agreement. It declared that it would not accept any unilateral change on the substantive provisions of the accord. The Chinese position in effect set the limit as to the concessions that might have been made by the administration to the congressional opponents. This Chinese constraint was acknowledged by eighteen of my twenty-one government respondents, who said that they were quite concerned about the Chinese reaction and its impact on the bilateral relationship.⁹¹ They also believed that the Chinese pressure helped strengthen the administration's lobbying efforts against the Glenn amendment by reinforcing the executive branch's argument that the amendment would keep the agreement from going into effect and hence damage U.S.-China relations.⁹²

It is not difficult to understand the Chinese position on the issue. The Chinese

⁹¹Interestingly, the three respondents who said they were not particularly concerned with the Chinese reaction were from the Defense Department. They instead stressed the impact of the agreement on U.S. nonproliferation and security interests.

⁹²A majority (twelve) of my sixteen congressional respondents (two congressmen, and fourteen staff members) who participated in the legislative process said they did not feel any direct impact from the Chinese pressure. But they also believed that the Chinese reaction appeared to have boosted the administration's lobbying activities.

government was extremely sensitive to its sovereign rights in dealing with the United States. As early as 1980, the Chinese position on nuclear relations with the United States, as the Americans learned then, was that although China would like to cooperate with America in peaceful uses of the atom, it wanted to be given the same treatment as other nuclear-weapons states that had dealt with the United States. It also let it be known that China, as a sovereign nation, could not accept nuclear safeguards and inspection given by IAEA, because it believed that the international agency was controlled by the Soviet Union and the United States.⁹³ The negotiating process became protracted as China found it difficult to accept the American requirements on the questions of nonproliferation, safeguards, and consent rights. Later, although some changes did emerge in the Chinese nuclear policy as it joined IAEA and made public statements on nonproliferation, the Chinese denied the American claim--made by administration officials as well as its congressional supporters--that the nuclear talks with the United States had much to do with the change in Chinese policy.⁹⁴ In negotiating the final version of the agreement, "the Chinese persisted that we were co-equal because we were all nuclear countries."⁹⁵ They frequently emphasized the following terms: "mutual respect for sovereignty, noninterference in each other's affairs, equality and mutual benefit," which were eventually written into the agreement.⁹⁶ Likewise, the available documents indicated that the Chinese government never agreed, publicly or privately, to a written pledge, as demanded by

⁹³*Nuclear News*, December 1980, pp. 54-55; and *New York Times*, 2 June 1982, p. A7. This view on the IAEA was later changed as China joined its membership.

⁹⁴See, for example, the speech by Zhou Ping, head of the Chinese delegation, at the 29th meeting of IAEA, *People's Daily*, 25 September 1985. According to the interview with a Chinese official at the State Science and Technology Commission, China's new membership in the IAEA was less related to the negotiation with the Americans than to China's desire for possible benefits from its membership in the IAEA, such as nuclear technological information and assistance. Such an intention was consistent with the Chinese nuclear energy program being under consideration at the time.

⁹⁵Interview with a State Department official who directly participated in negotiating the agreement.

⁹⁶Interview with a Chinese counsellor at the Chinese embassy in Washington.

the congressional opponents. It considered such a demand, in the words of its ambassador to the United States, "a mistrust about China which challenges our honesty."⁹⁷ Thus, the Chinese made their nonproliferation position clear only in their own terms (nevertheless with a very subtle shift from their previous position), and in their unique manner, as shown by Zhao Ziyang's White House toast. In a similar way, they declined to sign "the summary of discussions" as the American negotiators wished. They accepted the compromise resolution apparently because the conditions attached to the agreement did not affect the Chinese side. But they felt strongly about the Glenn amendment not only because they considered it unilateral and too restrictive but because the amendment had the *explicit* implication for influencing the Chinese nuclear policy.

Nonproliferation Groups vs. Nuclear Industry The influence of the anti-agreement coalition was also limited by the lack of influential interest groups. For example, only two of the sixteen congressional respondents involved in the case considered the nonproliferation groups somewhat influential by citing their contributions to the public awareness of the agreement through opinion columns in some major newspapers. The Conservative Caucus Inc. was the only visible ideological pressure group which openly expressed their opposition to the nuclear cooperation on the ground that China would use the American technology to increase its military capability.⁹⁸ However, it was not actively involved in the legislative process. Therefore, its influence could not be clearly detected. The legalistic group did work closely with the nuclear control groups, namely the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI), Union of Concerned

⁹⁷Interview with Chinese Ambassador Zhang Wenjin, *Washington Post*, 1 August 1984, p. A23.

⁹⁸For example, at a press conference held in early 1984, Howard Phillips, Chairman of the Conservative Caucus Inc., criticized the Reagan administration for its "needlessly jeopardizing the security of the United States and increasing the cost of defending the American people by treating Communist China, an enemy nation with a totalitarian government, as if it were a partner or ally of our country. It is bad enough to accede to the claims of legitimacy by this brutal anti-American regime. It is far worse to treat Red China as a friendly government eligible to receive militarily applicable high technology." (Quoted in *U.S. Export Weekly*, 10 January 1984, pp. 518-19)

Scientists (UCS), Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), and Public Citizen(PC). These pressure groups lobbied hard on the Hill and participated actively in the committee hearings. They wanted the president to withdraw and renegotiate or resubmit the agreement with a waiver of statutory requirements.⁹⁹ Most of these groups were nonprofit research organizations. They functioned as suppliers of information and ideas to the anti-agreement coalition in Congress.¹⁰⁰ But what they were advocating was technically difficult for attracting the interest of ordinary people. They did not have close ties with the lawmakers' constituencies and therefore lacked the political clout that was necessary to influence members of Congress.

By contrast, the influence of the nuclear industry, headed by Westinghouse, appeared to be considerable on the Hill. Eleven or 69% of the sixteen respondents considered the nuclear industry to have had some influence in the process. "At least we made the intolerable situation (on the Hill) tolerable," said Stuart Eizenstat (in my interview), former domestic affairs adviser to President Carter, who was hired by Westinghouse to lobby for the corporation. As described earlier, the industry's lobbying was particularly intense during the House-Senate conference on the Glenn amendment. But the industry's influence was not merely reflected in its lobbying. Although my respondents discounted any significant influence from the constituency, they attributed the industry's influence to the fact that it was an economic interest group, which had a strong congruence of views with many lawmakers who shared a common concern with the ailing nuclear industry. The industry apparently captured the imagination of some lawmakers by emphasizing that "China represents one of the few

⁹⁹See, for example, letter of Paul Leventhal et al. to Rep. Dante Fascell, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 10 September 1985.

¹⁰⁰For example, the idea of amending the congressional procedure of considering U.S. nuclear agreements with other countries in the aftermath of the 1983 Supreme Court ruling was first suggested by Leonard S. Spector, a nonproliferation activist and formerly chief counsel of the Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear Nonproliferation. See Spector, "More Countries with Nukes?", *Washington Post*, 8 January 1984, p. C3.

remaining markets for significant near-term sales of nuclear equipment and technology."¹⁰¹ The estimate of the potential value of U.S. export for China's nuclear power program was as high as \$25 billion before the end of the century.¹⁰²

The industry also enjoyed the support of the Reagan administration whose 1981 arrival in the White House it hailed, in the words of Carl Walske, president of the Industrial Forum, with "ecstasy, joy, pleasure, and euphoria."¹⁰³ It urged the new administration to move "expeditiously to develop a policy permitting initiation of an early and substantive dialogue with the PRC" on nuclear export matters.¹⁰⁴ The industry stood behind the whole negotiating process, and later helped strengthen the administration's determination to resist the pressure of the anti-agreement coalition in Congress. Thus, the nuclear industry, together with the administration and Chinese government, severely limited the chance of success for the congressional opponents.

Conclusion

The case study on the China agreement supports the theoretical arguments made in Chapter II concerning the behavior and influence of congressional opposition on the external/strategic type of issue. The American nuclear cooperation with China was a product of the expanding bilateral relationship between the two countries. At the same time, it also gave rise to the congressional opposition related to the U.S. nuclear export policy toward China and China's nuclear policy, manifested in the controversies on the specific provisions of the

¹⁰¹Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Trade with China, *Nuclear Cooperation with China*, p. 24.

¹⁰²*Washington Post*, 13 January 1984. However, a more realistic estimate made later was \$6 billion. See Alan T. Crane and Richard P. Suttmeier, "Nuclear Trade with China," *Columbia Journal of World Business* XXI (Spring 1986), pp. 39-40.

¹⁰³Quoted in *Wall Street Journal*, 15 December 1980, p. 27.

¹⁰⁴Letter from Dwight J. Porter, Vice-President for International Affairs, Westinghouse to Assistant Secretary of State James L. Malone, 20 November 1981.

China nuclear agreement. The intensity of congressional opposition increased with the expansive nature of the issue--its linkages to the larger, multilateral issue area of nuclear nonproliferation and U.S. nuclear exports to foreign countries, and to a lesser extent, to the power-sharing dimension of foreign policy making in which the congressional opponents sought to use the case to increase Congress's policy making power on nuclear nonproliferation.

The case study demonstrated that the anti-agreement coalition was an outward-looking, issue-oriented, congressional opposition. Members of the legalistic group, which dominated the coalition, were different from the traditional anti-China forces--the ideological group in this case--in three major aspects: (1) They were not opposed to the development of the bilateral relationship between the United States and China per se; (2) they were strongly dedicated to nuclear nonproliferation; and (3) flexibility in strategy and persistency in goal intermingled with each other to characterize their legislative styles. On the other hand, the legalistic and ideological groups could coexist in the anti-agreement coalition despite the ideological differences among them, because they shared the dislike of the China agreement as well as the distrust of the Chinese government--though from quite different perspectives.

In its response to the China nuclear agreement submitted by the administration, the anti-agreement coalition played a typical reactive role. By taking the functional role of revising the presidential proposal, the coalition attempted to maximize its constraining effect on the U.S. nuclear export policy toward China through its legislative measures, first the SANVA, which was modified by the compromise resolution, and then the Glenn amendment. In doing so, the coalition forced the administration to make certain concessions. In more general terms, the coalition also demonstrated its influence by using the case to heighten the importance of nuclear nonproliferation and by displaying the nonproliferation activists in Congress as a continuing strong force the executive branch had to reckon with in this U.S. foreign policy issue area.

Despite its strong opposition to the China agreement, the anti-agreement coalition's

influence was nevertheless very limited. Apart from the opposition's reactive role, it showed its weakness in this external/strategic type of issue--its lack of a strong constituent connection and influential interest groups. It was also affected by the legislative procedure, as defined by the Proxmire Amendment. In particular, it was faced with an alliance formed by the administration, the Chinese government, the nuclear industry, and the congressional counter-opposition.

In the final analysis, then, the policy influence of the congressional opposition was moderate at best as it failed to block the agreement, while making the administration a bit more cautious in pursuing the nuclear cooperation with China.

CHAPTER VI

THE ELECTORAL/ECONOMIC ISSUE COALITION AND THE TEXTILE IMPORT RESTRICTIONS

We saw in the last chapter that the outward-looking nature of the external/strategic issue (nuclear nonproliferation) led to the type of behavior and policy influence that the anti-agreement coalition displayed over the China nuclear agreement. According to the arguments made in Chapter II, then, with the issue orientation of the congressional opposition in the normal period of a bilateral relationship, a different kind of congressional opposition would emerge when Congress considered the electoral/economic issues such as foreign import restrictions that tend to induce strong congressional interest with their inward-looking nature.

If our earlier analysis is correct, this congressional opposition is expected to exert a greater policy influence on this type of issue than on the external/strategic type of issue. It will tend to be more intensified and mobilized. It is also more likely to play an assertive role with its initiating function that will have a policy-generating effect. It will confront a relatively weak congressional counter-opposition while having the support of domestic interest groups with close connections to constituencies. And it is more likely to push the administration to make substantial policy concessions. At the same time, the congressional opposition will be constrained by the resistance from the executive branch, the availability of countervailing interest groups, and the foreign government concerned which, on trade issues, can exert its direct pressure on the executive as well as the lawmakers in the Congress-centered policy process.

This chapter will test these propositions on the nature, behavior and influence of the electoral/economic issue coalition of congressional opposition by examining a case in the area

of foreign import restrictions--the congressional opposition's attempt to restrict the textile imports from China (and other textile exporters) in 1985--with a special attention to the textile bill of that year.

Chinese Textile Imports: A Thorny Issue In the Bilateral Relationship

Like the nuclear cooperation case, the textile issue is also an example of the expanded bilateral relationship in the normal period that produced both benefits and problems for the two countries. One of the most noticeable developments since the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations was the impressive growth of Chinese textile exports to the United States. From its distant sixth place in 1979, China had become the fourth largest textile exporter to the United States by 1984, occupying about 10% of the total U.S. textile imports market.¹ While the rapid growth of Chinese textile imports reflected China's desire to depend on textile exports for hard currencies, it increased concern among the American textile makers and their spokesmen in the U.S. Congress who pressured the U.S. government to impose restrictions on the Chinese imports. As a result, textiles became a major problem in U.S.-China trade relations.

Before U.S. lawmakers acted in 1985 to place restrictive quotas on Chinese textiles, they had relied on the executive branch to negotiate with China on the terms of restricting the growth of Chinese imports.² Between 1978 and 1984 the Carter and Reagan administrations

¹The American and Chinese governments tend to use different methods to calculate the growth of Chinese textile imports to the United States. The United States counts total square yards of textiles imported, while China calculates the value of its shipments. Since the Chinese products tended to be cheaper (in part because of its lower quality and cheaper labor) than the top textile exporters such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, China's share of U.S. import market would be smaller in terms of value. However, the American method of calculation is used in this chapter, since the case study focuses mainly on the U.S. textile trade policy.

²The authority of the president to enter into bilateral restraint agreements in textiles was delegated by the Congress in the Agricultural Act of 1956. Sec. 204 of the Act (P.L. 540, 70 Stat., p.200) stipulates: "The President may, whenever he determines such action appropriate,

clashed with the Chinese government on four major occasions. Each time both sides eventually accommodated each other and managed to keep the issue from getting out of control. To illustrate this point and facilitate the case study, a brief account of these four events follows.

In July 1980, after nearly two years of negotiations and following the imposition of U.S. unilateral quotas on Chinese textile imports, the U.S. government for the first time successfully reached a textile agreement with the Chinese. The three-year accord (1 January 1980 - 31 December 1982) covered U.S. imports of Chinese textile and apparel products made of cotton, wool, and man-made fibers. It allowed a higher level of Chinese imports than what would have been permitted under the U.S. unilateral actions; and at the same time it limited the three-year rises to 3-4% in six major categories of Chinese apparel imports. But concluding the agreement would not have been possible without some concessions from the Carter administration. One of the reasons China accepted the agreement, for example, was the promise made by the White House to avoid stringent enforcement of the agreement.³

Conflict erupted again when the Reagan administration entered into talks with China in August 1982 for the second textile accord to replace the first one that was to expire at the end of the year. This time the United States wanted to restrict the growth of Chinese imports to about 1% per year, as demanded by the American textile industry. It also wanted to expand the quota restrictions to cover more categories of Chinese textile and apparel products. However, the Chinese demanded the 6% growth rate the United States agreed to grant to

negotiate with representatives of foreign governments in an effort to obtain agreements limiting the export from such countries and the importation into the United States of any agricultural commodity or product manufactured therefrom or textiles or textile products, and the President is authorized to issue regulations governing the entry or withdrawal from warehouse of any such commodity, product, textiles, or textile products to carry out any such agreement."

³According to a letter released by Rep. Carroll Campbell (R-S.C.) in August 1984, the chief U.S. textile negotiator at that time, Reiter Webb, told the Chinese ambassador that the United States recognized the potential growth of U.S-China trade and indicated that Washington did not intend to administer the agreement so as to harm China's ability to export textiles to the United States. See *International Trade Reporter*, 8 August 1984, p. 142.

developing nations under the newly-concluded third Multifiber Arrangement (MFA III), even though China was not a member of it. When the American government imposed unilateral quotas on Chinese imports in January 1983 after the talks broke down, as it did in 1979 during the negotiation of the first accord, the Chinese government responded by suspending all new contracts for the purchase of U.S. soybeans, cotton, and chemical fibers. The three items affected comprised over \$400 million or 15% of total U.S. exports to the PRC in 1982.⁴ China also indicated that it might cut back its purchase of U.S. agricultural products--the largest item of U.S. exports to that country. The Chinese retaliatory measures caused deep concern in the American agricultural sector and among its representatives in Congress, who urged President Reagan to break the impasse by making necessary concessions to the Chinese.⁵ Under pressure, the administration agreed to resume talks with the Chinese and subsequently made a significant concession on limiting the growth rates of Chinese textile imports, paving the way for the final conclusion of the agreement with the Chinese.

The new agreement, formally signed on August 20, allowed an average 3.5% growth of Chinese textile exports to the United States over the five-year period from 1 January 1983 to 31 December 1987. Although lower than the growth permitted in the previous agreement and even lower than what was demanded by the Chinese in the talks, the new amount nevertheless far exceeded the 1% increase originally offered by the Reagan administration and requested by the U.S. textile industry. It gave China considerably higher growth rates than the less than 1% granted to the so-called "Big Three" textile exporters (Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea) in their agreements reached with the United States in 1982. Thus, under the five-year accord, China could potentially surpass the Big Three and become the largest textile exporter to the United States. To the American advantage, the new accord covered cotton,

⁴*Business China*, 19 January 1983, p. 12.

⁵See, for example, letter from Sen. Robert Dole (R-Kan.) to President Reagan, 20 July 1983.

wool, and man-made fiber textiles and textile products and set growth limits on thirty-three categories, doubling the coverage of the previous agreement. This meant that about 70% of all Chinese textile sales to the United States and 90% of the most profitable garments were brought under the quota control.

A little more than one month after the second agreement was signed, the two governments faced another challenge on the issue. Dissatisfied with the agreement,⁶ the American Textile Manufacturers' Institute (ATMI), the American Apparel Manufacturers Association (AAA) and two major textile workers' unions filed an unfair-trade-practices complaint with the U.S. Department of Commerce against China, charging that the Chinese textiles were subsidized through dual exchange rates and therefore could be sold in this country below their real production costs. According to U.S. law, if the textiles were found to be subsidized, the United States would have to impose countervailing duties on the Chinese textile imports. China denied that its textile exports to the United States were subsidized.

For the U.S. government, this was the first time it had tackled the knotty question of whether illegal subsidies existed in nonmarket economies (NMEs) such as China's.⁷ The complaint was backed by such prominent Southern Republicans as Sens. Strom Thurmond (S.C.) and Jesse Helms (N.C.), who were facing reelection in 1984. Also with the presidential election approaching, it was clear to the Reagan administration that simply dismissing it could have negative political repercussions. At the same time, however, the administration by no means wanted to take an action that might anger both the agricultural interests at home and the Chinese government. Concern over another potential episode of Chinese trade retaliation quickly arose in Congress.⁸ Moreover, both the United States and China were in the midst of

⁶See "U.S.-China pact raises new doubts," *Textile World*, September 1983, pp. 23-26.

⁷Stuart S. Brown, "The People's Republic of China and the U.S. Unfair Trade Laws," *Journal of World Trade* 22 (August 1988), pp. 86-87.

⁸See, for example, letter from Rep. Pat Roberts (R-Kan.) et. al., to Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige, 17 November 1983.

further improving their relations as Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang was scheduled to visit Washington in January 1984 and Reagan to visit Beijing the following April.⁹ After heated debates within the executive branch, the administration finally reached a compromise with Thurmond, Helms and a few other key leaders of the congressional Textile Caucus.¹⁰ Among other things, it promised to tighten import controls over large textile-producers when their imports reached a certain level, a decision which the textile industry welcomed as "a step forward in dealing with the problem of disruption of the American textile and apparel market by imports."¹¹ In turn, the industry agreed not to refile its diplomatically sensitive complaint against China. The compromise somewhat muted China's protest by successfully blocking the industry's petition and dropping China as the sole target of action.

The Reagan administration confronted the textile issue again in 1984 when the U.S. textile industry pressed the U.S. government to halt what it said had been widespread evasion of the rules of origin by China and other textile exporters. In late July, less than four months before the election, the administration adopted a new set of regulations under which the U.S. Customs Service would accept under a country's textile quota only products wholly made in that country or "substantially transformed" from material imported from elsewhere.¹² The

⁹My interviews with high-ranking State and Commerce officials involved in the countervailing case revealed that the administration was particularly concerned with the political repercussions of the case for U.S.-China relations. It anticipated that a ruling unfavorable to the Chinese would be certain to cause strong reactions from the Chinese government simply because its financial stake was so great.

¹⁰There were some detailed stories reported by the press on the debates within the administration and the subsequent compromise. See, for example, Christopher Madison, "Chinese Textile Dispute Entangled in Sensitive National Security Issues," *National Journal*, 3 December 1983, pp. 2526-2528; *Art Pine*, "Behind the Scenes: How President Came to Favor Concessions for U.S. Textile Makers," *Wall Street Journal*, 6 January 1984, pp. 1, 12; and "White House takes action on imports," *Textile World*, January 1984, pp. 23-24.

¹¹*New York Times*, 17 December 1983, p. 32.

¹²For example, ineligible by this definition was clothing that was simply sewn, looped or linked together from imported segments. As a result, Chinese-produced sweaters, assembled from pre-cut sleeves, front-and-back panel, and collars supplied by Hong Kong, would be allowed to enter the United States only as part of Hong Kong's quota and not China's.

new rules would affect a number of textile exporters, but they would hit Hong Kong and China hardest.¹³ Under a strong wave of foreign and domestic opposition and with the Chinese once again resorting to retaliatory measures against the American action, the Reagan administration first delayed the implementation of the new rules and then changed them into a more moderate form. In the end, the textile industry again achieved less than what it wanted while foreign textile exporters, including the Chinese, prevented a much greater loss than might have been incurred under the original version of the new regulations.

This brief review of the interactions between the Reagan administration and the Chinese government on the textile issue reveals six characteristics that will be relevant to our study of the congressional opposition in the Congress-centered process later in the chapter.

- (1) Conflict over the Chinese textile imports had frequently erupted between the two governments, but both sides had managed to accommodate each other on the issue.
- (2) The Chinese government had shown its willingness to resort to trade retaliation measures each time the United States sought to restrict its textile exports to the country.
- (3) When the conflict over the textile issue increased between the two countries and China threatened to retaliate, concerns over the impact of such conflicts and Chinese retaliation would occur in Congress and exert pressure on the administration to seek accommodation with the Chinese.
- (4) The bilateral textile conflict was closely related to the constant pressure from the American textile industry and its representatives in Congress, who formed the informal Textile Caucus.
- (5) The countervailing and rule-of-origin cases revealed an emerging pattern of how the Reagan administration would try to keep a balance between the textile protection issue and its interest in limiting its impact on U.S.-Chinese relations. When the issue arose, it would try to find a solution that would not be aimed specifically at China but only include it in a much broader, multilateral policy package, thus muting the Chinese anger. Meanwhile, this balancing act would also somewhat fit the objectives of the textile industry. What the latter really wanted was a broader and more general protection, rather than a protection

¹³For the new country-of-origin regulation and its potential impact on Chinese textile exports, see Dilip K. Das, "The New U.S. Customs Regulation and China," *Journal of World Trade Law* 19 (May/June, 1985), pp. 287-289. A more detailed account of the case was provided by Craig R. Giesse & Martin J. Lewin, "The Multifiber Arrangement: 'Temporary' Protection Run Amuck," *Law & Policy in International Business* 19 (1987), pp. 129-142.

from a specific textile supplier. In other words, it was willing to use a country like China as a bargaining chip to strike a deal with the U.S. government for a wider range of protection.

- (6) In each of the textile controversies cited above, the American textile industry was left largely dissatisfied with the result, since it usually got considerably less than what it requested from the executive branch. Consequently, it continued to push for further restrictive measures on the Chinese textile imports.

The Rise of the Pro-Quota Coalition in Congress

During the four major rounds of textile disputes between the United States and China, congressional opponents of Chinese textile imports had remained chiefly as one of the outside forces that tried to influence the administration's textile trade policy toward China. By early 1985, however, there had gradually emerged a coalition in Congress demanding a tight quota system on foreign textile imports. This pro-quota coalition had a geographical base. Its core supporters came from the South Atlantic region where the textile industry was most concentrated. But it attracted lawmakers from some other parts of the country. Although the mills that produced cloth were centered in the Carolinas, Georgia and Alabama, the factories that converted that material into garments were also located in such Northeastern states as New York and Pennsylvania. Moreover, the farmers and ranchers who produced raw materials for the industry, primarily cotton and wool, brought some Western lawmakers into the coalition.¹⁴ By early 1985 this pro-quota coalition had become so strong that it was ready to take the initiative in the making of U.S. textile trade policy.

¹⁴In 1984, textile employment and establishments were most concentrated in South Atlantic (64.4% of the total textile employment, 39.4% of the total textile establishments) and Middle Atlantic (11.1%, 28.3%). The degree of concentration was smaller for the apparel industry: South Atlantic, 24.7% and 15.2%; Middle Atlantic, 26.4% and 39.3%. The next areas of concentrated apparel employment were East S. Central (15.8%) and Pacific (10.7%). See Barry Eichengreen, "International Competition in the Products of U.S. Basic Industries," in Martin Feldstein, ed., *The United States in the World Economy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 334-335.

Bilateral Issue: The Special Problem of Chinese Imports

The emergence of the pro-quota coalition in Congress and its legislative drive were not accidental. Increasing foreign competition had become one of the major concerns for the U.S. textile industry and its congressional supporters. To them, China posed a particular threat. The *Textile World*, the major organ of the textile interests, warned its readers in its February 1985 issue that the development of capitalism in China was threatening to unleash a flood of Chinese textile products onto the world market:

China is making a determined effort to improve its position, and this involves moving closer to a free, almost capitalist society. This means that, since China has much of the supplies, labor and skill it needs, it could become an even more formidable competitor in the world textile trade. If China does indeed go along this road, the world textile industry must exercise great care to control the trade flow to prevent disruption and contraction of world markets.¹⁶

In the eyes of the American textile makers and their congressional supporters, the PRC not only had a comparative advantage in the production of cotton textiles and apparel but was developing rapidly its man-made fiber and wool industries to be as competitive internationally as its cotton sector.¹⁶ China's expanding synthetic fiber capacity was partly stimulated by the U.S. quotas on the cotton categories, which forced the Chinese textile makers to look for other, then unrestricted, products. The U.S. textile interests therefore wanted more protection for the man-made categories from the increasing Chinese competition.¹⁷

The concern over the Chinese textile imports also had an ideological element. Representing North Carolina, whose textile industry faced increasing competition from Chinese imports, Sen. Jesse Helms on one occasion declared:

¹⁶"China Gears Up to Double Textile Output," *Textile World*, February 1985, p. 69.

¹⁶For an analysis on this, see Susan B. Hester and Dennis E. Hinkle, "Balancing U.S. Trade Interests: The Impact of Chinese Textile Imports on the Market Shares of American Manufacturers," *Business Economics* XIX (April 1984), pp. 27-34.

¹⁷*Textile Industries*, February 1984, p. 47.

We owe it to the working men and women of our nation not to export their jobs to communist countries in whose economies low wages and slave labor conditions are enforced at gunpoint.¹⁸

Helms complained that giving most-favored-nation status to China "has had almost disastrous consequences on the U.S. domestic textile industry."¹⁹

Moreover, the past U.S.-Chinese textile disputes had created some bitter feelings among the textile supporters toward not only China, whose trade retaliation aborted much of their effort to control the Chinese imports, but also toward the Reagan administration that yielded to such retaliation. The administration's failure to impose import restrictions on China drew a bitter complaint from the textile makers and their supporters:

Too often the operation of the program takes a back seat to foreign policy objectives. There is a tendency to be more generous in our negotiations with foreign governments than we should be for fear of irritating some foreign country.²⁰

The State Department became a major target for the critics. Rep. Carroll Campbell (R-S.C.), one of the key leaders in the Textile Caucus, charged that "State Department bureaucrats worry more about foreign relations and foreign jobs than they do about the livelihood of Americans."²¹

Dimensional Linkages and Intensity Of the Congressional Opposition

However, China was not the only target of the pro-quota coalition in Congress. It was just part of its much broader concern over foreign textile imports. According to the

¹⁸Quoted in Mary Ann Huser, "Despite Some Growing Pains, Trade Blossoms," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 14 April 1984, p. 863.

¹⁹Quoted in *Asiaweek*, 26 July 1985, p. 41.

²⁰Statement of Murray H. Finley, President of the Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, at the hearings before the Trade Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee, *Current Conditions in the Textile and Apparel Industries*, 1st Sess., 99th Cong., 3 April 1985 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 118.

²¹*Ibid.*, 15 July 1985, p. 433.

government figures, since 1980 total textile and apparel imports increased rapidly, especially between 1982 and 1984--an annual rate of 30.8% (Table 6.1). The textiles and garments trade deficits for 1984 amounted to \$16.2 billion (by contrast, in 1980 the industry enjoyed a \$956 million trade surplus). Yet what particularly fueled the bitterness of the pro-quota coalition was that the American textile and apparel industry was one of the most modern and efficient in the world. Georgia Republican Sen. Mack Mattingly argued:

In the past 4 years, U.S. textile mills have spent over \$7 billion to modernize and retool their plants unlike other U.S. industries. Since 1971 worker production per hour has increased by one-third while textile mill products' prices have risen at only one-half the average rate for all manufactured products.²²

Despite this competitiveness and productivity, U.S. domestic market growth for textile and apparel goods over the previous four years had been only 1 to 1.5%. Since the mid-

TABLE 6.1

**U.S. Textile and Apparel Imports
(Millions of Square Yards)**

Period	Total Textiles and Apparel	Textiles	Apparel	Imports As Percent of Market
1980	4.9	2.0	2.9	12.9%
1981	5.8	2.7	3.1	14.1
1982	5.9	2.5	3.4	16.6
1983	7.7	3.8	3.9	18.8
1984	10.1	5.4	4.7	23.7
1985	10.8	5.7	5.1	25.0

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce data.

1970s, there had been a steady decline of employment in the industry. The pro-quota lawmakers believed that the imports were responsible for all this. If the situation continued, 95% of the U.S. market would be captured by imports within ten years. "We are witnessing

²²*Con. Rec.*, 19 March 1985, S3082.

the dismantling of a major domestic industry," said Sen. George Mitchell (D-Maine).²³ The congressional textile supporters demanded that "some of our trading partners need to be taught a lesson":²⁴

Let us simply serve notice to our trading partners that we will not continue to be the world's only free trader in this increasingly mercantilistic trading environment. Nor will we continue to serve as the dumping ground for the excess production of our trading partners.²⁵

The intensity of the congressional opposition to foreign textile imports was also caused by the issue's linkage to the power-sharing dimension of foreign trade policy, though to a much smaller degree. The Constitution gives the Congress the authority to "lay and collect duties" and "to regulate foreign commerce." Although Congress delegated the textile trade responsibilities to the president in the Agricultural Act of 1956, anti-imports lawmakers could argue that they had the right to intervene in the making of U.S. textile policy when they believed that the president had not carried out this delegated authority well.

Thus, while the pro-quota lawmakers claimed that foreign exporters, especially the Chinese, had benefitted greatly from their low-cost labor, they considered the problem to be more directly caused by the Reagan administration which they said had broken its repeated promises to protect the textile industry. President Reagan's commitment to the textile industry was well-known. In the midst of his 1980 campaign, presidential candidate Reagan sent Sen. Thurmond a written pledge that, if elected, he would make import restraints on textiles and apparel a priority, promising that he would allow imports of foreign textiles and apparel to grow no faster than the U.S. market.²⁶ After the election, Reagan, through his chief White House adviser James Baker, reaffirmed in December 1981 his 1980 pledge to the congressional

²³Ibid., S3086.

²⁴Mattingly, Ibid., S3082.

²⁵Sen. William Cohen, Ibid., S3085.

²⁶Letter from presidential candidate Reagan to Sen. Thurmond, 3 September 1980.

supporters of the textile industry.²⁷ This was followed by another pledge-making letter from Reagan to Thurmond on 4 October 1982. The president also made the textile makers "very happy" by appointing people favored by the industry to key positions in the regulatory agencies, the cabinet, and U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) office.²⁸ Reagan's commitment was further indicated by the promotion of the chief U.S. textile negotiator to the formal rank of ambassador in 1982. By 1985 the administration had also negotiated ten bilateral textile restraint agreements, moving the total number of the countries under the agreements to thirty-one--covering all important suppliers of textiles and apparel outside of Europe and Canada.²⁹

The president's promises and actions had apparently raised the expectations of the textile supporters. They complained that the administration had failed to enforce both the multilateral and bilateral agreements. Its actions on the countervailing cases and new country-of-origin rules were little more than superficial.³⁰ Rep. Ed Jenkins (D-Ga.) argued that even though Reagan personally promised to restrict imports to no more than the rate of growth in the domestic industry--about 1%, he had done nothing and that the president's promises for real relief had a "hollow ring."³¹ "The United States is at economic war with the rest of the world," declared Helms, "and our leaders are following a policy of economic pacifism."³² A number of lawmakers were particularly unhappy with the administration's reluctance to enforce the MFA which, in their view, was already unfair to U.S. textile industry. The MFA,

²⁷*U.S. Export Weekly*, 4 May 1982, p. 157.

²⁸*Textile World*, January 1981, p. 28.

²⁹Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Diane T. Berliner, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, *Trade Protection in the United States: 31 Case Studies* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1986), pp. 128, 139.

³⁰For a detailed criticism of the administration on this, see statement of Rep. Ed Jenkins before the Trade Subcommittee, *Current Conditions*, 15 July 1985, pp. 426-431.

³¹Quoted in *International Trade Reporter*, 6 February 1985, p. 189.

³²Quoted in *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 7 September 1985, p. 1755.

has been liberalized beyond all practicality, providing for a degree of growth in imports that is outrageously more than that of our domestic textile and apparel market. It has permitted surges which enable imports to flood a given market and devastate entire segments of the U.S. industry.³³

Clearly, the congressional opposition to the growth of Chinese textile exports to the United States was not bilateral in nature, but inevitably linked to the much broader, multilateral and power-sharing dimensions of U.S. textile trade policy, which increased the intensity of the pro-quota coalition. The lawmakers addressed the problem of Chinese textile imports as an integrated part of their strategy to express their concerns over the general issue of foreign textile imports. This anti-textile-imports sentiment occurred also at a time when a protectionist fervor was running high on the Hill. The country was experiencing a severe general trade deficit, which doubled in 1984 to almost \$123 billion and was expected to top \$150 billion in 1985. Much of this deficit was caused by the flood of Japanese goods, automobiles in particular, on the American market. In early 1985 various protectionist measures against the Japanese imports were introduced in Congress. This general protectionist mood apparently strengthened the position of the pro-quota coalition.

The Coalition's Assertiveness

It is important to realize that textiles trade falls into the issue area of foreign import restrictions that tends to induce strong inward-looking, constituency-related congressional interest, as has been shown by various studies on U.S. import policy.³⁴ Foreign imports compete directly with domestic industries and affect the employment of American workers and hence the economic well-being of many lawmakers' constituents. Foreign imports of textiles, steel, automobiles, telecommunications, shoes and mushrooms, to name a few, have been

³³Floor remarks of Sen. John P. East (R-N.C.), *Con. Rec.*, 19 March 1985, S3082.

³⁴See, for example, Robert E. Baldwin, *The Political Economy of U.S. Import Policy* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1985); and Stefanie Ann Lenway, *The Politics of U.S. International Trade: Protection, Expansion and Escape* (Boston: Pitman, 1985).

among the trade issues that have attracted the lawmakers' strong attention. To the textile supporters in Congress, as the arguments of the pro-quota coalition have shown, the U.S. textile industry needs special protection because of its size and employment which, its supporters have claimed, are "absolutely essential to the economy and national security of the nation."³⁶ As noted in 1984,

The textile and apparel industry is the single largest sector of manufacturing in our economy. Almost 2 million people are at work in 28,000 plants. The industry accounted for more than \$56 billion of our gross national product; more than either the automobile or steel industries....An additional two million people are employed in jobs that relate to the textile and apparel industry.³⁶

Furthermore, the industry provides the only job opportunity for many low-income women, minorities, and recent immigrants who, if they lose their jobs, have few other opportunities open to them.³⁷ The congressional interest in textile protection was best indicated by the number of lawmakers who belonged to the textile caucus in 1984: 200 of the total of 535 members.

In 1985, the electoral/economic nature of the textile issue functioned upon the intensity of the congressional opposition to foreign textile imports as precipitated by the dimensional linkages. It pushed the pro-quota coalition to play the assertive behavioral role by taking its policy-initiating function. During a period of the protectionist upsurge, coupled with a rapid rise of textile imports, all-time high U.S. trade deficits and an increase of unemployment rate in the U.S. textile sector, a policy opportunity opened for congressional textile-quota advocates to provide their multilateral quota alternative to the Reagan administration's textile policy based on bilateral negotiations with individual exporting countries. On March 19, 128 House Republicans and Democrats endorsed a major textile imports restriction bill, "The Textile and

³⁶Thurmond, *Con. Rec.*, 19 March 1985, S3077.

³⁸Statement of Richard H. Monk, Jr., President of International Division West Point-Pepperell, Inc. before the Trade Subcommittee, *Current Conditions*, 5 April 1985, p. 343.

³⁷Rep. Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.), *ibid.*, 20 March 1985, E1013.

Apparel Trade Enforcement Act of 1985," or in its short form the "Jenkins bill", named after its initiator Rep. Edgar Jenkins. An identical bill was introduced by Sen. Thurmond in the Senate, with twenty-five cosponsors. The cosponsors in both the chambers followed similar geographical patterns reflecting the concentration of the textile and apparel industries, with the majority from the South Atlantic region, followed by the Middle Atlantic and New England areas. In the Senate, the bill was cosponsored by influential senators like Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.), Jesse Helms, Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.), Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), and John Heinz (R-Penn.).

The bill established a comprehensive legal framework for U.S. textile policy based on unilaterally-imposed quotas. The existing system of bilateral negotiations would be replaced by an explicit and overall import licensing one. The bill divided textile/apparel exporting nations, except for Canada and European Common Market member states that were exempted from coverage, into either "major exporting countries," or "smaller exporting countries," depending on their relative share of total U.S. imports represented by each country's exports. Major exporting countries were defined as those whose exports to the United States accounted for 1.25% or more of the total U.S. textile/apparel imports. Those below 1.25% were classified as smaller export countries.

According to this formula, twelve textile exporters, all but one Asian, would fall in the category of "major exporting countries." They were China, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan, Philippines, Singapore, Pakistan, India, Thailand, Indonesia, and Brazil (see Table 6.2). Using their 1980 level of textile exports as a base, suppliers would be granted a 6% trade increase each year until 1984, thereafter a 1% rise. The bill also specified that imports from a "smaller exporting country" could be restricted to 1% a year after they reached 1.25% of the U.S. imports market. If the bill was passed, then, the growth of U.S. imports would be trimmed to only 1% a year, achieving a goal which the U.S. textile makers had been seeking for years to link imports with the growth of domestic textile market.

TABLE 6.2

"Major Exporting Countries"
(Percentage of total 1984 U.S. imports)

Taiwan	13.64%
South Korea	11.16
Hong Kong	10.55
PRC	9.88
Japan	7.53
Pakistan	3.11
Indonesia	2.74
India	2.59
Philippines	2.47
Thailand	2.16
Brazil	1.99
Singapore	1.43

Source: House Ways and Means Committee

The bill was chiefly aimed at the Asian textile producers since it deliberately excluded Canada and ECM nations from the category of major exporting countries under a so-called "gentlemen's agreement" from restraint agreements.³⁸ The bill would cut textile imports from these major producers by about 36% overall, and China would be one of the hardest hit, as USTR's estimate indicated (Table 6.3).³⁹ According to the Chinese own estimate, the imposition of quotas on Chinese textile and apparel imports under the bill would result in a reduction in the maximum allowable imports from China during 1985 of 433 million square yards equivalent from actual imports from that country in 1984, a cutback of 56%. The damage to China under this bill with respect to specific products of importance to China would be even greater. The legislation would cut back China's trade in eight categories by over 90% and China's trade in another fifteen categories by over 80%. Overall, these cutbacks would

³⁸*International Trade Reporter*, 6 February 1985, p. 189.

³⁹Since the PRC was the fourth largest exporter (after Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea) to the United States, it could suffer the hardest hit in terms of absolute volumes.

TABLE 6.3**Estimated Impacts of the Bill on Twelve Textile Exporters
(Percent reduction textile imports in square yards)**

Indonesia	89.1%
Brazil	88.9
Thailand	70.2
PRC	59.6
Pakistan	43.2
Taiwan	33.1
Korea	33.1
India	26.0
Japan	25.5
Philippines	14.7
Hong Kong	14.3
Singapore	8.1

Source: USTR data.

result in a loss to China's economy and foreign exchange of over half a billion dollars per year.⁴⁰

**Characteristics of the
Pro-Quota Coalition: A Further Look**

It was clear that the pro-quota coalition was an issue-oriented congressional opposition, whose assertive behavior was determined by the salience of the textile-imports issue. To obtain a better understanding of the nature of this opposition, let us take a further look at the characteristics of the coalition.

Textiles and the Issue Leaders

The fact that the pro-quota coalition was issue-oriented can be seen clearly by examining the attributes of its leadership. The five key lawmakers in the House and the Senate

⁴⁰Letter from Han Xu, Ambassador of the PRC to the United States, to U.S. congressmen, 11 July 1985.

who led the legislative battle were all from the Southeastern states of the Carolinas and Georgia where the textile industry was most concentrated.⁴¹ Four of them also occupied important legislative positions that helped them play the leading role on the issue. Rep. Jenkins, a moderate conservative Democrat from Georgia and the chief author of the textile bill, came from a congressional district in which the dominant industry was textiles. To Jenkins, whose mother worked in a garment plant for twenty-five years, "the textile industry is as much a part of me as my right arm."⁴² In 1977, he succeeded his fellow Georgian and political mentor, Phil Landrum, in the powerful House Ways and Means Committee as the leading champion of Southern textile interests, and later he also became the chairman of the Congressional Textile Caucus. He was an influential House member not only because he sat on a powerful committee but because he had the respect and trust of the House leadership, particularly Ways and Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski (D-Ill.).⁴³ Jenkins was also a member of Thomas P. O'Neill Jr.'s "Speaker's Cabinet," designed to improve communication between the Democratic leaders and the rank-and-file members. In all this capacity, Jenkins became a natural leader in the 1985 legislative campaign for the protection of the textile interests.

One of Jenkins' closest collaborators on Ways and Means was Carroll Campbell, Jr., a young conservative Republican from South Carolina. Despite his political loyalty to Reagan, Campbell often criticized the administration for failing to restrict foreign imports. He was particularly active in demanding more restrictions on the textile imports from China. He was

⁴¹In 1982, 5% of the American labor force was employed in textiles. But the respective percentage in each of the three states was: 32% in North Carolina, 36% in South Carolina, and 22% in Georgia. The apparel industry was less concentrated than textiles: 11% in North Carolina, 14% in South Carolina, and 17% in Georgia, compared with the nationwide 8%. Christine Chmura, "The Textile and Apparel Industries: An Overview," *Cross Section 2* (Spring 1985), pp. 1-4.

⁴²Interview with Jenkins, *Textile World*, January 1983, p. 31.

⁴³Interview with a staff member for Ways and Means.

one of the few leading lawmakers who urged the administration to be tough in the face of Chinese retaliation during talks on the second textile agreement between the two countries.⁴⁴

In the Senate, two prominent leaders of the pro-quota coalition were Republican Thurmond and Democrat Hollings, both from textile-producing South Carolina. Although they were not political allies, they were vigorous defenders of the textile interests and collaborated closely on the textile issue. Thurmond was rated by the textile industry as the most influential member of Congress in pleading the textile and apparel cause to the White House.⁴⁵ It was he who exacted a pledge of support from Reagan during the 1980 presidential campaign. That pledge provided the industry's leverage in the give-and-take of trade priorities. It was also Thurmond who arranged a meeting at the White House with Reagan on 13 December 1983 that resulted in the adoption of the compromise plan related to the China countervailing issue. Thurmond's legislative influence stemmed partly from his sheer seniority in the Senate--the second oldest senator (born in 1902) in the chamber, elected in 1954. He was the president pro tempore of the Senate, and in the theoretical line of succession to the presidency. Though not on any committee related to textile imports (he chaired the Judiciary Committee in 1985 and was also the ranking member on Armed Services), Thurmond was the well-recognized spokesman for protection of the textile industry. On the textile issue, said an aide to the senator, Thurmond would not "stand by and let our state's most important industry be eroded."⁴⁶

Hollings also used his senior position on the Commerce Committee to protect his state's textile interests. He was the author of the Hollings amendment in 1978 to exempt textiles and apparel items from any tariff reductions that would result from MFA talks, which

⁴⁴See *U.S. Export Weekly*, 1 February 1983, p. 690.

⁴⁵*Textile World*, March 1984, p. 63.

⁴⁶Quoted in Richard J. Whalen, *Trade Warriors: An Inside Look at Trade Activists in Congress--and How to Reach Them* (Washington, D.C.: Worldwide Information Resources, Ltd., 1986), p. 75.

was included in a measure vetoed by President Carter. In 1984, Hollings secured the Reagan administration's guarantee that any free-trade agreement negotiated with Israel would contain safeguards against the transshipment of textile goods from other countries.

Another pro-quota leader in the Senate was Jesse Helms from North Carolina, who had been active on the China nuclear agreement as seen in the previous chapter. Unlike Thurmond and Hollings, however, Helms did not belong to the commonly-identified group of "trade activists."⁴⁷ But his interest in limiting textile imports was never in doubt. Among the textile issue leaders, one might expect that Helms was the most likely person who would explicitly oppose Chinese textile imports out of his anti-PRC ideology, as he did on the nuclear agreement. Nevertheless, my interviews with his aides suggested that in the textile case, he appeared to be more practically concerned with the textile imports, since textiles was an important industry in his state. Undoubtedly, his strong anti-PRC attitudes would reinforce his position on the Chinese textile imports, as indicated by his remarks mentioned earlier. Helms collaborated closely with Thurmond and others in pressing the Reagan administration for more restrictions on Chinese textile imports as well as those from other exporters during the U.S.-China textile talks and the countervailing episode, and that might have contributed handsomely to his hard-fought 1984-reelection victory. A telling sign of his pragmatic approach to economic interests was that in the new 99th Senate Helms gave up the choice of his most-loved Foreign Relations chairmanship in order to head the Agriculture Committee for the sake of the tobacco interests in his state.

The Gramm Amendment on Taiwan

Further evidence that the pro-quota coalition was an issue-oriented congressional opposition with little influence of ideology was the Senate legislative battle over the Gramm

⁴⁷For example, Helms was not listed in Richard J. Whalen's *Trade Warriors*, which introduced seventy-five "informed and effective" trade activists in both the House and the Senate.

amendment to the Thurmond substitute--the weakened version of the Jenkins bill, which exempted China and some other textile producers from deep reductions of their textile imports as demanded by the original bill. Interestingly, it was the anti-quota lawmakers who tried to employ the anti-Communist ideology in their attempt to block the Thurmond substitute from being passed in the Senate. Sen. Phil Gramm, a conservative Republican from Texas, rejected the amended textile bill because he said it exempted the wrong friend--China--and punished the wrong enemies--the Big Three, who were important to the United States for national security and ideological reasons:

While the objective in moving from the initial bill was to make it more politically palatable, the truth is that it shows the dirty underwear of the whole process. We protect Communist China and we zap Taiwan. We hit Korea and we impose very heavy limitations on the ability of the only place (Hong kong) on Earth that is a free trader to sell to America. It makes absolutely no sense.⁴⁸

Gramm therefore made an amendment to eliminate application of the quota against Taiwan if U.S. textile trade with Taiwan and the PRC was not equitable. Gramm argued that the bill did not roll back quotas on Communist China as it did on Taiwan.

The amendment apparently put the quota supporters in an awkward position defending the textile bill. It is intriguing to note how the conservatives tried to avoid the ideological question and focus entirely on the economic aspect of the issue. Earlier, when Helms confronted the question, he declared that "There is not a better friend of Taiwan in this Chamber than the Senator from North Carolina."⁴⁹ Thurmond also repeatedly claimed that

I have been friend of Taiwan all of these years and I do not want to do anything to hurt Taiwan. I am a much better friend of Taiwan than I am of the People's Republic of China.⁵⁰

Yet, these people pressed for the passage of the textile bill even if it hit Taiwan much harder than the PRC. Economic interests had clearly overtaken ideological consideration. In this

⁴⁸*Con. Rec.*, 24 October 1985, S12456.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, S14027.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 13 November 1985, S15304.

respect, Hollings was a little more blunt about his feelings toward the protective Taiwanese textile market from U.S. products: "There is no free trade, no fair trade. You cannot go to downtown Taipei and sell your textiles."⁶¹

The Taiwan amendment also indicated that the anti-quota coalition could not necessarily be considered pro-PRC. Like the argument emphasizing the importance of U.S.-Chinese relations and trade with the PRC, as seen in the nuclear case, the measure was driven by the quota opponents' primary desire to block the textile bill. In other words, both pro- and anti-PRC attitudes could be utilized so long as they helped the quota opponents to achieve their legislative goals. As will be discussed later, China became the most important foreign ally of the anti-quota coalition, because it might respond with the heaviest retaliatory measures among the textile exporters against the U.S. textile import restrictions. On the other hand, the Taiwan amendment apparently made some anti-quota senators feel quite uneasy defending the rationale behind it, especially when they were making the pro-PRC argument against the bill.

Without much debate, the Taiwan amendment was subsequently defeated by a procedural vote of 68-30. As Table 6.4 shows, the mean ADA score among those opposing the Gramm amendment was 50.2, while the mean for those supporting it was 17.9. Furthermore, the Pearson product moment correlation on the voting was .43. Thus, there was a positive relationship between the liberal trend and the voting against the Taiwan amendment: The more liberal a senator, the more likely he was to vote for the Thurmond motion to kill the amendment; or the more conservative a senator, the more likely he was to vote against the motion to kill the amendment. However, the relationship was quite moderate. By comparing the percentages of the most conservative and liberal votes, we could see that the major differences occurred in the most-liberal group, with about 95% of them against the Gramm amendment, and to a much lesser degree, in the moderate group (73.7%). For the most-conservative votes, however, it was 50% (the other half supported the amendment). Thus,

⁶¹Ibid., S15304.

TABLE 6.4

**Party, Ideology and Rejection of the Gramm Amendment
(Senate Vote on the Thurmond Motion to Table the Amendment)**

	Yea	Nay
Total	68	31
Democrats	41	5
Republicans	27	26
Mean	50.2	17.9
Correlation Coefficient	$r = .43$	
% of Most Conservative Votes*	50	50
% of Most Liberal Votes	95.2	4.8
% of Moderate Votes	73.7	26.3

* For the categories of the three ideological voting groups, see Table 5.2, Chapter V.

analysis of the roll-call votes supports the conclusion that ideology was not a plausible explanation for the pro-quota coalition. The liberals' voting against the Gramm amendment could be related to the trend that liberals (and Democrats) tended to be less strongly pro-Taiwan than their more conservative colleagues. But the liberals' voting behavior could also be said to be related to their generally stronger protectionist orientation than the conservatives'. As noted earlier, the pro-quota coalition was not necessarily anti-PRC, while the anti-quota coalition was by no means pro-PRC.

Textile Voting Patterns

Let us further examine the congressional roll-call votes on the textile bill itself to get a better picture of the nature of the pro-quota coalition, as well as that of its anti-quota counterpart. We will look at the House vote on the Jenkins bill and the Senate vote on the Thurmond substitute (the weakened version of the Jenkins bill).

In this case in which the administration did not submit policy proposals in the first place, partisanship was not clearly evident (Table 6.5). In the two major votes on the textile bill during 1985, lawmakers from both parties formed a strong majority coalition in their showdown with the administration. Only the lack of a two-thirds majority kept the Congress from prevailing on the issue. On the other hand, the votes also showed that a slightly less than 50% of the Republicans supported the positions of an overwhelming majority of the Democrats in each chamber on the passage of the bill. A plausible explanation for this might be that Democrats in general tend to be more protection-oriented than Republicans.

The congressmen's voting also reflected a weak influence of ideology (Table 6.6). In the House, the mean of the ADA score among those voting for the Jenkins bill was 52.2, while the mean for those voting against the bill was 35.2. In addition, the Pearson product moment correlation was .25. It thus suggests that there was a positive relationship between the liberal trend and voting for the textile measure: The higher the ADA score, the more likely a member was to support the bill; or the lower the score, the more likely a member was to oppose it. A comparison of the three ideological groups (most conservative, moderate, and most liberal) also shows the trend. But it was also clear that the relationship was weak. It apparently resulted from the fact that there was a considerable percentage of the most conservative members supporting the bill, thus damping the role of ideology in the members' overall voting behavior.

On the Senate side, the ideological influence on the voting was even weaker, though there was also a positive relationship between the liberal trend and the voting. While both the percentages of those in the moderate and most liberal categories voting against the Thurmond

TABLE 6.5

Party and the Textile Voting

	House:		Senate:	
	Jenkins Bill		Thurmond Substitute	
	Yea	Nay	Yea	Nay
Total	262	159	60	39
Dem.	187	62	35	11
% of all Dem. votes	75	25	76	24
Rep.	75	97	25	28
% of all Rep. votes	44	56	47	53

substitute were higher than those in the House voting, the percentage of the most conservative senators voting against the bill was actually much lower than that of those voting for it, hence pushing the mean ADA score for those supporting the textile measure below 50%. As a result, the Pearson product moment correlation between the liberal trend and voting was smaller than that for the House voting. It thus suggested that senators tended to be less influenced by ideology than the House members.

If ideology was a weak factor, then, could presidential leadership be an explanation for the textile voting? Table 6.6 shows that the Pearson product moment correlation between the presidential support scores and voting on the textile bill in the House was $-.34$, and in the Senate, it was $-.26$. Therefore, there was an inverse relationship between the two variables: The lower the overall presidential support score, the more likely a lawmaker was to vote for the textile measure (or against President Reagan's position on the bill); on the other hand, the higher the overall presidential support score, the less likely a member was to vote for it

TABLE 6.6

Ideology, Presidential Leadership and the Textile Voting

		House:		Senate:	
		Jenkins Bill		Thurmond Substitute	
		Yea	Nay	Yea	Nay
Ideology	Total	262	159	60	39
	Mean	52.2	35.2	45.9	31.3
	Correlation Coefficient	$r = .25$		$r = .21$	
	% of Most Conservative Votes*	43.3	56.7	55.3	44.7
	% of Moderate Votes	70.5	29.5	62.5	37.5
	% of Most Liberal Votes	76.5	23.5	66.7	33.3
	Mean	39.1	55.0	51.5	63.7
Pres'l Support	Correlation Coefficient	$r = -.34$		$r = -.26$	
	% of Most Supportive Votes*	3.7	96.3	44.2	55.8
	% of Less supportive Votes	63.7	36.3	78.9	21.1
	% of least Supportive Votes	79.4	20.6	61.1	38.9

* For the categories of both ideological and presidential supportive votes, see Tables 5.2 and 5.3, Chapter V.

(thereby supporting the president's position). But the relationship was clearly a very weak one. A further look at the table will find that such an inverse relationship in the House voting was more strongly related to the fact that almost all the members (20 out of 21) in the highest supportive category voted against the bill, while the more moderate trends in the other two groups tended to weaken the relationship. In the Senate, the inverse relationship was weaker as the yea/nay ratio in the same category became much smaller, being accompanied by some changes in the other groups. Thus, the influence of the presidential leadership appeared to be stronger among the House members voting against the textile bill, particularly in the most supportive group than it did for their Senate counterparts.

If partisanship, ideology, and presidential leadership did not have a strong influence on the congressional voting coalitions on the textile issue, sectional factors did. Table 6.7 shows that the conflict over the textile bill was essentially a regional one. It was, in particular, a case in which the Southern states, allied with the Eastern states, were pitted against the Western and Midwestern states that had close trade ties with China and other Asian and Pacific countries. In the House, lawmakers from fourteen Southern and Eastern states voted unanimously for the textile bill, compared with those from eleven Western and Midwestern states unanimously opposing the measure. In the Senate, the gap was even larger, with eighteen Southern and Eastern states as opposed to thirteen Western and Midwestern states, voting unanimously either for or against the bill. The textile voting thus tended to support the assertion that despite the arrival of widespread industrialization and urbanization the classical regional competition continues to exist in Congress.⁵² However, it does not necessarily indicate that congressional voting would always be divided along the regional lines on trade issues. Rather, it depends much upon how the industries involved are located. Regional factors become predominant only if the industries with conflicting interests are each highly

⁵²Richard F. Bense, "Sectional Stress & Ideology in the United States House of Representatives, *Polity* XIV (Summer 1982), 657-675.

TABLE 6.7

**Region and the Textile Voting
(Vote By State Delation)**

	House:		Senate:	
	Jenkins Bill		Thurmond Substitute	
	Yea	Nay	Yea	Nay
Total	262	159	60	39
Single Vote	15	12	24	14
South*	7	1	10	1
East	7	0	8	0
West	1	6	2	7
Midwest	0	5	4	6
Majority Vote*	16	4	1	0
South	4	1	1	0
East	5	0	0	0
West	3	1	0	0
Midwest	4	2	0	0
Split Vote	3		11	
South	0		1	
East	0		4	
West	2		4	
Midwest	1		2	

* For the categories of regions and majority votes, see Table 5.4, Chapter V.

concentrated in a distinct geographic area, as are the Southern textile industry and Western export-oriented industries.

Overall, then, we can see from the voting patterns that the pro-quota coalition tended to be most influenced by a regional factor--the concentrations of the textile and apparel industries--which reflected the dominant characteristic of the coalition. Partisanship, ideology, and presidential leadership had a relatively weak effect on the lawmakers' voting behavior. On the other hand, it could be said that the coalition, compared with its anti-quota counterpart, tended to be made up of more Democrats than Republicans, more liberals than conservatives, and more of those who tended to oppose the president's positions on other issues during the year than those who tended to support the president. But it was clear that the differences were quite small.

Policy-Generating Effect Of the Pro-Quota Coalition

Having examined the nature of the pro-quota coalition, we now turn to the policy-generating effect of this congressional opposition and want to know what policy changes it brought about in terms of U.S. textile policy toward China and other major Asian exporters as well. As noted earlier in the chapter, the constituency-related nature of the textile issue, with the intensity of the congressional opposition to foreign textile imports stimulated by the issue's dimensional linkage to the broad, multilateral trade problems facing the United States, pushed the pro-quota coalition to take the function of initiating a legislative quota bill. As an issue coalition playing its assertive role, its logical aim was to maximize its influence by exerting its *generating* effect as fully as it could. This could be achieved by obtaining a two-thirds supermajority to prevent a potential presidential veto of the bill and thus turning it into law, or, to a lesser extent, engendering as significant changes in the administration's textile policy as possible. During the process of the legislative consideration of the Jenkins bill, the pro-quota coalition failed to achieve the first objective but succeeded in generating some significant

policy changes in the U.S. textile policy toward China and other major textile exporters.

Failure to Build a Super-Majority-Winning Coalition

Since the initiation of the Jenkins bill, the pro-quota issue leaders had aimed at building a two-thirds majority voting coalition so as to override a potential presidential veto, which had been indicated by the Reagan administration. This objective was not unrealistic given the fact that the bill was initiated at a time when a majority of lawmakers were highly mobilized on the issue. By late September, for example, the bill had been signed by 292 cosponsors in the House and 54 in the Senate. At the same time, however, it had also become more difficult for the issue leaders to hold off an increasingly determined resistance from the anti-quota forces inside and outside the Congress.

China and the Foreign Retaliation Argument The anti-quota argument was based on three assumptions against the Jenkins bill: (1) The textile measure exaggerated the impact of foreign imports on the domestic textile industries; (2) it would lead to enormous costs for American consumers by restricting cheaper foreign textile products; and (3) it would jeopardize U.S. trade relations with the major Asian textile exporters.

But what the quota opponents cited most frequently was the threat of foreign retaliation. To many of them, the fear of retaliation was not merely rhetorical but real. Reading the hearing testimonies, committee and floor speeches leads to the conclusion that the threat of Chinese trade retaliation had a strong effect on the lawmakers' consideration of the textile bill. Past instances of Chinese retaliation as noted earlier in the chapter were so deep-rooted in their minds that nearly all the lawmakers who spoke against the bill emphasized them. Reminding her colleagues of the impact of the 1983 Chinese retaliation on farm interests, for example, Rep. Virginia Smith (R-Neb.) argued that she was

gravely concerned that increased quotas will substantially increase the danger of retaliation against farmers in my State who rely on foreign markets for, in some cases,

30 to 50 percent of their income.⁵³

Testifying before the Ways and Means' Trade Subcommittee, Rep. Richard Armev (R-Texas) warned that if the bill was implemented China would not only cut off all agricultural trade with the United States but also

take actions against other U.S. exports and economic joint ventures with American companies. Such actions could prevent American high-tech and manufacturing interests from entering the huge Chinese markets.⁵⁴

At one hearing anti-quota leader Sam Gibbons (D-Fla.) clashed head-on with quota advocate Campbell, arguing that

If (the Chinese) respond to it in a retaliatory fashion, Mr. Campbell, we would put in jeopardy every export industry in South Carolina (where Campbell came from) and North Carolina and Georgia, Florida, Alabama, and all the others.⁵⁵

Rep. Don Bonker (D-Wash.), whose state had much at stake in the trade with China, told the House that China was in the middle of a dramatic economic and social transformation. If the bill became law, he warned, "it will be a serious affront to a country that is moving in the right direction and could be a major export market for our products in the future."⁵⁶

Republican Sen. Daniel Evans, who also came from Washington and led the anti-quota battle in the Senate, told quota supporters that the Chinese resorted to trade retaliation in 1983 "because we had instituted regulations adversely affecting them as related to textiles."⁵⁷ This view was shared by Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole (R-Kan.), who represented the farm interests. Dole argued that the sponsors of the textile bill

may be losing sight of the inseparable interrelationships in international trade. To say we can simply cap textile or apparel imports at some arbitrary level and not expect our trading partners to respond in kind against our exports is naive in the extreme. And

⁵³*Con. Rec.*, 19 March 1985, H1241.

⁵⁴Statement of Rep. Armev, *Current Conditions*, 15 July 1985, p. 533.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, p. 485.

⁵⁶*Con. Rec.*, 10 October 1985, H8648.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, 2 October 1985, S15297.

to say that U.S. exports--particularly farm exports--are somehow less important and should be put at risk is as parochial an attitude as I have seen.⁶⁸

The quota opponents' emphasis on foreign retaliation, particularly that from China, was reinforced by the reactions of the Reagan administration, the Chinese government, and other major Asian textile exporters. In their letter to congressmen, for example, four cabinet members (Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of the Treasury Baker, Secretary of Commerce Baldrige and Secretary of Labor Brock) warned that among other things,

The proposed legislation would undoubtedly cause affected countries to retaliate to the detriment of our exporters, especially those in our agricultural sector. U.S. exports to the twelve suppliers that would be most immediately affected by substantial import restrictions under (the Jenkins bill) totalled more than \$33 billion in 1984.⁶⁹

My interviews with the State Department officials who were directly involved in the textile issue also strongly indicated that the Reagan administration was very concerned that U.S.-Chinese relations could be seriously affected as they were sure that the passage of the bill would definitely lead to strong reaction from the Chinese.

The Chinese reaction to the Jenkins bill apparently substantiated the warnings of the quota opponents. In May, two months after the Jenkins bill was introduced, the U.S. Boeing Corporation, which had confidently awaited a Chinese order for some sixteen airplanes, felt the impact when China signed up for only eight. Then U.S. wheat growers saw their summer orders from China shrink 85% from last year's levels. Although Chinese domestic reasons might account much of the sudden retrenchment--good harvests and a general pullback in capital equipment outlays--the time at which this occurred appeared to U.S. exporters as a clear retaliatory signal.

This was followed by a letter from Chinese Ambassador Han Xu to American lawmakers in July, warning that the bill, if passed, "would severely jeopardize trade relations between our two countries." Noting that China imported from the United States such products

⁶⁸Ibid., S15297-S15298.

⁶⁹Letter from Secretary of State Shultz et al., to Rep. Gibbons, 19 June 1985.

as aircraft, locomotives, computers, wheat, man-made fibers and yarns, Han wrote that the bill could strike a severe blow to China's ability to pay for many of these products:

the impact on China's economy and foreign exchange earnings resulting from a minimum 56 percent cutback in this trade would inevitably affect China's importations from the United States across a wide range of products.⁶⁰

Han's point was repeated by a commentary in the July 22 issue of the *Beijing Review*, China's official English-Language magazine, which warned that the bill had "sparked a crisis in Sino-U.S. trade relations."

The Chinese message was not missed by an eight-member congressional delegation led by Rep. Gibbons, which was touring the capitals of the Asian textile-producing countries in August to assess their reaction to the Jenkins bill. Gibbons informed his congressional colleagues at home that the Chinese "let us know in no uncertain terms" that they would cut off other types of trade if the United States cut Chinese exports under the proposed bill.⁶¹

The potential impact of Chinese retaliatory moves seemed to be going beyond the American airplanes and agricultural exports to China. Some other major American companies were also at risk. Among them was General Electric, which was completing deliveries of \$450 million of locomotives and parts to China, and Weyerhaeuser, a major supplier of the \$250 million of American timber the Chinese bought in 1984. Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering might also be affected if Chinese reaction spilled over to their nuclear power business in China, particularly at a time when the nuclear cooperation agreement was about to be signed by both governments, which could finally permit them to compete with other foreign companies in the Chinese nuclear market. As reported the *Fortune* magazine:

China's early reaction points to nearer-term consequences. Protect the jobs of Georgia textile workers and New York garment workers if you will, the Chinese are saying, but the cost may be laid-off lumber-jacks in Oregon and idle factory machines in

⁶⁰Letter from Han Xu, Ambassador of PRC to the United States, to U.S. congressmen, 11 July 1985.

⁶¹Quoted in *Washington Post*, 12 August 1985, p. A8.

Pennsylvania.⁶²

To be sure, China was not alone in its unhappiness with the Jenkins bill. At this time, Rep. Jenkins was a person much better known in Asian capitals than at home. The Asians dubbed him as America's textile "monster." The *South China Morning Post*, a major Hong Kong newspaper, branded him "the man Hong Kong loves to hate."⁶³ From Seoul to Singapore, the mere mention of his name conjured up fears of unemployment and economic doom. The reaction from the major textile-producing countries potentially affected by the Jenkins bill reinforced the fear of an imminent trade war. The International Textile and Clothing Bureau (ITCB) condemned the bill's violation of international agreements and its discrimination against developing countries.⁶⁴ It warned that

As the targets of the proposed import restrictions, we developing country trading partners would see our import capacity significantly reduced, which would result in fewer U.S. exports to us. This would adversely affect our capacity to repay our debts, most of which are owed to U.S. banks.⁶⁵

Indonesia, a member of the group and one of the hardest hit under the Jenkins bill, had already refused to meet with a U.S. cotton-selling team to discuss the \$150 million worth of U.S. cotton it bought annually.⁶⁶ Thus, there was clearly a strong multi-national reaction to the Jenkins bill from the major Asian textile exporters. On the other hand, the available evidence

⁶²Robert E. Norton, "China Threatens to Shut the Trade Door," *Fortune*, 30 September 1985, p. 119.

⁶³Quoted in *Newsweek*, 19 August 1985, p. 50.

⁶⁴The ITCB was formed in July of 1984 by China and seven other textile exporters (Colombia, Macao, South Korea, Mexico, Hong Kong, India, and Pakistan), with its headquarters in Geneva. These eight exporters accounted for more than 75 percent of the textiles exports from developing countries. The original purpose of the organization was to coordinate and conduct MFA negotiations with the United States and textile-importing countries. Since early 1985, the major target of this group was the Jenkins bill. By July, ITCB had become the single largest international lobbying group against the bill, with its membership now expanded to 28.

⁶⁵Letter from Felipe Jaramillo, Ambassador of Colombia to the United States and Chairman of ITCB, to Rep. Sam Gibbons, 27 June 1985.

⁶⁶*Business Week*, 24 June 1985, p. 60.

suggests that while the other major textile exporters expressed their concerns about potential repercussions from the Jenkins bill, China was the only major country openly showing its intention to retaliate and even its willingness to walk to the "brink" of a trade war. It was no accident that the quota opponents so often emphasized the threat of Chinese retaliation--apparently not just as a major strategy to resist the pro-quota legislative drive.

The Pro-Quota Responses The way the quota supporters responded to the Chinese retaliation argument suggested that the pro-quota coalition also took the issue seriously. On the one hand, quota advocates tried to repudiate the importance of foreign retaliation. Sen. John Heinz argued that the relationship between textile imports from the PRC and U.S. farm exports to that country was minimal because

other factors, like rapidly growing Chinese agricultural production and noncompetitive American export prices, are much better explanations of the decline in Chinese agricultural purchases from the United States.⁶⁷

To Helms, the Chinese did not buy as much wheat from the United States not because they retaliated against the U.S. textile import restrictions but because they found prices lower in other such countries as Argentina. "We have jacked the price up of our wheat and feed grains so that we no longer are competitive with Argentina".⁶⁸ "The Chinese do not love you," added Sen. Ernest Hollings. "They are smart business people."⁶⁹ Rep. Jenkins argued that "in light of our staggering trade deficits with these (major textile-producing nations), I cannot imagine what else is left to fear except fear itself!"⁷⁰

Despite the rhetoric, however, quota supporters found it hard to ignore the increasing threat of foreign retaliation. One of the first signs that they became attentive to such pressure was given by Rep. Campbell, one of the leading sponsors of the textile bill. Noting China's

⁶⁷*Con. Rec.*, 10 July 1985, S9292.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, 2 October 1985, S15293.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, S15296-S15297.

⁷⁰Statement of Rep. Ed Jenkins, *Current Conditions*, 15 July 1985, p. 428.

warnings, Campbell said that China was only a "small part" of the textile-imports problem for the United States and that Congress could reconsider parts of the bill dealing with specific countries. "We are not closed-minded," he maintained, "but we are closed-minded on the question of whether we should do something or not."⁷¹

What particularly concerned the issue leaders was that the foreign retaliation argument appeared to have increased the division within the pro-quota coalition. Some pro-quota congressmen became increasingly ambiguous about their positions. For example, Rep. Beryl F. Anthony Jr. (D-Ark.) in August indicated that he would still support the bill if a vote were held then, but he conceded that his attitude had changed and might continue to evolve only "up to a point it won't get me defeated in 1986."⁷²

A more explicit sign of a weakened pro-quota coalition was Rep. Richard A. Gephardt's (D-Mo.) attempt to amend the Jenkins bill at Ways and Means's markup. According to the interview with one of the congressman's personal aides, despite his reputation as a leading proponent of protectionism, Gephardt would nevertheless lean to a more realistic approach that would avoid a direct confrontation with the foreign textile exporters. In his view, the textile problem should be handled by bilateral and multilateral agreements rather than legislation. The Jenkins bill should be considered as a way to strengthen the hand of the United States at the negotiating table of these agreements. Thus, the legislation could have a positive effect even if it never became law. Accordingly, Gephardt proposed an amendment in committee on September 26 to assure that the bill would not supercede the thirty-four existing bilateral textile agreements and to delay the imposition of mandatory quotas until the MFA collapsed. The amendment was defeated 18-17, but its significance lay in the fact that it was defeated by only a single vote, signaling a change in the pro-quota coalition.

The vote on the Gephardt ammendment indicated that pro-quota leaders might have

⁷¹Quoted in *Washington Post*, 12 August 1985, p.A8.

⁷²*Ibid.*, 20 August 1985, p. E2.

trouble in getting a two-thirds majority on the floor. It was a sign that some quota supporters might be abandoning the goal of a "veto-proof" supermajority and choosing instead to concentrate on generating policy changes on the administration's side. This subtle but significant change within the pro-quota coalition was precipitated by the issue leaders' attempt to limit the size of the coalition. Before the House could act on the textile bill, for example, a compromise was reached between the bill's chief sponsor Jenkins and its leading opponents Gibbons and Rostenkowski in the Ways and Means Committee, which had jurisdiction over the bill. Jenkins agreed that the bill, when it reached the floor, would be closed to all amendments, thus foregoing any chance of changing it to attract more support. In return, Gibbons and Rostenkowski agreed not to try to keep the bill from going to the floor.

In fact, the compromise reflected each side's efforts to avoid a predicament. With 292 initially signing on as cosponsors of the bill and a majority of Ways and Means supporting it, Gibbons and Rostenkowski appeared to have little choice but let the bill go out of the committee. On the other hand, Jenkins and his supporters were concerned that the bill could get bogged down on the floor if it was open to a variety of other import restrictions. Such a free-for-all action could severely jeopardize the bill. As Jenkins acknowledged, "We don't want every industry to piggyback on textiles."⁷³ This clearly reflected the pro-quota coalition leaders' intention to minimize its winning coalition so as to maximize the benefits for the textile interests. Under the circumstances, it was apparently not an unreasonable strategy. Nevertheless, the closed rule severely limited the quota supporter's ability to expand their coalition. It was an advantage for the quota opponents, since it enabled them to concentrate their energy on those who supported the bill reluctantly, rather than spending more time trying to prevent the possible expansion of the pro-quota coalition.

The impact of foreign retaliation pressure on the pro-quota coalition was further reflected in the House vote (262-159, see earlier analysis) on the passage of the Jenkins bill.

⁷³Quoted in *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 28 September 1985, p. 1910.

It followed a poignant floor appeal the day before from Singapore's visiting Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew to keep American trade doors open, and a heated debate on the possibility of foreign retaliation in which nearly every anti-quota speaker cited the case of Chinese trade retaliation in 1983. It was significant not because it was passed but because it was nineteen votes shy of a two-thirds majority needed to override an expected presidential veto. Of the 292 initial cosponsors of the bill, thirty--most from states outside the South where textiles were less concentrated--defected to the anti-quota camp at the last moment. Among them was Rep. Stephen J. Solarz (D-N.Y.), Chairman of Foreign Affairs' Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, who eventually resisted the strong attraction of garment workers' votes in his district and voted against the bill as a result of his concern over the bill's impact on U.S. trade relations with the Asian countries (interview with his aides). Some defectors even openly admitted that it was wrong to be a cosponsor in the first place. "I signed on to this bill as a cosponsor out of frustration at what is happening to American jobs," said E. Clay Shaw (R-Fla.). "This frustration is the wrong way to go."⁷⁴

Another sign of the impact of the foreign retaliation argument was the weakened version of the Jenkins bill that was offered by the quota supporters in the Senate. The original bill had called for tough new quota limits on the twelve "major exporting countries" that each provided more than 1.25% of total U.S. textile imports. The new version, called the Thurmond substitute after its chief sponsor, would raise that cutoff point to 10%, leaving only the "Big Three"--Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan--subject to deep reductions. The revised bill was thus less restrictive on China and eight other exporters that provided between 1.25% and 10% of textile imports.

In order to achieve a two-thirds majority, the bill's sponsors also accepted two amendments. One was to limit imports of nonrubber footwear for eight years to 60% of the U.S. market and the other was to require the president to negotiate voluntary restraint

⁷⁴*Con. Reg.*, 10 October 1985, H8619.

agreements with other countries to limit their copper sales in the United States. By expanding the textile bill to some adjacent policy issues, the bill's supporters hoped to attract additional votes from such states as Maine (the footwear industry) and New Mexico, Utah, Nevada, Arizona, Idaho, Montana and Michigan (the copper industry).

But the Thurmond substitute failed to soften the opposition from China and the other textile exporters, since they would continue to be limited on future import growth. The revised version would freeze their 1985 quotas at 1984 levels and allow subsequent annual growth of 1%.⁷⁵ The quota opponents in the Senate were not satisfied with it, either. They again used the foreign retaliation argument. To highlight their points, they proposed two farm export amendments to the textile bill. The first amendment was offered by Sen. Max Baucus (D-Mont.) to exempt from the textile quotas any country that bought more than \$400 million in agricultural products. It would thus prevent the imposition of quotas on China, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan, Indonesia and Brazil. The second one, put forward by Sen. Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minn.), was even broader. It would simply condition the application of the import quota on a presidential determination that agricultural exports would not be reduced as a result of the quota. Boschwitz explained that his amendment was designed to eliminate the risk of uncertainty and instability that might be caused to American farmers by the textile quotas.⁷⁶ The two amendments triggered another round of heated debate on foreign retaliation, with the focus once again on the possibility of Chinese retaliation. In the end, the Thurmond substitute was passed by a 60-39 vote (see earlier analysis). The majority was six votes more than the number of the substitute's cosponsors, apparently reflecting the effect of the footwear and copper amendments, but seven votes short of what was needed to override a presidential veto.

⁷⁵According to the Chinese calculation, under the new version China would face rollback in twenty specific limits and unilateral restraint categories, and an overall reduction of its negotiated 1985 base quota of 4.6%. Individual category rollbacks ranged as high as 75%. See letter from Ambassador Han Xu to USTR Clayton Yeutter, 28 October 1985.

⁷⁶*Con. Rec.*, 13 November 1985, S15294.

The House later passed the Senate version by 255 to 161, seven votes less than the Jenkins bill received, and that much further away from a two-thirds majority. On December 17, President Reagan vetoed the controversial bill.⁷⁷

Thus, the threat of foreign retaliation played a significant role in the failure of the pro-quota coalition to achieve a winning supermajority. However, it would be misleading to think that it was the only source of constraint on the coalition. As will be discussed below, the actions taken by the Reagan administration had also contributed to the weakened position of the pro-quota coalition.

Generating Policy Changes

While quota opponents failed to turn the Jenkins bill into law, they did make some achievements in terms of generating changes in the administration's textile and other trade policies. Throughout the congressional deliberation of the Jenkins bill, the administration had been conducting a campaign against the bill by using both carrots and sticks. Apart from the five cabinet members who virtually adopted the same argument as the anti-quota lawmakers,⁷⁸ President Reagan hinted clearly that he would veto the legislation.⁷⁹ But in the face of surging congressional protectionist sentiment and the pro-quota coalition in the particular,⁸⁰ the administration could not rely solely on negative lobbying tactics such as the

⁷⁷Four congressmen actually shifted their votes, supporting the Jenkins bill and opposing the Senate version. In the meantime, there were seven lawmakers who, previously having opposed the Jenkins bill, now voted for the Senate version--suggesting that the Thurmond substitute had attracted a few but very limited number of House members. The additional loss of the House votes for the quota supporters on the Senate version was also due to the fact that nine congressmen voting for the Jenkins bill did not cast their votes on the Senate version.

⁷⁸See letter from Secretary of State Shultz et al. to Rep. Sam Gibbons, 19 June 1985.

⁷⁹See, for example, letter from President Reagan to Sen. Evans, 12 November 1985. In it, the president declared that "I will not sign any protectionist legislation that diminishes competition abroad or in the United States."

⁸⁰The textile bill was on the top of a list of approximately 300 bills before Congress, most of which were rather insignificant and never attracted as much attention as did the textile one.

threat of the presidential veto, since it was not clear that the pro-quota coalition would fail to achieve a two-thirds majority vote. Believing that the pro-quota sentiment was linked to a more general anti-foreign-imports mood in Congress, the administration made significant moves to weaken the pro-quota coalition by taking measures to reduce the general protectionist fervor in Congress. By September the White House had designed an aggressive trade strategy against countries that refused to open their markets to foreign competition.

On September 7, Reagan ordered his chief trade negotiator Yeutter to investigate "unfair trading practices" by South Korea, Brazil and Japan under Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act. If negotiations did not resolve the disputes, Reagan warned, sanctions would be imposed "as a last resort." It was the first time an American president had initiated trade inquiries against U.S. trading partners.⁸¹ Then on September 23, Reagan unveiled a package of administrative and legislative trade proposals. Included were a call for Congress to create a \$300 million "war chest" to combat other nations' export-credit subsidies and a plan for streamlining trade procedures and enhancing presidential authority in international trade negotiations.⁸² Although these measures received a mixed reaction in Congress, they nevertheless showed to some lawmakers that the administration was responding to the protectionist pressure from Capitol Hill and hence made them less eager to push for restrictive legislation. Rep. Denny Smith (R-Ore.), for example, cited the administration's action as one of the reasons for his "defection" from the pro-quota coalition to the anti-quota camp.⁸³ These measures also appeared to increase the attractiveness of the Gephardt amendment that followed in late September.

On the other hand, the administration's policy moves indicated that the pressure of the

⁸¹*Asiaweek*, 20 September 1985, p. 36.

⁸²See "Text of President Reagan's Remarks on Trade," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 28 September 1985, pp. 1948-1949.

⁸³*Con. Rec.*, 2 October 1985, E4325.

pro-quota coalition was taking effect. This was further demonstrated by the textile policies announced by the administration following Reagan's veto of the textile bill on 17 December 1985 and the quota supporters' selection of the time--6 August 1986, just three months before the mid-term congressional election--to override the veto:

- (1) The president directed Treasury Secretary James Baker as chairman of a cabinet-level economic policy council to conduct a new study of textile and apparel imports and determine within sixty days whether import levels were exceeding limits set by previous negotiations.
- (2) Reagan requested Congress to provide an additional \$100 million for retraining of workers who lost their jobs due to import competition.
- (3) Reagan promised to "most aggressively renegotiate the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) on terms no less favorable than present."⁸⁴

Under this policy, the administration vigorously and successfully pressed the major Asian textile exporters to conclude more restrictive bilateral agreements and adopt the MFA. Hong Kong, for example, signed a highly restrictive six-year accord with the United States on 30 June 1986, limiting the growth of U.S. textile imports from the major textile exporter to an average of about 1% annually through 1991. Two weeks later Taiwan agreed to a 0.5% annual growth limit on its textile shipments to the United States over the next three years. Finally, a new, more restrictive multilateral textile treaty called MFA IV was concluded on August 1, 1986, five days before the scheduled veto-override vote in Congress. Except for pure silk, the accord expanded its coverage to practically all fibers, including silk blends, linen and ramie.⁸⁵ The administration declared that MFA IV "will help the textile and apparel industries compete more fairly in international market-place."⁸⁶ Months later, the administration also managed to conclude a restrictive bilateral accord with China, which would

⁸⁴"Textile Quotas Veto," Presidential Reagan's message to the House of Representatives, 17 December 1985, *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* (1985), p. 40-D.

⁸⁵For a detailed analysis on MFA IV, see Madhavi Majmudar, "The Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA IV) 1986-1991: A Move towards a Liberalized System?" *Journal of World Trade* 22 (1988), pp. 109-125.

⁸⁶Quoted in *New York Times*, 2 August 1986, p. 31.

limit Chinese textile imports in more than 100 categories to an average annual quota growth of 3.3% and cover all U.S. imports of Chinese textiles already covered by past bilateral agreements, plus silk, ramie, and other natural fibers that were not previously restrained.

Pro-Quota Legislative Styles

We have seen that the pro-quota coalition's assertive behavior with its initiating function had exerted a generating effect on the U.S. textile and other trade policies. The policy changes made by the Reagan administration, in turn, helped prevent the coalition from reaching a supermajority, thus assuring that the presidential veto would be sustained. From 1986 to 1988, the pro-quota coalition made three attempts in the House to obtain a two-thirds majority and failed in each. Instead, its margin of support declined from 276-149 in 1986, to 263-156 the following year, and to 248-150 in 1988. It appeared that the pro-quota drive was aimed increasingly less at achieving a legislative goal than at generating policy changes from the administration. In order to examine the generating effect of the pro-quota coalition more closely, let us look at the two legislative styles used by the coalition that also characterized the anti-agreement coalition in the nuclear case--flexibility in strategy and persistency in goal--which were interwoven to engender the kind of policy effect seen earlier.

When the quota supporters initiated the Jenkins bill, their goal was to impose a very restrictive quota system upon foreign textile imports. This goal was never altered throughout the Congress-centered policy process. But in the face of a strong opposition, the pro-quota leaders' strategies changed noticeably. This flexibility in strategy reflected the division within the coalition as well as the pragmatic consideration of the chance for a supermajority. The Gephardt amendment highlighted the differences over how to achieve the coalition's goal. It was the first explicit sign that some quota supporters were using the coalition's legislative drive and pressure merely to exact policy concessions from the administration, hoping to rely on the executive branch to achieve their goal.

But for the "hard-liners" in the coalition, the strategy should be to pursue the votes needed to override a veto and not to obtain some concessions then ease off on the legislation. For them, the vote-maximizing strategy was also a concession-maximizing strategy. They felt that even if it failed, their drive for a supermajority would exert greater pressure on the administration, and achieve more than the Gephardt compromise strategy. Indeed, according to a staff member for Ways and Means who had worked closely with Jenkins on the bill, "proportionally or not, a smaller pressure would only bring about smaller changes in the administration's policies." Since the Jenkins bill was to impose different quotas on individual textile exporters based on certain criteria, it gave its sponsors some room to make adjustments in order to reduce the anti-quota resistance. The Thurmond substitute also reflected this strategy. It was designed to disperse the threat of foreign retaliation by making limited concessions to China and eight other textile exporters. Also for pragmatic purposes, Jenkins and his associates supported the closed rule so as to maximize both the benefits for the textile interests and the chance to pass the bill in the House. On the other hand, the pro-quota leaders in the Senate tried to seek a supermajority by expanding the benefits of the bill to such interests as the shoe and copper industries.

When President Reagan finally vetoed the bill, the pro-quota hard-liners' strategy moved decisively to a position similar to that of the Gephardt amendment, that is, to use their legislative pressure to bring about as many changes in U.S. textile policy as possible. They believed that the threat of overriding the veto would put pressure on the administration to take a very tough position in the on-going MFA talks. If the administration failed to get what the textile industry wanted, according to Jenkins, it would risk overriding of the veto.⁸⁷ "We will have a better chance to override than if they don't act than we do now," warned Campbell.⁸⁸

While the pro-quota leaders demonstrated their flexibility in strategy, they also showed

⁸⁷*International Trade Reporter*, 1 January 1986, p. 5.

⁸⁸Quoted in *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 21 December 1985, p. 2686.

a remarkable persistency in pursuing their ultimate goal. The case study strongly indicated that they would continue to push vigorously and consistently for their demand until it was met. As declared by Ellison S. McKissick Jr., President of the ATMI, "We're in a war, and we're going to fight like hell. We're not going to give up."⁸⁹ "We have just begun to fight," Sen. Hollings said following Reagan's veto.⁹⁰ Such persistency means that the quota advocates would always be very critical of what the executive branch negotiated with foreign textile exporters, since the outcome was usually the product of compromise and accommodation between the governments and unlikely to meet the lawmakers' goal--even though the negotiations were generated by the direct congressional pressure.

Thus, when MFA IV was finally concluded, Hollings called it "a total sham," and argued that "it fails to relate import growth to domestic market growth as the President pledged to do."⁹¹ Thurmond predicted that "This new MFA will only have the effect of throwing gasoline on a smoldering flame and will only build support for a vote to override the President's veto."⁹² Similar critiques were also heard on the new U.S.-China textile agreement concluded in 1987. Hollings, for example, complained that "we are being set up for yet another outrageous give-away at great cost to our domestic textile and apparel industry."⁹³ It is clear that the style of persistency, intermingled with the issue leaders' flexibility in strategy, sustained a constant congressional pressure on the executive branch and maximized the pro-quota coalition's generating effect on U.S. textile policy.

⁸⁹Quoted in *Asiaweek*, 29 November 1985, p. 20.

⁹⁰*Con. Rec.*, 19 December 1985, S18079.

⁹¹Quoted in *International Trade reporter*, 6 August 1986, p. 996.

⁹²Quoted in *Investor's Daily*, 5 August 1986, p. 1.

⁹³*Con. Rec.*, 19 December 1987, S18455.

**Policy Influence of
The Pro-Quota Coalition**

It has been seen that the pro-quota coalition, by playing its functional role of initiating, had a policy-generating effect on the Reagan administration. Through this generating effect, the issue coalition was able to influence the making of U.S. textile policy in general and China policy in particular. It forced the Reagan administration to take a series of measures to strengthen the U.S. trade competitiveness and put a considerable pressure on its trading partners to change their trade practices. Moreover, it pressed the administration to maintain a tough negotiating position on textile imports from major foreign producers and eventually conclude more restrictive trade agreements with them. The influence of the pro-quota coalition could also be seen in its psychological impact on the major textile exporters--it made them more sensitive to the congressional pressure, as the reaction of the Asian textile producers to the Jenkins bill indicated.

On the other hand, the pro-quota coalition failed to achieve their legislative goal, that is, to impose a unilateral quota system on foreign textile imports, mainly from the Asian producers. MFA IV fell short of what the quota advocates demanded. Its influence was clearly even less in the case of Chinese textile imports. The U.S.-China textile trade relations in 1985 and after essentially followed the patterns of the previous years noted earlier in the chapter: conflict and accommodation in the bilateral negotiations in the midst of increased pressure from the assertive pro-quota coalition. Despite a growing number of U.S. quotas under the bilateral agreements, Chinese textile exports continued to climb rapidly and in 1986 accounted for 46% of China's total exports to the United States. By early 1987 China had become the largest supplier in volume terms to the U.S. market.⁹⁴ Although the 1987 textile accord was more restrictive than the earlier ones, its restraint on China was considerably less than the average 1% growth limit imposed on Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and Hong Kong. As a result, China

⁹⁴*Far Eastern Economic Review*, 25 February 1988, p. 69.

could maintain its status as the largest textile exporter to the United States. Furthermore, the new accord would encourage China to step up its efforts to shift to higher value-added goods--a still great potential for China--to maximize export revenues.

On the whole, the pro-quota coalition's influence was *substantial* in terms of U.S. multilateral textile and other trade policy, but apparently less so on its policy toward China. In this section, we will look at the coalition's policy influence more closely by putting it in the context of the coalition's interactions with the other major forces that were involved in the Congress-centered policy process.

The Power and Influence of the Textile Interest Groups One important factor that contributed greatly to the influence of the pro-quota coalition in Congress was the existence of a powerful textile interest group. Its power lay in the fact that it was one of the largest employers in the country in terms of size and employment and hence provided a critical linkage between the lawmakers' political fortune and their constituents' economic interest. For the same reason, potential presidential candidates could not afford to neglect such a large constituency. All fifteen congressional respondents who directly participated in the legislative battle over the textile bill from both the pro- and anti-quota coalitions considered the group either influential or very influential.

In particular, the textile group had what a veteran lobbyist called a "very funny kind of coalition" between management and labor. On the one hand, there were the leading industrial lobbying groups such as ATMI and AAA; on the other, major labor unions like the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers' Union (ACTWU) and the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU). The two old antagonists worked closely together in 1985 to form the Fiber, Fabric, and Apparel Coalition for Trade (FFACT) to lobby for the bill. Both believed that increased imports hurt them. This cooperation helped generate bipartisan support for textile protection. In the words of a Senate aide,

They are the closest coupling of industry and labor you can find. When you're dealing with Republicans in Congress or the White House, the industry does most of the work.

With Democrats the labor groups go to it.⁹⁶

Being in the position of taking the legislative lobbying initiative, these groups were also well-prepared. According to two textile lobbyists I interviewed, the textile interests' lobbying activities contributed most to the success of getting 292 cosponsors for the bill. Their strategy was to start early and quickly, conducting a shoe-leather, door-to-door sign-up campaign on Capitol Hill. By the time the opposition began to feel the pressure, the pro-quota momentum had already built up. After the Jenkins bill was introduced in Congress, the textile industry speeded up its campaign by spending an estimated \$500,000 a month on promoting the legislation alone.⁹⁶ In the meantime, the labor unions, with the advantage of large memberships, were conducting a cheap but very impressive letter campaign. By early November, they had sent 2.7 million letters to the White House, imploring the president to sign the bill if it was passed in Congress--one of the largest grass-roots lobbying efforts ever.⁹⁷

At this point, the textile interest groups appeared to have an issue advantage: They could point to the number of jobs that had already been lost in their factories while their opponents could only talk about the potential impact of the textile bill on the export, import and retail industries. However, the influence of the textiles groups was partially balanced by the lobbying activities of their countervailing groups--consumers, retailers, farmers, importers, and exporters. These groups had been traditionally unable to mobilize their resources to form political alliances.⁹⁸ Before 1984 the retailers--the core of the anti-quota lobbying groups--did not even have a national, competitive counterpart to the highly influential and well-organized

⁹⁶Quoted in *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 7 September 1985, p. 1517.

⁹⁶*The Economist*, 20 July 1985, p. 59. For more on the textile industry's lobbying campaign, see "Strategies Behind Textiles' Lobbying Blitz," *Textile World*, December 1985, pp. 26-29.

⁹⁷*U.S. News & World Report*, 18 November 1985, p. 46.

⁹⁸For a discussion on these interest groups, see Craig R. Giesse & Martin J. Lewin, "The Multifiber Arrangement: 'Temporary' Protection Run Amuck," *Law & Policy In International Business*, Vol.19, No.1 (1987), pp. 81-89.

textile lobbying organizations. In the case of U.S.-Chinese textile disputes, the retailers made more complaints than actual lobbying, as they did in the talks over the first and second textile agreements and the countervailing petition case. They did not participate in those negotiations as actively as the textile industry. "In the past," as a retail lobbyist in Washington acknowledged, "we have had few, if any, victories to cheer about."⁹⁹ Rep. Frenzel, an anti-quota advocate, also complained that retail lobbyists had not done a good job of making political rounds in Washington or selling their message to the public.¹⁰⁰

In June 1984, as the textile industry's influence grew and a wave of protectionism emerged on the horizon, retailers finally set up the National Retail Industry Trade Action Coalition or RITAC--a coalition of forty-five large and small retail companies and seven retail associations.¹⁰¹ RITAC first attracted big attention in its campaign against the Reagan administration's new country-of-origin rules and contributed to the delay of their implementation. In 1985, RITAC formed the core of opposition to the textile bill at the national level, working together with farm and consumer groups, importers, transporters and multinational corporations.¹⁰²

Like the textile groups, the anti-quota groups also poured a large amount of money into the lobbying campaign. For example, their computerized mail campaign alone cost them about \$2.5 million. In late September, as part of the kickoff of a \$500,000 campaign against the Jenkins bill, the American Fair Trade Council, a group of 100 retailers, delivered teddy bears to each member of Congress. According to a lobbyist for RITAC in an interview, the anti-quota

⁹⁹Robin W. Lanier, "Trade Tale," *Stores*, December 1983, p. 58.

¹⁰⁰*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 4 August 1984, p. 1899.

¹⁰¹For a list of these companies and associations, see "The Politics of U.S. Textile Trade Policy," RITAC, 30 April 1986, p. 59.

¹⁰²These other chief lobbying groups included the American Association of Exporters and Importers, Textile and Apparel Group, the National Retail Merchants Association, the American Retail Federation, the Consumers for World Trade, and the American Farm Bureau.

groups spent such an unprecedented amount of energy and money because "we were driven into the corner by the protectionist bill."

Nevertheless, the anti-quota groups were relatively weak compared with their counterpart. Retailers as a group were not politically inclined and were not organized into a cohesive political force as the veteran textile interest groups were. Business competition among themselves tended to weaken their devotion to a common cause. In addition, there was always a way out of the costs imposed by protectionism: They could simply raise the price and pass the cost to the consumers. Finally, they did not have the same intensity of constituency connection as the textile industry. Therefore, it can be argued that the anti-quota groups were not an equal force that could balance itself against the textile interests. In Destler's words, "It is an imbalance in intensity of interest and, as a result, in political organization."¹⁰³ But in this case the countervailing groups did play some role in constraining the power of the textile interests. In general, the behavior of the economic groups in the textile case did not support the argument that interest groups were ineffective in foreign trade policy.¹⁰⁴ Nor did it fully confirm Schattschneider's classic conclusion that interest groups were particularly influential on trade legislation due to the lack of countervailing pressure groups,¹⁰⁵ because in this case there were available just such countervailing groups.

The Foreign Constraints A more powerful check on the influence of the pro-quota coalition clearly came from the foreign textile producers, who would have been most affected by the textile bill. After all, it was the common fear of foreign retaliation against U.S. textile imports restrictions that drew together various anti-quota forces--the foreign textile producers,

¹⁰³I. M. Destler, *American Trade Politics: System Under Stress* (New York, N.Y.: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1986), p. 3.

¹⁰⁴See Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade* (Chicago: Aldine, Atherton, 1972).

¹⁰⁵See E. D. Schattschneider, *Politics, Pressures and the Tariff* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1935).

the domestic interest groups, the Reagan administration, and the anti-quota lawmakers. The participation in the anti-quota coalition of the lawmakers from farm states displayed the particular effect of the foreign retaliatory threat, as demonstrated by the debates discussed earlier and the two farm amendments offered on the Thurmond substitute. As for many of the major third-world textile-exporting countries, textiles exports were often the major source of their revenues.

For China, the production of textiles and apparel has a particular importance. Since the late 1970s, the Chinese government has considered the development of the industry a high priority in its drive for modernization, using the relatively quick return of profits from this light industry to promote and accelerate the development of other economic sectors. By the early 1980s, textiles earned 10% of state revenues and 20% of the country's total volume of retail sales in consumer goods.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, textiles and apparel are labor-intensive goods in which China has a strong comparative advantage vis-a-vis the industrialized countries, with its huge labor force and very low average monthly wage per worker. Therefore, China has counted heavily on this industry to earn its badly-needed foreign exchanges to finance imports of industrial machinery and other goods it needs for development.¹⁰⁷ At the beginning of the 1980s, textiles generated approximately 20% of China's total foreign-exchange earnings from exports. The United States became the biggest market for China's textile exports, which accounted for an annual average of 40% of China's total exports to that country.¹⁰⁸

The importance of textile exports for China's modernization program explains why the Chinese government consistently resisted the American efforts to restrict its textile exports and

¹⁰⁶For the statistics and development of the Chinese textile industry, see James T.H. Tsao, *China's Development Strategies and Foreign Trade* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 111-113.

¹⁰⁷For the Chinese textile-exporting strategies, see, for example, *People's Daily* (Overseas edition), 30 April 1988, p. 3 and 18 May 1988, p. 3.

¹⁰⁸Tsao, *China's Development Strategies and Foreign Trade*, p. 112.

was willing to take retaliatory measures even at the risk of jeopardizing the overall Sino-U.S. trade relations. The Chinese, as reflected in my interviews with two Chinese trade officials, were particularly concerned with the Jenkins bill not only because it would more sharply reduce the growth rate of Chinese textile exports to the United States than the bilateral negotiations would, but because it would fix the tough restriction in a legal framework that would be later very difficult to change if it became law. China was willing to retaliate also because it apparently had convenient means to do so, such as reducing the large amount of agricultural products it imported from the United States.

As demonstrated earlier, the threat of Chinese retaliation had a clear impact on the balance between the pro- and anti-quota coalitions in Congress. It became one of the most effective arguments used by quota opponents; it was one thing that allied the representatives of the farm interests with those of exporters and importers; it also forced the quota supporters to change the version of the Jenkins bill so as to soften its effect on China. Although the threat of Chinese retaliation was not the only force that prevented the pro-quota coalition from getting the two-thirds majority necessary to override the presidential veto, it was clearly one strong factor that weakened the pro-quota coalition's position. To be sure, China was not the only country that threatened retaliation, but it appeared to be most vocal and ready to do so among major textile exporters.¹⁰⁹ Indeed, from the 1985 and earlier experiences in U.S.-China textile trade disputes, most major third-world textile exporters had apparently realized that China had become a major player in the future MFA negotiations. It was one country the U.S. lawmakers most mentioned that was likely to take stiff retaliatory action if Washington

¹⁰⁹One plausible reason behind some trading partners's restraint from employing retaliation was that they did not have such a large market as China enjoyed and hence retaliation might bring substantial costs to their economies. For a discussion on retaliation as a strategy in foreign trade relations, see JoAnn Fagot Aviel, "Strategies to Influence U.S. Commercial Policy," *SAIS Review* 5 (Summer/Fall 1985), pp. 205-219.

Some quota advocates apparently realized the weak position some trading partners had in taking retaliatory measures. Helms, for example, flatly ruled out the possibility of retaliation from such a textile exporter as Taiwan, because it "needs us a lot more than we need them." Quoted in *New York Times*, 25 October 1985, p. A15.

moved in a more protectionist direction. Such a recognition of China's weight was indicated by the selection of Beijing, the Chinese capital, to be the meeting place of twenty-three major textile exporters in early 1986 to make strategies for the crucial upcoming MFA talks.¹¹⁰

The Reagan Administration: Opposition and Concessions The influence of Chinese retaliatory threat was again present when it became one of the arguments used by the Reagan administration in opposition to the bill. It was the administration that directly experienced the Chinese retaliation during the textile talks of 1983 and eventually made a compromise with the Chinese on the second textile accord. The administration's general approach toward U.S.-China textile disputes, according to one State Department official I talked to, was to separate the issue from others in the bilateral relations and treat China like Japan and other countries:

We conduct textile negotiations with China not because China has special importance, but because it is within the general framework of our textile negotiations with other countries. It (the issue) has a functional effect.

This point was also emphasized by Commerce and USTR officials. But the lesson the U.S. government learned from the 1983 episode, noted a high-ranking Commerce official, was that while the United States was used to the textile issue and considered it a regular commercial trade dispute and a normal part of American trade life, China looked at it a little differently and was willing to place it in the context of Sino-U.S. political and economic relations. The Chinese action, the official said, actually made the administration "more cautious in future textile disputes with China."

The concern of potential Chinese retaliation related to the Jenkins bill was explicitly expressed by fourteen of my eighteen government respondents who were involved in either negotiating the bilateral agreements with China or the making of U.S. textile policy. But there were some differences in their views by rank and agency. State Department officials (especially those in charge of Chinese affairs) were more concerned than those from Commerce

¹¹⁰*International Trade Reporter*, 12 March 1986, p. 328.

and USTR, who also defended the position of U.S. textile industries.¹¹¹ High-ranking officials tended to be more concerned than those at the middle level, who tended to be more technically involved in the textile issue than broader bilateral affairs. Three middle-ranking officials in charge of textile affairs at Commerce and USTR showed little concern over Chinese retaliation while defending the domestic textile industry. But there was a general feeling among the respondents that textile disputes should not disturb the development of U.S.-China relations, particularly in the economic field.

In addition to the concern of Chinese retaliation, the interviewees also mentioned some other factors that had made the administration more concessionary to the Chinese than to the other top textile exporters: China was a much poorer country and textiles had a larger share of its exports to the United States; moreover, it was relatively a late comer, starting from a small base. These were also major points frequently stressed by the Chinese textile negotiators in their complaints about U.S. import restraints, as reflected in my interviews with Chinese textile officials in the Chinese Embassy in Washington.

In the meantime, the administration's opposition to the Jenkins bill was also related to the U.S. government's traditional "adherence to the norms, rules, and procedures of the multilateral trade regime."¹¹² In my interviews, those officials in charge of textile policies particularly emphasized this point. The bill was apparently too protectionist for a Republican administration that had championed, at least rhetorically, free trade. Moreover, the bill, if passed, would severely restrict the flexibility of the executive branch in its conduct of trade relations with other countries, since it would replace the MFA and the thirty-four bilateral agreements negotiated by the U.S. government. Therefore, the administration would insist on

¹¹¹One major explanation for the difference, offered by my respondents, was that Commerce and USTR officials tended to have a better understanding of the textile interests because of their closer working relationship with these groups.

¹¹²Lenway, *Politics of International Trade*, p. 205.

"using the international system to the utmost to assist our domestic industry."¹¹³ Finally, the passage of the textile bill, which was the first major protectionist measure under congressional consideration in 1985, would feed the already high protectionist sentiment in Congress and boost the chance of passing much broader protectionist trade legislation which the administration was trying to stop.

The administration's opposition and the president's veto thus significantly limited the influence of the pro-quota coalition. On the other hand, the administration made a number of concessions to the quota supporters during the process. Although the textile bill failed to become law, it had actually led to a series of moves on the part of the administration that were designed to protect the American industries affected by imports in general, and the textile industry in particular. Later it also made serious commitments to negotiating more restrictive textile agreements with the major textile exporters. While the pro-quota lawmakers tried to use the threat of overriding the presidential veto to put pressure on the executive branch to toughen its position in international trade negotiations, the administration was in effect using this congressional pressure as leverage to press the U.S. trading partners for making more concessions in the on-going MFA and bilateral talks. As Stephen Cohen puts it, such a threat of congressional action

can affect the substance of executive branch policy and its international negotiating efforts. "The Congress will never buy this" is an argument often used by presidential negotiators in an effort to moderate other countries' bargaining positions.¹¹⁴

Chief U.S. textile negotiator Carlisle made the American intention clear in a rare interview in May of 1986:

If our trading partners, both in Geneva and bilaterally, will sit down and work out reasonable arrangements, I think the President's veto will be upheld by a decent margin. But if we should fail to accomplish most of what we set out to do, then I think

¹¹³Statement of Amb. Richard H. Imus, U.S. Chief Textile Negotiator before the Trade Subcommittee, *Current Conditions*, 3 April 1985, p. 8.

¹¹⁴Stephen D. Cohen, *The Making of United States International Economic Policy: Principles, Problems, and Proposals for Reform* (New York: Praeger, 1981), p. 93.

we can see a very, very threatening situation.¹¹⁶

A number of major textile exporters apparently took the warning seriously as Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea concluded more restrictive bilateral accords with the United States. The new MFA was also eventually signed. These accords seemed to reaffirm Destler's point that "sometimes diplomatic benefits accrue from executive-congressional conflict."¹¹⁸

The Weakness of the Counter-Opposition in Congress The administration's concessions to the pro-quota coalition were also related to the weakness of the anti-quota coalition. It was true that the most powerful members on trade panels in both the House and Senate (Rostenkowski, Chairman of Ways and Means; Gibbons, Chairman of Ways and Means' Trade Subcommittee; Sen. Dole, Ranking member of Finance; and Sen. Danforth, Chairman of Finance's International Trade Subcommittee) were generally against the Jenkins bill. But as leaders, they had some practical considerations. Dole's new majority leadership position, for example, somewhat complicated his role as a leading spokesman for farm interests on the textile issue. According to my interview with one of his chief personal aides, Dole was now particularly concerned with how to maintain the Republican majority in the Senate. To do this, he must protect the interests of those Republicans from textile-producing states as well as those from the farming states. Thus, his opposition to the textile bill would have to be compromised by the need for a balancing act. Indeed, the anti-bill coalition in the Senate was actually led by Daniel J. Evans, a junior Republican senator from the Pacific state of Washington who was originally appointed to fill the vacancy left by the unexpected death of veteran Democratic Sen. Henry M. Jackson in September of 1983. Evans appeared to be the natural choice to lead the opposition, since he represented the Western states' exporting

¹¹⁶Cited by Julia K. Hughes, "A Retail Industry View of the Multifiber Arrangement: How Congressional Politics Influence International Negotiations," *Law & Policy In International Business*, 19 (1987), p. 259.

¹¹⁸I.M. Destler, "Executive-Congressional Conflict in Foreign Policy: Explaining it, Coping with it," In Dodd and Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered*, 3d ed., 1985, p. 352.

industries that could have been most affected by a possible retaliation from the Asian trading partners.

But a fundamental weakness of the anti-quota coalition was its minority status. This apparently made the administration uncertain of whether the quota opponents could sustain a veto and felt that it had to do more to influence the legislative process. As a minority, what the coalition could do was to play its functional role of blocking. And it did it vigorously. Its leaders in the House managed to negotiate a closed rule with the quota supporters, which might have helped prevent the possible expansion of the pro-quota coalition through amendments. The anti-quota resistance in the Senate was even more stubborn. Quota opponents put up more than a dozen procedural hurdles and delayed the vote on the Thurmond substitute for nearly two months.¹¹⁷ Relying on its sheer majority, however, the pro-quota coalition was able to get over all the roadblocks and forced its counterpart to place its last hope on the president's veto. But the influence of the anti-quota coalition was apparent beyond the procedural battle. It presented a strong debate on the defects of the bill. In particular, it publicized and reinforced the retaliation argument that played a significant role in constraining the pro-quota coalition. Finally, of course, it sustained the president's veto.

Conclusion

The textile case again demonstrated that congressional opposition in the making of U.S. China policy was determined by the salience of the issue involved. The pro-quota members of Congress advocated tight quotas on Chinese textile imports because: (1) it was an electoral/economic issue that linked the lawmakers closely to their constituents and thus induced a strong interest among them; (2) it was an integrated part of the overall pro-quota effort to impose a general quota system on the major textile exporters outside Europe and

¹¹⁷Sen. Hollings, for example, acknowledged that "Despite the considerable support for this measure, getting a vote on it has been like pulling teeth." *Con. Rec.*, 13 November 1985, S15341.

Canada.

It is thus clear that the conflict between the pro- and anti-quota coalitions was rooted in the long-time struggle over the issue of foreign import restrictions, not in the development of the American bilateral relationship with China or any other textile-exporting country. The consideration of China and U.S.-China relations only became relevant when each coalition wanted to defend its respective positions on the textile issue. The pro-quota leaders were textile-protection advocates, not anti-Chinese per se (with the probable exception of Sen. Helms). Ironically, the case shows that anti-communist ideology can also be used by the counter-opposition (the anti-quota coalition), with which China was a practical ally in the legislative battle against the opposition, in an attempt to block the opposition's legislative drive.

The pro-quota coalition played the assertive behavioral role. Through its function of initiating a textile policy, it was able to exert a policy-generating effect on the Reagan administration. A series of policy moves made by the administration indicated that the coalition had a substantial influence in the making of U.S. textile policy. However, this was far short of its legislative goal. Its influence on U.S. textile policy toward China was less than it was on U.S. bilateral textile policies toward some other textile exporters as well as the multilateral textile policy.

The coalition's policy influence was related to its majority status in Congress and the existence of a powerful textile interest group. But the coalition was also constrained by a combined resistance from its opponents: the administration, the anti-quota-coalition in Congress, the countervailing interest groups, and the foreign textile exporters affected by the Jenkins bill. In sum, the findings from the textile case study support the propositions raised in Chapter II concerning the behavior and influence of congressional opposition on the electoral/economic type of issue in a normal period of a bilateral relationship.

CHAPTER VII

THE EMOTIVE/MORAL ISSUE COALITION, THE CHINESE FAMILY PLANNING POLICY AND THE FUNDING OF UNFPA

The preceding two chapters have dealt with two different issues--external/strategic and electoral/economic. In both cases, the behavior of the congressional opposition was influenced by the salience of the issue in question. The issue coalitions in the two cases each displayed its own intensity, roles, patterns of interactions with the other major forces, and policy influence. In this chapter, we will turn to another coalition of congressional opposition that was concerned with an emotive/moral issue.

It has been argued (Chapter II) that the behavior of the congressional opposition on emotive/moral issues like human rights will also be influenced by the salience of the issue. Compared to the other two coalitions examined earlier, there will be a different kind of issue coalition, with a different intensity, roles, patterns of interactions with the other major forces, and policy influence. In general, we expect that congressional opposition will find it easier to exert its policy influence in the issue area of human rights than in the areas of nuclear nonproliferation and foreign import restrictions. Members of Congress will tend to have a more homogeneous view, being more passionate and assertive in their behavior. In addition to the executive concessions and pressure from interest groups, but the foreign government will be able to exert little influence on the legislative process.

This chapter will test these propositions on the nature, behavior and policy influence of the emotive/moral issue coalition of congressional opposition by examining a case in the issue area of human rights--the congressional reaction to the Chinese family planning policy that led to the U.S. cutoff of population aid to UNFPA in 1985.

The Issue of Forced Abortion In the Bilateral Relationship

Like the issues of China's nuclear nonproliferation policy and its textile exports to the United States, the issue of forced abortion was a product of the expanded bilateral relationship. More specifically, it resulted from the rapidly increased cultural and press exchanges between the two nations. Since the normalization of diplomatic relations in early 1979, there had been a growing number of American journalists, scholars, tourists, and politicians visiting, experiencing and examining the Chinese landscape, its system and society. In turn, China became more and more exposed to the American visitors, in both positive and negative terms. Because the Chinese, especially those in power, and Americans tend to hold different values, a clash between the two on value-oriented issues seemed to be inevitable as the volume of exchanges grew.

The issue of forced abortion was closely related to the family planning policy carried out by the Chinese authorities. Controlling the growth of the huge Chinese population had been a policy of the Chinese government since the 1970s.¹ But it was after 1978 that the government began to advocate a vigorous one-child-per-family policy and integrated it into its broad economic modernization program--on the premise that China's economic modernization would not succeed without successful control of the growth of its one-billion-plus population. This policy was written into the 1982 constitution, which stipulated: "The state promotes family planning so that population growth may fit the plans for economic and social development" (Article 25).²

The issue of forced abortion thus emerged as the impact of China's population policy

¹For an official account of China's population policy, see Qian Xinzhong (formerly chairman of the State Family Planning Commission), "China's Population Policy: Theory and Methods," *Studies in Family Planning* 14 (December, 1983), pp. 295-301.

²See the English version in *Beijing Review*, 27 December 1982, p. 10.

on its society began to capture the attention of the American press and some concerned researchers. During 1982 and 1983, there were press reports on abuses in China's population program in several provinces. In the meantime, several researchers made similar claims about coercive practices in the Chinese population program. Steven Mosher, formerly an anthropology student at the Stanford University, had written frequently since 1982 about China's family planning policies. Based on his one-year research in a Chinese village in 1980, he concluded that "the wave of infanticide sweeping China is a direct consequence of a population control policy of unprecedented severity" and that the one-child-per-family policy "systematically denigrates the value of human life."³ His book *Broken Earth: The Rural Chinese*, published in 1983, provided a detailed description of forced abortions in China. Research conducted by John S. Aird and Judith Banister, both experts on China's population policies in the U.S. Bureau of the Census, also supported the conclusion that China's family planning policy had resulted in widespread coercive abortions.⁴

But the stories that attracted the American public's attention most appeared on the public television program *Nova* in February 1984, which depicted a Chinese woman pressured into having an abortion seven months into her pregnancy.⁵ Early in 1985, there occurred a wave of news reports and stories on the consequences of China's one-child-per-family policy. Coupled with the rebroadcasting of the *Nova* program and the CBS television network's *60 Minutes* in January, the influential *Washington Post* published a three-part series by Michael

³Steven W. Mosher, "Why Are Baby Girls Being Killed in China?", *Wall Street Journal*, 25 July 1983, p. 11.

⁴John S. Aird, "Coercion in Family Planning: Causes, Methods, and Consequences," *Con. Rec.*, 7 June 1985, S7776-S7786; Judith Banister, "Family Planning and Fertility in China," prepared statement at the hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House, *Political Developments and Human Rights in the People's Republic of China*, 31 October 1985, pp. 128-170.

⁵WGBH, "China's Only Child," 14 February 1984.

Weisskopf, its foreign correspondent in Beijing for the previous four years. In his first article, Weisskopf reported that China's one-child policy had resulted in

a pattern of official coercion and brutality in the name of birth control--sometimes limited to villages or regions, sometimes nationwide. In their zeal to save China from its reproductive excesses, authorities have resorted to roundups of pregnant women for abortions, infanticide in city hospitals and sterilization campaigns backed by harsh penalties for resisters.⁶

In the second article, the author further wrote,

China, to be sure, is curbing its population growth, but its success is rooted in widespread coercion, mass abortion and intrusion by the State into the most intimate of human affairs....[The] one-child policy is piling up heavy costs in broken lives and is tearing at the fabric of Chinese society.⁷

The last article focused on the fate of baby girls, who "became another victim of the ugliest side effect of China's war against overpopulation--female infanticide."⁸ The author estimated that the Chinese population policy had led to "a loss of almost 300,000 baby girls in 1982 and 345,000 in 1983."⁹

The Reagan Administration's Reaction

Whether forced abortions were widespread as the reports suggested is not our concern here.¹⁰ What interests us is that the Reagan administration took these widely-publicized

⁶Michael Weisskopf, "Shanghai's Curse: Too Many Fight for Too Little," *Washington Post*, 6 January 1985, p. A30.

⁷Michael Weisskopf, "Abortion Policy Tears at China's Society," *Washington Post*, 7 January 1985, p. A16.

⁸Michael Weisskopf, "China's Birth Control Policy Drives Some to Kill Baby Girls," *Washington Post*, 8 January 1985, p. A1.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. A10.

¹⁰Some researchers have presented a more sympathetic view of the Chinese population policy and an assessment of a lower rate of forced abortions, arguing that it is often difficult for Westerners to comprehend the pressures of overpopulation, since the population situations (e.g., aging societies and decreasing birth rates) are so different in Western nations. But these researches were mainly conducted during and after 1986. See, for example, Jennie A. Clarke,

reports and articles seriously and subsequently made its controversial decisions. The reports on forced abortions in China raised the administration's suspicion of the nature of UNFPA's involvement in China's population-control programs and it began to reconsider the long-time U.S. financial contribution to that organization.

UNFPA is the world's largest multilateral population assistance agency.¹¹ Since 1969, the United States had been its largest and most consistent donor, providing \$400 million, some 16% of the Fund's budget during the period. As a sign of its support for UNFPA specifically, the U.S. Congress began in 1982 the process of "earmarking" the amount of the U.S. contribution to the Fund. Congressional legislation provided that 16% of all U.S. funding for foreign population assistance was to be contributed to the UN agency. For FY 1985, the continuing resolution appropriated \$46 million to the Agency for International Development (AID), which was responsible for distributing the U.S. contribution to UNFPA.

The Fund's close relationship with China began in 1980 when its governing board decided to provide financial assistance to China's various population projects. In the first five years, the agency provided about \$10 million annually to that country, one of the agency's largest country programs. According to the UNFPA China program, in addition to supporting the first census to be made since 1964 in that country, the funds would also be used to

provide assistance in the areas of demographic training and research, maternal and child health and family planning service delivery and research, training of maternal and child health and family planning personnel, family planning service statistics and program evaluation, human reproduction and contraceptive research, contraceptive

"The Chinese Population Policy: A Necessary Evil?" *International Law and Politics* 20 (Fall 1987), pp. 321-354.

¹¹Since 1969, when it became operational, the organization has assisted governments in 149 developing countries and territories with assistance in formulating programs and financing projects designed to promote the achievement of national population and development goals. In the meantime, UNFPA has also gotten voluntary financial support from the governments of 144 countries and territories to enable the Fund to provide nearly \$1.5 billion in population assistance.

production, and population information and education.¹²

The Fund thus became an intervening factor in the interactions between the Reagan administration and the Chinese government on the issue of forced abortion. It relied considerably upon the United States for financial support while contributing to the Chinese population program. Thus, the UN agency provided a convenient arena for the administration to display its concern with the reported forced-abortion practice in China. In early 1984, responding to the reports of forced abortion cases in China, AID Administrator Peter McPherson put a hold on \$19 million of \$38 million U.S. funds appropriated for FY 1984 to UNFPA. The funds were nevertheless released in August after an AID review of the UNFPA program in China concluded that "allegations of UNFPA support for coercive Chinese practices are unfounded."¹³ But at the same time, the administration also set conditions for future U.S. aid to UNFPA, announcing at the UN-sponsored International Conference on Population held in Mexico City (August 6-13) that, as part of a new U.S. population policy (dubbed as Mexico City policy), in addition to the policy that no part of U.S. contribution for population control abroad should be used for abortion,

the U.S. will also call for concrete assurances that the UNFPA is not engaged in, or does not provide funding for, abortion or coercive family planning programs; if such assurances are not forthcoming, the U.S. will redirect the amount of its contribution to other, non-UNFPA, family planning programs.¹⁴

This policy showed the Reagan administration's intention to increase its influence on the Fund's population assistance programs worldwide, including those in China. In February

¹²"Recommendation by the Executive Director: Assistance to the Government of China Comprehensive Population Programme," United Nations Development Programme Governing Council, 27th Sess., June 1980, p. 2.

¹³N.C. Brady, "Information Memorandum to the Administrator," 6 April 1984.

¹⁴"Policy Statement of the United States of America at the United Nations International Conference on Population (Second Session)," Mexico, August 6-13, 1984, p. 5. The statement also declared that the United States "will no longer contribute to separate nongovernmental organizations which perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family planning in other nations."

of 1985, following the publications of the Post articles, AID announced that it would freeze \$23 million of U.S. funds to UNFPA, on the ground that it might go to support forced abortions in China. The agency was also conducting an internal review of all UNFPA projects in China. An AID team was sent to China to check into allegations of government-coerced abortions made in Weisskopf's series.

The Chinese government denied the allegations made in the Post articles. Its Embassy in Washington defended the government's population policy in a letter to the Post as an "absolute necessity." "Of course deviations ... did occur in a few localities," said the letter, "but they were checked and corrected immediately."¹⁶ The *People's Daily*, China's leading official newspaper, criticized Weisskopf's reports for greatly misrepresenting China's family planning work. The paper reminded the reader that "some Americans who have visited China thought that Weisskopf's reports are inconsistent with the facts."¹⁸

An eight-page briefing note, prepared by UNFPA, also defended China's family planning policy. The paper noted that the Chinese government "has repeatedly emphasized the voluntary nature of its one-child policy" and that it "has initiated legal action against cases of female infanticide, maltreatment of mothers and children."¹⁷ The paper claimed that the UN funds were used only for non-coercive projects such as population tracking, research and education of the populace.¹⁸

In March, AID released the results of its review of UNFPA's China projects. The review again concluded:

The evidence available indicates that UNFPA does not support, facilitate, or condone

¹⁶Letter from Chinese Press Counselor Shi Chengxun to the *Washington Post*, 11 January 1985.

¹⁶*People's Daily*, 25 January 1985, p. 7.

¹⁷"UNFPA and China: Briefing Note," revised edition, 9 February 1985, p. 5.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

coercive family planning practices in China but rather provides alternative approaches to family planning that can reduce the incidence of coercive procedures.¹⁹

On March 30, however, McPherson announced that AID would still withhold \$10 million while releasing remaining \$36 million to UNFPA, because

the practices in the family planning programs of one country is such that any support for that country's program is linked with and gives the appearance of condoning its practices.²⁰

For diplomatic reasons apparently, China was not explicitly named. But the \$10 million being withheld was about the amount of UNFPA's budget scheduled to go to China. AID then asked the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to request Congress for authority to reprogram the \$10 million withheld from UNFPA for use in other family planning activities.

AID's decisions suggested the following points:

- (1) The administration, at least in part, believed that the Chinese family planning policy contained coercion.
- (2) It did not directly confront the Chinese government, making no explicit protest or condemnation; instead, it targeted UNFPA.
- (3) It took the administrative initiative against the Fund, thus leaving the Congress in a reactive mood during the initial phase of the policy process.

The Rise of the Anti-Funding Coalition In Congress

Congress was highly divided on the UNFPA issue. There were, in effect, two major coalitions that had emerged. One, dubbed here as the anti-funding coalition, was opposed to the funding of UNFPA because of its assistance to the reported coercive Chinese family planning programs. They supported the administration's policy for U.S. population assistance abroad (the Mexico City policy), but wanted to go beyond what AID had done on the cutoff

¹⁹"A.I.D. Review of UNFPA Program for Compliance with U.S. Law and Policy," March 1985, pp. 2, 6.

²⁰"U.S. Withholds \$10 million from United Nations Fund for Population Activities," *AID News Release*, 30 March 1985.

of aid to UNFPA. This anti-funding coalition was mainly made up of anti-abortionists in Congress. The other, dubbed here as the pro-funding coalition, was opposed to the administration's Mexico City policy and AID's decision to withhold the \$10 million from UNFPA. This pro-funding coalition consisted mainly of population-control and pro-choice members of Congress. In this section, we will look at the characteristics of the anti-funding coalition, since it is the main focus of our study.

**Opposition to Chinese Population Policy:
Forced Abortion as Human Rights Violation**

While the Reagan administration tried to avoid directly denouncing any abusive Chinese family planning practice, the anti-funding lawmakers explicitly linked the UNFPA funding with the issue of forced abortion in China. They claimed that the United States should cut all funds to UNFPA because the U.S. money had been used by the agency to finance not only abortion but forced abortion activities in China, through its programs in that country.

Citing media reports, Rep. Christopher Smith (R-N.J.) charged that the Chinese government was committing "one of the worst and grossest forms of human rights violations that this world has ever known."²¹ On March 25, Smith proposed a concurrent resolution in the House condemning China for its one-child-per-family policy which, "with its reliance on forced or coerced abortion and resultant increase in female infanticide," was "violative of the human rights of the citizens of that country, constituting an ongoing crime against humanity."²² Smith suggested that cutting funds to UNFPA was the right step for the United States to demonstrate its interest in defending human rights in China:

I think the overriding concern that many of us have is that the United States must not

²¹Hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, *Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Years 1986-87, Part I* (hereinafter *Foreign Assistance Legislation, Part I*), 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 February 1985 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 237.

²²*Con. Rec.*, 25 March 1985, H1434-H1435.

be part of, in any way, the coercion and tyranny in China. We have a moral obligation not only to not be part of, but to take affirmative action to defend and promote human rights....Keeping our money out of China's coercive policies would be a prudent step.²³

According to Smith, the cutoff of funds would also serve as an effective way to influence the decision making of the UN agency and force it "to disengage itself from China's activities."²⁴

"If UNFPA does not voluntarily vacate China," asked Smith, "shouldn't we then make some concrete decisions which will encourage UNFPA to disengage itself from China's activities?"²⁵

Rep. Henry J. Hyde (R-Ill.) said more bluntly: "If the UNFPA is going to get out of China altogether--then they're entitled to money. But as long as they contribute to China ... then none of our money will go to the UNFPA."²⁶

Some anti-funding members hoped not only to influence UNFPA's decision making but to press for change in Chinese population policy. Rep. Michael DeWine (R-Ohio), for example, believed that "what we must do is get some leverage over the U.N. so that they can exert some influence to moderate, at least, China's family planning program."²⁷

The intention of the anti-funding lawmakers was thus much more straightforward than that of the Reagan administration: They not only wanted to cut off all funds to the UN organization, but also openly and sharply criticized China and expressed their purpose to influence China's population policy. Therefore, they were far from satisfied with AID's March 30 decision to withhold the \$10 million from UNFPA. In their letter to President Reagan dated

²³Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House, *Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Years 1986-87, Part 8* (hereinafter *Foreign Assistance Legislation, Part 8*), 99th Cong. 1st Sess., 2 April 1985 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 45.

²⁴Ibid., p. 44.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁶Ibid., p. 50.

²⁷*Con. Rec.*, 10 July 1985, H5342.

April 2, for example, Sens. Gordon Humphrey, Jesse Helms and Reps. Henry Hyde (R-Ill.) and Jack Kemp (R-N.Y.) charged that "administrative officials at AID apparently are unwilling to obey *existing* law (emphasis in the original) as to providing any funding at all for UNFPA." They wanted to have the \$36 million returned to the United States and demanded that the president intervene directly to ensure that AID would "halt funding of any grantee which subgrants to China, including UNFPA."²⁸ Thus, as the focus of the policy making moved to the legislative arena, the anti-funding coalition was ready to expand the U.S. policy toward UNFPA beyond AID's action.

Dimensional Linkages and The Anti-Funding Intensity

Why did the anti-funding lawmakers become so interested in the reported forced abortions in China? And why did they want to bother about and influence the Chinese population policy? The answer lay much in the issue's linkage to the broader, multilateral dimension of foreign policy making. The anti-funding coalition's reaction to the issue of forced abortion in China reflected its members' long struggle for eliminating any association of U.S. population assistance with abortion activities in foreign countries.

Abortion and U.S. Population Assistance Abroad Before the issue of forced abortion in China occurred, the anti-abortionists in Congress had tried consistently to assume a dominant position in influencing U.S. population policy abroad. For a number of years, it was the population control advocates who dominated U.S. population policy making, reflecting a general consensus within both the executive and legislative branches.²⁹ This consensus was based on the rationale that rapid population growth in the less developed countries would

²⁸Letter from Humphrey et al. to President Reagan, 2 April 1985.

²⁹See, for example, Peter J. Donaldson, "The Origins and Implementation of America's International Population Policy," paper presented to the annual meeting of the Population Association of America, Chicago, Ill., April 30 - May 2, 1987.

constitute

a growing potential for social unrest, political instability, mass migrations, and possible international conflicts over control of land and resources. Demographic pressures will certainly reinforce the frustrations caused by absolute and relative poverty (underlining original). The near certainty of at least a doubling of the population of most developing countries within the next two to three decades has particular significance for the United States, which has been the goal of so many of the world's emigrants and refugees.³⁰

Thus, rapid population growth would hinder economic development and increase poverty in third world countries and this, in turn, would cause instability and conflict that would upset the United States' efforts to maintain the status quo and its dominant position in the world system. The United States had much to lose also because it "has major security interests in a string of countries with high growth rates."³¹ Moreover, population problems would reduce the ability of third world countries to repay their debts to the United States. The United States therefore had its stakes in controlling the growth of the world population.

UNFPA then became an important part of the U.S. population control effort abroad.

As the 1980 NSC policy paper stated:

From the U.S. stand-point, the UNFPA plays a critical role. It can operate in countries where political sensitivity inhibits bilateral assistance; in fact, it has activities in 85 countries where there are no bilateral U.S. programs.³²

In 1967, Congress passed the Title X Amendment to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act which, for the first time, specified that the United States should establish population assistance programs with the governments of third world countries and with nongovernmental and multilateral organizations such as the abortion-rights advocate International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) and UNFPA. By the late 1960s, AID had become a leading force in

³⁰"U.S. International Population Policy," Fourth Annual Report of the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy, April 1980, p. ii.

³¹Marshall Green, former assistance secretary of state for Asian and Pacific affairs and Population Coordinator, quoted in *Christian Science Monitor*, 7 August 1984, p. 6.

³²"U.S. International Population Policy," p. 21.

international family planning efforts. The U.S. population policy was then both well-funded by Congress and accepted by the American public.³³

Beginning in the early 1973, the anti-abortion forces increasingly challenged this dominant population-control policy. In 1973, Congress passed the Helms Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, specifically banning the use of foreign aid monies for abortion. Since then AID had changed its practice of directly supporting abortion activities and instead provided funds only to governments and nongovernmental organizations which might be involved in abortion activities.³⁴

The anti-abortionists' influence in Congress rose substantially with the advent of the Reagan administration, the increase of new conservative members in Congress following the 1980 elections, and the rise of powerful pro-life pressure groups. The congressional anti-abortion coalition then became an important part of the broad pro-life movement to stop abortion activities in the United States in general and turn over the 1973 Supreme Court ruling on abortion in particular. It also cooperated closely with the administration in its effort to use U.S. money to press foreign recipients to stop abortion activities.³⁵ "China was a chance for them to seek legislative victories when they failed in the domestic front," according to a chief aide to pro-funding Rep. John Porter (R-Ill.) All the fourteen pro-life congressional staff members I interviewed considered abortion, rather than China, the central issue in the UNFPA case. The typical view was expressed by a senior aide to Sen. Robert W. Kasten (R-Wis.) who, as Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, was active in the UNFPA case:

³³Donaldson, p. 14.

³⁴Donald P. Warwick, "Foreign Aid for Abortion," *Hastings Center Report*, April 1980, p. 31.

³⁵For an account on this, see Sharon L. Camp and Craig R. Lasher, "International Family Planning Policy--A Chronicle of the Reagan Years" (draft) (Washington, D.C.: Population Crisis Committee, February 1989).

The central issue is not China-related. It is a domestic issue. It could affect other countries as well, for example, Japan, if same things happened in that country. Senator Kasten did not look at it as a U.S.-China issue. He considered it only an abortion-related issue. The issue could be in Japan and Taiwan. He would have acted in the same way.

In 1984, the anti-abortion coalition gained momentum with the administration's adoption of the Mexico City policy and its subsequent cutoff of all U.S. aid to the long-time recipient IPPF as a consequence of its support of abortion. The connection between the abortion issue at home and U.S. population assistance abroad seems to vindicate partially historian Robert Dallek's thesis that U.S. foreign policy has frequently become a product of "the impulse to make overseas affairs a vehicle for expressing unresolved internal tensions."³⁶ Clearly, without acknowledging the sharp division over abortion in the American society, it would be difficult to understand the intensity of the anti-funding coalition in this case.

The Human Rights Issue The anti-funding sentiment in Congress was further intensified by another multilateral dimensional linkage--the concern over human rights. The issue of forced abortion in China fell neatly into the human rights issue area, which tends to induce both strong inward- and outward-looking orientations of congressional interest. Such a bicentric congressional interest, as described by a chief of staff to one of the leading anti-funding leaders in the House, was related to three factors: "First, we provide aid to other countries, and we want these countries to observe human rights; secondly, we have immigrants; and finally, there is a constituency concern."

Various studies have shown that congressional initiatives have been largely responsible for the development of human rights as an important element in U.S. foreign policy since the early 1970s.³⁷ U.S. lawmakers became increasingly interested in human rights during a series

³⁶Robert Dallek, *The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs* (N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983), p. xiii.

³⁷See, for example, David D. Newsom, ed., *The Diplomacy of Human Rights* (New York: University Press of America, 1986); Natalie Kaufman Hevener, ed., *The Dynamics of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1983); Donald P. Kommers

of fifteen hearings in 1973 held by the House Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements (later renamed the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations) chaired by then congressman Donald Fraser (D-Minn.). The result of these hearings was the subcommittee's 1974 report entitled *Human Rights and the World Community: A Call for U.S. Leadership*, which provided the rationale for promoting human rights as one of the priorities in U.S. foreign policy:

Protection of human rights is essentially the responsibility of each government with respect to its own citizens; however, when a government is itself the perpetrator of the violations, the victim has no recourse but to seek redress from outside his national boundaries. Men and women of decency find common cause in coming to the aid of the oppressed despite national differences.³⁸

Between 1973 and 1978 the Fraser subcommittee held about 150 hearings with more than 500 witnesses, focusing on U.S. relations with governments in all continents and of different political ideologies. These hearings were coupled with a series of legislative enactments linking U.S. foreign aid with human rights concerns, which significantly increased its weight in the consideration of U.S. foreign policy within the executive branch.³⁹ Congressional human rights advocates were further encouraged by, though not completely satisfied with, the record of President Carter who made a commitment to human rights a priority in his foreign policy.⁴⁰ Congress's interest in human rights remained high when the Reagan administration appeared to consider the issue a low priority, using it essentially to

and Gilbert D. Loescher, eds., *Human Rights and American Foreign Policy* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979); and Barry M. Rubin and Elizabeth P. Spiro, eds., *Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979).

³⁸Quoted in John P. Salzberg, "A View from the Hill: U.S. Legislation and Human Rights," in Newsom, p. 15.

³⁹Ibid., pp. 13-20.

⁴⁰Robert B. Boettcher, "The Role of Congress in Deciding United States Human Rights Policies," in Hevener, pp. 279-289.

oppose Soviet-led communism.⁴¹

Thus, it was no accident that anti-funding lawmakers frequently emphasized that the Chinese population policy was a serious violation of human rights. By linking the cutoff of U.S. aid to the forced abortion in China and eventually to the issue of human rights, the coalition could gain broad support in Congress. Members of Congress would find it difficult to oppose such a value-oriented issue. The issue of human rights violations in Communist countries was particularly appealing to conservatives. As former congressman Fraser noted, conservatives tended to be more strongly concerned with human rights in communist nations than liberals who were usually more upset by action in right-wing dictatorships, and that conservatives would like to use human rights policy as a means of cutting multilateral and bilateral development aid.⁴² Many conservatives were also staunch anti-abortionists and cool or even hostile toward the United Nations. They thus formed the core of the anti-funding coalition and focused their attack on China as a way to achieve their purpose of either making the Chinese government change its population policy or forcing UNFPA to withdraw its aid to China.

Characteristics of the Anti-Funding Issue Coalition: A Further Look

The dimensional linkages of the issue of forced abortion in China suggested that the anti-funding coalition was strongly issue-oriented. The coalition members were not dictated by anti-Chinese feelings but by their broader concern over U.S. population policy abroad, abortion, and human rights. In this section, we will take a further look at the nature of this issue coalition.

⁴¹David Forsythe, *Human Rights and World Affairs* (University of Nebraska Press, 1983), p. 112; see also Tamar Jacoby, "The Reagan Turnaround on Human Rights," *Foreign Affairs* 64 (Summer 1986), pp. 1066-1086.

⁴²Donald M. Fraser, "Congress's Role in the Making of International Human Rights Policy," in Kommers and Loescher, pp. 247-254.

The Anti-Funding Issue Leaders

One characteristic of the anti-funding issue leaders was that they were all Republicans. Reps. Kemp, Hyde and Sens. Humphrey and Helms were well-known conservatives. But Rep. Chris Smith, a leading figure in the legislative battle at the House authorizing level, was a moderate Republican. This indicated that the coalition was generally led by the Republicans, yet not exclusively led by conservatives.

In addition to their partisanship, all these issue leaders were arch anti-abortionists, and some of them had already established an impressive anti-abortion record. With his Catholic and fervent anti-abortionist background, Smith was probably more active than anyone else in the House on abortion. He was a former executive director of the New Jersey Right to Life Committee. After the election, he became the co-chairman of the House Pro-life Caucus. Beginning in 1985, he was a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations, which apparently provided him with a very suitable and important forum for his anti-abortion cause abroad. In 1984, Smith showed his potential as a formidable issue leader by proposing an amendment to the foreign aid bill that would have had the effect of banning U.S. aid to all population control programs run by the United Nations and other agencies in China. However, his effort was blocked when Congress adopted a much milder amendment offered by Foreign Affairs Chairman Dante Fascell (D-Fla.) that specified that none of the U.S. money could be used by the UN and other organizations in China for coerced abortion.⁴³ Thus in 1985, Smith became the natural leader in waging the campaign against the Chinese population programs and against the UNFPA programs in that country at the House authorizing level.

Sen. Gordon Humphrey was elected in 1978, using federal funding of abortions as one

⁴³*Con. Rec.*, 9 May 1984, H3614-H3619.

of his major campaigning issues.⁴⁴ According to my interview with one of the senator's personal aides, abortion was one of his legislative priorities. He viewed abortion as "an issue of human rights and human dignity," even if the families involved were poor. He believed that the economic problems in third world countries were distribution, not population problems. Therefore, he would do everything he could to prevent abortion at home and abroad.

Before the issue of forced abortion in China occurred, Helms had already established his anti-abortion leadership in the Senate. He was the author of the 1973 Helms Amendment banning the use of foreign aid monies for abortion. Since then he had failed to carry out any other major initiative on the issue, including his all-out push for his anti-abortion amendment of 1982 that directly challenged the 1973 Supreme Court decision on abortion. But in 1984, Helms led an anti-abortionist coalition that successfully forced Sen. Robert W. Packwood (R-Ore.), a population-control advocate, to withdraw his sense-of-the-Senate resolution repudiating the administration's population policy and reaffirming Congress's commitment to furnishing population control assistance, after the Senate accepted Helms' counter-amendment supporting the thrust of the administration's Mexico City policy.⁴⁵ Compared with Humphrey and other anti-abortionists in the Senate, Helms was in a better position to exert influence on cutting off U.S. aid to UNFPA, since he was a senior member of the Republican majority in the Foreign Relations Committee in 1985.

Another characteristic of the anti-funding issue leaders was that with the exception of Helms they were not militantly anti-Chinese. Although they were anti-Communist, they were not dominated by a fixed unfavorable attitude toward China. Rep. Kemp, for example, stated that he favored a better relationship with China despite his opposition to its population

⁴⁴Michael Barone, Grant Ujifusa, and Douglas Matthews, *The Almanac of American Politics 1980* (New York, N.Y.: E.P. Dutton, 1979), p. 530.

⁴⁵*Con. Rec.*, 8 August 1984, S9932-S9938.

policy.⁴⁶ According to one of Hyde's personal aides, the conservative congressman "puts some value on China's opposition to the Soviet Union and recent economic reforms in the country." Smith declared that "I welcome the improvements that have occurred in recent years between the United States and the People's Republic of China."⁴⁷ He would also like to "see China contain the Soviet Union" and was even interested in cooperating with China on child-nutrition programs, which had been one of his legislative priorities.⁴⁸ Interviews with some of their aides did indicate that their anti-Communist views somewhat hardened their reaction to the Chinese population policy, but first of all, they were issue leaders--their reactions to the reported forced abortions in China and the subsequent AID decision on UNFPA were primarily driven by their anti-abortion convictions.

The Pro-Funding Issue Coalition

The issue orientation of the anti-funding coalition was also clearly reflected in the nature of its counter-opposition in Congress--the pro-funding coalition. As mentioned earlier, this coalition consisted mainly of population-control lawmakers. Many of them were pro-choice.⁴⁹ But some did not favor the PRC in attitude.⁵⁰ In the past, it was this coalition

⁴⁶Floor speech by Kemp, *Con. Rec.*, 27 June 1985, H5218.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, 10 July 1985, H5336.

⁴⁸Interview with Smith's chief personal aide.

⁴⁹Like their opponents, the leading pro-UNFPA lawmakers also possessed the quality of issue leadership. However, they were from both parties--for example, Sens. Nancy Landon Kassebaum (R-Kan.), Daniel K. Inouye (D-Hi.), Reps. Olympia Snowe (R-Maine), John Porter (R-Ill.), Peter H. Kostmayer (D-Penn.), Stephen J. Solarz (D-N.Y.), and Jim Moody (D-Wis.). Their ideologies ranged from most liberal (e.g., Kostmayer, Solarz, Inouye) to moderate (e.g., Kassebaum, Snowe) to most conservative (e.g., Porter). But they had one thing in common: They were all population-control activists. Most of them had collaborated with each other before, for example, in their attempts to block the Mexico City policy from being adopted and maintain U.S. aid to IPPF in 1984.

which had been engaged in the struggle over the policy of U.S. population assistance to international family planning and opposing the anti-abortionists who formed the core of the anti-funding coalition. Unlike the counter-oppositions we have seen in the nuclear and textile cases, the pro-funding coalition in the UNFPA case assumed the position of opposition to the Reagan administration's policy--the Mexico City policy and its policy toward UNFPA in particular. But in our analytical context, the coalition was considered a counter-opposition because it opposed policies that did not favor Chinese government and/or Sino-American relations.

As population-control supporters, pro-funding lawmakers realized that the anti-funding coalition's attacks on the Chinese population policy were not anti-Chinese seemed to be, but another attempt to change U.S. population assistance policy. They saw the linkage between the cutting of U.S. aid to UNFPA and the fate of international family planning and hence the consequences of world population growth. Rep. Kostmayer, for example, charged that the anti-abortionists were trying to establish a smokescreen. "The real danger here," he said, "is that there is an effort, a very deliberate effort, to confuse abortion and family planning."⁶¹

According to Sen. Bill Bradley (D-N.J.),

This debate is about whether the United States should help provide family planning services to developing countries. Ultimately, this debate is also about whether the United States should take effective steps to prevent millions more children from starving every year.⁶²

Rep. Snowe believed that the U.S. population assistance was becoming terribly politicized:

⁶⁰One example was Rep. Porter, one of the leading pro-funding members. According to his personal aide, the congressman "is very hostile to U.S.-China relations, or at least not pro-Chinese."

⁶¹Hearing before the Foreign Affairs Committee, *Foreign Assistance Legislation, Part I*, p. 255.

⁶²*Con. Rec.*, 11 June 1985, S7896.

"This antiabortion crusade has now become an antifamily planning crusade."⁶³

The population control advocates also insisted that what they were debating was not the population policies of the PRC but whether or not the U.S. government ought to continue its contribution to UNFPA. They argued that there was no evidence that the agency was supporting the reported forced abortions in China. They contended that U.S. money funded only voluntary family planning programs. They further stated that no U.S. aid given to UNFPA went "even indirectly" to any abortion-related programs in China. "UNFPA gives \$10 to \$12 million to China, and none of that is American money," said Kostmayer. "Not a cent of American money goes to China."⁶⁴ Rep. Moody believed that the AID decision was "essentially a political decision that gives credence to untrue accusations that American money to UNFPA somehow finds its way into allegedly coercive programs in China."⁶⁵ Pro-funding lawmakers insisted that U.S. cutoff of funds to UNFPA could have a very negative impact on third world countries. According to Rep. Solarz,

it sets a terrible precedent, because there are a lot of governments around the world that have policies that many of us find unacceptable, or even outrageous. One could then say, based on this precedent, that we ought to terminate all funding for any international agency that has a program in a country that has some policy or practice we object to, even if the program has nothing to do with the policy or the practice. I think it throws the baby out with the bathwater.⁶⁶

The pro-funding coalition was thus in a direct issue contest with the anti-funding one. What it was vigorously defending was not China or its family planning practice, but its position on U.S. population assistance to international family planning. They acknowledged that the reported abuses in Chinese population programs were "human rights (underlining original)

⁶³*Foreign Assistance Legislation*, Part 8, p. 43.

⁶⁴*Foreign Assistance Legislation*, Part 1, p. 233.

⁶⁵*Associated Press*, 7 April 1985.

⁶⁶*Foreign Assistance Legislation*, Part 8, p. 52.

issues, not family planning issues."⁶⁷ This was further indicated by the pro-funding issue leaders' efforts to separate China from UNFPA--to seek a

position that protects UNFPA to do what's worthwhile in its program, while giving the United States a way of expressing its displeasure with the programs of individual country's in a concrete way.⁶⁸

Here the "individual country" apparently referred to China.

The Voting Patterns

Let us now look at the three roll-call votes in the case and see how the voting behavior of the anti-funding coalition, as well as that of its counter-opposition, was related to the four variables: partisan affiliation, ideology, presidential leadership, and regionalism. If the coalitions were issue-oriented, the voting patterns should reflect that. The first was the House vote on the Fascal-Kostmayer substitute to retain the earmarking of U.S. assistance to UNFPA. The second House vote was on the Smith amendment to express the sense of Congress against forced abortion in China and to authorize the president to withhold funding from UNFPA if he found the reports of forced abortion in China valid. The third was the Senate vote on the Kassebaum motion to kill the Helms amendment to maintain presidential authority in connection with funding for international family planning.

Table 7.1 shows the three votes by partisan affiliation. The two House amendments both contained explicit language condemning China for its practice of forced abortion, and a majority of Democrats voted for both amendments--even though, as noted in Chapter V, Democrats tended to be generally in favor of Sino-American relations. The vote on the Smith amendment was more indicative: 58% of Democrats voted along with 83% of Republicans to condemn forced abortions in China. While the two votes revealed a lack of bipartisanship

⁶⁷"Dear Colleague" letter from Rep. Jim Moody, 19 June 1985.

⁶⁸Staff memo to Representative Steven J. Solarz, 25 March 1985.

TABLE 7.1

Party and the Family Planning Voting

	House Fascell Substitute		House Smith Amendment		Senate Kassebaum Motion	
	Yea	Nay	Yea	Nay	Yea	Nay
Total	198	221	289	130	53	45
Dem.	161	78	139	99	35	10
% of total Dem. votes	67	33	58	42	78	22
Rep.	37	143	150	31	18	35
% of total Rep. votes	21	79	83	17	34	66

on China's family planning policy, they reflected the difference between the two parties on the issue of earmarking U.S. funds to UNFPA, with 83% of Republicans supporting the Smith amendment and only 21% of them voting for the substitute. In the Senate, partisanship seemed to be stronger, with 78% of Democratic senators and only 34% of the Republicans voting for Sen. Nancy Kassebaum's motion to kill the Helms amendment. But if we consider the fact that the motion was sponsored by a Republican and supported by eighteen other Republicans in order to kill a fellow Republican's amendment (Kassebaum vs. Helms), the voting then appeared to reflect more of an intra-party conflict than a partisan matter.

Ideology appeared to be a moderate factor for the two voting coalitions in the House (see Table 7.2). The gaps between the most liberal and most conservative two groups on the ideological continuum were noticeably larger than the partisan gaps. The mean of the ADA score among those voting for the substitute was 63.4, compared with 27.9 for those voting

TABLE 7.2

Ideology and the Family Planning Voting

	House Fascell Substitute		House Smith Amendment		Senate Kassebaum Motion	
	Yea	Nay	Yea	Nay	Yea	Nay
Total	198	221	289	130	53	45
Mean	63.4	27.9	33.5	69.5	59.6	15.6
Correlation Coefficient	r = -.39		r = -.51		r = .67	
% of Most conservative Votes*	13.3	86.7	91.2	8.8	15.4	84.6
% of More Liberal Votes	43.7	56.3	69.9	30.1	5.0	25.0
% of Most Liberal Votes	86.5	13.5	29.8	70.2	89.5	10.5

* For the categories of ideological votes, see Table 5.2, Chapter V.

against it. Meanwhile, the Pearson product moment correlation between the voting and the liberal orientation of the congressmen was -.39. It thus suggested an inverse relationship between the two variables: The less liberal, the more likely a member was to vote against the substitute. But the relationship was not a strong one. This was apparently due to the fact that there was not a sufficiently large gap between the supporters and opponents of the substitute within the more moderate group, which accounted for about 79% of the total votes. On the other hand, the inverse relationship was stronger for the voting on the Smith amendment ($r = -$

.51): The less liberal, the more likely a member was to vote for the amendment--with the gap within the moderate group being considerably enlarged. On the Senate side, the mean of the ADA score among those voting for the Kassebaum motion was 59.6, compared with 15.6 among those voting against it. Furthermore, the Pearson product moment correlation was .67. Thus, there was quite a strong relationship between the voting and the liberal orientation of the senators: The more liberal, the more likely a senator was to vote for the motion.

Compared with ideology, presidential leadership appeared to be stronger on the voting against the substitute and slightly weaker on the voting for the Smith amendment (see Table 7.3). The mean CQ score for those voting for the substitute was 31.9. For those voting against it, it was 58.7. Meantime, the Pearson product moment correlation between the votes and presidential support scores was .61. It thus indicated that there was quite a strong relationship between the two variables: The more supportive of the president on other issues during the year, the more likely a member was to vote against the substitute. The relationship between the voting on the Smith amendment and presidential support scores was not strong ($r = .49$), however. In the Senate, there was an inverse relationship between the votes for the Kassebaum motion and presidential support scores: The higher the presidential support score, the less likely a senator was to vote for the motion. But the relationship was moderate, considering the range of the presidential support scores (20-92).

The sectional factor was not evident in the three votes (Table 7.4). They showed no visible pattern of regional differences. Apparently, views on family planning as well as human rights issues were not easily divided along the regional lines; and even within individual states diversity appeared to be more common than conformity.

In sum, congressional voting behavior showed that the anti-funding coalition tended to consist of more Republicans than Democrats, more conservatives than liberals, and those members who were more likely to support the president on other issues. This was no accident, since the three issues involved in the case--abortion, UNFPA, and China--were

TABLE 7.3

Presidential Leadership and the Family Planning Voting

	House Fascell Substitute		House Smith Amendment		Senate Kassebaum Motion	
	Yea	Nay	Yea	Nay	Yea	Nay
Total	198	221	289	130	53	45
Mean	31.9	58.7	53.2	30.1	43.5	70.2
Correlation Coefficient	r = .61		r = .49		r = -.55	
% of Most Supportive Votes*	3.6	96.4	100.0	0.0	25.6	74.4
% of Less Supportive Votes	42.9	57.1	74.0	26.0	73.2	26.8
% of Least Supportive Votes	91.7	8.3	26.7	73.3	85.7	14.3

* For the categories of presidential supportive votes, see Table 5.3, Chapter V.

likely to unite most of the conservative Republicans in the Congress who were pro-life, anti-UN, and anti-Communist. Besides, as noted earlier, conservative Republicans had not been supporters of foreign aid. Of course, they liked it even less when they saw that U.S. money, through UNFPA, went to a Communist country. On the other hand, liberal Democrats tended to be pro-choice, pro-population control and displayed less anti-Communist intensity. They were also generally in favor of developing Sino-U.S. relations. In the meantime, however, the influence of partisanship, ideology, and presidential leadership on the anti-funding coalition was

by no means strong, indicating the salience of the issue at work--especially in the House voting on the Fascell substitute. Furthermore, the two groups closed their gap considerably in their votes on the Smith amendment stressing the issue of forced abortion and human rights. The

TABLE 7.4

**Region and Family Planning Voting
(Vote By State Delegation)**

	House Fascell Substitute		House Smith Amendment		Senate Kassebaum Motion	
	Yea	Nay	Yea	Nay	Yea	Nay
Single vote	7	10	17	2	17	13
South*	0	3	4	0	2	4
East	4	1	3	2	9	0
West	1	5	6	0	3	3
Midwest	2	1	4	0	3	6
Majority vote*	11	15	22	7	1	1
South	2	5	9	0	0	0
East	3	1	3	2	0	0
West	4	2	3	4	1	0
Midwest	2	7	7	1	0	1
Split vote		7		2		18
South		3		0		
East		3		1		3
West		1		1		6
Midwest		0		0		2

* For the categories of regions and majority votes, see Table 5.4, Chapter V.

major difference between the two coalitions was centered on foreign population assistance issues (e.g., earmarking U.S. funds to UNFPA), and each coalition showed no clear pro- or anti-PRC orientation in its voting behavior--another indication that both coalitions were strongly issue-oriented.

Roles and Effect of The Anti-Funding Coalition

Having examined the nature of the anti-funding coalition, let us now turn to the roles and effect of this coalition in the Congress-centered policy process. In this process, the coalition first reacted to the AID decision to withhold \$10 million from UNFPA by suggesting that such a decision was insufficient to address the problem of the UN agency's relationship with Chinese family planning programs. It then played an assertive role by taking its functional role of supplementing the administration's decision, which exerted a policy-amplifying effect on U.S. population assistance policy in general and its policy toward UNFPA and Sino-American relations in particular.

The ability of the anti-funding coalition to play the assertive role with its supplementing legislative function was related to the two favorable conditions it had vis-a-vis its opponents. First, the coalition enjoyed the issue advantage. As pointed out earlier, forced abortion in China was a human rights issue, an emotive/moral issue that tended to induce both outward- and inward-looking orientations of congressional interest. In other words, it linked congressmen's foreign policy concern (advocating human rights abroad) with their domestic political interest (constituency connection). Potential opponents would find it difficult to argue against such a value-oriented issue.⁵⁹ To link UNFPA with alleged forced abortion in China

⁵⁹As a former personal aide to Rep. Moody and now a population-control lobbyist acknowledged in an interview, the linkage between the Chinese policy and U.S. support of UNFPA hurt pro-funding members politically. "Typical citizens did not understand why China had such a policy," she said. "They hold the American individualistic idea that government should not tell me what to do."

would put the opponents in a very difficult position to defend the UN agency. For political expediency, few would like to defend China in order to save UNFPA. On the other hand, the pro-funding coalition was advocating world population control--a foreign policy issue that had a weak constituency connection. As a personal aide to Rep. Kostmayer acknowledged in an interview: "The international family planning is an issue without constituencies. It is an issue of interest and conscience. The constituencies do not care about that."

The second condition that precipitated the role of the anti-funding coalition was that it generally shared similar views with the Reagan administration on abortion and U.S. population assistance policy abroad--both supported the Mexico City policy and both wanted to do something to restrict the role of UNFPA in the Chinese family planning programs. It thus made it easier for the coalition to seize the momentum, mobilize the Congress and supplement the administration's policy in the legislative arena. By contrast, the pro-funding coalition was generally in a reactive mood in face of the policy initiative taken by the administration. They could only take the revising function to provide a constraining effect on both the administration's policy and anti-funding coalition's efforts to supplement that policy.

The Supplementing Role at the Authorizing Level

By taking its supplementing functional role, the anti-funding coalition's legislative objectives were: (1) to have the U.S. government ban any U.S. contribution to UNFPA for its involvement in the Chinese family planning programs, and (2) to apply this policy to any other country that had family planning programs similar to China's. The strategy to achieve these objectives was to exploit the issue of forced abortion in China as fully as possible. The coalition leaders first tried this at the Senate and House authorizing level.

The Senate In early April, Helms offered an amendment to the population section of the foreign aid authorization bill for fiscal 1986 being considered by the Foreign Relations Committee. It would prohibit any U.S. family planning aid to: (1) a country "which permits,

officially or in practice, infanticide or coerced abortion;" or (2) "any organization which provides funds, directly or indirectly, with respect of such a country." The second part of the amendment, in fact, was meant to bar further funding of UNFPA. In a draft report, Helms stated that the language was deliberately "very broad" so that aid might be cut off not only to China but also to any other country where the forbidden practices might be suspected, even if they were without official sanction.

The effectiveness of linking the issue of forced abortion to the cutoff of all funding to UNFPA was indicated by the strong majority of 13-3 that passed the Helms amendment. It was even more clearly shown by the differences between the Helms amendment and another amendment that was offered by pro-population-control Sen. Kassebaum. The Kassebaum amendment differed little with the Helms amendment on the issue of forced abortion in China: It would forbid the use of U.S. population funds for family planning programs in the PRC, including through any private voluntary organizations and international organizations. The amendment even came up with an additional way of showing concern about the PRC program by ordering the U.S. representative to UNFPA to vote against the extension of assistance by the U.N. agency for any population planning in the PRC. But the amendment emphasized that the United States continue to provide funds to UNFPA, which would be held in *separated* accounts, thus reflecting the pro-funding lawmakers' efforts to separate the China issue from U.S. funding of UNFPA. Apparently the term "separate accounts" was not persuasive, since the anti-funding lawmakers could easily raise the question of "fungibility" of money.⁶⁰ Thus, despite its position on China, the Kassebaum amendment narrowly passed the committee by 9 to 7.

The Kassebaum amendment nevertheless posed a potential threat of overturning the administration's policy toward UNFPA as stated in the Mexico City policy and the AID decision

⁶⁰Rep. Smith, for example, argued that "the (U.S.) moneys that go into the UNFPA accounts are commingled, and the money becomes part of a large pool of money that then is disbursed country by country." *Foreign Assistance Legislation*, Part 1, p. 238.

in particular. Therefore, after the Senate passed both Helms and Kassebaum amendments on May 15, Helms made a floor amendment on June 11 to the State Department authorization bill in an attempt to override it. Helms and his supporters argued that the Kassebaum amendment "would tie the President's hands in developing policies to curb human rights abuses in connection with U.S. population assistance." The implication of this second Helms amendment was even broader than the first one. It would allow the president,

to implement whatever policies he deems necessary to curb human rights violations, including but not limited to infanticide, abortion, involuntary sterilization, and racial or ethnic discrimination.⁶¹

Here Helms defined abortion--not just coerced abortion as it appeared in the first Helms amendment, but any legal abortion as practiced in the United States and elsewhere--as a human rights violation that the president could fight with the full force of his constitutional powers. Presenting his amendment, Helms argued that Congress "must leave the President the authority for setting requirements and restrictions that he believes are in the best interests of the United States and the furtherance of human rights in our foreign policy."⁶² Humphrey added that "there is a crying, urgent need" for the president "to be able to exercise such policies" when "millions of women are being forced to undergo abortions involuntarily" in the PRC.⁶³

Although the supporters of the amendment granted full power to the president on the premise that human rights violations must be checked, the very meaning of the amendment was clearly about the presidential power itself. It thus enabled the pro-funding lawmakers to move the debate into the power-sharing dimension--an issue concerning which branch had the power to make U.S. population policies, hence increasing the intensity of the pro-funding

⁶¹*Con. Rec.*, 11 June 1985, S7884.

⁶²*Con. Rec.*, 11 June 1985, S7885.

⁶³*Ibid.*, S7895.

coalition and expanding its base of support. They stressed the Congress' role in international family planning. Kassebaum argued that U.S. population policy abroad was an area in which "Congress has traditionally been involved, and we should continue to be." "The President certainly has the ability and responsibility of his leadership to express his concerns," she said. But "Congress has the opportunity to work its will."⁶⁴ Sen. Daniel Evans also contended that the amendment would give the president "unusual powers in dictating policies in any country which may be a recipient of U.S. aid."⁶⁵ Sen. Packwood attacked the amendment for its giving the President "complete power and responsibility--without the consent of Congress--to form our U.S. foreign policy on international family planning."⁶⁶ The focus of the debate on the presidential powers vis-a-vis those of the Congress helped shift the lawmakers' attention away from the issues of abortion and forced abortion and therefore weakened the appeal of the Helms amendment, which was subsequently killed by a procedural vote on the motion offered by Kassebaum (53-45, see earlier analysis).

The House The supplementing role of the anti-funding coalition at the House authorizing level experienced somewhat different twists. It was more constrained by the pro-funding coalition in the committee room than on the House floor. The Foreign Affairs Committee, dominated by pro-choice members, passed an identical version of the Kassebaum amendment offered by Rep. Snowe on a voice vote. The Snowe amendment, like the Kassebaum amendment, was adopted because, according to a staff memo, "it is a way the American people can dissociate themselves from practices that are contrary to our values, while not pulling the rug on UNFPA."⁶⁷ The committee rejected an amendment offered by

⁶⁴Ibid., S7887.

⁶⁵Ibid., S7895.

⁶⁶Ibid., S7897.

⁶⁷"Strategy on the Population Issue in Full Committee Markup," staff memo to Rep. Stephen Solarz, 25 March 1985.

Chris Smith, identical to the first Helms amendment, by a 23-12 vote. In addition, the pro-funding members in the committee also boosted U.S. funding for family planning overseas to \$320 million, a \$70 million increase over Reagan's request and \$30 million above the fiscal 1985 level, and again managed to keep the earmarking of funds to UNFPA (the Kostmayer amendment as amended by the Snowe amendment).

The balance of forces in the whole House, however, appeared to be more favorable to the anti-funding coalition. According to an April staff estimate, population control and anti-abortion forces in the House were in a neck-and-neck situation, with about eighty others uncommitted.⁶⁸ Encouraged by this, Smith and his supporters vowed to fight all the way to the floor with his amendment to the foreign aid bill.⁶⁹ During May, the anti-funding coalition was strengthened by the passage of the Kemp amendment in the House Appropriations Committee, which would virtually give the president the authority to withdraw U.S. aid to UNFPA (see below).

The growing anti-funding strength in the House could be seen by a series of changes in strategy made by pro-funding coalition leaders between April and July. These changes showed the dilemma and deteriorating position of the UNFPA supporters in the House. In April, they tried to hold the position they put forward in the Foreign Affairs Committee, which was to distance the United States from UNFPA's China program and give members a way of voting against what was happening in China without jeopardizing UNFPA in other parts of the world.⁷⁰ At the end of May, however, they decided to allow the U.S. government to cut off up to \$10 million in aid to UNFPA, which was quite appealing at the time of the Kemp Amendment. In addition, they wanted Congress to instruct the president to raise the

⁶⁸Personal file of a staff member for the Foreign Affairs Committee.

⁶⁹See letter from Douglas Johnson, Legislative Director of National Right to Life, to Rep. Bernard Dwyer, 24 April 1985.

⁷⁰"Dear Colleague" letter of Snowe et al., 17 April 1985.

population program with the Chinese as a *human rights* issue, thus moving the issue up to the agenda of U.S.-PRC bilateral relations.⁷¹ Reflecting this strategy was the draft Fascell-Solarz substitute to the expected Smith amendment. It moved significantly closer to the latter. The only two major differences were that the substitute criticized China much less harshly than the expected Smith amendment and maintained the earmarking of U.S. contributions to UNFPA.⁷²

But three days before the floor debate, a meeting of leading pro-funding lawmakers concluded that the Fascell-Solarz substitute could not pass. They felt that the only way to head off Smith was to make the substitute even tougher on China, and to place an even greater burden on the administration to make a choice between China and its conservative friends. The new strategy was to change the Fascell-Solarz substitute by harshly criticizing China's population policy and giving the president authority to reduce to zero the U.S. contribution to UNFPA if he determined that the PRC had not made significant and sustained progress in eliminating incidents of coerced abortion in its population program. This was instead of the Fascell-Solarz substitute's phased reduction of the U.S. contribution by a maximum of \$10 million. Having given the president this authority, pro-funding members assumed that the forces inside and outside the administration who had a stake in good U.S.-China relations would successfully bring their influence to bear on the president to limit the extent of the reduction.⁷³ Thus, the major difference between the new substitute and the

⁷¹Staff memo to Representative Stephen Solarz, "Update on the Population Issue in the Foreign Aid Bill," 30 May 1985.

⁷²"Substitute Offered by Mr. Fascell of Florida for the Amendment Offered by Mr. Smith of New Jersey" (draft), 8 July 1985.

⁷³Staff memo to Rep. Stephen Solarz, "Developments on Strategy Concerning China and UNFPA," 8 July 1985. However, some UNFPA supporters had certain reservations on the strategy. Solarz's aides felt that this approach would give the president too much power and was based on faulty assumptions; Rep. Howard E. Wolpe (D-Mich.) also feared that such a strategy could lead to the termination of funding even for countries where there was no evidence whatsoever of coercion in their family planning programs. But they went along with the substitute anyway.

Smith amendment would be: According to the former, the earmarking of aid to UNFPA would be maintained until it was cut off--based on the presidential determination, while the latter would give a mandate to eliminate all U.S. money for UNFPA.

Hence, after repeated revisions, the final Fascell-Kostmayer substitute criticized China so harshly that Smith at the last moment found it suitable to transfer most of it into his own amendment, originally only a few lines as he offered in the committee markup session. Consequently, the new Smith amendment and the substitute for it became too identical on China for many lawmakers to tell the difference between the two without a careful reading.⁷⁴

An aide to Rep. Snowe recalled in an interview:

Our amendment was very harsh on China. We did it on purpose. We tried hard to separate abortion and China from funding of UNFPA. But we made some parliamentary mistakes. The issue was very arcane; it was difficult to decide whether you should offer a substitute amendment. The night before the floor debate, Smith got a copy of our amendment and changed a few words in it and made it his own amendment. We should not have given the amendment to Smith.

The pro-funding lawmakers did succeed in focusing the debate on the question of earmarking. But many undecided members were apparently overwhelmed by the anti-Chinese rhetoric of the two amendments. The highly-emotional moral issues of forced abortion and human rights overshadowed the policy implication of earmarking funds to UNFPA, especially under Smith's assertion that in light of the forced abortions in China and the condemnation contained in the Fascell-Kostmayer substitute, "it seems contradictory to be earmarking funds."⁷⁵ The Fascell-Kostmayer substitute was subsequently defeated by a vote of 198-221. The Smith amendment was then adopted by 289 to 130 votes (see earlier analysis), with a large margin of 159 votes. A total of sixty-five congressmen, most moderate liberal Democrats, who had voted for the Fascell-Kostmayer substitute now voted for the Smith amendment. Riding the wave of victory, the anti-funding coalition also defeated the Snowe

⁷⁴Camp and Lasher, p. 82.

⁷⁵*Con. Rec.*, 10 July 1985, H5346.

amendment contained in the Foreign Affairs Committee bill voiding the Mexico City abortion policy by a 234-189 vote, and replaced it with a Smith amendment granting the President statutory authority to implement the Mexico City policy.

The House-Senate Conference But the anti-funding coalition was again constrained by its opponents in the House-Senate conference. The Smith amendments, along with the first Helms amendment passed by the Senate, confronted the Kassebaum amendment repudiating the Mexico City policy and continuing U.S. contributions to UNFPA. Neither side wanted to compromise. The deadlock was finally broken when the conferees chose the easiest route to drop all the controversial provisions related to family planning. The result was an authorization of \$290 million for family planning programs, with no clear congressional direction on how to spend the money.⁷⁶

Thus, at the authorizing level, the anti-funding coalition's drive to expand the administration's policy toward UNFPA was virtually blocked by its counter-opposition. Anti-funding lawmakers could not knock out the U.S. support to UNFPA completely as they had wished. Nevertheless, the coalition succeeded in holding back the attempt of the pro-funding lawmakers to repudiate the administration's population assistance policy. It also put the earmarking of U.S. aid to UNFPA in doubt, hence increasing the concern of population-control advocates. Kostmayer, for example, warned that "U.S. support for family planning may now be on the verge of being effectively terminated."⁷⁷

The Amplifying Effect But the role of the anti-funding coalition at the authorizing level went beyond the legislative battles over U.S. population assistance policy. It highlighted the issue of forced abortion in China and, in effect, put the Chinese population policy on trial. Despite the differences between the two coalitions, they both criticized the Chinese policy and

⁷⁶See the Conference Report, *International Security and Developments Cooperation Act of 1985*, U.S. Senate, Rep. 99-237, 29 July 1985, p. 118.

⁷⁷*Con. Rec.*, 1 August 1985, E3763.

both believed that forced abortion was a human rights issue. This common denominator was shown in the reports of the two foreign affairs committees. The Foreign Relations Committee reported that both the Kassebaum and Helms amendments, despite their contradictions with each other, were "intended to respond to widespread concern about reported instances of coerced abortion and infanticide within the PRC."⁷⁸ The Foreign Affairs Committee report also stated that due to the widespread concern over abuses in Chinese family planning programs,

It is the sense of the committee that it does not support the UNFPA's presence in China at this time and that it hopes that other countries on the UNDP governing board which approves UNFPA programs will share this concern and approve a termination of the UNFPA program in the PRC.⁷⁹

In the heated floor debate, virtually no one defended the Chinese population policy. The sections of the Fasel-Kostmayer substitute and the Smith amendment condemning abuses in Chinese population policy apparently reflected the sentiment in the House. Clearly, if a vote had been cast on a separate resolution related only to the Chinese population policy, it was almost certain that it could have achieved unanimity.

The Supplementing Role At the Appropriating Level

What the anti-funding coalition did not achieve at the authorizing level was realized at the appropriating level. Its supplementing role was manifested in the Kemp Amendment passed by the Congress, which would not only sanction the withholding of the \$10 million from UNFPA, but potentially cut off all U.S. aid to that organization.

When the House Appropriation Committee was considering a fiscal year 1985

⁷⁸Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, *International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985*, 19 April 1985 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 33.

⁷⁹Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House, *International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985*, 11 April 1985 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 38.

supplemental appropriation bill in May, committee member Kemp inserted the amendment to the bill, which stated that

None of the funds made available in this bill nor any unobligated balances from prior appropriations may be made available to any organization or program which supports or participates in the management of a program of coercive abortion.⁸⁰

In his "additional views" attached to the committee report, Kemp explained that participation in the management of such a program would include providing resources to collect and analyze the data necessary to the enforcement of such a program; training of the individuals who planned, managed, and carried out such a program, education and publicity about the programs; assistance to the official bodies of government that were charged with developing and implementing such a program; and other such assistance.⁸¹ On the surface, the amendment was designed to keep the \$10 million of UNFPA money still left in the 1985 budget from getting to UNFPA. But as UNFPA supporters realized later, it was a crucial step toward banning all U.S. aid to UNFPA.

The Kemp amendment passed the committee and later the House on a voice vote and with little difficulty. There was no clear reason why the amendment encountered little opposition here, while there was a heated debate at the authorizing level. It appeared that Kemp skillfully designed "the kind of language which congressmen are hard-put to vote against (unless they are planning to retire before the next election)."⁸² The cutoff of the \$10 million to UNFPA was so closely linked to the issue of forced abortion in the amendment that it was difficult for lawmakers to vote against it. Besides, the sentiment in the House at the time, as noted earlier, was clearly moving toward suspending UNFPA's relationship with the Chinese population programs and pro-funding leaders were also inclined to give up the \$10 million in

⁸⁰Report of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House, *Supplemental Appropriations Bill*, 1985, Rep. 99-142, 22 May 1985, p. 86.

⁸¹*Ibid.*, p. 232.

⁸²Camp and Lasher, p. 81.

their "phase-out" strategy. Moreover, according to interviews with the staff members involved in the process, some committee members did not realize that the amendment was directly against UNFPA until later when they read Kemp's additional views in the Committee report. Another reason was that the amendment appeared to be aimed more specifically at UNFPA's role in China than the much broader Helms amendment or the Smith amendment openly condemning China. The amendment did not explicitly mention China and therefore helped mute the opposition from the State Department and those in Congress who might be concerned with its impact on Sino-U.S. relations.⁸³ Meanwhile, the amendment was passed by a voice vote, both in the committee and House, thus making it impossible to compare the similarities and differences between the vote on the Kemp amendment and the later vote on the Smith amendment at the authorizing level.

The Inouye Amendment The passage of the Kemp amendment in the Congress was made possible also because of the strategy taken by the pro-funding members in the Senate, led by Sen. Daniel Inouye (D-Hi.), member of the Senate Appropriations Committee and champion of UNFPA. Inouye clearly realized the amplifying effect of the Kemp amendment. A memo prepared for him by his staff warned that "if enacted into law, this language will be construed in a manner which would prevent further fiscal year 1985 funding of the UNFPA." More importantly, it said,

once this language is incorporated into the law, it will be carried forward in any continuing resolution for fiscal year 1986 and consequently lead to the demise of the UNFPA as an effective population assistance intermediary.⁸⁴

Despite a strong inclination to strike the Kemp language in its entirety, Inouye and his aides nevertheless feared that the abortion issue so inflamed passions that it was unlikely that

⁸³According to interviews with State Department officials, the China Office did draft a proposal, expressing its intention that the amendment should not mention any particular country.

⁸⁴Staff memo to Senator Daniel Inouye, "Fiscal Year 1985 Supplemental," 4 June 1985, p. 4.

members of the Appropriations Committee could be expected to publicly draw a distinction between their support for UNFPA and its purported collaboration with the reported coercive abortion practices of the PRC. Therefore, they concluded that a motion to strike the Kemp amendment would fail. Based on staff advice, Inouye then inserted during the committee markup a clause "as determined by the President of the United States" into the Kemp amendment, which was now called the Kemp/Inouye amendment and later passed in Congress.⁸⁵ It was designed to require the president to make a *formal* determination that China did, in fact, have a policy of coercive abortion and that UNFPA was, in fact, "an organization or program which supports or participates in the management of a program of coercive abortion."

Thus as the UNFPA supporters in the House would do, Inouye and his aides hoped to exert a constraining effect on the Kemp amendment by forcing the China-UNFPA issue up to the top level of the U.S. government where any decision or determination would be made by either the president himself or his designee, the Secretary of State:

The overweening influence of the anti-abortionists would be diminished because the question of coercive abortion in China would then enter the domain of U.S. bilateral relations with the PRC. The full range of U.S. interests in relations with China would have to be examined and, quite possibly, the anti-population assistance thrust of the Kemp language (which would otherwise be advanced by the interpretations and determinations of population assistance opponents in AID and the WH) would be blunted.⁸⁶

In this way, Inouye and his supporters hoped, AID would have to be obliged to abide by the earmarking of funds in the FY 1985 act and provide the remaining \$10 million to UNFPA.

⁸⁵The Kemp Amendment was also amended by Helms who inserted a clause of "or involuntary sterilization" at the end of the Kemp Amendment. Thus, the amendment was also called the Kemp/Inouye/Helms Amendment which, as it stood in its final form, was: "None of the funds made available in this bill nor any unobligated balances from prior appropriations may be made available to any organization or program which, as determined by the President of the United States, supports or participates in the management of a program of coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization."

⁸⁶Staff memo to Sen. Inouye, p. 5.

To make the issue more sensitive to the administration, Inouye also indicated that he might subsequently offer further legislation to cut off funding for the bilateral Science and Technology (S&T) Agreement in the event of an affirmative presidential determination made pursuant to the Inouye modification of the Kemp Amendment. The S&T Agreement with China, with 23 implementing protocols, was the largest such bilateral agreement that the United States had ever concluded with any country and was one of the diplomatic achievements for the Reagan administration in U.S.-China relations.⁸⁷

The Administration's Reaction However, later events did not turn out the way Inouye and his supporters expected. Apparently to avoid both a potential conflict with the Chinese government and direct pressure from anti-abortion activists both inside and outside the government, President Reagan delegated the authority under the Kemp/Inouye Amendment to Secretary of State Shultz who, citing the existing law, redelegate this authority to AID Administrator McPherson.⁸⁸ In this way Shultz shifted the potentially explosive issue to someone whose decisions, though probably more vulnerable to domestic pressures, could bring about much less diplomatic consequence. Relying heavily on Kemp's additional views appended at the end of the committee report,⁸⁹ McPherson announced on September 25 that AID would reprogram \$10 million so far withheld from UNFPA to other family planning activities because

there is sufficient evidence to indicate that UNFPA participates in the management of the China family planning program and also that implementation of China's one-child

⁸⁷Staff memo to Senator Inouye, 7 June 1985; and Inouye's Senate statement on the Inouye amendment to the Kemp Amendment, *Con. Rec.*, 20 June 1985, S8526.

⁸⁸George Shultz, "Delegation of Authority No. 145-3," 21 September 1985; and letter (date not available) from William L. Ball, III, Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, to Sen. Daniel Inouye. Ball's letter stated that "General practice under the Foreign Assistance Act and related appropriations acts has been to delegate to the Director of AID such functions formally vested in the President."

⁸⁹Action memo for the Administrator from Derham, "1985 Funding for the United States Fund for Population Activities," 25 September 1985.

3-per-family policy has resulted in these abuses.⁹⁰

The Amplifying Effect of the Amendment However, the objective of the anti-funding legislators was not the \$10 million, but the cutoff of all U.S. funds to UNFPA. Helms and his supporters therefore set up two conditions for AID to fund UNFPA: "first, if UNFPA were to pull out of China completely; or second, if China were to cease its coercive and involuntary practices."⁹¹

Since both UNFPA and China were unlikely to change their existing policies, Helms' strategy was to put direct pressure on the administration by holding up the Senate confirmation of Winston Lord as new U.S. Ambassador to China. "This is the only lever I have to prompt the Administration to be specific on its position," he declared.⁹² On October 2, Helms and four other conservative Republican senators (William L. Armstrong of Colorado, Orrin G. Hatch of Utah, and Chic Hecht and Paul Laxalt of Nevada) wrote to Reagan, expressing their opposition to the appointment. They urged Reagan to intervene personally in pressing AID to adopt the two conditions they raised or

if (Lord's) nomination comes up for debate, it will be an occasion for extended debate on China's population policies and the strategy of the Administration for coping with those policies.⁹³

The administration apparently felt the pressure. In his letter to Helms on November 4, McPherson gave the senator a clear sign that AID might cut off all funds to UNFPA in FY 1986:

Congress has not earmarked funding for UNFPA in 1986. The Administration, accordingly, has discretion to determine whether to furnish assistance to UNFPA and in what amount even if assistance to UNFPA is not prohibited under the

⁹⁰U.S. AID, "AID Reprograms UNFPA \$10 Million" (Press release), 25 September 1985.

⁹¹Letter from Senator Helms et al., to President Reagan, 2 October 1985.

⁹²*Washington Post*, 9 October 1985.

⁹³Helms et al., to Reagan.

Kemp/Inouye/Helms amendment.⁹⁴

McPherson also promised to consult Helms before the administration made its decision regarding funding for UNFPA in 1986.⁹⁵ As it turned out, beginning FY 1986 and thereafter, the United States withdrew its entire funding from UNFPA as both UNFPA and the Chinese government refused to accept the conditions set up by anti-funding lawmakers.⁹⁶

Anti-Funding Legislative Styles

Throughout the legislative process, the anti-funding coalition revealed a remarkable persistency in pursuing its goal--the cutoff of all U.S. funds to UNFPA, from the committee room to the floor, from the House to the Senate, and from the authorizing to appropriating level. Following the House-Senate conference at which the anti-funding coalition failed to push through the Smith amendment, Chris Smith declared that

Absent sweeping reforms in the PRC, the authorities in Beijing should be on notice that the Congress has really just begun to address this issue and will persist with diligence in focusing on these human rights abuses.⁹⁷

Helms' holding Winston Lord as a "hostage" on the UNFPA issue, in particular, reflected this persistency. After 1985, Smith, Kemp, Helms, and Humphrey continued to lead their triumphant coalition against any U.S. funding of UNFPA. Every year, they insisted on having the Kemp/Inouye Amendment be extended automatically, preventing the U.S. government from contributing to the U.N. family planning agency. Also each year, the coalition raised the issue of forced abortion in China and linked it to the funding of UNFPA.

On the other hand, the issue leaders of the anti-funding coalition appeared to have

⁹⁴Letter from AID Administrator McPherson to Senator Helms, 4 November 1985.

⁹⁵Ibid.

⁹⁶See, for example, U.S. AID, "AID Withholds Funds from UNFPA" (press guidance), 28 August 1986.

⁹⁷*Con. Rec.*, 26 July 1985, H6439.

revealed few instances of flexibility in their legislative strategy. Unlike the other coalitions of congressional opposition witnessed in the preceding chapters, the anti-funding coalition showed little sign of making compromises with their opponents. This seemed to be related to the nature of the issue. The issues involved here were value-oriented and hence tended to harbor less room for compromise. When the issue of forced abortion in China was linked to the issue of abortion, it would likely make the anti-abortionist lawmakers even more passionate and emotional. This aspect of the issue, coupled with the advantages enjoyed by the coalition vis-a-vis its counterpart, reduced the necessity of flexibility in strategy for the anti-funding issue leaders.

By contrast, the pro-funding coalition appeared to have experienced so much flexibility in strategy that it had actually weakened their persistency in pursuing their goals. This does not mean that the pro-funding issue leaders did not have persistency. Indeed, they put up a series of vigorous battles during and after 1985. It merely means that their flexibility sometimes appeared to have threatened the pursuit of their goals. For example, the issue leaders would be willing to bet the cutoff of all U.S. funds to UNFPA on the president's concern with the U.S.-Chinese bilateral relationship. This was obviously a risky strategy given the similar positions shared by the Reagan administration and the anti-funding coalition. On the other hand, however, there seemed to be few other alternatives available to the pro-funding issue leaders,⁹⁸ because the nature of the policy issue they were advocating--population control--put them in an apparently disadvantageous position. All my fifteen congressional interviewees (three congressmen and twelve staff members) who were active in the UNFPA case acknowledged that they were eventually unable to separate the two issues: funding of UNFPA and China's family planning policy.

⁹⁸Speaking of the strategy to link the issue to Sino-U.S. relations, for example, a senior aide to Sen. Inouye said in the interview: "In 1985, it was the only choice we had at the time, the only way to remove the control of the Right to Life groups' influence by moving up to a higher level to the president, and to Shultz."

It thus becomes clear that the nature of the issue explains the seeming imbalance between flexibility in strategy and persistency in goal in the legislative styles of the anti-funding coalition, as well as its counter-opposition.

Policy Influence of The Anti-Funding Coalition

We have seen that the anti-funding coalition played both reactive and assertive roles in the Congress-centered policy process. In responding to what it considered an insufficient policy taken by the administration, the congressional coalition asserted itself by taking the supplementing function, which produced an amplifying effect on the administration's policy toward UNFPA and the U.S.-China bilateral relationship.

Then, how can we assess the policy influence of the anti-funding coalition? On the whole, the anti-funding coalition appeared to have exerted a greater influence on policies than either the anti-agreement or the pro-quota coalitions in the previous two cases. The coalition clearly achieved its legislative goal of cutting off all U.S. contributions to UNFPA. It succeeded in having the Congress pass the Kemp/Inouye Amendment and forced the Reagan administration to make its UNFPA decisions as they had wished. During the legislative process, the anti-funding issue leaders also set two other alternative goals: to change the Chinese population policy; and to force UNFPA to cut off its connection with the Chinese family planning programs. It failed to achieve either of these two goals. But this was not important, since they actually used these goals as conditions on U.S. funding of UNFPA, which Helms and others accomplished. Their real legislative objective was to cut off U.S. aid to UNFPA. This seems to be logical, given that the coalition had been engaged in a long-term struggle for suspending all U.S. population assistance to any governmental, nongovernmental, or multilateral organizations that supported or practiced abortion in their family planning programs.

However, even though the coalition could not exert an explicit influence on the Chinese population policy, it did substantially publicize the nature, especially the defects, of the Chinese

family planning programs and make it an important bilateral issue between the two countries. It helped make not only the American public but some informed Chinese who had some exposure to the American political scene more aware of the consequences of the one-child-per-family policy.⁹⁹ It might also have made the Chinese authorities more cautious in both pushing for and carrying out the policy, though it is difficult to substantiate this with clear evidence.¹⁰⁰

Clearly, the emotive nature of the value-oriented issues as advocated by the anti-funding coalition was ultimately responsible for its policy influence. This nature of the issue functioned upon the roles played by the coalition, producing a policy-amplifying effect. At the same time, it also led to the particular patterns of interactions between the coalition and the four other major forces involved in the Congress-centered policy process: the congressional counter-opposition, the pressure groups, the Reagan administration, and the Chinese government. Each of these four forces had a different impact on the policy influence of the anti-funding coalition.

The Counter-Opposition in Congress The preceding sections have already discussed the interactions of the pro-funding coalition with the anti-funding group. Here we need only to summarize the differences between the two coalitions which contributed to the failure of the pro-funding lawmakers to effectively constrain the anti-funding coalition.

- (1) The anti-funding coalition enjoyed a clear advantage over its counter-opposition. While the former successfully linked the issue of forced abortion with the U.S. population assistance policy in general and U.S. policy toward UNFPA in particular, the latter ended up with a failure to separate the two issues. When the pro-funding coalition eventually went along with its counterpart on the issue of forced abortion, it enabled the anti-funding lawmakers to achieve an overwhelming winning coalition.

⁹⁹Interviews with Chinese officials and scholars visiting the United States.

¹⁰⁰Official Chinese press did indicate in 1985 that the one-child-per-family policy may be relaxed to allow couples with special circumstances to have two children if they wished to. See, for example, *Beijing Review*, 24 June 1985, pp. 7-9; and *China Daily*, 6 December 1985, p. 1.

- (2) In this case, the anti-funding coalition was in an "offensive" position, asserting itself with the supplementing function, while the pro-funding was "defensive," reacting to the administration's policy initiative with its revising function. This difference means that the former was relatively mobilized compared with the latter, and was able to assemble a winning coalition more easily than its counter-opposition.
- (3) The weakness of the pro-funding coalition was further reflected in the substantial imbalance between its flexibility in strategy and persistency in goal. Its considerable flexibility compromised the pursuit of its objectives.

Despite its fundamental weakness, however, it is also difficult to discount completely the constraining role of this coalition. After all, it succeeded in blocking the anti-funding coalition's attempt at the authorizing level to have the Congress pass the Smith amendment.

The Reagan Administration While the policy influence of the anti-funding coalition was related to the relatively weak position of its counter-opposition, it is also important to note that the coalition shared a similar position with the Republican Reagan administration. Indeed, it acted on the basis of the initiatives already taken by an anti-abortion White House.

President Reagan's anti-abortion views were well-known and explicitly expressed in an essay he contributed to the spring 1983 edition of the *Human Life Review*, a then eight-year-old conservative quarterly (it was quite rare for a sitting president to write an essay). In the ten-page essay, Reagan attacked *Roe vs. Wade*, the 1973 U.S. Supreme Court decision that struck down state laws prohibiting abortion, and displayed his emotional opposition to abortion.¹⁰¹ Throughout his first term, the president endorsed a number of bills to outlaw abortion.¹⁰² Reagan's anti-abortion position was also reflected in his population assistance policy abroad. Since 1981, the administration gradually replaced some population control advocates in some key population-related positions with anti-abortionists and moved toward a new U.S. population policy abroad, which was finally announced at the 1984 Mexico City

¹⁰¹*Time*, 9 May 1983, p. 36.

¹⁰²See, for example, Nadine Cohodas, "Federal Abortion Alternatives Cut by Reagan Administration," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 17 November 1984, pp. 2949-2951.

conference.¹⁰³

The administration's effort to change the long-established U.S. population policy was based on a set of assumptions that were different from the traditional ones. It argued that big government, not population growth, caused third world poverty and that population control was "not a panacea." It believed that only the adoption of free market economics could ensure a general slowing of population growth in third world countries.¹⁰⁴ Acting upon these assumptions, the administration pushed for the use of U.S. population assistance to promote free market systems in those countries.¹⁰⁵ Accordingly, AID began in 1982 to link its award of grants to the willingness of developing nations to adopt free market strategies.¹⁰⁶

Thus, the withholding of the \$10 million from UNFPA in early 1985 was not merely a response to the news coverage of forced abortion in China but a logical outcome of the administration's new population assistance policy. (Remember that it already cut all U.S. aid to IPPF, a nongovernmental international family planning organization, at the end of 1984.) At his speech to an assembled audience of 200 anti-abortion leaders on July 30, for example, Reagan listed the Mexico City policy and the defunding of UNFPA as two important steps his administration had taken to further the anti-abortion cause. The president told his audience:

As you may be aware, some international organizations have chosen to support abortion as a means of population control. Well, the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, or UNFPA, for example, works with Chinese population programs which include abortion. Our response to that? We cut off American funds from

¹⁰³For an account on this, see Camp and Lasher.

¹⁰⁴"Policy Statement of the United States," p. 6.

¹⁰⁵These assumptions, of course, were not totally accepted within the executive branch. A State Department statement, for example, warned that "ignoring demographic realities or delaying practical responses to these conditions runs the risk of perpetuating poverty and human degradation and undermining the stability of the family and of society." ("State Department Draft U.S. Scope Paper for the international Conference on Population," *Con. Rec.*, 18 June 1984, S7442).

¹⁰⁶Gregory H. Fox, "American Population Policy Abroad: The Mexico City Abortion Funding Restrictions," *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, Vol.18, No.2 (Winter 1986), p. 620.

UNFPA and from organizations that support or promote abortion.¹⁰⁷

As the UNFPA case showed, however, there were some differences between the administration and the anti-funding coalition in Congress over how much the United States should withhold from the UN agency. There was also some difference in their views of China's population policy. While the leading anti-funding lawmakers saw widespread forced abortions in China, the administration was reluctant to conclude that there was enough evidence of forced abortions.¹⁰⁸ As the lawmakers pushed hard for a congressional resolution condemning China for its violation of human rights in family planning and for the passage of the Kemp amendment, the administration generally remained silent. It was obviously concerned with the possible impact of such legislation on Sino-American relations. Citing the administration's careful opposition to a March 25 resolution proposed by Chris Smith because of its strong language condemning Chinese population policy, a mid-June State Department memo to Shultz cautioned the administration about the effect of the Inouye modification of the Kemp amendment, which "would be to pass an explosive issue from the Congress to the President--or to his designee, the Secretary of State," while "the increasing level of protest from China is a clear warning that the issue could spill over and affect--in ways difficult for us to predict--the aspects of our relationship."¹⁰⁹ China specialists in the department urged the administration to "handle the issue quietly" and avoid the mentioning of China in any public policy announcement related to the matter.¹¹⁰ The administration apparently took this warning seriously. Throughout the case, the White House, State, and AID never explicitly mentioned China in any public statement related to the case. The administration showed a

¹⁰⁷*Legislative Documents*, 14 August 1987, personal files of a State official in charge of population affairs, pp. 6-7.

¹⁰⁸Interview with a desk officer in the State Department's Human Rights Bureau.

¹⁰⁹Memo from Paul Wolfowitz to Secretary Shultz, "The Gathering Storm: China and Family Planning," 16 June 1985, pp. 1, 5-6.

¹¹⁰Interviews with State officials.

considerable reluctance to cut off all U.S. funds to UNFPA clearly in part because it tried not to offend the Chinese too much. It also successfully avoided the "trap" prepared by the Inouye amendment to the Kemp amendment by shifting the authority from the president and Secretary of State to AID Administrator McPherson.

While the administration carefully drew a line between the UNFPA issue and U.S.-China relations, it generally acquiesced in what the anti-funding lawmakers had done. "Sometimes it is nice for the Congress to do what the administration cannot do by itself for diplomatic reasons," said a White House aide in the interview, "so long as they do not get us into trouble." The administration supported the Kemp amendment which did not specifically mention China, though its ambiguous language indicated an eventual cutoff of U.S. aid to UNFPA. It also made concessions to Helms in order to have Winston Lord be confirmed. Thus, the anti-funding coalition in Congress was able to expand the administration's own restrictive policy toward UNFPA through legislation.

The Power and Influence of the Pro-Life Pressure Groups Besides the administration's general acquiescence in the anti-funding legislative drive, a more fundamental force behind the anti-funding coalition's assertive role in the making of U.S. population assistance policy was the existence of strong pro-life pressure groups such as the National Right to Life Committee Inc., the Roman Catholic Church, and the American Life Lobby. These groups were influential because they provided the constituency connection for both the anti-abortion lawmakers and the Reagan administration.¹¹¹ They shared the same moral values with President Reagan and the members of the anti-funding coalition in Congress. As the core supporters during the presidential and congressional elections, these groups enjoyed considerable access to the making of U.S. population assistance policy within the Reagan administration. For example,

¹¹¹The pro-life groups' strong influence in the UNFPA case was identified by all the congressional interviewees. Six pro-funding congressional interviewees acknowledged that they made some tactical errors in the 1985 legislative process on UNFPA because some leading pro-funding lawmakers did not fully estimate the power of the pro-life groups.

their representatives met with Reagan on 22 January 1981, two days after he took office. Since then they met with the president every January for the following six years and thereafter with top White House advisors. They left strong imprints on the United States foreign population assistance policy. Some of these groups even called for abolishing U.S. population funds abroad. They pressured the White House to send a "pro-life" delegation to the Mexico City conference and helped the administration formulate the new population policy.¹¹²

The anti-abortion groups played a very active role in the UNFPA case. They appeared to have fully exploited the issue of forced abortion in China. The National Right to Life Committee Inc., spearhead of the anti-UNFPA lobbying groups, launched an intensive campaign for the Smith amendments which, claimed its legislative director Douglas Johnson, were "a major pro-life priority for the year. And votes on these amendments we will regard as key pro-life votes."¹¹³ Avoiding the issue of international family planning, the group focused its attack on China's population policy. For example, it sent to every lawmaker a compilation of carefully-selected press reports of the last few years on reported forced abortions in China, with the Post series on the top of the list. The compilation was revised again and again to meet the purpose of the campaign and the changing congressional mood.¹¹⁴ The sensational cases of forced abortion supplied by the organization were then cited repeatedly by its congressional supporters in their public speeches and statements. All my pro-life congressional interviewees acknowledged that they relied "heavily" on the materials and information supplied by the pro-life groups.

One of the most influential pro-life lobbyists cited by the interviewees from both sides

¹¹²Camp and Lasher, pp. 25-26; and Gregory H. Fox, "American Population Policy Abroad: The Mexico City Abortion Funding Restrictions," *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics* 18 (Winter 1986), p. 631.

¹¹³Quoted in *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 15 June 1985, p. 1142.

¹¹⁴See, for example, National Right to Life Factsheet, "Forced Abortions in China," rev. ed., 16 April 1985.

was Steven W. Mosher, the author of the *Broken Earth* and a series of articles on abuses in China's family planning programs. Mosher urged the Congress to cut off aid to UNFPA because "there is a good chance that such a move would goad Peking into correcting the worst abuses of its program."¹¹⁶ In addition to influencing public opinion through publications, Mosher was also a frequent visitor to congressional offices, and his lobbying was quite impressive, as acknowledged by my congressional respondents. "When he sat down with you for three hours and told you he had hard evidence because he was there in China," said a former aide to a leading pro-funding lawmaker, "you would find it very hard not to believe him."

While lobbying heavily on members of Congress, pro-life groups also pressed the administration not to yield to the Chinese government. "If Shultz comes out in favor of China," warned the American Life League, "we will see how he weathers the storm and agitation which will follow."¹¹⁸ Such pressure was unlikely to go unnoticed by the administration.

The pro-life forces did encounter a number of active countervailing pressure groups. Some population-control groups were well-recognized lobbyists for birth control. The Washington-based Population Crisis Committee, or PCC, for example, had its board made up of retired ambassadors and generals, prominent businessmen, and other notable public figures.¹¹⁷ There were also the Population Institute (PI), a grass-roots group that advocated population control, the Alan Guttmacher Institute (AGI), an independent group whose primary focus was on domestic U.S. family planning, and a number of medical and environmental groups such as the American Academy of Pediatrics and the Audubon Society. There was, of course, the UNFPA as a lobbying group. But as the international agency, at the center of the

¹¹⁶Stephen W. Mosher, "How China Uses U.N. Group's Aid for Forced Abortions," *Asian Wall Street Journal*, 26 April 1985, p. 6.

¹¹⁸Quoted in *Washington Post*, 18 September 1985, p. A12.

¹¹⁷For example, Marshall Green, President of PCC, was formerly U.S. Ambassador to India and Assistant Secretary of State for Asian and Pacific Affairs.

controversy, it was preoccupied with clarifying its programs and practices, rather than active lobbying. One critical weakness these groups had was the lack of issue attractiveness--population control did not attract the lawmakers' attention and arouse their emotions as much as forced abortion and human rights did.

Another weakness these countervailing groups had was the policy differences and clashes of personalities that existed among them, particularly between PCC and PI, as revealed in my interviews with congressional aides for pro-funding congressmen and the lobbyists from the two pressure groups. The leaders of PCC and AGI, for example, found it difficult to get along with Werner Fornos, president of PI. "Mr. Fornos does not like coalitions," complained an AGI lobbyist. "He prefers to go in his own way. He makes staffers on the Hill quite upset with us." PCC people also disliked PI because it tended to "have a confrontational approach which we thought inappropriate.... We like to work behind the scene." Both PCC and AGI disagreed with PI's insistence on the earmarking for UNFPA. They believed that the real issue was whether the agency could get money at all. On the other hand, PI tended to disregard PCC's claim to be the leader of the population control coalition. It believed that PCC's concentration of lobbying activities in Washington was not enough and that more effective lobbying could be achieved through mobilizing grass-roots support in congressional districts. Moreover, PI complained that both PCC and AGI were not firm enough in supporting China's one-child-per-family policy. The interviewees agreed that these differences had a negative impact on the legislative battles waged by the pro-funding leaders. They affected strategies and coordination. Indeed, some congressional respondents complained that quite often they had to mediate the lobbying groups before they could sit down and discuss the issue itself. Sometimes, it was more difficult to do the former than the latter. The pressure groups were also troubled with some "misguided campaign tactics."¹¹⁸ All this created an imbalance of influence to the population-control groups' disadvantage. It suggests that a pressure group

¹¹⁸See, for example, *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 15 June 1985, p. 1142.

advocating an external/strategic policy issue (population control) is unlikely to form an equally effective countervailing force against the one advocating an emotive/moral issue (human rights).

The Chinese government This imbalance of influence between two opposite pressure groups, in part, explained why the Chinese government was unable to exert the kind of pressure upon the Reagan administration and members of Congress as it was in the previous two cases. By focusing on the issue of forced abortion in China, the pro-life groups became practically a "human-rights" pressure force to which no countervailing groups were available. It is true that the population-control groups, by advocating their cause, became a natural ally of the Chinese government--but only on the common concern over population growth, not on the issue of forced abortion. To openly defend the Chinese one-child-per-family policy was extremely difficult for these groups, since it was contrary to their pro-choice beliefs.¹¹⁹ The only major defense these groups could make for China was to argue that the Chinese government did not encourage such coercive family planning practices, but instead was trying vigorously to correct them where they existed.¹²⁰ However, such an argument apparently was not convincing enough, since the evidence of how the government punished the offenders was often lacking. Thus, the Chinese government was unable to gain much from its alliance with the population-control groups.

In the meantime, the fact that the administration and the congressional anti-funding coalition shared the same strong anti-abortion views severely limited the ability of the Chinese

¹¹⁹The feelings of some pro-choice lawmakers and lobbyists toward China's one-child-per-family were properly reflected by the pro-choice, pro-population-control *Washington Post's* editorial: "A totalitarian state is using its immense resources to intervene crudely, often violently, in the most delicate *personal choices* (italics mine) of millions of human beings. In the name of modernization, the state is seeing to the death of live human beings." ("One Couple, One Child," 10 January 1985, p. A20).

¹²⁰See, for example, testimony of Werner Fornos, president of the Population Institute, *Foreign Assistance Legislation, Part 1*, pp. 387-388; and Marshall Green, "Preaching to China," *Washington Post*, 8 July 1985, p. A11.

government to influence the Congress through its pressure on the administration. Indeed, family planning was one of the few issues over which the Chinese government had significant differences with the Reagan administration. But in face of the American anti-abortion pressure, the Chinese response was limited largely to angry rhetoric (denial and informal protest) rather than retaliatory action. At the 1984 Mexico City conference, the two governments clashed openly with each other when China issued the strongest public attack among the delegations against the administration's Mexico City policy, stating that it would resist any attempt by the United States to impose its ideas and experiences upon China.¹²¹ In response to AID's freeze of \$23 million to UNFPA, China complained that it was based on "the lopsided, distorted and exaggerated reports on China's cases of 'abortion' and 'infanticide'."¹²² Its State Family Planning Commission accused the United States of trying to interfere in China's internal affairs:

We hold consistently that the population strategy and policy of each country should be formulated by its own conditions, and that this should be respected by other countries. This is a matter of the sovereign rights of every country.¹²³

Similar statements were repeated throughout the UNFPA episode, but no formal diplomatic protest or retaliatory action was taken by the Chinese government.¹²⁴

The most important occasion for the Chinese government to make a formal response could be the scheduled Chinese President Li Xiannian's state visit to Washington in July in the midst of the House actions on the family planning issue. The Chinese President did issue a statement criticizing the U.S. Congress' actions related to China's family planning program. But he chose to do so at the Beijing airport moments before he got on the plane for his state visits to Canada and the United States. Li also indicated that he did not think the House action

¹²¹*Washington Post*, 11 August 1984, p. A12.

¹²²Letter from Zhang Wenjin to George Shultz, 5 March 1985.

¹²³*New York Times*, 10 February 1985, p. 3; and *People's Daily*, 9 February 1985, p. 1.

¹²⁴See, for example, *People's Daily*, 2 August 1985, p. 4; and 28 September 1985, p. 1.

would affect his visit to Washington, which began on July 22.¹²⁵ During his ten-day stay in the United States, Li did not formally raise the issue with the Reagan administration.¹²⁶ The Chinese apparently did not want to poison the friendly atmosphere surrounding Li's visit. In addition, there was no clear indication that either President Reagan or Secretary of State Shultz was directly involved in the UNFPA matter. Indeed, as the State memo showed, the administration had been trying to avoid such a move in fear of diplomatic repercussions. Finally, even if China had issued a formal protest, it was doubtful whether it could have forced the State Department to do anything different. For domestic political reasons, the State Department would try to avoid it anyway as Shultz did in re delegating the authority to McPherson.

Thus, despite their differences, both governments shared the same concern over the negative impact of the family planning issue on the bilateral relationship, and both wanted to control the damage. While the Reagan administration quietly restrained its overture on the issue, the Chinese government openly expressed its concern over Sino-U.S. relations. On June 7, for example, Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian wrote to Secretary of State Shultz to "express regret over the unfriendly act" of the U.S. House of adopting the Kemp Amendment and urge the secretary and his government to "use influence to prevent this state of affairs from getting worse so as to avoid any damage to Sino-U.S. relations."¹²⁷ Two days later, Chinese Ambassador Han Xu sent a similar letter to House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill Jr. On June 11, China's leading newspaper *People's Daily* carried a written-speech by Zhou Guocheng, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, urging the United States to "think highly of the promotion of friendly relations between China and the

¹²⁵*Washington Post*, 12 July 1985, p. A27.

¹²⁶Camp and Lasher, p. 84.

¹²⁷Letter from Wu Xueqian, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, to U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, 7 June 1985.

U.S. and stop the groundless attacks on China."¹²⁸ On August 2, the Chinese *People's Daily* merely cited an American scholar's letter to the editor published in the *New York Times*, saying that "American impressions are indeed based on 'distortions' that are unnecessarily exacerbating Chinese-American relations."¹²⁹ All this indicated that the Chinese government was basically on defense. It did not show a sign of any strong counter-offensive measure as it was prepared to do in the textile case. Apparently, the two governments' efforts to avoid being engaged in the controversial issue increased the chance of success for the anti-funding coalition in Congress.

The Chinese government's influence was limited also because it was unable to form a strong alliance with the congressional pro-funding coalition, as it did with the population-control lobbying groups. There was no doubt that the two shared the same interest in sustaining the U.S. contribution to UNFPA and that each benefitted from the other's action (e.g., Chinese denial and protest, UNFPA supporters' legislative action). But their cooperation was constrained by two important factors. First, since the case involved the issue of human rights it made it extremely difficult for any sympathetic member of Congress to openly defend the Chinese population policy. On the contrary, the pro-funding members criticized the Chinese policy for the sake of maintaining U.S. aid to UNFPA. Second, China's restrained response for the sake of the bilateral relationship did not help the UNFPA supporters, who attempted to use Sino-U.S. relations as a lever to constrain the anti-funding coalition through the administration.¹³⁰ It was no wonder that they were disappointed with the limited Chinese

¹²⁸*People's Daily*, 11 June 1985, p. 1.

¹²⁹*People's Daily*, 2 August 1985, p. 4.

¹³⁰Some population control activists apparently had expected that the Chinese government would react strongly because it had much at stake in the U.S. cutoff of funds to UNFPA. "The Chinese are concerned not only that their name is being smeared in the United States," said Sharon Camp, vice president of PCC, "but also that their relationship with other third world countries is jeopardized by these moves" (*New York Times*, 22 July 1985).

response.¹³¹

Conclusion

This case study on the congressional opposition to the Chinese family planning policy and the subsequent U.S. cutoff of aid to UNFPA again demonstrated that congressional opposition in the making of U.S. China policy was dominated by the salience of the issue in question. The anti-funding coalition and its counterpart were issue-oriented: They were primarily divided on U.S. population assistance abroad, not along pro-and anti-Chinese lines. The issue of forced abortion in China was effectively used by the anti-funding coalition to achieve their legislative objective: to cut off all U.S. aid to UNFPA. To be sure, anti-Chinese feelings among some anti-funding lawmakers affected their positions, but there was no evidence that such feelings dominated the legislative behavior of the anti-funding coalition.

The anti-funding coalition was able to exert an explicit policy influence on U.S. population assistance policy and have a clear impact on U.S.-China relations because it captured an emotive/moral issue. Forced abortion, as a human rights issue, induced both strong outward- and inward-looking orientations of congressional interest. By focusing on this issue and reacting to the administration's initiative, the anti-funding coalition could mobilize the legislature and assert itself in the Congress-centered policy process, through its functional role of supplementing the administration's policy. This role then led to a policy-amplifying effect on U.S. policies toward both UNFPA and China. The policy effect was strengthened by the weakness of the pro-funding coalition, the anti-abortion administration's acquiescence, the support of influential pro-life pressure groups and a relatively weak countervailing force, and the failure of the Chinese government to exert substantial pressure on both the administration and members of Congress.

¹³¹Interviews with congressional staff members and lobbyists from the Population Crisis Committee and the Alan Guttmacher Institute.

CHAPTER VIII

THE NATURE AND INFLUENCE OF THE CONGRESSIONAL OPPOSITION: A COMPARISON OF THE THREE CASE STUDIES

The last three chapters focused on three case studies concerning the congressional opposition in the making of U.S. China policy during the normal period of Sino-U.S. relations. We examined how the congressional opposition emerged and behaved in each case. Based on the findings of the three case studies, we can now look further at the nature and influence of the congressional opposition by comparing the similarities and differences of the issue coalitions in the three cases.

The Issue-Oriented Congressional Opposition

The basic conclusion that has emerged from the case studies supports the argument that there was no *fixed* congressional opposition in the making of U.S. policy toward China during the normal period of the bilateral relationship. Congressional opposition changed in size, form, and character from one case to another. In other words, there was no single, predominant coalition existing across the three cases. Instead, there was a different type of coalition in each case. In the case of the China agreement, the nuclear nonproliferation advocates and anti-Chinese conservatives formed an anti-agreement coalition, demanding the imposition of strict conditions on the nuclear accord. In the textile case, the Southern textile interests formed the core of the coalition advocating tight quotas on textile imports from China and other major Asian exporters. In the UNFPA case, an anti-funding coalition emerged to condemn human rights violations in the Chinese family planning program and cut off all U.S. aid to the UN population agency because of its alleged connection with forced abortions in

China.

This then leads to another conclusion of the cases studies: These groups of opponents were all *issue-oriented*. They were issue coalitions. Such a coalition was not dominated by the members' anti-Chinese attitudes per se, but by the salience of the issue in question. Thus, to simply call it anti-Chinese would miss the very nature of the congressional opposition and the very basis upon which it was formed. It would also blur the distinctions of various coalitions focusing on different issues. Rather, the existence of issue coalitions displayed the dynamics of congressional opposition in the making of U.S. China policy during the normal period of the bilateral relationship. The nature of the coalitions changed as members of Congress shifted their positions from one issue to another. Some members in the anti-nuclear agreement coalition switched sides and opposed the imposition of quotas on textile imports, while others switched to join the pro-funding coalition against its anti-funding counterpart.

The issue orientation of the congressional opposition can be seen by the behavior of its counter-opposition in Congress. None of the pro-agreement, anti-quota, and pro-funding coalitions was pro-Chinese in nature. Each was strongly issue-oriented. The pro-agreement lawmakers supported the China nuclear accord because they believed that it could bring economic benefits to their districts and states. The anti-quota members opposed the textile bill not because they were friends of the PRC but because they believed that such a bill, if it became law, could bring retaliation from China and other countries and hence jeopardized the trade interests of the states they represented. The pro-funding coalition resisted the anti-funding legislative drive because they were primarily concerned with its population-control cause. Frequently, these coalitions of counter-opposition stressed the importance of U.S.-China relations to strengthen their respective positions. As a result, they became the allies of the Chinese government. This was normal, since they were the counterweights to the coalitions of congressional opposition that were opposed to a U.S. policy favoring China and/or the development of U.S.-China relations. But to consider them pro-Chinese would miss the

very essence of their existence--they were engaged in heated issue contests with their opponents.

The volatile nature of coalition-forming is further demonstrated by the percentage of lawmakers who cast cross-cutting votes on the three China-related issues. Table 8.1 shows that 355, or 81.7% of the House of Representatives cast a "mixed" vote (at least one vote was favorable to China) on the three issues. Among the eighty or 18.3% voting "straight", forty-six representatives (10.5% of the total House membership) cast all the votes unfavorable to China and thirty-four (7.8% of the total membership) favorable to China. In the Senate, the pattern was similar: Seventy-nine senators, or 79% of the total, cast a mixed vote, while only twenty-one (21% of the total) cast a straight vote (twelve all unfavorable, nine all favorable).

It should be noted that even the straight vote could not be easily interpreted as all anti- or pro-Chinese. Apparently there was a great degree of convergence of views on the issues and these lawmakers' attitudes toward China. As the table shows, in both chambers the majority of those casting the straight unfavorable vote tended to be conservatives, southerners, and Republicans. They shared anti-Communist (and unfavorable attitudes toward China), anti-abortion, anti-UN views, coupled with the predisposition of protecting the textile industry. Meanwhile, the majority of those casting the straight favorable vote tended to be liberals, westerners, and Democrats. These lawmakers also shared a set of similar things: lower anti-Communist intensity (and more favorable attitudes toward China), support of the UN, support of population control and close trade ties with China and other Asian-Pacific countries. The pattern for the senators casting the straight favorable vote, though somewhat different from above, was even more issue-oriented: They were mostly Republicans and/or westerners and ranged from moderate to conservative in ideology. Thus, a more plausible interpretation of these groups of lawmakers than that their positions would be derived from their pro- or anti-Chinese stance is that their respective positions on specific issues would reinforce their favorable or unfavorable attitudes toward China which, in turn, could be used

TABLE 8.1

**"Straight" Unfavorable and Favorable
Votes on the Three China-Related Issues***

	House		Senate	
	Unfavorable	Favorable	Unfavorable	Favorable
Total	46	34	12	9
% of all Members	10.6	7.8	12	9
Republicans	30	11	7	8
Democrats	16	23	5	1
Conservative#	37	8	8	4
Moderate	7	6	2	4
Liberal	2	20	2	1
South	26	3	7	0
West	4	18	0	7
East	9	5	2	2
Midwest	7	8	3	0

* House passage of the China nuclear agreement resolution; Evans motion to table the Glenn amendment to the China agreement; Fascal substitute to the Smith amendment on family planning; the Smith amendment; the Kassebaum motion to table the Helms amendment on family planning; House passage of the textile bill; the Gramm amendment on Taiwan; Senate passage of the textile bill.

Conservatives, moderates, and liberals are defined by the distribution of the following ADA scores in 1985: 0 - 35 (conservative), 36 - 64 (moderate), and 65 - 100 (liberal).

to strengthen their arguments on the issues.

The nature of the issue coalitions can be further observed by looking at the groups of issue leaders heading these coalitions. These issue leaders were by no means top party leaders. Most of them did not hold high congressional leadership positions. But many of them sat on very important committees dealing with particular issues. They either chaired or became very influential in special policy caucuses such as those on textile and human rights. Moreover, with the exception of Helms, the key issue leaders in each coalition tended to vary. They came from different ideological, geographical and partisan backgrounds, specialized in the specific issue on which they took the lead, and represented different groups of lawmakers. The appearance of Helms in each group of issue leaders might indicate that there was an element of anti-Chinese sentiment in these coalitions, since he could represent the most conservative, anti-Chinese wing in Congress. This was particularly clear in the anti-nuclear agreement coalition. But in the other two cases it is difficult to conclude that Helms' fixed anti-Chinese attitudes actually dictated his legislative behavior. As his vote on Gramm's Taiwan amendment in the textile case indicated, Helms' pro-quota position could be considered to be dominated by his interest in protecting the textile industry. Likewise, his well-known anti-abortion record indicated rather convincingly that his position on the UNFPA issue was more influenced by his anti-abortion view than his anti-Chinese attitudes. Undoubtedly, the fact that forced abortions occurred in China provided him with a very handy and convenient target in the pursuit of his anti-abortion objectives.

One common characteristic of issue coalitions, as shown in the case studies, is their remarkable persistency in pursuing its goals. It suggests that the congressional opposition over a policy issue is likely to endure and will wage legislative battles again and again unless its demands are met. But this nature of persistency does not necessarily hinder the issue coalition's ability to be flexible in strategy *when* it is faced with a strong resistance from its opponents in and outside the Congress. Instead, we have seen that strategic and tactical

flexibility can be often employed to make necessary adjustments in the issue coalition's pursuit of its goals. The case studies showed that congressional opposition tended to be less concessionary on emotive/moral issues than on external/strategic and electoral/economic ones. It appears that value-oriented issues are less susceptible to compromise than other issues.

The existence of issue coalitions is also indicated by comparing the congressional voting patterns on these issues. Had a fixed coalition prevailed in all the three cases, congressmen's voting behavior should have reflected some kind of partisan, ideological, or regional consistency on all the issues. But the data has shown that this was not the case. First of all, the congressional voting patterns in the three cases did not actually follow the party line. This finding contradicts the view that party affiliation has the greatest impact in the foreign policy area (Edwards 1984b). In the nuclear and family planning cases, the Reagan administration's policies were not automatically supported by the Republicans or opposed by the Democrats in either the Senate or the House. In the textile case in which the pro-quota coalition in Congress initiated the policy proposal, partisanship was even less evident. While the congressional voting patterns in the three cases displayed little partisanship, however, they did not show strong bipartisanship. On most of the legislative and procedural measures, there were some significant differences between the two parties. Quite often, a little more or less than 50% of the Republicans supported the positions of an overwhelming majority of the Democrats in each chamber. This could be attributed in part to the fact that Democrats in general tended to be more enthusiastic about developing relations with the PRC (in the nuclear and UNFPA cases), more protection-oriented (in the textile case), and more supportive of population control (in the UNFPA case) than Republicans. In the meantime, intra-party conflicts appeared to vary from case to case in terms of the House voting patterns. While the Democrats were less divided than the Republicans in the nuclear and textile cases, they were more split than the Republicans in the UNFPA case. On the whole, the congressional voting

patterns in the three cases were characterized more by *nonpartisanship* than bipartisanship.¹

The Congress was divided on the issues but not along party lines.

Ideology had a more varying effect on the voting patterns than partisanship. It was a more visible factor for the congressional voting on family planning than on the other issues, especially in the Senate. The gaps between the most liberal and conservative groups on the ideological continuum were considerably larger than those in the nuclear and textile cases. (An overwhelming majority of each group either voted for or against a measure.) In the House voting patterns, the most conservative group was much more divided than the most liberal and more moderate groups in the textile and nuclear cases, suggesting that the salience of the issue had the biggest impact on this group. On the other hand, the more moderate congressmen were much more split among themselves than either of the other two groups in the UNFPA case. All this indicates that the influence of ideology on the congressmen was quite uneven in the three cases, and depended on the issues they were dealing with.

Presidential influence on the House voting behavior also varied with issues in the three cases. It was considerably stronger on the family planning votes than it was on the nuclear and textile ones. While those congressmen with high presidential support scores tended to vote for the president's positions in the textile and UNFPA cases, they were substantially divided in their voting on the China nuclear agreement. In fact, a majority of them (55.2%) voted against the president's position. On the other hand, an overwhelming majority of those with lower presidential support scores (72.2% of the less supportive group and 92.1% of the least supportive group) voted for the president's position on the nuclear agreement, while they did the opposite in their voting on the textile bill and the Fascell-Kostmayer substitute.

The relationship between regionalism and votes also varied greatly in the three cases. It was strongest on the textile vote and weakest on the family planning vote. Obviously,

¹Randall Ripley (1985, 65) defines nonpartisanship as "passive behavior based on the lack of policy disagreement between the two parties that does not deliberately seek to increase party advantage *or* the size and visibility of inter-party agreement on policy."

regionalism was even less likely than partisanship, ideology or presidential leadership to contribute to the formation of a single, dominant congressional opposition across various China-related issues.

This discussion of the congressional voting patterns makes clear that none of the four variables (partisanship, ideology, presidential leadership, and regionalism) could be used to explain the formation of various coalitions on issues that were associated with the normal-bilateral relations between the United States and China. Each had a different impact on different coalitions dealing with different foreign policy issues.² Moreover, there was little in these cases to support what might be called the stable-ideological-coalition view of congressional decision making (Schneider 1979; Smith 1981; Shelley 1983). Rather, these cases lend support to the "pluralistic" (policy-coalition) perspective (Clausen 1973; Clausen and Van Horn 1977; Asher and Weisberg 1985). In the making of China policy during the normal period of the bilateral relationship, the formation of a congressional opposition depended on the foreign policy issue that confronted the lawmakers.³

In sum, the existence of the issue coalitions in the three cases confirmed the general proposition that when congressional attitudes became diversified during the normal period of the bilateral relationship, the behavior of the congressional opposition in the making of U.S. China policy tended to be issue-oriented. The major causes for such diversified congressional attitudes toward China and the issue-oriented behavior of the congressional opposition came not only from congressional internal changes such as membership turnover, but more importantly and directly from external changes including the improvement of U.S.-Soviet

²This conclusion is also reflected in Ralph Carter's interesting study (1989) of senators' voting behavior on defense budgets, which finds that issue-based differences affect senatorial behavior: The influence of party, ideology, and local economic benefit on senators' voting tends to differ from procurement to nonprocurement issues.

³It should be noted that the view expressed here seems to be even more "pluralistic" than the general pluralistic perspective. Clausen's consideration of international involvement as one dimension is too broad to take into account the differences between the issues that arise from normal and nonnormal bilateral relations with other countries.

relations, the development of the Sino-U.S. bilateral relationship itself, and changes in Chinese domestic and foreign policies.

Dimensional Linkages and the Intensity of Congressional Opposition

The case studies also support the argument that the intensity of congressional opposition is closely associated with the expansion of a bilateral issue into the multilateral and/or power-sharing dimensions of foreign policy making.

The major bilateral issues in the three cases--China's nonproliferation policy and practice, rapid growth of Chinese textile exports to the United States, and forced abortions in China--were products of the expanded relations between the United States and China. They occurred as the volume of interactions between the two countries increased and the relationship developed into new areas. They attracted congressional attention in part because of their *gravity*. China's nuclear program per se might not have alarmed the U.S. lawmakers so much as its reported cooperation with Pakistan (and even Iran) in developing the latter's nuclear weapons. The Chinese textile imports might not have so concerned the congressional textile supporters if there had been no rapid growth in volume during a relatively short period of time. China's population policy might not have become a serious issue if there had been few reports of forced abortions in that country.

What intensified the congressional opposition to a specific China policy was the linkage of these bilateral issues to much broader, multilateral issue areas, which were more likely to induce a strong inward, outward, or mixed orientation of congressional interest. U.S. nuclear technology transfer to China was part of U.S. nuclear export policy, which governed U.S. nuclear cooperation with other countries. Thus, the congressional concern over nuclear proliferation was not merely related to U.S. cooperation with China, but with Sweden, Norway, and other countries as well. It also touched upon the issue of China's nuclear policy, which was related to the larger policy issue area of nuclear nonproliferation. The growth of Chinese

textile imports was part of the larger textile trade problem for the United States. Thus, textile import restriction was not just a matter between the United States and the PRC, but also an issue between the United States and Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Japan, and other major textile exporters. Likewise, the issue of forced abortion in China was not only an issue of abortion, but linked to U.S. aid to UNFPA, which was part of U.S. population policy abroad. It was also linked to human rights, which was another broad and sensitive issue area with similar multilateral implications.

Clearly, the intensity of congressional opposition would have been much smaller if the issue were exclusively one of U.S.-China relations. We have seen that congressional opponents focused so much on the China nuclear agreement because they knew that such an accord could prospectively affect U.S. negotiations and the contexts of its agreements with other countries, hence the U.S. overall nuclear export and nonproliferation policies. The purpose of restricting Chinese textile imports was well incorporated into a broad legislative scheme that was to impose a general quota system on the major textile exporters. The international family planning bills--the Helms, Smith and Kemp amendments --were crafted in such a way that they could be applied to other countries as well. Indeed, the way the congressional opponents treated the China issues in the multilateral policy-making dimension suggested that they considered China one of those countries that had normal relations with the United States--a typical legislative behavior in the making of normal-bilateral policies.

We have also seen that congressional opposition can be further intensified by the issue's linkage to the power-sharing dimension of foreign policy making. Such a linkage tended to mingle the *policy conflict* that characterized the multilateral dimension of policy making with the *institutional conflict* between the president and members of Congress, since it raised the issue of presidential authority vis-a-vis the Congress' in the making of a particular policy. But in the three cases the linkage to the power-sharing dimension was much less visible and direct

and therefore had less impact on the intensity of congressional opposition than the linkage to the multilateral dimension. It appeared in the nuclear case, as the congressional nonproliferation advocates tried to regain their legislative influence on approving U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements with other countries in the aftermath of the 1983 Supreme Court ruling. In the textile case, the pro-quota lawmakers justified their legislative initiative on the grounds that the president had failed to use the authority delegated to him by the Congress to control the rapid growth of textile imports. On the other hand, the anti-funding coalition in the UNFPA case wanted to give full power to the president to curb human rights violations through the second Helms amendment; this actually weakened the coalition and increased the intensity of the pro-funding coalition which, by stressing the power of the Congress, blocked the amendment.

The dimensional linkages of the China issues thus gives support to the observation that the "sticks and fibers that constitute the bundle of issues" that are called China policy "are simultaneously part of other policy bundles as well" (Oksenberg 1984, 76). Because of these linkages congressional opponents were able to form a rather sizable coalition in each of the three cases.

Types of Issues and the Differentiation of Issue Coalitions

While the coalitions of congressional opposition shared the same attributes--strong issue orientation and intensity with dimensional linkages--what is equally important is that there were crucial differences among these coalitions. The case studies have shown that these coalitions differed noticeably in behavioral and functional roles, policy effects and influences in the Congress-centered policy process. The major cause for these differences lies in the different types of issues around which each of these coalitions were formed.

Different Intensities of Congressional Opposition

We have seen that dimensional linkages were generally responsible for the intensity of congressional opposition in all three cases. But the intensity of each coalition was nevertheless different in degree. To be sure, there was no simple way to measure the intensity. While in the textile case we had the exact number of congressmen sponsoring the Jenkins bill and hence a measure of intensity for the pro-quota coalition, there was no way to compare that with the intensities of the coalitions in the other two cases, which did not have the numbers to indicate their sizes. The only statistical data that were available in all three cases were the sizes of the voting coalitions on the various legislative measures in the House and Senate. But even to compare these votes would be difficult. In the Senate, for example, only one procedural vote was recorded and available in each of the nuclear and UNFPA cases. However, in the House we have at least one legislative vote recorded in each case. The percentages of votes obtained by the three coalitions on three major measures respectively were as follows:

Anti-agreement coalition (nuclear agreement)	26.7%
Pro-quota coalition (textile bill)	62.0%
Anti-funding coalition (Smith China Amendment)	69.0%

It appears, then, that the intensity of congressional opposition in each case differed in terms of the size of voting coalitions, with the anti-agreement coalition having the lowest intensity and the anti-funding coalition having the highest. Although the size of voting coalition may not be an accurate measurement of the intensity, the results of the House votes do support the hypothesis raised in Chapter II that the intensity of congressional opposition tended to vary from one type of issue to another. External/strategic issues tended to produce a lower level of intensity of congressional opposition than electoral/economic issues. Emotive/moral issues tended to lead to the highest level of intensity. The case studies also indicated that different types of issues could lead to different degrees of compromises between the

conflicting coalitions in the legislative process, thus producing different sizes of voting blocs. The UNFPA case study has further indicated that the congressional opposition focusing on such emotive/moral issues as human rights violations has the potential to achieve a "universalistic" coalition (Collie 1988). The pro-funding coalition emerged as a counter-opposition to the anti-funding coalition only for the purpose of maintaining a U.S. contribution to UNFPA. The two coalitions had no real quarrel over the issue of forced abortion in China.

Different Roles and Effects Of Congressional Opposition

The case studies have also shown that there is a relationship between the type of issues and the type of behavioral and functional roles a coalition of congressional opposition is likely to play and the correspondent functional effects these roles are likely to produce.

In the nuclear case and the external/strategic issue of nonproliferation, the anti-agreement coalition clearly played a reactive role and took the functional role of revising the presidential proposal for a nuclear cooperation agreement with China. As a result, the coalition produced a policy-constraining effect on the pro-agreement coalition in Congress and the Reagan administration.

In the textile case and the electoral/economic issue of textile imports restrictions, the pro-quota coalition played an assertive role, with its functional role of initiating a textile trade policy. Consequently, the coalition had a policy-generating effect on the administration.

In the UNFPA case and the emotive/moral issue of human rights in China, the anti-funding coalition played a react/assertive role, with its functional role of supplementing the policy initiative from the administration, which led to a policy-amplifying effect on the executive branch.

The case studies have thus supported the propositions articulated in Chapter II: *External/strategic issues* are more likely to induce a reactive legislative behavior, a revising function, and a policy-constraining effect from the congressional opposition than

electoral/economic and emotive/moral issues; *electoral/economic issues* are more likely to induce an assertive legislative behavior, an initiating function, and a policy-generating effect from the congressional opposition than external/strategic and emotive/moral issues; and *emotive/moral issues* are more likely to induce a react/assertive legislative behavior, a supplementing function, and a policy-amplifying effect from the congressional opposition than external/strategic and electoral/economic issues.

Despite these conclusions from the case studies, however, there is still ample reason to believe that the relationship between the types of issues and the types of roles and effects of the congressional opposition may not be so close in some cases. Although electoral/economic issues are more likely to induce the opposition to assume the initiating functional role than external/strategic issues, it may *not* happen that way. A brief review of the legislative actions in a congressional session would suggest that members of Congress *usually* do not take initiatives themselves but respond to policies taken by the executive branch. This may be in part because there has already been major legislation giving the president legal guidelines in making specific policies or delegating to the president the authority to make certain policies in an issue area, and in part because lawmakers simply expect the president to make policy proposals on some issues for which the president has the responsibility.

At the same time, however, it can be also argued that lawmakers can always *potentially* take the initiating function and hence the assertive behavioral role. They can actually do so if they are highly dissatisfied with the president's existing policies and/or if they want to establish a legal framework on making certain policies. When this happens, there could be no close linkage between the type of issues and the roles the congressional opposition is to play. It may play the reactive role with its revising function on an electoral/economic issue at one time and the assertive role with its initiating function at another. Similar behavior could be expected on an external/strategic issue. Likewise, it could not be ruled out that on

an emotive/moral issue the congressional opposition may sometimes assert itself by taking a policy initiative if they feel particularly strong about the issue and the administration has failed to act quickly.

Nevertheless, such an argument should not overshadow the differences the types of issues can make in terms of congressional opposition's roles and effects, as demonstrated by the case studies. After all, we are focusing on the issue areas in which congressional opposition is most likely to emerge in the Congress-centered process of making U.S. normal-bilateral policies. At least, the case studies have suggested that there exists a direct relationship between the types of issues and the congressional opposition's roles and policy effects.

Different Patterns of Interactions With the Other Forces in the Policy Process

The different types of issues, through their respective impacts on the intensity, roles, and policy effects of the congressional opposition, also led to different patterns of interactions between the congressional opposition and the other four major forces in each of the three Congress-centered policy processes.

Congressional Opposition And its Counter-Opposition

The case studies have indicated that the congressional opposition tends to enjoy an issue advantage over its counter opposition. This is because, as pointed out in Chapter II, the congressional opposition is most likely to emerge in the issue areas which can induce a strong inward, outward, or mixed orientation of congressional interest. And it will be further stimulated by the issues' dimensional linkages. As a result, the counter-opposition will frequently find itself in a defensive position in the legislative process. However, its strength and role tend to vary on different types of issues and in response to the roles of its opponents.

In the nuclear case, the pro-agreement coalition put up a strong resistance against the agreement opponents. It benefitted from the general reactive mood in the Congress as its members responded to the agreement submitted by the administration. Moreover, the intensity of the outward-looking congressional interest in nuclear nonproliferation was somewhat balanced by the inward-looking congressional interest in the prospect of substantial economic benefits from the nuclear agreement, which provided some constituency connection. The result was that the pro-agreement coalition was able to help limit the policy-constraining effect of anti-agreement lawmakers.

The situation for the counter-opposition was rather different in the textile case. The anti-quota coalition was opposed to a policy issue that had a very intense constituency connection. It confronted a congressional opposition taking the initiative function in an assertive mood. It became a minority in a highly mobilized Congress. As a result, the coalition was unable to make any significant legislative moves of its own, such as the compromise resolution made by the pro-agreement coalition with its opponents in the nuclear case. The counter-opposition's role was reduced to passive resistance, namely, using procedural techniques to block the pro-quota legislative offensive. When that failed, it subsequently relied on the presidential veto to stem the quota drive.

The UNFPA case showed the weakness of the counter-opposition advocating an external/strategic policy issue (population control or international family planning) in a confrontation with the congressional opposition focusing on an emotive/moral policy issue (human rights). Although both issues attracted congressional attention, each produced a very different intensity. The pro-funding coalition waged a series of battles in the process. But its failure to separate the issue of forced abortion from the U.S. funding of UNFPA consequently tempered its resistance to the anti-funding legislative drive, eventually leading to the total cutoff of U.S. aid to the UN agency. However, the pro-funding coalition clearly played a greater role in the process than the anti-quota coalition in the textile case because it was able

to make some substantial legislative moves of its own at the authorizing level. But its role was apparently smaller than the pro-agreement coalition in the nuclear case, since it eventually failed to bring about any concrete legislative result.

Congressional Opposition And the Administration

The case studies have also shown that the congressional opposition tends to have conflicting interactions with the president and his administration in the making of U.S. normal-bilateral policies. While the issue-oriented congressional opposition tends to emphasize the salience of a particular policy issue, the president and his administration are more concerned with the impact of such a policy issue on U.S. relations with the foreign country. While a major purpose of the congressional opposition is to force the president and his administration to make or change certain policies, the latter will usually resist such pressure. Thus, what concessions the administration can make will reflect the influence of the congressional opposition. The case studies have demonstrated that the president and his administration do make policy concessions under pressure from the congressional opposition, but such concessions tend to vary on different types of issues and in response to the roles played by the congressional opposition.

In the nuclear case, the Reagan administration made very limited concessions to the anti-agreement lawmakers. It did not accept their demands for resubmitting or renegotiating the China agreement. Nor did it follow their advice to obtain a written statement from the Chinese government. It made concessions on the compromise resolution only because the conditions were mild and put on the American side of the accord. Finally, it vetoed the Glenn amendment with no further concessions attached. The fact that the anti-agreement coalition was playing a reactive role with its revising legislative function on an external/strategic issue limited its constraining effect on the administration.

In the textile case, the administration clearly felt stronger pressure from the

congressional opposition which, in the midst of growing protectionist sentiment in Congress, was playing an assertive role with its initiating function. With the pro-quota coalition occupying a nearly supermajority position, the administration could not rely on the congressional counter-opposition (the anti-quota coalition) to constrain the pro-quota legislative drive. Nor was it confident that the presidential veto, if exercised, could be sustained. Thus, the administration had to make a series of policy concessions to reduce the intensity of the pro-quota coalition. Although quota supporters failed to realize their legislative goals, their pressure clearly exerted a generating effect on the administration and forced it to substantially tighten its textile trade policy toward the major textile exporters, including the PRC.

While in the nuclear and textile cases the administration was able to see its vetoes sustained--although not without making some limited concessions to the congressional opposition--in the UNFPA case the administration acquiesced to the congressional opposition's demand. It thus enabled the anti-funding coalition to realize their legislative objectives eventually. What contributed to this acquiescence was the similar viewpoint shared by the administration and the anti-funding lawmakers on the issue of forced abortion in China and reinforced by the anti-abortionist ties between the two. The administration's policy initiative on withholding funds from UNFPA made it easier for its supporters in Congress to assert themselves with the supplementing function. As a result, the anti-funding coalition could exert a policy-amplifying effect on the administration.

Congressional Opposition And Domestic Pressure Groups

The case studies have revealed a close relationship between the types of issues, the roles, and effects of the congressional opposition and the kind of pressure groups that supported it. *Outward-looking* or external/strategic pressure groups tend to have a weak constituency connection and therefore provided very limited support for the congressional opposition. *Inward-looking* or electoral/economic pressure groups tend to have a strong

constituency connection and therefore provided strong support for the congressional opposition.

In the nuclear case, the anti-agreement coalition was backed by various nuclear nonproliferation groups. But these outward-looking groups had little constituency connection and thus were unable to mobilize their constituents in the congressional districts on the issue. They advocated an external/strategic issue that was unlikely to arouse the interest of ordinary people. Instead, these groups probably reinforced the reactive role of the anti-agreement coalition. The support of these groups for the anti-agreement coalition was apparently weaker than that of the nuclear industry for the pro-agreement coalition, since the latter had at least some constituency connection.

The pressure groups in the textile case were different. With their electoral/economic nature and a strong constituency connection, the textile industry and unions were able to provide potent support for the pro-quota coalition in Congress. Their active lobbying contributed to the coalition's assertive role and initiating function and hence its policy-generating effect. Clearly, the geographically-concentrated textile groups were much more powerful than the relatively scattered and loosely-organized countervailing coalition of importers, exporters, consumers, farmers and retailers.

Similarly, powerful support from pressure groups was available to the anti-funding coalition in the UNFPA case. The pro-life groups were primarily inward-looking, with a strong constituency connection. Their main battlefield had been usually located in the domestic policy arena (abortion). In this case, their influence increased as they successfully grasped the issue of forced abortion in China--a human rights issue that gave additional strong outward-looking and inward-looking elements to the anti-abortion cause of these groups. Their presence contributed to the congressional anti-funding coalition's react/assertive role and its legislative supplementing function and hence its policy-amplifying effect. By comparison, the countervailing population-control groups, being basically outward-looking and with a much

weaker constituency connection, were relatively weak and divided. However, contrary to what was expected in Chapter II, we have found no clear involvement of such human rights groups as Amnesty International in the UNFPA case. It appeared that the activities of the powerful pro-life groups had far overshadowed the role of the human rights activists.

Congressional Opposition And the Chinese Government

Compared with the influences of the counter-opposition, the administration, and domestic pressure groups, we have found that the relationship was much less clear between the influence of the Chinese government and the types of issues, roles and policy effects of the congressional opposition. This seems to suggest that the foreign government is, after all, a "remote" outside variable, subject less to the gravity of the Congress-centered policy process than the other three major forces would. In the meantime, the case studies have demonstrated that the influence of the Chinese government tended to vary from one case to another. They showed three visible trends in terms of the Chinese influence.

First, Chinese pressure tended to be directed more at the executive branch than at the Congress. In all the three cases, the Chinese government frequently warned the Reagan administration of the consequences of the congressional opposition for Sino-U.S. bilateral relations. These warnings had little impact on the congressional opposition which was overwhelmingly preoccupied with the issue in question. But they reinforced the concern of the administration which, due to the nature of its foreign policy responsibility, was interested in maintaining the bilateral relationship. The Chinese warnings were often used by the administration to strengthen its argument against the coalitions of congressional opposition.

Second, Chinese pressure tended to be stronger on the trade-related external/strategic and electoral/economic issues than on the value-oriented emotive issues. In the nuclear case, China's warnings against the actions of the anti-agreement coalition appeared to have increased the concern among the supporters of the nuclear industry about the prospect of

losing a big nuclear market if the anti-agreement demands were realized, thus stepping up their own lobbying activities against the Glenn amendment. The Chinese pressure was even more visible in the textile case in which it was a crucial factor in bringing various trade and economic interests into an anti-quota coalition. Therefore, on the trade-related issues, the Chinese government was able to exercise its influence because there were a number of American economic interest groups which, with various trade ties with China, would take its pressure seriously. In the UNFPA case, on the other hand, there were no such groups to respond seriously to the pressure. The Chinese pressure could not split the strongly-dedicated value-oriented groups and press them to make necessary compromises as the pro-quota supporters would do.

Third, the forms of pressure adopted by the Chinese government tended to vary in the three cases. In the nuclear case, denial, rejection, and protest were the major forms of pressure used by the Chinese government. In the textile case, they were protest and threat of retaliation. In the UNFPA case, denial and protest were employed. The variation in the forms of pressure seems to suggest that the Chinese government saw different stakes involved in the three cases. By taking the stronger forms of protest and threat of retaliation on the textile bill, the Chinese government apparently shows that it considered textile trade more important than either the nuclear agreement or the risk of UNFPA's cutoff of population aid to China under the American pressure. Sustaining the growth of its textile exports to the United States was an integrated part of China's economic modernization program. The import restrictions under the Jenkins bill could result in a substantial loss to China and severely affect its export strategy. In monetary terms, the textile issue involved hundreds of millions of dollars, while the UNFPA's aid to China was only \$10 million a year, about 1% of the total Chinese budget on family planning programs. Although the nuclear agreement was a significant symbol for Sino-U.S. relations, its benefits for the Chinese energy program were nevertheless something potential--apart from the substantial costs China would have to pay

for the American nuclear materials. Another important difference was that retaliatory measures were more available to the Chinese in the textile case (trade issues) than in the family planning case (value-oriented issues).

Patterns of Interactions

To summarize the points above, the case studies have both supported and revised the propositions raised in Chapter II on the patterns of interactions between the congressional opposition and the four other major forces in the Congress-centered policy process on the three different types of issues in which they are involved:

- (1) When the congressional opposition plays a reactive role with its revising function on an external/strategic issue, it tends to have weak support from domestic pressure groups while confronting relatively strong resistance from the counter-opposition, the administration, the countervailing domestic pressure groups, and the foreign government (the nuclear case);
- (2) When the congressional opposition plays an assertive role with its initiating function on an electoral/economic issue, it tends to have strong support from domestic pressure groups while confronting a relatively weak counter-opposition and countervailing domestic pressure groups, a more conciliatory administration, but substantial pressure from the foreign government involved (the textile case);
- (3) When the congressional opposition plays a react/assertive role with its supplementing function, it tends to have strong support from domestic pressure groups while confronting a relatively weak counter-opposition and countervailing domestic pressure groups, an acquiescing administration, and subdued pressure from the foreign government (the UNFPA case).

Assessing the Different Policy Influences of Congressional Opposition

We have so far compared the three case studies and analyzed their differences in terms of the types of issues, intensities, roles and effects of the congressional opposition, and patterns of interactions between the congressional opposition and four other major forces in the policy process. Since the final objective of the study of the congressional opposition is to determine its influence on policies, we must ask the question: How did these differences

affect the policy influence of the congressional opposition in each case? Or, did these differences lead to different policy influences of the congressional opposition?

Because it is extremely difficult to quantify the concept of influence, we will probably never reach an accurate measurement of the policy influence of the congressional opposition in each of the three cases. Therefore, we can not be sure of the exact differences the coalitions of congressional opposition had in terms of their policy influence. What I will do here is to make an *assessment* of these differences based on certain criteria applied to all the three coalitions of congressional opposition in the cases. These criteria are put forward in the form of questions.

(1) Did the congressional opposition affect a particular U.S. policy or policies toward China?

In the nuclear case, the anti-agreement coalition clearly had some influence on the U.S. nuclear export policy toward China. Through the compromise resolution putting certain conditions on the transfer of U.S. nuclear materials to China, the coalition made the U.S. export policy more restrictive than what the original version of the agreement had implied. As noted in the case study, such conditions did complicate and delay the final implementation of the agreement.

In the textile case, the influence of the pro-quota coalition was also felt in the administration's negotiations with the Chinese on the third textile agreement. It clearly toughened the administration's position. As a result, the accord was more restrictive on the Chinese textile imports than the previous ones.

In the UNFPA case, however, there was no clear indication of the influence of the anti-funding coalition on U.S. policy toward China. The United States had not provided any direct aid to China when the case emerged. Therefore, the coalition did not have influence in this respect. Nor did it link the issue of forced abortion to any other U.S. policy toward China. While the coalition tried to force UNFPA to abandon its financial support to the Chinese family

planning program, it clearly failed as the Fund continued its existing policy toward China.

(2) Did the congressional opposition affect U.S.-China relations?

Being formed around the controversial issues that had emerged directly from their bilateral relations, the congressional opposition had constrained the relationship between the two countries. But the constraint varied in the three cases. One measurement of the impact is to consider how seriously the Chinese government took the congressional opposition. Apparently, the tougher the Chinese response, the more serious the impact on bilateral relations would be. We have noted earlier that the Chinese government tended to use the forms of denial and protest to address its displeasure over the actions taken by the anti-agreement and anti-funding coalitions in the nuclear and UNFPA cases. Comparatively, these forms were milder than the threat of retaliation used in the textile case. The willingness to retaliate indicated that the Chinese government considered the pro-quota coalition a more serious threat to the bilateral relationship than either the anti-agreement or anti-funding coalition, since the stake was higher in the textile case.

Another measurement of the impact of the congressional opposition on the bilateral relations is to look at the actions taken by the Reagan administration. It appears that the administration expressed more vigorously its interest in the importance of U.S.-China relations in the nuclear and textile cases than it did in the UNFPA case. By withholding funds from UNFPA, the administration explicitly showed its displeasure over the Chinese population policy and later acquiesced in the anti-funding lawmakers' demands, thus contributing to the strain in the bilateral relationship.

(3) Did the congressional opposition affect U.S. policies toward other individual countries?

In the textile case, the pro-quota coalition clearly exerted some influence on the U.S. textile trade policy toward some of the major textile exporters. The conclusion of the very restrictive bilateral textile accords with Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea (or the Big Three)

indicated the impact of the congressional pressure. The anti-agreement and anti-funding coalitions in the nuclear and UNFPA cases, however, did not have such direct influence on U.S. policies toward other individual countries.

(4) Did the congressional opposition affect U.S. bilateral relations with other individual countries?

The textile case again shows that the legislative offensive launched by the pro-quota coalition constrained U.S. relations with those textile exporters who were most affected by the textile bill. It created widespread tension and complaints in these countries. But the coalition's contribution to the strains on these bilateral relations appeared to be smaller than it was to U.S.-China relations, since it was the Chinese government which was most willing to express the threat of retaliation explicitly and frequently. On the other hand, both the anti-agreement and anti-funding coalitions exerted no direct influence on U.S. relations with any other individual country in the cases under study.

(5) Did the congressional opposition affect U.S. multilateral policies?

In both the textile and UNFPA cases, the congressional opposition had a clear influence on U.S. multilateral policies. The pressure from the pro-quota coalition generated a much tougher U.S. position on the MFA talks. The result was a considerably more restrictive multilateral textile trade regime in favor of the U.S. textile makers. The influence of the anti-funding coalition on U.S. policy toward UNFPA was even more direct. It forced the U.S. government to cut off all U.S. contributions to the international organization. In the nuclear case, on the other hand, we have seen that the immediate anti-agreement influence was limited to U.S. export policy toward China.

(6) Did the congressional opposition achieve its legislative objectives?

This is probably the most important criterion for assessing the policy influence of the congressional opposition. If its legislative measures become law, the congressional opposition could have a lasting influence on a particular U.S. foreign policy, since it is not easy to change

laws once they are established. It is clear that in both the nuclear and textile cases the congressional oppositions were unable to realize their legislative objectives. In addition to the failure to secure a written statement from the Chinese, the anti-agreement coalition was unable to overcome the lobbying power of the administration in alliance with the counter-opposition, the nuclear industry and the Chinese government to push through the Glenn amendment. Likewise, the pro-quota coalition eventually failed to override President Reagan's veto of the textile bill.

In the UNFPA case, the anti-funding coalition clearly realized its chief legislative objective--to stop all U.S. funding of UNFPA. It also succeeded in having the Congress enact a law to prohibit such funding in subsequent years.

Having considered the policy influences of the congressional opposition based on the above six general criteria, we are now in a better position to arrive at an overall assessment of the variance of its policy influence in each of the three cases:

- (1) The congressional opposition had some direct influence on U.S. China policy in the nuclear and textile cases, but not in the UNFPA case;
- (2) The congressional opposition contributed to the strains in U.S.-China bilateral relations in all three cases, with a stronger impact in the textile case;
- (3) The congressional opposition contributed to the strains in U.S. bilateral relations with some other individual countries in the textile case, but not in the other two cases, by affecting U.S. policies toward those countries;
- (4) The congressional opposition exerted a clear influence on U.S. multilateral policies in the textile and UNFPA cases, but not in the nuclear case;
- (5) The congressional opposition achieved its legislative objective in the UNFPA case, but not in the other two cases.

To get a more general assessment of the different policy influences of the congressional opposition, we can say:

- (1) Given all the six criteria, the congressional opposition had the greatest policy influence in the UNFPA case, followed by the textile and nuclear cases respectively;
- (2) In terms of roles and effects, the congressional opposition exerted the greatest influence when it played a react/assertive role with its supplementing function

and policy-amplifying effect; it had less influence when it played an assertive role with its initiating function and policy-generating effect; it had the least influence when it played a reactive role with its revising function and policy-constraining role;

- (3) In terms of issue areas, the congressional opposition had the greatest influence on value-oriented issues, followed by foreign trade restrictions and nuclear nonproliferation respectively;
- (4) In terms of types of issues, the congressional opposition had the greatest influence on emotive/moral issues, followed by electoral/economic and external/strategic issues respectively.

The process of assessing the different policy influences of the congressional opposition reminds us that it may be easier to overestimate the influence of the congressional opposition than to underestimate it. While the emergence of congressional opposition, with its highly publicized rhetoric, tends to attract much attention among policy-makers and concerned outsiders, the actual influence of the opposition may be much smaller than its appearance would suggest. The president is still very powerful; he has substantial means at hand to deal with the congressional opposition if he disagrees with it. There are also serious obstacles set up by other countervailing forces such as the congressional counter-opposition, domestic pressure groups, and the foreign government(s). Thus, it is not so easy for the congressional opposition to realize its objectives. As most of my congressional interviewees from the three coalitions of congressional opposition acknowledged, congressional opposition can be best considered an "educational process," to help the lawmakers, as well as the public and the decision makers in the executive branch, to get a better understanding of the salience of the issue and the kind of politics involved. The case studies conducted in this dissertation thus indicate that in general the congressional opposition did not reach the status of "codetermination" in the making of U.S. normal-bilateral policies, as some exponents of the pendulum theory would argue. On the other hand, it was certainly not as weak as the two-presidencies model would suggest.

The variances of the influence of the congressional opposition on U.S. bilateral and multilateral policies may also suggest that while a foreign country like the PRC often becomes

a target of the congressional opposition, the real aim of the opposition is much broader and multilaterally-related. It thus further confirms the issue-oriented, rather than pro- or anti-country, nature of the congressional opposition in the normal period of a bilateral relationship. A bilateral issue tightly mingled with multilateral objectives tends to complicate the Congress-centered process of making U.S. normal-bilateral policies. But the process is nevertheless different from that of making U.S. multilateral policies. Therefore, the conclusions from the research on the making of U.S. multilateral policies can not be readily applied to the making of U.S. bilateral policies. There are some similarities between the two, though. For example,

TABLE 8.2

**Issue Coalitions of Congressional Opposition in the
Making of U.S. Normal-Bilateral Policy Toward China:
Results of Three Case Studies**

Cases	Nuclear Agreement	Textile Bill	Cutoff of Aid To UNFPA
Bilateral Issues	Chinese Nuclear Policy	Chinese Textile Imports	Forced Abortion
Issue Areas	Nuclear Nonproliferation	Foreign Import Restrictions	Human Rights
Dimensional Linkages:			
Multilateral	Strong	Strong	Strong
Power-Sharing	Weak	Weak	Minimal
Type of Issues	External/ Strategic	Electoral/ Economic	Emotive/ Moral

(Cont'd on the next page)

(TABLE 8.2--Cont'd)

Cases	Nuclear Agreement	Textile Bill	Cutoff of Aid To UNFPA
Coalitions of Congressional Opposition	Anti-Agreement	Pro-Quota	Anti-Funding
Key Issue Leaders	Sens. Glenn, Cranston, Cohen, Proxmire, Helms; Reps. Markey, Burton, Wolpe	Sens. Thurmond, Hollings, Helms; Reps. Jenkins, Campbell	Sens. Helms, Humphrey; Reps. Smith, Kemp, Hyde
Influences On Voting Behavior:			
Partisanship	Weak	Weak	Weak/Moderate
Ideology	Weak	Weak	Moderate/Strong
Presidential Leadership	Weak	Weak	Moderate
Regionalism	Weak	Strong	Weak
Coalition's Behavioral Role	Reactive	Assertive	React/Assertive
Coalition's Functional Role	Revising	Initiating	Supplementing
Coalition's Functional Effect	Constraining	Generating	Amplifying

(Cont'd on the next page)

(TABLE 8.2--Cont'd)

Cases	Nuclear Agreement	Textile Bill	Cutoff of Aid To UNFPA
Other Forces' Influences:			
Executive	Very Limited Concessions	Substantial Concessions	Acquiescence
Chinese Government	Strong Constraint on the Executive	Strong Constraint on the Executive & Congress	Limited Constraint on The executive
Pressure Groups	Weak support for Congressional Opposition	Strong support for Congressional Opposition	Strong support For congressional opposition
Counter-Opposition	Moderate/ Strong	Moderate/ Weak	Moderate/ Weak
Coalition's Influence on			
China Policy	Very Limited	Very Limited	Minimal
U.S.-China Relations	Moderate	Moderate/ Strong	Moderate
Other Countries	Minimal	Moderate/ Strong	Minimal
Multilateral Policies	Minimal	Moderate	Strong

my studies, particularly on the textile and UNFPA cases, have strongly indicated that the making of U.S. normal-bilateral policies is often closely linked to American domestic politics, and they thus support the basic argument of the intermestic perspective.

The major difference between these case studies and other studies associated with the

intermestic theory is that these have introduced the notion of U.S. normal-bilateral foreign policy and the influence of the congressional opposition in the process. Moreover, the results of these case studies, which are summarized in Table 8.2, strongly support a different way to understand the congressional opposition through the three types of issues that tend to induce an outward- or inward-looking or mixed orientation of congressional interest, and to help us predict its behavior and policy influences in other cases related to the making of U.S. normal-bilateral policies.

Conclusion

The examination of the trends in the congressional attitudes toward China and the subsequent three case studies in the normal period of U.S.-China bilateral relationship yield a number of findings and conclusions on the nature and influence of the congressional opposition in the making of U.S. China policy. They generally support and further revise the theoretical points and propositions raised in Chapter II.

Namely, in a normal-bilateral relationship between the United States and another country, congressional opposition will arise as the congressional attitudes toward that particular country become increasingly diversified with different, often conflicting, perspectives. This diversity of congressional attitudes is, in turn, precipitated by changes in both internal and external environments, as well as by the development of the bilateral relationship itself.

The diversified congressional attitudes will then provide the necessary conditions for changes in congressional behavior in the Congress-centered policy making process related to the American policy toward the particular foreign country. The result will be the emergence of an issue-oriented congressional opposition (issue coalitions) on policy issues related to that country. This tends to occur in those issue areas that can both meet a particular type of lawmakers' personal goals and induce a strong outward-, inward-looking, or mixed orientation of congressional interest. But the intensity, roles, policy effect and influence of a coalition of

congressional opposition tend to depend on the type of issue involved.

While the differentiation of issues is crucial to the understanding of the variances in the behavior and policy influences of the congressional opposition and politics that evolves in the Congress-centered policy process, the notion of dimensional linkages helps explain why the making of U.S. normal-bilateral policy, to an extent, resembles the making of U.S. multilateral policies. Nevertheless, bilateral and multilateral policies each belong to a different dimension of U.S. foreign policy making. Therefore, the making of U.S. bilateral policies, which so far has been largely ignored, needs to receive greater attention from students of Congress and American foreign policy.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION: SOME IMPLICATIONS

The previous pages have focused on the nature and influence of the congressional opposition in the making of U.S. China policy during the normal period of Sino-U.S. relations. This concluding chapter will discuss the implications of the issue-oriented congressional opposition for the development of U.S.-Chinese bilateral relations, presidential-congressional relations in the making of U.S. normal-bilateral policy, and the study of other cases on the same subject.

Implications for Sino-U.S. Relations

The rise of the issue-oriented congressional opposition reflected the normal status of the Sino-U.S. bilateral relationship. The existence of issue coalitions, along with the congressional attitudes, tended to sustain the normal relations--so long as they remained diversified and unlinked with each other. Nevertheless, it was by no means positive in terms of Sino-U.S. relations. At best it served as a constraint on the development of the relationship; potentially, it threatened to move the relationship backward.

Congressional Opposition Being Increasingly Sensitive to and Contingent on the Changes in Chinese foreign and domestic Policies The rise of congressional opposition meant an increase of congressional demand for policy changes in China. The emergence of issues in the normal-bilateral relationship provided congressional opponents with the opportunity to influence not only the U.S. policy but the Chinese policy as well, thus increasing the conflict between the congressional opposition and the Chinese government. A major intention of the anti-agreement coalition was to make an impact on China's nuclear policy by placing strict

conditions on the accord. While the Reagan administration apparently hoped to use nuclear cooperation to influence the Chinese policy, its congressional opponents wanted to deny China such cooperation unless it accepted their conditions. In the UNFPA case, the anti-funding coalition's intention to influence China's population policy was even more explicit. While the administration restrained its actions by simply displaying its disagreement with the Chinese government on the latter's family planning practice, anti-funding lawmakers pressured China to change its policy by openly condemning its family planning programs and moving to cut off all U.S. funding to the UNFPA. In both nuclear and UNFPA cases, it was clear that compromises were extremely difficult to reach between the Chinese government and its opponents in the U.S. Congress. The latter would persist in their pressure until the former changed its policy and practice. However, as the case studies indicated, the Chinese government (as well as UNFPA) was unlikely to meet such a demand. Thus, so long as these issues existed, they would restrict the development of the bilateral relationship between the two countries.

The Cumulative Effect of the Conflict in a Single Issue Area It has been seen that in the normal period of the bilateral relationship congressional opposition tended to be dispersed in several issue areas and that the shifting of congressional coalitions from one issue area to another limited the influence of the congressional opposition on the bilateral relationship as a whole. This would imply that a potential threat to the bilateral relationship would come from an increasing concentration of the congressional opposition in a single issue area, which would significantly enlarge and sustain an issue coalition in Congress. Such concentration would result from the exposure of the attentive lawmakers to more and more unfavorable aspects of Chinese policies over a period of time. As noted in Chapter IV, by 1987 congressional opposition had concentrated most rapidly in the human rights area as there occurred a series of issues such as forced abortions, Tibet, the arrest of a Chinese student studying in the United States, and purges of Chinese intellectuals. These emotive/moral issues tended to enlarge and

strengthen the value-oriented issue coalition and hence increased conflict between the congressional opposition and the Chinese government by bringing into the conflict more and more lawmakers who were concerned with human rights. They thus resulted in a cumulative negative effect on the bilateral relationship. Such an effect was not easily reduced since compromise was extremely limited on human rights issues.

The Possibility of Increased Linkage between Issue Areas The concentration of conflict in human rights per se would put a substantial constraint on the normal-bilateral relations, but not necessarily move the relationship backward--so long as it was confined to the single issue area. The real threat of the cumulative effect would be its spillover from one issue area to others. This could happen when the human rights-related congressional coalition, stimulated by additional new human rights issues, became so large and strong that the coalition members could find no sufficient and effective means to express their position within the boundary of the issue area itself. The result would be to link the development of the bilateral relationship in other areas to the resolving of human rights issues. When this linkage occurred, congressional opposition in the making of U.S. China policy would change its character of issue orientation during the normal period of the bilateral relationship, and become more of a predominant, value-oriented (but not ideological-oriented as it was in the 1950s and 60s), "anti-Chinese" coalition in a nonnormal period of the relationship.¹

The Gravity of the Chinese Policy Behavior and Outcome Since the congressional opposition was sensitive to the changes of Chinese foreign and domestic policies, the graveness of the Chinese policy behavior and its outcome would determine the degree of the initial response from the congressional opposition. The more grave the policy outcome was, the more passionate and intense the response of the congressional opposition would be. When the outcome of the Chinese policy behavior went beyond a certain point of gravity in the eyes

¹Anti-Chinese here, as elsewhere in the dissertation, should be interpreted as the opposition to the Chinese government and its policy, not to the Chinese people per se.

of the lawmakers, it would not only significantly enlarge the coalition of congressional opposition but become a crucial link between different issue coalitions and force the lawmakers to consider other aspects of the bilateral relationship. The result would be the emergence of an increasingly predominant coalition, coupled with an increasingly predominant congressional attitude unfavorable to the PRC.

This was what happened when the Congress responded to the June-4 event of 1989 in which the Chinese government ordered its army to crack down on the student movement in Tiananmen Square. The trigger for the congressional response was the combination of the gravity of the Chinese government's behavior and the cumulative effect from the previous conflict in the human rights area and its subsequent linkage with issues in other areas. It was no longer sufficient for the highly-mobilized congressional opposition to simply use the means available in the human rights issue area, such as rhetorical condemnation of the Chinese policy and passage of nonbinding sense-of-Congress resolutions, to express their positions. Apart from the passage of such specific and binding legislation as the Pelosi bill granting the Chinese students the right to stay in the United States after their visas expired, the congressional opposition also demanded sanctions against China in the areas of trade, high-tech transfer (including nuclear technology), and military cooperation. The issue of human rights dominated the congressional consideration of many non-value-oriented issues. As a result, a nearly predominant, value-oriented, anti-Chinese coalition emerged in the U.S. Congress as the two countries entered the period of an uncertain relationship.

The Congressional Counter-Opposition and the Bilateral Relationship Just as hostility has not taken over all aspects of Sino-U.S. relations since the June-4 incident, there has not yet existed a single, totally predominant and stable anti-Chinese coalition in Congress. This is not merely due to the strong resistance from the Bush administration and the pressure from the Chinese government, but because of the continuing, though severely weakened, existence of the congressional counter-opposition, along with a number of domestic interest groups, from

the previous normal period of the bilateral relationship.

As demonstrated in the case studies, the counter-opposition in Congress was important to the development of the bilateral relationship in the normal period, because it formed the front-line resistance to the congressional opposition by denying the latter enough votes needed to pass an unfavorable China-related bill or override a presidential veto. Like its counterpart, the counter-opposition was also issue-oriented. It was by no means a permanent and pro-Chinese coalition. Its various coalitions were formed around specific issues. Their members defended China not because they particularly liked China but because they found it beneficial to their own interests. The existence of the issue-oriented counter-opposition helped move Sino-U.S. relations away from the simple, abstract, strategic and political base to a more substantive, grass-roots, domestic-oriented ground linking the bilateral relationship more closely to lawmakers' political interests, domestic pressure groups, and their constituencies. It indicated that the development of the relationship was gradually being rooted in the American soil by finding constituents of its own. It was thus one of the essential elements that contributed to the normal, relatively stable development of Sino-U.S. relations during the 1980s. As the nuclear and textile cases showed, the most important and solid congressional support of China policy was in the economic and trade area. This support would not disappear easily, since it linked some lawmakers' political interests closely to the economic well-being of their constituencies.

On the other hand, the weakness of the congressional counter-opposition in promoting the development of the bilateral relationship lay in the fact that its coalitions tended to shift from one issue area to another. As a result, those lawmakers supporting a favorable policy toward China on the economic ground could not be counted on to back China on other non-trade issues such as human rights. The family planning case showed that while there was a strong convergence of views on population control and UNFPA issues, the pro-funding coalition was willing to confront the Chinese government on the issue of forced abortion as a way to

realize their own legislative objectives.

Thus, the economic and trade interests would be the most likely force that would sustain a certain level of counter-opposition to the emerging dominant, value-oriented coalition of congressional opposition in the nonnormal period after June 4, denying the latter a total dominance in the Congress-centered policy making process. As noted earlier, the balance of these two forces in Congress during the nonnormal period of the bilateral relationship would depend greatly on the changes in Chinese domestic policies. A Chinese policy moving in either a more or a less repressive direction would reduce or increase the strength of the counter-opposition in the United States Congress.

Changes in the External and Internal Environment and Congressional Attitudes Toward China In addition to the availability of the counter-opposition, the influence of the value-oriented coalition of congressional opposition on U.S. China policy would also be weakened if changes in the international environment were such that the United States needed China more in pursuing its own national interests in the global arena. Over a longer period, the internal environment could also experience change, when the lawmakers who had been active on human rights in China gradually left the legislative scene as a result of membership turnover. Under these circumstances, congressional attitudes toward China could change again in a more favorable direction. But it is also possible that when the international environment develops in the way that sees China's strategic value for the United States continue to decrease as it did during the normal period, then the influence of the value-oriented, anti-PRC congressional opposition could be sustained and increased. However, the volatile nature of the international environment would tend to make it hard for us to predict its future impact on the congressional attitudes toward China.

Implications for Interbranch Relations

In terms of the presidential-congressional relations, the rise of the congressional

opposition would imply the need for checks and balances in the making of normal-bilateral policies. There are at least three such implications.

Bilateral Issues Being Increasingly Mingled with American Domestic Politics As pointed out in the preceding chapter, the case studies support the intermestic perspective which argues that congressional influence in foreign policy increases as foreign policy issues become more and more mixed with domestic politics. This is particularly evident in the textile and UNFPA cases in which two domestic interest groups--the textile makers and pro-life groups--were both actively involved. At the same time, the occurrence of the bilateral issues helped trigger domestic debates and intensify the political cleavages, which often had little to do with the bilateral relationship itself. Because of the involvement of domestic interest groups, members of Congress were concerned more with the domestic significance of the issue than with its foreign policy implications. The nature of a bilateral issue changed as debates between the supporters and opponents expanded to the power-sharing dimension, hence the increase of institutional rivalry (presidential prerogatives vs. congressional power), and to such widely divisive issues as abortion and trade protection.

Meanwhile, as the nation's chief foreign policymaker, the president has the natural tendency to maintain and develop normal and friendly relations with a foreign country. The three case studies showed that he tends to prevail in the end in his struggle with the congressional opponents because of the advantages the presidency still enjoys. But during the process the existence of a strong congressional opposition would nevertheless force him to consider the domestic political consequences of his decisions and hence make necessary concessions to the opposition. The stronger the opposition is, the more concessions the president is likely to make. Thus, presidential foreign policy decision making would become increasingly subordinated to domestic political considerations. The result is the restriction of the president's power in the making of normal-bilateral policies and his management of the bilateral relations with the foreign country. Furthermore, because of a controversial bilateral

issue's expansive nature, interbranch conflict is likely to increase as the issue is being more and more linked to multilateral issue areas.

Congressional Behavior Becoming Harder to Predict With the rise of the issue-oriented congressional opposition in the normal period of a bilateral relationship, members of Congress will form different coalitions on different issues. When this happens, it will greatly complicate the executive's effort in dealing with the Congress. He will find it more difficult to predict the congressional behavior with diversified attitudes toward the foreign nation than the one with a single-perspective-dominated attitude. In the case of Sino-U.S. relations, the executive would find it hard to use the strategic importance of the bilateral relationship--which served as a common ground between the two branches in the 1970s--to seek congressional support on policy issues related to China during the normal period of the 1980s.

Congressional Opposition Reflecting the Need to Balance the Executive Power The rise of the congressional opposition in the normal period of a bilateral relationship demonstrates the American system of government at work. The case studies have shown that as a separate branch of the government the Congress quite loyally plays its role of "checks and balances" in the making of U.S. normal-bilateral policies through the function of the congressional opposition. It helps constrain a natural tendency within the executive branch to play down negative events between the two countries in order to maintain and develop the bilateral relationship. By linking bilateral issues to their personal political and policy interests, congressional opponents act in a way to balance the executive's usual emphasis on the importance of the bilateral relationship with other moral, economic, political, and foreign policy considerations. "The president provides leadership, commands information, expertise, speed, efficiency," Henkin notes. "Congress represents the people, its wider, soberer (more cautious) long-term values and judgments" (1987/88: 310). In effect, the existence of the congressional opposition frequently reminds the policy-makers in both the American and foreign governments that they cannot develop the bilateral relationship as fast as they would wish without proper

consideration of the problems that exist between the two countries.

Implications for the Study of American Normal-Bilateral Policy Making

Finally, we need to address the issue of the applicability of the conclusions reached in this research to other cases of American normal-bilateral policy making.

Obviously, China is very different from any other country in character. At present, it is the largest Communist state on earth, with substantial military and nuclear strength; it is the most populous; and it has a relatively backward economy. Therefore, China weighs much differently than other countries in United States foreign policy. China's influence on the policy process, as the textile case showed, may also be different from that of many other countries.

In addition, what specific issues will be subject to the scrutiny of this issue-oriented congressional opposition depends on what country it deals with. Democratic countries are much less likely to confront the congressional opposition on value-oriented issues than are nondemocratic ones. Countries having extensive economic and trade relations with the United States are more likely to be faced with congressional opposition on such issues as foreign import restrictions than are those having no such close relations.

Despite all the differences, however, what has been found in this dissertation can also be applied to many other countries as well, because it is about the nature and influence of the congressional opposition in the making of U.S. policy toward a country during the normal period of the bilateral relationship. So long as the nature of a bilateral relationship remains normal, the applicability of the China case study will not be significantly reduced. We may still be able to predict the following: When a country confronts the congressional opposition on several issues across different issue areas, there will be no single congressional coalition dominating all the issues; instead, different issue coalitions will be formed and their policy influences tend to vary with different types of issues, the coalitions' different roles and policy effects, and their different patterns of interactions with the other major forces in the policy

process. The differences between China and other countries in U.S. policy making during the normal period of a bilateral relationship may differ only in degree, not in nature. Of course, further studies are needed in order to achieve a better understanding of the congressional role in the making of American normal-bilateral foreign policy.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX**THE CODING OF SEVEN CONGRESSIONAL SUBATTITUDES**

The congressional attitudes toward China during the period of 1981-1988 were classified into two "favorable" and "unfavorable" categories, which included a total of seven perspectives or subattitudes. The classification and meanings of these seven perspectives were in part described in Chapters III and IV. They followed two basic principles: First, the coding was to strongly reflect the consideration of combining word and thematic indicators so as to achieve a greater degree of reliability and validity; and second, familiar terms were adopted for the indicators so that they could be easily used and tested by other researchers on the same subject. At the same time, the coding of the seven perspectives adhered to four additional criteria as follows.

- (1) No random samples of statements were selected. The content analysis covered all the relevant congressional statements that were carried by the *Congressional Record* between 1981 and 1988.
- (2) Each statement made by an individual lawmaker at one time was treated as one speech or remark, regardless of its length. However, a lawmaker might give more than one speech in a continuous debate on a given subject--especially when he or she was leading the debate. In such cases, the remarks would be analyzed only as one speech so that a more equal weight could be given to the speeches made by other individual lawmakers.
- (3) Any one congressional perspective would be coded only once in a given statement, regardless of the frequency in which an expression occurred. Thus, if the term "Red China" appeared ten times in a speech, it would be coded as one entry, indicating that the speech had an ideological intensity. In so doing, we might avoid the problem of overvaluing some perspectives or undervaluing others.
- (4) The indicators used for coding the seven perspectives should be mutually exclusive. A term expressing one perspective would not be used for another. Hence, if "Red China" and "Communist China" were both used by a lawmaker in a speech, only the first expression would be counted, suggesting the speech had a stronger ideological intensity than if the lawmaker expressed the term of "Communist China" only. Likewise, two different terms such as "human rights violation" and "strategic importance of China" reflected two different perspectives, and therefore both would be counted. Thus, mutual exclusiveness meant that a speech might contain more than one perspective.

(Chapter IV gave the examples of the terms or indicators used for each of the seven perspectives.)

The results of the content analysis of the congressional floor speeches and remarks between 1981 and 1988, as contained in the *Congressional Record*, are given in two separate tables below.

**Results of Content Analysis of Congressional
Floor Speeches and Statements on China, 1981-88
(Total and Percentages of Entries by Perspective Categories)**

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Ave.
Total Entries	47	72	71	81	151	95	107	67	21.1
Unfavorable (%)									
Ideological	21	42	28	24	21	31	20	10	24.6
Value-Oriented	4	6	14	15	21	8	55	32	19.3
Trade-Related	4	0	14	13	8	14	7	10	8.8
Pro-Taiwan	15	41	14	18	15	35	7	36	22.6
Favorable (%)									
Strategic	18	4	4	5	4	2	2	0	4.9
Economic	6	1	13	10	15	4	3	2	6.8
Other Importance of China	32	6	13	15	16	6	6	10	13.0

**Results of Content Analysis of Congressional
Floor Speeches and Statements on China, 1981-88
On a Two-Year Basis
(Total and Percentages of Entries by Perspective Categories)**

	1981-82	1983-84	1985-86	1987-88
Total Entries	119	152	246	174
Unfavorable (%)				
Ideological	34	26	25	16
Value-Oriented	5	15	16	47
Trade-Related	2	12	10	8
Pro-Taiwan	31	17	22	18
Favorable (%)				
Strategic	9	5	3	1
Economic	3	11	11	2
Other Importance Of China	16	15	12	7

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Letters and Memos*

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Ball, William L., Assistant Secretary for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, to Dante B. Fascell, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 5 November 1985.

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